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TRANSFERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES: 
CONTRIBUTION TO A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A preliminary evaluation of the results obtained so far by the European Railway Reform 
shows a slow evolution in its implementation and a number of shortcomes as regards the 
degree of competition introduced in the market and its expected economic effects. One 
of the causes behind this poor success is found in the failure to harmonize the regulatory 
aspects of the reform across the Member States, together with the increased complexity 
derived from the reform itself. This consideration is particularly appropriate in relation 
to the current diversity of railway infrastructure charges and has recently fostered the 
debate on whether they should be further standardized. The preliminary outcome of the 
ongoing discussion suggests the convenience of promoting a greater harmonization of 
track access charges, opening the door to the concept of transferability (i.e. whether one 
policy or practice can be transferred from one to another reality). 
In line with this background, this thesis has been aimed at proposing a conceptual 
framework for the assessment of transferability in the field of railway infrastructure 
charging. To achieve this goal, the thesis has first characterized the more relevant 
economic and political aspects intervening in the formulation of track access charges and 
reviewed the notion of transferability as developed in other disciplines, notably in 
comparative politics and management science. Building on these bases the thesis has 
then proposed a multilevel analytical structure and four transferability criteria 
(indifference to contextual variations, indifference to external influences, horizontal 
compatibility and vertical compatibility) and particularized them for their use in the 
field of railway infrastructure charging.  
Additionally, the framework has been tested through the development of six case studies 
involving the current practice of European Member States. The case studies, based on a 
detailed and comparable characterization, have shown the validity of the conceptual 
structure proposed as a methodological tool able to organize the analysis and formulate 
effective transferability criteria at an early stage of the transfer process. Moreover, the 
experience obtained through the case studies has pointed out some aspects of the 
framework that could be further refined but that do not contest in any case its ability to 
establish necessary conditions (though not sufficient) on the objects transferred. 
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RESUMEN 
 
La evaluación preliminar de los resultados de la Reforma Ferroviaria Europea muestra la 
lentitud de su implementación y la existencia de insuficiencias en el nivel de competencia 
introducido en el mercado y en la consecución de los efectos económicos esperados. Una 
de las causas de este escaso éxito radica en la falta de harmonización de las regulaciones 
introducidas por la reforma en los diferentes Estados Miembros, así como en la mayor 
complejidad del sistema derivada de la propia reforma. Esta reflexión, especialmente 
apropiada para la diversidad actual de las tarifas por uso de infraestructura ferroviaria, ha 
contribuido a alimentar el debate sobre su posible homogeneización. El resultado 
preliminar de esta discusión todavía abierta sugiere la conveniencia de promover una 
mayor harmonización de los cánones de acceso a la red ferroviaria, lo que abre la puerta 
al concepto de transferibilidad (es decir, en qué medida una política o una práctica 
pueden ser transferidas de una a otra realidad). 
De acuerdo con estos antecedentes, esta tesis se ha planteado como objetivo el desarrollo 
de un marco conceptual para la evaluación de la transferibilidad en el ámbito de la 
tarifación por uso de la infraestructura ferroviaria. Para alcanzar esta meta, primero se 
han caracterizado los aspectos económicos y políticos más relevantes para la 
formulación de los cánones de acceso a la red ferroviaria y se ha revisado el concepto de 
transferibilidad desarrolado por otras disciplinas como la política comparada o la gestión. 
A continuación se han propuesto un marco de análisis multinivel y cuatro criterios de 
transferibilidad (indiferencia a las variaciones de contexto, indiferencia a las influencias 
externas, compatibilidad horizontal y compatibilidad vertical) y se han particularizado 
para el ámbito de las tarifas por uso de infraestructura ferroviaria.  
Además, el marco propuesto ha sido puesto a prueba mediante el desarrollo de seis 
casos de estudio apoyados en la práctica acual de algunos Estados Miembros. Los casos 
de estudio han evidenciado su validez como herramienta metodológica para organizar el 
análisis y formular criterios de transferibilidad efectivos en una fase temprana del 
proceso de transferencia. Asimismo, la experiencia conseguida a través de ellos ha 
señalado algunos aspectos del marco que podrían ser ulteriormente afinados, pero que no 
ponen en duda en ningún caso su habilidad para establecer condiciones necesarias 
(aunque no suficientes) sobre los objetos transferidos. 
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1. Introduction     
  1 
 
Chapter 
1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Since its origins, the aim of the European Union has been the establishment of a common 
market so that goods and factors of production can freely travel across all Member 
States included within its boundaries. The transport field is not apart from this objective 
and has deserved a special focus from the EU through the Common Transport Policy, 
whose principles were already embedded in the foundational Treaty of Rome, signed in 
1957 (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Art. 74-84). 
In spite of this early inclusion in the political agenda, for years the Common Transport 
Policy remained paralyzed by the rigidity of many decision-making procedures, which 
at that moment required unanimity of the Council of Ministers. It was only in the 
second half of the ‘80s that the Common Transport Policy could effectively begin, after 
some relevant court decisions and the enforcement of the Single European Act 
introduced relevant changes in the decision-making procedures. 
The starting policy had to face a highly regulated transport sector that was controlled in 
each Member State by a national intervention system aimed to accomplish specific 
transport and societal objectives generally divergent from those of its neighboring 
countries. To address this situation, priority was given to the deregulation of transport 
markets and the liberalization of the provision of transport services, an experience that 
had already been successfully implemented in other sectors of the economy. 
Today, the process of liberalization and opening up of national markets to competition 
is to a large degree completed at a normative level, with the two exceptions of rail 
passenger transport and port services in maritime transport. Still its practical 
implementation is not homogeneous across modes and Member States. In the case of 
railways, the reform has progressed slowly in comparison with other transport modes. 
The causes of this delay may be found in a combination of factors such as the strong 
differences among national operating conditions, the existence of physical, 
administrative and organizational barriers to the development of services on a European 
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scale, the accumulation of indebtedness of the national railway companies or their strong 
links to the State (Izquierdo, 1994, pp.877-895). However, relevant milestones have 
been already reached. 
Today, formal separation of the infrastructure and the operation businesses is a fact in 
all the Member States and competition is taking off at national level in the rail freight 
sector. The reform is progressing as well in the definition of the steps leading to the 
opening to competition of the passenger sector, the achievement and implementation of 
common technical standards or the construction of a trans-European railway network.   
But there are also some important concerns about the implementation of the railway 
reform, particularly as regards the development of international freight traffic, the 
potential discrimination of new entrants in the market or the competition conditions 
with other transport modes. 
In order to solve some of these critical points, the EU has strongly directed its attention 
to infrastructure pricing policies, as a powerful tool able to guide the behaviors of the 
rail market agents and the decisions of the final consumers. 
The 1996 White Paper on railways already stated the need of defining common pricing 
principles at European level in order to ensure that no distortions of intermodal 
competition occur (EC, 1996a, p.13). Two years later, the White Paper on pricing of 
infrastructure use concluded that “different current charging principles distort 
competition, while common charging principles would create a level playing field and 
correct intra and intermodal imbalances” (EC, 1998, p.4) and remarked the urgent need 
of addressing the question of harmonizing charging frameworks in the context of 
progressively liberalized transport markets (EC, 1998, p.5). 
The 2001 White Paper on the European transport policy identified the lack of fiscal and 
social harmonization as a source of distortions of competition hindering the 
development and completion of the internal market (EC, 2001a, p.11). This perception 
was extended to the infrastructure pricing policies applied at that moment in the EU. 
According to the White Paper the policies in place had been conceived individually for 
each mode of transport and for each country, leading to some anomalous situations able 
to hamper international transport and even discriminate between operators and modes of 
transport. Consequently, the European Commission remarked the need for a 
Community framework in this domain, and proposed the development of a framework 
directive to establish the principles of infrastructure charging and a pricing structure for 
all modes of transport (EC 2001a, pp.73-74). 
As regards rail, the framework for setting infrastructure charges was provided by 
Directive 2001/14/EC, which set common principles in order to avoid discrimination in 
the access to rail infrastructure and to reduce variations in the structure and level of 
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charges applied in the Member States (European Parliament and Council, 2001a, rec. 4-
5). 
In spite of these aims, tending towards increasing integration and harmonization, the 
comprehensive scope and complexity of the current legal framework has allowed a high 
level of choice to the Member States as regards its interpretation and enforcement (Fig. 
1). This relative freedom, together with national diversity in institutional arrangements, 
market conditions, infrastructure characteristics and legislation, has favoured the 
implementation of different pricing principles and schemes across the EU. 
Fig. 1: Differentiation dynamics in the implementation of the Common Transport Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
According to the main associations of infrastructure managers at European level, “The 
situation today relating to charging systems in Europe can be characterised by the 
variety of charging systems in application” (EIM et al. 2008, p.3). 
This scenario risks inducing an additional fragmentation of the European railway market 
and therefore hindering the achievement of some of the declared objectives of the 
Common Transport Policy. This lack of homogeneity may in fact lead to inconsistent 
incentives for international traffic, barriers to international transport, financial risk and 
lack of competition for railways (ECMT, 2005, p.11). 
To overcome such unwanted effects, the European Commission has undertaken a series 
of measures aimed at achieving a greater convergence in the pricing practice. The actions 
started include the reformulation of the current legislation (recast of Directive 
2001/14/EC), greater pressure on Member States as regards its implementation (opening 
of infringement procedures) and the promotion of research on harmonization 
(establishment of a common approach for cost calculation methodologies, for 
performance regimes, for charges along international corridors, etc.). 
Aware of the issues at stake, the industry has promoted as well research and initiatives 
aimed at achieving a greater coordination among the different national railway 
administrations at the time of defining and applying their charging schemes. An example 
of this interest is the RailNetEurope platform, which has successfully launched projects 
Common Transport 
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as a common format for the network statements, a database of rail infrastructure charges 
at European level (EICIS) or a One Stop Shop (OSS) for the acquisition of international 
train paths. 
However, the whole of the initiatives and measures promoted to achieve a greater 
convergence of tariffs has reported lower success than initially expected and, at the end 
of the day, the harmonization of track access charges seems still far to become a reality 
in the EU. 
Some reasons have been suggested for this shortcomings, like the remaining signs of 
protection of incumbent and domestic suppliers (PETS Consortium, 2000, p.23); the 
contested nature of the ongoing debate about pricing principles in the fields of academic 
teaching, official doctrines and practical implementation (Quinet, 2001, p.21); the 
difficulties in deriving an appropriate pricing system or the existence of numerous 
barriers to implementation (Nash et al. 2002, p.8). 
Other authors have explained the lack of harmonization as the result of “significant 
differences between the market structures and the nature of the rail network in each 
Member State, and also clear differences between government policies in relation to 
public transport and the availability of public funds” (NERA et al. 1998, p.3). 
Broadly speaking, the literature provides a series of arguments related to the process of 
definition of charges, like complexity or difficulties in cost measurement, but also a 
number of reasons related to national specificities: acceptability on behalf of railway 
operators, presence of different systems of infrastructure financing, variety in the size 
and equipment of the network, dissimilar resistance to change of national railway 
administrations, diversity of institutional arrangements and competitive structures, etc. 
The first type of arguments has been extensively treated through relevant European 
research projects and actions aimed at defining pricing principles, cost calculation 
procedures or charge setting methodologies1. 
The second type of considerations has been transversally present through this research 
effort, in the form of implications for government taxation and spending decisions 
(NERA et al. 1998, p.61); in the form of differences in national costs and accounting 
standards (ECORYS et al. 2005, pp.55-56), particular problems of certain Member 
                                                
1 CAPRI - Concerted action on transport pricing research integration (1998); PETS - Pricing European 
Transport Systems (2000); UNITE - Unification of accounts and marginal costs for transport efficiency 
(2003); MC-ICAM - Implementation of Marginal Cost Pricing in Transport – Integrated Conceptual and 
Applied Model Análisis (2004); IMPRINT-EUROPE - Implementing Pricing Reform in Transport – 
Effective Use of Research on Pricing (2004); GRACE - Generalisation of Research on Accounts and Cost 
Estimation (2008); or IMPRINT-NET - Implementing pricing reforms in Transport – Networking (2008). 
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States or impacts of greater harmonization of charging regimes (IMPRINT-NET 
Consortium, 2006, p.111). It has also been present in the analysis and proposition of 
charging schemes for East European or new candidate countries (GRACE Consortium, 
2005, pp.39-46). 
The progress of the pricing reform able to overcome the actual hindrances to 
international traffic and market unification requires a further understanding of the role 
played by national specificities, the difficulties that may arise from them and the 
solutions available to go further. In words of the railway associations EIM and CER 
(2008, p.3): “Even though a higher degree of harmonisation can be helpful under certain 
conditions, the differences in operating conditions of the Infrastructure Managers should 
not be forgotten. National access charge regimes should be related to the complexity and 
intensity of the use of their rail network and should respect specific market conditions 
within their environment”. 
This conflicting relation between harmonization and national specificities has driven 
attention on the concept of transferability (i.e. whether one policy or practice can be 
transferred from one to another reality). In fact, it is very likely that any process aimed 
at attaining a higher level of convergence and consistency among the pricing policies of 
several Member States will involve a transfer at some point in time. 
Furthermore, the search for the most effective measures to deal with the problems 
derived from the heterogeneity of charging structures has resorted to the notion of best 
practices2. The basic idea is the identification of policies that can solve the problem 
effectively, and then apply these policies to other contexts. Although this idea is 
meaningful, it requires the detailed evaluation of the transferability conditions. 
The notion of transfer is also present in the improvements of the charging schemes 
undertaken at national level, which may take advantage of the experience already gained 
in other Member States, not to say in their introduction in newcomers or candidate 
countries. 
Some references to this approach already exist in the railway infrastructure pricing 
literature particularly as regards the transfer of cost models and charging schemes. 
The UNITE project (2003, p.6), in its search for reliable marginal costs estimates 
already remarked the importance of providing guidance on whether and how the case 
study evidence could be transferred for use in different contexts. The MC-ICAM 
project (2004, p.2) sought to identify and understand possible barriers to 
                                                
2 See for instance the project RAILCALC – Calculation of charges for rail infrastructure (2008), directed 
by Prof. López Pita and Dr. Fonseca Teixeira. 
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implementation and to define optimal and feasible implementation paths for marginal 
cost pricing. Continuing their task, among the objectives of the GRACE project (2005, 
p.12) it is possible to find the review and estimation of methods to transfer cost figures 
from one country to another. 
The IMPRINT-EUROPE coordination action noted the following as a key requirement 
for pricing reform:  “Understanding complexity and transferability – do we really need in 
depth studies of every mode in every location in order to implement pricing reform, or 
can we find ways of transferring results from one context to another” (IMPRINT-
EUROPE Consortium, 2002, p.2). 
The ECMT (2005, p.86) recommended the development of “better guidance on the 
transferability of results, in all the above areas, from one context or country to another, 
and on adjustments that might be necessary to ensure coherent outcomes”. The areas 
concerned are the variability of rail infrastructure costs with traffic levels, the best way 
of dealing with scarcity and congestion in rail infrastructure charges, the impact of 
various forms of mark-up on train operating companies and the quantification and 
valuation of the environmental costs of rail transport. 
However, the major part of these considerations remains in a very specific domain (the 
transfer of marginal cost estimations from one Member State to another), avoiding a 
wider reflection on the transferability of railway infrastructure pricing policies. This 
first impression is supported as well by the absence of comprehensive approaches to 
transferability in the railway infrastructure pricing literature. 
This view is shared by Geerlings and Stead (2003, p.191), who after reviewing a number 
of policy documents and research programmes in the areas of land use planning, 
transport and environmental policy, concluded that “although the issue of policy 
transferability is mentioned in a number of the research projects, few of them consider 
the issue in great detail. Furthermore, little attention is given to the wider social sciences 
literature on lesson drawing or comparative policy analysis from the social sciences 
area. Clearly, these limitations of the existing research provide some clues for promising 
new areas of research.” 
Since then, there has been an increasing attention to transferability issues in the field of 
urban transport policies (e.g. the CIVITAS initiative and its accompanying project 
METEOR) or in the field of integration between urban transport and land use (e.g. the 
research projects TRANSLAND and LEDA), but not in the field of railway 
infrastructure pricing. 
It is from this evidence that the present thesis takes origin, as an attempt to progress in 
the analysis and application of the transferability concept to the field of railway 
infrastructure pricing policies from a wide perspective. 
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Indeed it is believed that advances in such a direction have the potential to improve the 
understanding and treatment of national specificities, allowing for a better conception 
and design of harmonization policies. This, in turn, will provide a larger basis to improve 
the quality of national practices, helping to overcome some of the present shortfalls of 
international rail traffic attributable to the heterogeneity of railway infrastructure 
charges. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The definition of the main objective of the thesis took advantage from two different 
circumstances. The first one regards the increasing interest shown by researchers and 
practitioners about the role played by national specificities in the transfer and 
implementation of railway infrastructure charging practices. The second one is the 
relatively low degree of development found in the scientific literature as regards the 
specific question of when and whether a railway infrastructure charging policy or 
practice may be deemed transferable to a network different from the one where it was 
initially implemented. 
The coincidence in time of both aspects, an increasing interest for transfer and a low 
degree of development, rapidly suggested the convenience of investigating the 
conceptual basis of transfer and, more specifically, the notion of transferability. 
Moreover, the investigation of these primary aspects is perceived as a prerequisite for 
the development of any operational application of the transfer concept. Accordingly, 
the main objective of this thesis should be understood as an effort to contribute to the 
understanding of the transferability concept and its potential operationalization in the 
field of railway infrastructure charging. 
The main objective of the thesis can be stated as: 
“To propose a conceptual framework for the assessment of transferability 
in the field of railway infrastructure charging” 
In this expression a conceptual framework stands for a set of ideas and principles that 
provides the basis for the analysis of a given matter. It is a conceptual structure that lies 
between the theoretical foundations of the subject treated and a more detailed model of 
it, able to be implemented in the real world. Consequently, the thesis will treat the key 
elements of transferability, but it will not arrive to the detailed specifications of a model. 
The term transferability refers to the condition of being transferable from one to another 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 8 
reality (e.g. railway infrastructures in the field of railway infrastructure charging). The 
thesis will further define this notion in the search of the exact meaning and implications 
of such condition. Finally, field of railway infrastructure charging applies to the whole 
of elements related to the charges levied on railway operators for the use of the 
infrastructure (e.g. pricing principles, charging structures, charging levels, etc.). 
Another point that should be noted is that though the main objective is general in its 
scope, i.e. it looks forward to be valid for the field of railway infrastructure charging 
with independence of the geographical scope considered, it is clearly focused on the 
European Union. In fact, the motivation behind the thesis arises from the particular 
analysis of the situation in the EU, where the diversity of railway infrastructure charging 
schemes is extremely relevant3. In addition, the access to information has determined the 
selection of case studies among EU Member States, somehow biasing the validation of 
the framework proposed. This focus should not be understood as a renounce to the 
generalization of the ideas proposed, but as the first step of their corroboration. 
In order to ease the consecution of the main objective stated for the thesis, four partial 
objectives have been identified: 
• To identify and characterize the more relevant economic and political aspects 
intervening in the formulation of charges for the use of railway infrastructure. 
• To explore and review the notion of transferability as developed in other 
disciplines, notably in comparative politics and management science. 
• To formulate a theoretical framework for the assessment of transferability in the 
field of railway infrastructure charging. 
• To develop a set of case studies in order to validate / refute the main 
assumptions of the proposed framework and refine it where necessary. 
Each of them is intended to drive the attention on a particular element intervening in the 
problem posed, but is worthless for the solution without the appropriate links to the 
others. Hence, these partial objectives should not be conceived as independent parts 
summing up the overall goal, but as different steps in the path to the solution that 
should be put together. 
Indeed, the basic methodology proposed for this research is organized around these four 
partial objectives. The formulation of the framework for the assessment of 
transferability (third objective) is first done building on the notion of transferability 
                                                
3 A similar scenario may be found as well in Australia, where every State developed its own railway 
system in both its technical and regulatory aspects. 
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already existing in other disciplines (second objective) and on the characterization of 
railway infrastructure charging (first objective), then is validated through a number of 
case studies (fourth objective). 
 
 
1.3 Methodological approach 
Transport research has deserved increasing attention in recent years, both at national and 
European levels, particularly as regards the formulation, design and assessment of 
transport policies. 
The ever-increasing mobility, the acute unbalance and inadequacies perceived in current 
transportation systems or the consolidation of the sustainability paradigm are 
unparalleled challenges for the research community, which strains to put in place 
comprehensive methodologies and tools able to guide strategic decisions and investments 
in the sector. Additionally, the growing importance of supranational political actors has 
enlarged the scope and consequences of political decisions related to transport, leading 
to higher levels of interaction and complexity. This new dimension of the policy setting 
activity has expanded both the scale and relevance of the defy, driving attention on 
concepts and issues previously neglected. 
In practical terms, the research on transport policy seeks to develop and solve problems 
that are adequately motivated to deal with important aspects of the design, analysis and 
assessment of policies related to transportation systems. To address them, researchers 
are confronted to pronouncedly interdependent political, societal, environmental, 
economic and technical features, which have favored the increasing adoption of 
multidisciplinary approaches. 
The main objective stated for this dissertation, the design of a transferability assessment 
framework in the field of railway infrastructure charging, may be certainly included 
within the transport policy research field, of which it shares the main characteristics. 
First, this research is aimed at developing methodologies with a final impact on 
transport policies. Second, it is focused on the notion of transferability, probably one of 
the more promising concepts for the handling of the recently acquired supranational 
dimension. Third, it is confronted with the complexity of decision-making in different 
political settings. Fourth, it involves both political and economic considerations. Finally, 
it requires the adoption of a multidisciplinary approach able to bridge the gap between 
different backgrounds and levels of analysis. 
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On a more practical ground, the nature of the selected objective conditions the 
methodological approach followed in this thesis. 
The formulation of a conceptual framework, an intermediate stage between the basic 
theoretical developments and the design of specific models suitable to support decisions 
in the real world, defines a particular relation between the methodological approach and 
both aspects, theoretical knowledge and real practice. In fact, the framework will be 
successful only in the measure in which it will be able to link theory to practice, 
providing an adequate support to more detailed developments. 
In this research, the theory is represented by the concepts and methodological 
procedures defined by other scientific disciplines that have already studied transfer 
processes but fall outside the domain of transport research. The practice is the specific 
information available on the reality of railway infrastructure charges levied in a number 
of networks, as well as the considerations and procedures effectively taken into account 
to design and implement them. 
Accordingly, the methodology adopted has defined as a priority the conciliation of the 
theoretical and practical dimensions of the framework. To ensure the achievement of this 
goal, a top-down procedure involving two steps has been selected. The first step builds 
on the theoretical knowledge available on policy transfer to propose a general framework 
for the assessment of transferability and then contrasts it with the practical knowledge 
available on railway infrastructure charging. The result of this phase is a framework 
particularized for the assessment of transferability. The second step challenges the 
particular framework through the development of specific case studies rooted in the 
information accessible on the real world practice. This way of proceeding enables a 
double interaction between “theory” and “practice”, ensuring a high degree of 
consistency for the framework proposed. 
Moreover, the interaction achieved in every step provides different inputs to the 
framework definition process. The first step is aimed at adapting the theoretical 
concepts found in the literature to the specific considerations of railway infrastructure 
charging. It allows as well to complement the existing theoretical background through the 
formulation of new concepts and procedures able to improve the framework. The 
second step is directed at refining the methodology proposed, through the adjustment of 
some of its elements. It is also used to identify the validity of the framework, eventually 
pointing out its limitations as observed through the case studies. 
The overall procedure reproduces the scientific approach, as far as it tests the 
methodological hypotheses formulated (theoretical considerations) against the 
conditions prevailing in the real world (information available on real practice). In this 
1. Introduction     
  11 
research, as it is characteristic in the domain of transport policy, the verification relies 
on the development of case studies. 
Case studies are based on the collection and presentation of detailed information about 
particular entities or situations. They are developed according to mixed methodologies, 
including both quantitative and qualitative aspects, as the more effective way to provide 
a wide perspective on reality, including the presence of uncontrolled elements. Each case 
study looks intensely at the individual case, drawing conclusions only about that 
particular entity or situation and in that specific context. Its objective is not to provide 
universal and generalizable truth, but to partially test the framework proposed. The 
overall degree of validation will depend on the number and selection of case studies. 
The selection and definition of case studies in this thesis presents some particularities as 
a consequence of its interest in transfer procedures. Indeed, the consulted literature on 
railway infrastructure charging does not provide any documented case of transfer of 
policies or practices between different railway administrations. Thus, the research has 
been forced to build its own case studies on the information available on national 
practices. First, importer and exporter jurisdictions have been selected and characterized. 
Then, the case studies have been defined as the transfer of a pricing policy or practice 
between an importer and an exporter jurisdiction. 
Though the characteristics of the practice and the jurisdictions have been described with 
recourse to detailed information on reality, the transfers represented in the case studies 
have never occurred in practice. This fact has forced a double analysis of the transfer 
represented in each case: a first analysis studies the transfer between both jurisdictions 
without any formal constraint, while the second applies the framework proposed. The 
comparison of both approaches is used to explore the eventual limitations of the 
framework. 
The selection of case studies in this research has been performed with the aim of 
obtaining an adequate representation of the current railway infrastructure pricing 
policies and practices in the European railway sector and being realistic as regards the 
eventuality of transfers in the European scene (through the selection of the importer and 
exporter jurisdictions). Furthermore, the formulation of case studies has sought to reflect 
the different levels of analysis proposed in the framework (through the selection of the 
policies and practices being transferred). 
The final and partial objectives proposed for this research, as well as the methodological 
considerations exposed so far, have been reflected in the work structure adopted (Fig. 2). 
The structure is made of a main work stream reproducing the top-down approach from 
the more general levels (close to theory) to the more particularized (close to the practice 
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of rail infrastructure charging) and two secondary streams, designed to provide the 
“reality inputs” required by the two-step procedure. 
Fig. 2: Work structure followed in this research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The color code refers to the fulfilment of the partial objectives indicated in section 1.2: Green – To 
explore and review the transferability as developed in other disciplines; Purple – To formulate a 
theoretical framework for the assessment of transferability in the field of railway infrastructure charging; 
Yellow – To identify and characterize the more relevant economic and political aspects intervening in the 
formulation of charges for the use of railway infrastructure; Blue – To develop a set of case studies. 
Source: own elaboration 
The main stream is formed by the tasks Review of the transferability notion, Proposition 
of a general framework, Particularization of the general framework for the field of 
railway infrastructure charging and Discussion of the particular framework. The first of 
the secondary streams includes the tasks Review of economic and political aspects of 
infrastructure charging and Characterization of railway infrastructure charging. It 
facilitates the basic input for the particularization of the framework, closing the first 
interaction between theory and practice. The other secondary stream gathers the tasks 
Characterization of EU railway infrastructure charging, Selection and characterization 
of case studies and Development of case studies. It provides the second interaction 
between theory and reality, exploring the limits of the proposed framework. Every 
stream is linked as well to the fulfillment of the partial objectives set for this research. 
This fact has been highlighted in Fig. 2 through the color code used to depict each task. 
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The more remarkable methodological characteristics of the tasks developed in this 
research are referred next: 
• Review of the transferability notion – the review has been performed on the 
literature produced by the comparative politics and the management science. The 
main source of information at this stage has been handbooks, reports from 
supranational organizations (UN, OECD, EC) and scientific publications (e.g. 
Journal of European Public Policy, Governance, Political Studies, Public 
Administration Review, The Review of Policy Research, ASQC Quality Press, 
Benchmarking: An International Journal, International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, etc.). The information gathered has been processed and presented 
according to two different analyses: an “horizontal analysis” dedicated to the 
concept definition and a “vertical analysis” dedicated to the concept 
implementation. 
• Proposition of a general framework – the proposition of the general framework 
has formulated the basic methodology to assess the transferability of policies 
and/or practices between different jurisdictions. Previously to its formulation, 
this task has clarified the basic hypotheses and assumptions done on the basis of 
the review of the transfer concept. These assumptions basically regard the 
conceptualization of the policy definition process and the conceptualization of 
the transfer process. 
• Review of economic and political aspects of infrastructure charging – the review 
has been based on a number of research projects promoted by a wide range of 
institutions (World Bank, UN, ECMT, EC, UIC, EIM, CER, BTRE), 
complemented with handbooks, academic literature (Transport Policy, Utilities 
Policy, Journals of Industry, Competition and Trade, etc.) and a number of 
selected conferences and workshops (e.g. VATT -Helsinki, 2000; Rafael del Pino 
Foundation - Madrid, 2004; University of Bath 2004). Contrarily to the review 
of the transferability notion, this task has had an instrumental function and it is 
not reflected in a specific section in the document. Its outputs have been the 
basis for the development of the characterization of railway infrastructure 
charging. 
• Characterization of railway infrastructure charging – the information gathered 
through the previous task “Review of economic and political aspects of railway 
infrastructure charging” has been analyzed and used to characterize the basic 
concepts and elements influencing the determination and implementation of 
railway infrastructure charges. The characterization has been performed 
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according to a top-down approach that goes from the structure of railway 
infrastructure markets to the operationalization of railway infrastructure charges.  
• Particularization of the general framework – this task has merged the general 
framework with the characterization of railway infrastructure charging. The 
approach adopted has maintained the formal structure of the general framework 
and particularized each of its elements and criteria for the field of infrastructure 
charging. 
• Characterization of EU railway infrastructure charging – this task has provided 
an overview of the EU railway reform and a synthetic description of the 
European practice as regards the concepts and elements pointed out in the task 
“Characterization of railway infrastructure charging”. The documentation used 
in this task consisted of EU legislation and policy documents (EC 
Communications, White Papers, etc.), complemented by some research projects 
and statistics from international organizations (EC, ECMT, UIC) and sparse 
scientific contributions. 
• Selection and characterization of case studies – in order to reflect the more likely 
informational conditions at the time of undertaking a transferability assessment 
process, the importer jurisdiction selected for the six cases developed has been 
the Spanish railway network managed by ADIF. The exporter jurisdictions have 
been chosen according to a threefold criterion integrating maturity, market size 
and geographical proximity. The characterization of rail infrastructure pricing in 
the selected jurisdictions has been performed in the more accurate way as 
possible from the diversity of sources publicly available (network statements, 
financial annual reports of infrastructure managers and operators, national 
legislation, decisions from regulatory bodies, presentations at conferences and 
workshops, press releases, etc.). In every case, the thorough description of the 
national practice has been accompanied by a qualitative - quantitative analysis of 
the structure and levels of the charging scheme. The presentation of the 
information and analysis performed for every jurisdiction has been done 
according to a normalized structure so as to ease the development of the case 
studies. 
• Development of case studies – each case study has been developed according to 
the same structure, providing first the description of the transfer and a set of 
preliminary considerations on its feasibility, and then the contents of the 
particular framework for the transferability assessment. 
• Discussion of the particular framework – this task has discussed the validity of 
the particular framework proposed in the light of the conclusions obtained from 
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the six case studies developed. Its outcomes have been directly incorporated to 
the final conclusions of the thesis. 
 
 
1.4 Plan of the thesis 
The structure of this document has been designed to reflect the objectives and the tasks 
developed in the research. Accordingly, every chapter fully presents the outcomes of at 
least one relevant task of the research, with the only exception of Chapter 2 European 
railway reform, which is intended to provide a synthetic overview of the broad context 
surrounding railway infrastructure charging in the EU. Additionally, every chapter has 
been conceived as a self-standing entity, obviously within the logical limits imposed by 
its participation in the general workflow. 
The document contains eight chapters, now shortly described: 
• The present chapter, Introduction, exposes the motivation and objectives of the 
research undertaken in this thesis, as well as the methodological approach 
adopted. 
• Chapter 2, European railway reform, presents the background of the research 
through the examination of the motivations, basic principles, actual results and 
harmonization dynamics of the European railway reform. 
• Chapter 3, Railway infrastructure charging, illustrates the specificities of the 
railway infrastructure charging activity, particularly in relation to the regulation 
and the pricing theory. This chapter presents as well the conceptualization of 
pricing policies and proposes a scheme for the decision-making process involved 
in the definition of railway infrastructure charges. 
• Chapter 4, The notion of transferability, explores and reviews the notion of 
transfer as it has been developed in other disciplines, notably in comparative 
politics and management science, in order to provide a sound theoretical 
foundation for the proposition of the conceptual framework. The chapter 
explores as well the conceptual relation between the two literatures reviewed. 
• Chapter 5, A conceptual framework for the assessment of transferability, 
proposes a general framework to assess the transferability of policies and/or 
practices from one jurisdiction to another. In the second part of the chapter, the 
general framework is particularized for the specific analysis of railway 
infrastructure pricing policies and practices. 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 16 
• Chapter 6, Characterization of case studies, selects and documents a number of 
case studies that will be used in Chapter 7 to provide further validation to the 
assumptions of the transferability assessment framework. 
• Chapter 7, Development of case studies, presents the results of six case studies, 
differentiating the preliminary considerations (performed outside the proposed 
framework) from the basic elements, analysis levels and transferability criteria 
stated in the framework. 
• Chapter 8, Conclusions, resumes the conclusions of the research and suggests 
future lines of work related to it. 
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Chapter 
2  
EUROPEAN RAILWAY REFORM 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The field of interest of this thesis, the transferability of railway infrastructure charges, 
achieves its full signification within the deep political and economic reform undertaken 
by the European Union to stop the continuous decline of the railway mode. 
First of all, because the reform enforced the vertical separation of the railway business, 
giving way to the setting of infrastructure charges in all the national rail networks of the 
Union. Second, because the European railway reform has revealed in all their strength 
the opposed dynamics of integration and differentiation affecting the economic 
regulation of the access to the network. It is in the EU where it is possible to find a 
supranational legislation setting common principles for track access charges and twenty-
three different charging systems. Third, because in spite of the preliminary results 
achieved so far by the reform, there is the perception that the lack of harmonization may 
potentially hinder the consecution of its final goals. Finally, because its ongoing status 
leaves open the door to new initiatives and changes. 
Accordingly, this chapter aims to introduce the background of this research through the 
examination of the motivations, basic principles, actual results and harmonization 
dynamics of the European railway reform. Logically, this will be done keeping a 
particular focus on the charges for the use of railway infrastructure. 
Section 2.2 presents the evidence of the decline of railways in the European context and 
reviews some of its fundamental causes; Section 2.3 refers the basic principles of the EU 
railway reform; Section 2.4 examines the current state of implementation and success 
achieved by the reform; Section 2.5 elaborates on the role attributed to harmonization by 
the ongoing reform; Finally, section 2.6 presents a synthesis of the chapter. 
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2.2 The decline of railways 
Over the last thirty years, Europe has witnessed a steady decline of railway transport 
performance, both in the freight and passenger market segments. This negative evolution 
seems even more significant when compared to the trends observed in other countries, 
like US or Japan, who have been able to preserve a greater participation of railways in 
the transport scene (EC, 2006b, 3.4.13 and 3.4.14). 
Aware of the extreme importance of the issues at stake, the European institutions and 
the national States carried out a wide number of detailed analysis of the phenomenon, 
that finished up in the identification of a bundle of structural characteristics hindering 
the potential evolution of the railway sector, both at national and European level. It is 
based on these facts, the evidence of the decline and the diagnostic of its causes, that the 
EU launched, in the early nineties, an intensive railway reform involving the whole of its 
Member States. 
 
2.2.1 Evolution of the railway market share 
For the last decades the overall transportation activity has significantly increased in the 
EU-15, with annual rates around 4% in the freight market and between 2,5% and 3% in 
the passenger market between 1970 and 2000 (EC, 2003, p.88). However, in spite of 
this significant growth in the whole volume of transport, rail has faced a continuous 
reduction of its share in both markets. During the period 1970–2000, rail’s market share 
for freight dropped from 20,0% to 8,0% (Table 1), while in the passenger market 
decreased from 10,4% to 6,4% (Table 2). 
Table 1: Modal share for freight transport market in the EU-15. 1970-2001 
 Road Rail 
Inland 
waterways Pipelines Sea 
1970 34,7 20 7,3 4,5 33,5 
1980 36,3 14,6 5,3 4,3 39,4 
1990 41,9 11 4,6 3 39,6 
2000 44,3 8 4 2,7 40,9 
2001 45 7,8 4 2,8 40,4 
Note: % over ton-km performed by all transport modes included. Source: EC, 2003, 3.4.2 
Table 2: Modal share for passenger transport market in the EU-15. 1970-2001 
 
Passenger 
cars 
Buses & 
Coaches 
Tram & 
Metro Railway Air 
1970 73,8 12,7 1,6 10,4 1,6 
1980 76,1 11,8 1,2 8,4 2,5 
1990 79 9,3 1 6,7 4 
2000 78,1 8,6 1 6,4 5,9 
2001 78,2 8,6 1 6,4 5,9 
Note: % over pax-km performed by all transport modes included. Source: EC, 2003, 3.5.2 
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This situation has little changed during the last years in spite of the enlargement from 
the EU-15 to the EU-25 that brought into the Union countries were rail traditionally 
hold a relevant market share. Calculated over this enlarged basis, railway share evolved 
from 10,2% to 10,0% in the freight transport market in the period 2001-2005 (Table 3) 
and from 6,1% to 5,8% in the passenger transport market in the period 2001-2004 
(Table 4). 
Table 3: Modal share for freight transport market in the EU-25. 2001-2005 
 Road Rail 
Inland 
waterways Pipelines Sea Air 
2001 43,1 10,2 3,6 3,6 39,4 0,1 
2002 43,6 10,0 3,6 3,6 39,2 0,1 
2003 43,4 10,1 3,3 3,3 39,6 0,1 
2004 44,1 10,3 3,4 3,4 38,9 0,1 
2005 44,2 10,0 3,3 3,4 39,1 0,1 
Note: % over ton-km performed by all transport modes included 
Source: EC, 2006a, 3.2.2 
Table 4: Modal share for passenger transport market in the EU-25. 2001-2004. 
 
Passenger 
cars 
Motored 2 
wheels 
Bus & 
Coach Railway 
Tram & 
Metro Air Sea 
2001 73,4 2,3 8,5 6,1 1,2 7,6 0,9 
2002 74,0 2,3 8,3 5,9 1,2 7,4 0,8 
2003 73,9 2,4 8,3 5,8 1,2 7,6 0,8 
2004 73,5 2,4 8,3 5,8 1,2 8,0 0,8 
Note: % over pax-km performed by all transport modes included 
Source: EC, 2006a, 3.3.2 
The situation is particularly challenging when it comes to international traffic, especially 
freight. An appropriate example is provided by the evolution of road and rail freight 
transport across the Pyrenees (Table 5). According to the European Commission (2007, 
p.83), in 2005 the international rail freight volumes in Portugal and Spain were 
equivalent to just 3% and 6% respectively of these countries’ international road freight 
volumes. 
Table 5: Evolution of rail and road freight transport across the Pyrenees. 1997-2004 
 
Road 
(daily trucks) 
Evolution 
(basis 1997) 
Rail 
(thousand ton-
km/year) 
Evolution 
(basis 1997) 
1997 13.266 100,0 4.795 100,0 
1998 14.765 111,3 4.442 92,6 
1999 15.845 119,4 4.241 88,4 
2000 17.943 135,3 4.583 95,6 
2001 18.028 135,9 4.188 87,3 
2002 18.904 142,5 4.161 86,8 
2003 19.954 150,4 4.284 89,3 
2004 21.832 164,6 4.563 95,2 
Source: EC, 2006a, 3.4.12 
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2.2.2 Causes of the decline 
During the last twenty years, academicians, practitioners and policy-makers have sought 
to understand the root causes of this negative trend, and have proposed a large number 
of them. This section shortly reviews some of the more relevant ones, which clearly 
illustrate the grounds on which the railway reform took off. 
According to Stehmann and Zelhoffer (2004, p.328), one of the main reasons for the 
decline of railways must be found in the organization of the national railway sectors in 
very rigid monopolistic structures under the direct control of Member States. Such 
circumstance provoked the submission of the national railway companies to a wide 
range of political objectives, mainly in the form of imposed investment and employment 
policies or forced public service obligations. Over time, the situation led to a huge 
indebtedness on the part of railway companies and to a day-to-day political interference 
incompatible with a business oriented approach. The visible result of this arrangement 
has been the increase of the financial support for rail services and the application of 
compensation systems for social obligations that are not clear in their objectives and 
retributions. At the same time, as noted by Nash and Rivera (2004, p.4), the national 
transport enterprises frequently had unrealistic balance sheets burdened with inherited 
debts and with low relation to the value of their assets. 
But this is of course not the only reason. Sthemann and Zelhoffer (2004, p.329) pointed 
out the fragmentation of the European market, as it prevents railways from competing 
with other transport modes in markets where they could be particularly effective (e.g. 
freight international services running over long distances). Fragmentation has arisen from 
the protective nature of national legislation and the market power exerted by national 
railway undertakings, but also from the size of most Member States and the lack of 
technical interoperability due to different national standards and operating rules. The 
consequences of market segmentation are illustrated by Olivier Silla (2002, p.1) in a 
single but very relevant question: “whilst some 20% of domestic traffic in Germany and 
France goes by rail, how is it that traffic between the two countries is as little as 6%?” 
Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans (2004, p.3) remarked that a third cause explaining the 
current position of railways could be found in its technological characteristics, which 
had made it suitable for the transportation of heavy weights over long distances or for 
the transportation of passengers in high demand corridors. On the reverse, these same 
characteristics had led to a lower flexibility than its competing modes as regards the 
satisfaction of demand in its current spatial and temporal requirements. Within a context 
of transformation from an industrial economy to a service-based one and adaptation of 
the industrial activity to just-in-time production processes this particularity has become 
a disadvantage for railways. Furthermore, the guided nature of the railway transport and 
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the different speeds of the services offered make it very vulnerable to operational 
incidents, thus affecting to its reliability. 
Other reasons that are also found in the literature regard the historical lack of investment 
on railway infrastructure because of a political preference for road infrastructure, the 
limited attention of national railway companies to customer care, the lack of service 
integrators for optimized logistical chains, the traffic priorities allocated to passengers, 
the non transparent cost structure of services running on international corridors (Di 
Pietrantonio et al. 2004, p.3) and the inadequacy in the capacity and quality of 
infrastructure, which limits the ability to operate high speed passenger and combined 
transport freight services on international routes (Nash et al. 2004, p.4). 
The described problem of railway decline in Europe and its potential effects on the 
whole transportation system has been, and it is still being, a core issue in the Common 
Transport Policy applied by the EU, and has been the basis for the railway reform 
started in the first nineties. 
The European Commission (1992, pp.24-25) already described the negative trend of 
railway’s market share in its White Paper on the Common Transport Policy and 
suggested a number of reasons strongly linked to intermodal competition (e.g. the 
increasing penetration of road haulage, the constant reductions in road costs charged to 
users or the fact that external costs are not fully internalized by the road mode). 
Two years later the EC (1996a, pp.9-10) enlarged the list of causes including several 
aspects related to the conditions prevailing in the railway sector, namely: 1) the variety 
of physical characteristics (e.g. gauge, signalling, electrification, etc.) of the national 
infrastructures, leading to interoperability problems; 2) the incorrect management of 
railways, as Member States have traditionally denied railway companies to carry out a 
commercial business; 3) the inadequate investments in infrastructure, which have led to 
infrastructure backwardness; and 4) the low flexibility of the railway sector. 
When in 1998 the Commission delivered its White Paper on the payment for 
infrastructure use (EC, 1998, p.3), it emphasized the role of distortions of competition in 
the unbalanced modal distribution observed in the EU (both between Member States and 
between modes). It also referred to the failure to consider social and environmental 
aspects of transport and the difficulties in funding infrastructure investments. 
Almost all of the previously mentioned reasons are found as well in the later White 
Paper on the European Transport Policy (EC, 2001a, p.27), notably the lack of 
infrastructure suitable for modern railway transport, the lack of interoperability between 
networks and systems, the non-transparency of costs, the low productivity and 
reliability of the service, the absence of real competition within the rail sector or the 
strong competition from the road. 
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It is on the top of this analysis that the EU decided to launch, more than fifteen years 
ago, a deep reform of the European railway sector. 
 
 
2.3 The railway reform 
Accordingly to the evidence of the railway decline and in line with the diagnostic of its 
causes, the EU set the political goal of revitalizing the railway mode in Europe and, as 
the way to achieve it, selected the integration and opening of the national railway 
markets to competition. 
However, the path started has revealed to be far from easy. In fact, in order to achieve a 
common market open to competition it is necessary to address institutional, 
organizational, technical and economic issues of the greatest complexity. Examples are 
the creation of adequate regulatory bodies, the vertical separation of infrastructure and 
operation activities, the search for interoperability or the setting of track access charges. 
The European institutions have launched initiatives regarding all these aspects, backing 
them with a large legislative production regulating their core aspects in the territory of 
the Union. They are known as the European Railway Reform. 
The following sections will briefly describe the rationale, major legislation and principles 
of the reform, with a particular focus on its economic and regulatory aspects, field of 
interest of this dissertation. 
 
2.3.1 Rationale 
As previously said, in order to stop and invert the decline of the part of railways in the 
modal distribution, the EU has promoted a set of legal actions with the aim of reaching a 
step by step market opening in the railway sector leading to the revitalization of this 
transport mode. But before going ahead with this topic a question arises: what is the 
interest of reversing the current trend for railway transportation? Or otherwise, what 
reasons justify the European Railway Reform? 
The main answer to these questions is that the present trend would inevitably lead to 
economic and environmental problems. Firstly, the reduced market shares would imply 
financial difficulties for the public monopolies, faced to a high amount of fixed costs and 
a reduced ability to generate incomes over time. Secondly, the growing share of road 
transport is likely to increase the overall environmental costs of transportation given the 
level of externalities created by this mode (Holvald, 2006, p.2). This view is also shared 
by Stehman et al. (2004), who remarked that the present trend is not only to the 
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detriment of the rail sector but of the entire transport sector in the EU, as the traffic 
displaced into other transport modes places a greater burden on their infrastructure. A 
complementary argument is provided by Pittman (2003, p.9), who suggests political 
integration as another key reason for the railway reform. 
To address all or part of these effects, in the early nineties the European Union pointed 
at market opening as the key objective to be reached and started its railway reform, 
which is still ongoing. 
 
2.3.2 Major legislation 
The first step of the European Railway Reform consisted on the publishing of Directive 
91/440/EEC on the development of the Community’s railways. This directive 
established the basic framework for the separation of accounts between infrastructure 
management and transport operation, imposing the vertical separation of the sector. 
Accordingly, it required the infrastructure manager to charge a fee to the operator for the 
access to the railway network. 
In 1995, the European Parliament and the Council authorized the entry of private capital 
in the rail sector through the Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway 
undertakings. This Directive permitted the private finance of new infrastructures and the 
private operation of services. It was approved together with Directive 95/19/EC on the 
allocation of railway infrastructure and the charging of infrastructure fees, which gave 
legal force to the concept of financial stability of the infrastructure manager and required 
governments to lay down rules for establishing fees for the use of the infrastructure, to 
publish the capacity allocation procedures and to appoint an independent body for 
appeals on capacity allocation decisions. 
Six years later, the European Parliament and the Council issued the First Railway 
Package consisting of Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 2001/14/EC which 
substituted or amended the abovementioned Directives 91/440/CEE, 95/18/EC and 
95/19/EC. 
Directive 2001/12/EC amending Council Directive 91/440/EC was aimed at progressing 
in the core aspects of the structural reform: it increased the independence of the railway 
undertakings and the infrastructure manager from the budgetary accounting of national 
government; required the separation of accounts between passenger and freight services 
in order to avoid cross-subsidies from a socially significant service to another service 
operated in competition with unsupported suppliers; defined the Trans-European Rail 
Freight Network, on which railway freight undertakings were to be granted open access 
after March 2008. Directive 2001/13/EC amending Council Directive 95/18/EC was 
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focused on the provision of operating licenses valid across the European Union. 
Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the 
levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification set the 
basic framework for the levying of charges and the allocation of capacity. 
In 2004, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Second Railway Package, 
based on the measures established in the 2001 White Paper (EC, 2001a) and consisting 
of Directive 2004/49/EC on safety on the Community’s railways, Directive 2004/50/EC 
amending Council Directive 96/48/EC and Directive 2001/16/EC and Directive 
2004/51/EC amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC. This legislative package proposed 
the complete opening of the rail freight markets, including cabotage, and focused on 
railway safety and on the establishment of a European Railway Agency aimed at 
providing technical support for interoperability and safety work. 
Finally, in March 2004, the European Commission presented the Third Railway 
Package in order to complete some aspects of the previous legislation. The package 
consists of a Communication, four legislative measures and a working document on the 
extended impact assessment for the gradual opening up of the market for international 
passenger services. These legal texts continue the railways reform focusing on the 
opening to competition of the international passenger services across the European 
Union, the integration of the European railways and the revitalization of this mode of 
transport. The Third Railway Package, after a long discussion between the European 
Commission and the European Parliament has been finally passed to the Council in June 
2007. 
The distribution over time of the main legislative steps described in the previous 
paragraphs is synthesised in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3: Milestones of the European Railway Reform 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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2.3.3 Principles 
The European Railway Reform looks for a step-by-step liberalization of the railway 
sector aimed to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of railway undertakings. 
This objective has been pursued on the basis of three complementary policies (UN, 
2003, p.84): 
• A clearer separation of the State and the railway undertakings. 
• An improvement in the financing of railways through greater transparency. 
• A progressive opening, through the provision of non-discriminatory rights of 
access, to rail infrastructure for specified categories of service. 
These developments have been facilitated notably by the separation of infrastructure 
and operation activities and the establishment of specific access conditions to the 
market. The following analysis will focus on three aspects closely linked to the scope of 
this proposal: the vertical separation of infrastructure and operations, the introduction 
of infrastructure charges and the possibilities available for railway competition. 
2.3.3.1 Vertical separation of the railway sector 
Vertical separation of infrastructure and operation activities is one of the distinctive 
characteristics of the European Railway Reform, and constitutes the cornerstone of the 
legislative actions undertaken by the EU. 
Traditionally, railway transport markets have been integrated national monopolies under 
the control of Member States, who were responsible for the definition of prices and 
services offered to the final consumers. The main justification for this organization was 
found in the fact that railway transport presents the characteristics attributed to natural 
monopolies4, given its strong economies of scale5 and its high ratio of fixed and sunk 
costs imposed by the construction, maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure. 
However, this situation did not protected railways from intermodal competition. The 
intermediate role of transport and the highly substitutive nature of rail transport in the 
majority of market segments favoured the loss of rail’s market share with respect to 
road or air transport, imposing an increasing burden on national finances. 
                                                
4 Such a monopoly is said to occur when production technology leads to economies of scale relative to the 
existing demand for the industry's product. 
5 Economies of scale imply that average costs per unit decrease with the quantity of the good produced, 
which makes a single producer to reach a level of output at a lower cost than it would be jointly reached 
by two or more producers. 
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To invert this negative trend, the EU promoted a structural change aimed at introducing 
competition forces in the railway sector. The reform has sought to separate two parts of 
the business, infrastructure management and transport operation, based on the rationale 
that the latter presents reduced natural monopoly characteristics and therefore is likely 
to be opened to intramodal competition. Competition for services is then assumed to 
result in lower prices and higher quality product than when there is only a single 
producer. The potential for competition in railway transport has been estimated by 
Gómez-Ibáñez (1999, p.71) around 50 to 60 per cent of total railway costs6. 
Fig. 4: Vertical separation options under EU legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: TOC - Transport Operating Company. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
From the three possible levels of vertical separation7, the EU imposed to its Member 
States the less restrictive, demanding the division of infrastructure management and 
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organizational and institutional separation (Directive 91/440/EEC, Art. 6). 
                                                
6 Calculated as a the proportion of above-rail costs to total costs. 
7 According to the literature (Pittman, 2003; Goujon, 2004a), three different levels of vertical separation 
may be distinguished: 1) Accounting separation: the railway infrastructure is owned and operated by a 
single institution that keeps separate accounts for infrastructure and operation activities; 2) 
Organizational separation: the infrastructure and the operation activities are carried on by different 
business units within a larger holding. These business units are more or less autonomous from a 
functional point of view, but they are not legally independent; and 3) Institutional separation: the 
infrastructure and the operation activities are done by two different entities that are independent from an 
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Under these framework two different arrangements have been adopted in the EU, a full 
separation resulting from the institutional separation of infrastructure and operation 
activities and a partially integrated separation where the infrastructure management and 
the incumbent operator belong to the same holding (Fig. 4). 
The literature on railway reform has provided a thorough review of the advantages and 
disadvantages of vertical separation. Among its benefits, the opening to competition of 
the operation business and the encouragement of technical and dynamic efficiency are 
mentioned. As well, it is widely accepted that vertical separation leads to a reduction of 
the costs produced by increases in traffic resulting from on track competition (because 
of the economies of density of infrastructure8), to the independent development of train 
operations previously constrained by the restricted framework of national 
infrastructure, and to the predictable enhancement of transportation policies. 
On the cost side, vertical separation implies the loss of economies of density in the 
operation business (as the incumbent operator is likely to lose market share), the 
increase of transaction and coordination costs, a reduced effectiveness of infrastructure 
capacity utilization (which has to be allocated to different actors now with different 
objectives), asymmetrical incentives for the wheel-rail interface and increasing safety 
costs (BTRE, 2003, pp.11-21). 
There is much elaborated as well on the advantages and disadvantages of the two 
different arrangements that can be adopted within vertical separation and to which 
extent one should be preferred to the other. Some of the main statements supporting one 
or the other approaches are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6: Full separation versus partially integrated separation 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Full separation 
Ensures non discriminatory treatment 
of TOC 
Creation of internal competition 
Increased focus on services 
Clarification of public policy 
Less regulatory requirements 
More difficult coordination 
Loss of economies of scope 9 
 
Partially integrated 
separation 
Benefits from economies of scope 
Greater incentives for investment in 
the network 
Greater need for regulation 
 
Note: TOC – Transport Operating Companies. 
Source: own elaboration with data from (UN, 2003, pp.15-16) and (Pittman, 2003, pp.10-11) 
                                                
8 With economies of density, incremental costs decline as usage increases (without extension of the 
network). 
9 With economies of scope, incremental costs decline when two or more goods or services are produced 
collectively, or jointly, instead than individually. 
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2.3.3.2 Introduction of infrastructure charges 
The vertical separation of the railway sector implied the appearance of a new interface 
in the production system between infrastructure and operation. In this interface the 
infrastructure manager provides access to railway network facilities to the operating 
companies against the payment of an access charge. In turn, the railway operating 
companies internalize the payment of track access charges as a cost in their production 
process and set the charges for the different services offered. The final users receive the 
operator charges as inputs for their transportation decision, in which other substitutive 
transport modes will also be considered. In order to completely describe the economic 
system it is necessary to introduce the role of the Public Administration, which may 
provide subsidies and grants to the other actors (e.g. investments in infrastructure to the 
infrastructure manager, subsidies for the improvement of rolling stock to the operating 
companies, subsidies on the ticket fare for commuters, etc.) and receives back taxes. The 
overall system is synthesised in Fig. 5. 
Fig. 5: Basic economic relations in the reformed railway sector 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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• Track access charges are a basic input for the railway undertakings performing 
operation activities. Depending on their level and structure they may influence 
the number of operation companies and the nature of the railway services offered 
in the final market. 
• Furthermore, they constitute an additional cost that must be taken into account 
by the railway undertakings in their business planning, their commercial strategy 
and, in the end, in the final user charge. 
• As they contribute to the definition of the supply of railway services and to the 
formation of the final user charge, they are a key factor in the competition of 
railway services against other transportation modes (road, air, etc.). 
The basic provisions to be respected when charging for railway infrastructure are 
contained in Directive 2001/14/EC, which reflects the conclusions of previous works as 
the Green Paper on fair and efficient pricing in transport (EC, 1995), the final report of 
the High Level Group on Infrastructure Charging (HLG, 1998) or the White Paper on 
fair payment for infrastructure use (EC, 1998). 
First, the institutional responsibilities for the setting of track access charges are 
regulated: 
• “The determination of the charge for the use of infrastructure and the collection 
of this charge shall be performed by the infrastructure manager, provided the 
infrastructure manager is independent of any railway undertaking” (Art. 4.1). 
However, the rules for determining the infrastructure fees are still set by the 
national governments (Directive 91/440/EEC as amended by Directive 
2001/12/EC). 
• “Where the infrastructure manager […] is not independent of any railway 
undertaking, the functions […] other than collecting the charges shall be 
performed by a charging body that is independent in its legal form, organisation 
and decision-making from any railway undertaking.” (Art. 4.2). 
Second, attention is driven on the relation between the Administration and the 
infrastructure manager, which according to Art. 6 can rely upon regulation or upon 
contractual agreements. The Directive states the requirement of financial equilibrium for 
the infrastructure manager and opens the door to reach it without recourse to State 
subsidies: “Where rail transport is able to compete with other modes of transport, within 
the charging framework of Articles 7 and 8, a Member State may require the 
infrastructure manager to balance his accounts without State funding.” (Art. 6.1). 
Third, the Directive classifies the services to be supplied to the railway undertakings in 
four packages depending on their relevance (Fig. 6): 1) Minimum access package - e.g. 
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the use of track and junctions; 2) Track access to service facilities - e.g. freight terminals; 
3) Additional services - e.g. traction current; and 4) Ancillary services - e.g. access to 
telecommunication facilities. This distinction is not neutral, as while the services 
included in the first two groups (minimum access package and track access to service 
facilities) must respect the principle of marginal cost pricing, the additional and ancillary 
services only need to reflect their costs if they are provided under monopoly conditions. 
Fig. 6: Classification of railway services according to Directive 2001/14/EC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration on a graphical basis of Ludwig, 2006, p.2 
When it comes to the setting of track access charges, Directive 2001/14/EC assumes the 
main recommendations arising from the economic theory (in terms of social welfare 
maximization) and therefore proposes social marginal cost pricing as the basic rule to 
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     (Use of electrical supply equipment for 
traction current) 
(3)  Additional services: 
     (Traction current) 
(4) Ancillary services: 
     (Access to telecommunication network) 
 
  2. EU railway reform     
  31 
It is noticeable the fact that Directive 2001/14/EC does not prescribe in detail the rules 
and methodologies for establishing the various charging elements, giving freedom to the 
Member States as regards their implementation. A main reason for this flexibility might 
be found in the subsidiarity principle, which allows Member States a high degree of 
discretion in their methods of implementation. Another reason for flexibility might be 
the complex negotiation process related to the approval of EU legislative instruments, 
usually resulting in frameworks flexible enough to reconcile the diverging points of view 
of the Member States (in this case on a possible harmonization of charging policies and 
on how the railway infrastructure should be financed in their countries). 
In practice, the enactment of this flexible framework has led to a great diversity among 
the charging practices in the EU as regards the principles and structure of charges, their 
level, the variables adopted and the calculation procedures followed to set them. 
2.3.3.3 Railway market competition 
The vertical separation of the railway sector and the introduction of track access charges 
can only be understood in the light of the final objective of opening the railway 
operation market to competition. To fulfil this aim, the Member States are faced to two 
possible alternatives, rather different in their characteristics and implications. 
On the one side they can chose a model based on the competition in the market (also 
known as on track competition), where several railway undertakings compete to provide 
services on the same network during the same time period. On the other side they may 
set a model based on the competition for the market (competition for the tracks), 
whereby railway undertakings are in competition prior to start the operations through 
alternative offers for a contract to provide services. 
Although clearly setting the conditions for the competition in the market, the First and 
the Second Railway Packages do not include any resolution on the competition for the 
market, and do not give any hint on when and how each model should be applied. 
Moreover the legal sources for this type of competition are to be found in a separate 
stream of norms. 
For years the main norm at the Community level governing the procurement and funding 
of inland public transport has been Regulation 1191/69 concerning the obligations 
inherent in the concept of a public service in transport that authorized the Member 
States to conclude public service contracts with the transport companies and first 
introduced the PSO notion. In the last years, several attempts of revision of this norm 
have been promoted by the European Commission, who prepared a first proposal for a 
new Regulation in the year 2000 (EC, 2000) rejected by the European Parliament, an 
amended proposal two years later (EC, 2002) and a third proposal in the year 2005 (EC, 
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2005a). This third attempt has been finally approved by the European Parliament in 
May 2007 and will substitute regulation 1191/69. 
Among its main resolutions there are the limitation in time of long term franchises (a 
maximum of 15 years for railway transport) and the approval of three different 
modalities for awarding contracts (to an “internal operator”, to external operators 
through a call for tenders and some special arrangements when small and medium size 
companies are involved). 
According to this new framework “the competent authorities may act in the field of public 
passenger transport to guarantee the provision of services of general interest which are 
among other things more numerous, safer, of a higher quality or at a lower cost than 
those that mere market forces would have allowed.” (EC, 2005a, Art. 1.1) Where 
“public passenger transport” means “transport services of general economic interest 
organised by the competent authority and provided to the public on a non-discriminatory 
and continuous basis” (EC, 2005a, Art. 2). 
The Third Railway Package included as well a Proposal for a Directive amending 
Council Directive 91/440/EEC now approved (EC, 2004a). In this text, regulating the 
opening of the passenger rail market to competition, arose the problem of its 
coordination with the existence of public service obligations, finally solved through the 
following provision: “Member States may limit the right of access [...] on services 
between a place of departure and a destination which are covered by a public service 
contract conforming to the Community legislation in force. Such limitation may not have 
the effect of restricting the right to pick up passengers at any station located on the route 
of an international service and to set them down at another, including stations located in 
the same Member State, except where this is strictly necessary to maintain the economic 
equilibrium of the service defined in a public service contract …”(EC, 2004a, Art. 1.7). 
From the legal framework described, it can be noticed that competition for the market 
may only arise in the field of passenger railway services, and that competition in the 
market is compulsory for freight railway services. 
Another important consideration related to the opening of the railway operation sector 
is related to the nature of the railway services opened to competition, in terms of 
passenger / freight services and national / international services. As far as the freight 
services are concerned, the rail freight market in Europe is completely opened for 
railway undertakings established in Member States from the 1st January 2007 for both, 
international and national services (cabotage), as stated in Directive 2004/51/EC (Art.1). 
As regards the passenger services, the operation market will be opened from 1st January 
2010 for international services produced by railway undertakings that have a license and 
the required safety certificates. These services will have the right to pick up and set 
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down passengers along the route and will be only limited by their possible negative 
effects on the economic equilibrium of PSO services. “For example, it would be possible 
on the future high speed line between Madrid and Perpignan to conclude a public service 
contract granting exclusive rights for the section between Madrid and Barcelona. These 
exclusive rights would prevent any other operator from operating a national service 
limited to the Madrid-Barcelona section. However, these exclusive rights could not 
prevent an international operator running a service between Perpignan and Madrid 
from picking up or setting down passengers in Barcelona, unless it was shown that this 
could affect the economic equilibrium of the public service contract in question” (EC, 
2004a, p.6). 
 
 
2.4 The preliminary results  
Since it was first proposed at the beginning of the nineties to our days, the European 
Railway Reform has been implemented according to a step-by-step approach that has 
faced different national conditions (from a completely privatized sector in the UK to 
national monopolies in the vast majority of EU countries) and several enlargements of 
the EU itself, from the EU-12 to the EU-15 in 1995, then EU-25 in 2004 and finally 
EU-27 in 2007 (adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria). In order to illustrate the results so 
far achieved in the reform process, this section focus first on the degree of 
implementation of the railway reform, then analyzes its effects on the degree of 
competition in the railway market and finally presents some considerations about its 
economic effects. 
 
2.4.1 Degree of implementation 
The first step to assess the effects of the European Railway Reform on the market 
opening or the market share of the railway mode is the evaluation of the degree of 
implementation of its main determinations. 
As far as the vertical separation of the sector is concerned, most of the Member States 
have formally separated railway infrastructure and operation activities from an 
accounting and functional point of view. According to the ECMT (2005, p.14), 23 
Member States had already set up a functionally independent infrastructure manager in 
the year 2005 (see Fig. 7). This view is shared by the RAILIMPLEMENT study, which 
pointed out that in the year 2005 only the Irish Railways and one of the Estonian 
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national railway companies were still integrated (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a, p.69). 
This list should be completed with Luxembourg. 
Fig. 7: Implementation of vertical separation in the EU-27. 1988-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: AT-Austria, BE-Belgium; BG-Bulgaria; CH-Switzerland; CZ-Czech Republic; DE-Germany; DK-
Denmark; EE-Estonia; EI-Ireland; EL-Greece; ES-Spain; FI-Finland; FR-France; HU-Hungary; IT-
Italy; LT-Lithuania; LU-Luxembourg; LV-Latvia; NL-The Netherlands; PL-Poland; PT-Portugal; RO-
Romania; SE-Sweden; SI-Slovenia; SK-Slovakia; UK-United Kingdom. 
Source: own elaboration with data from ECMT, 2005, p.14 
More difficulties are found when trying to assess the degree of implementation of the 
specific regulations contained in the First Railway Package, since several countries 
delayed their transposition into national law (e.g. Germany, Luxembourg, Greece and 
United Kingdom referred a late transposition of Directive 2001/14/EC) or did not 
proceed to their full implementation at national level. 
The abovementioned research (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a, p.66) performed a country-
based study on the degree of implementation of the First Railway Package, and 
concluded that: 
• Not all the Member States had transposed the Directives into national law. 
• Εven where the Directives had been transposed, there may not have been 
effective domestic implementation, for a number of reasons. 
• Εven where implementation had taken place, it can take up to two years for a 
new entrant to gain access to the infrastructure and begin to provide services. 
These conclusions were in line with those obtained the year before by the study Rail 
Liberalisation Index 2004 (LIBEX), second of a series of reports oriented to monitor the 
evolution of the opening of the rail market to competition. More precisely, the study 
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pointed out that “in the manner in which the liberalisation steps introduced by the 
European Commission are implemented at the national level there are still considerable 
differences from one country to another, which can lead to distortions in competition” 
(IBM et al. 2004, p.2). 
The update of the LIBEX study in the year 2007 showed a greater level of 
implementation of the EU legislative framework, though remarked that “the practical 
market access conditions for external RUs in most countries – due to the relatively short 
period of time available for the practical implementation of the legal framework – are not 
as pronounced and developed as the legal requirements.” (IBM et al. 2007, p.15). 
This heterogeneity in the implementation of the First Railway Package and the unclear 
effects of the national inertia, together with the phased nature of the railway reform, 
may lead to a diversity of interpretations when evaluating the extent to which markets 
are actually opened for potential entrants. 
 
2.4.2 Degree of competition 
As part of the monitoring scheme, the LIBEX study calculated several aggregated 
indicators designed to highlight the results achieved by the railway reform in the 
Member States. One of them, the COM index10, indicates the degree of competition in 
the rail transport markets. In year 2004, this index reached the higher values for United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, a group that not 
surprisingly includes the four countries that first achieved the vertical separation in the 
railway sector (IBM et al. 2004, p.3). 
An alternative assessment of competition in the freight market is found in the 
RAILIMPLEMENT study, that focused the analysis on the market share not held by 
the largest national operator (Fig. 8). This analysis remarked that there are still many 
Member States where the incumbent operator controls almost 100% of the freight 
market (e.g. France or Spain). Moreover, even in the more opened markets freight and 
passenger transport is dominated by the incumbent operators. Only in very rare cases, 
like in the United Kingdom, Estonia or Sweden, the market share of the largest supplier 
is below 80%. 
 
 
                                                
10 Index based on the evolution of the modal split (5%), the number of new railway undertakings (45%) 
and the market share of new entrants (50%) (IBM et al. 2004, p.23). 
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Fig. 8: Freight market share not hold by the largest rail operator in European countries. 2004 
 
Note: market share calculated as a % of total ton-km. 
Source: Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a, p.38 
The more recent reference on the degree of competition in the rail market has been 
provided by the update of the LIBEX study in 2007 (Fig. 9). With respect to its 
previous version, the update showed a general increase in the value of the index, though 
without important changes in the relative position of European countries with respect to 
competition. 
Fig. 9: Degree of competition in European rail markets. COM Index. 2007 
 
Note: the COM index ranges from 100 (minimum opening to competition) to 1000 (maximum). 
Source: IBM et al. 2007, p.20  
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The previous references clearly show the existence of very different degrees of 
competition across the Member States that might be explained by their national 
characteristics as well as by the different degrees of implementation of the regulations 
contained in the First Railway Package. The apparent relationship between the degree of 
competition and the year of accomplishment of the vertical separation of the railway 
sector seems to suggest the need of a longer period of time after the restructuring in 
order to identify a positive effect on competition. This point seems to be confirmed as 
well by the overall evolution of the licensing activity in the operation sector (Fig. 10). 
Fig. 10: Evolution of licensed railway operators in the EU-25. 2003-2006 
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Source: own elaboration with data from EC, 2006b, Annex 9, p.56 
 
2.4.3 Economic effects 
Some attempts have also been carried in order to evaluate the economic effects of the 
ongoing railway reform. Most of the studies carried in this domain drive their attention 
to the reductions in the overall operation costs of the system, while others are focused 
on the market share for railways. 
An example of the first kind of analysis can be found in Shires and Preston (1999), who 
found that operation costs in Sweden have reduced by around 10% since the separation, 
what was interpreted as empirical evidence on vertical disintegration. Preston (1999) 
also performed some qualitative assessments on the benefits of the railway reform in the 
United Kingdom and observed improvements (product differentiation, increase in 
service frequencies and selective fare cuts) where on-track competition had been applied 
and reductions in subsidies where off-track competition had been implemented. 
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Among the second type of studies, RAILIMPLEMENT (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a) 
provides quantitative evidence on the effect of the reform on the market share of 
railways. Its authors present the percentage growth in rail freight in different Member 
States according to three different groups: newly opened markets (more than one 
operator after 2000), developed open markets (more than one operator since before 
2000) and not opened markets (Fig. 11). From their analysis it is not possible to reach a 
general conclusion on the effects of competition on the railway market share. It is 
possible however to note the positive evolution of rail in almost all the opened markets, 
although Member States included in the other groups seem to obtain better results in 
some cases. 
Fig. 11: Evolution of rail freight transport split according to the degree of competition. EU-25. 
1993-2004 
 
Note: change in total ton-km carried in the period 1993-2004. 
Source: Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a, p.35 
Fig. 12: Correlation between railway reform implementation and market share evolution in 
selected European countries. 1990-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Goujon 2004c, p.2  
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A more complete analysis has been performed by the French Ministry of Ecology, 
Development and Land Planning. Their study defined a synthetic indicator evaluating 
the degree of implementation of the railway reform according to three axes 
(independence of the incumbent operator from the State, the degree of separation 
between infrastructure and operation activities and the markets effectively opened to 
competition) and then correlated it with the evolution of the railway market share in 
different Member States. The result fitted to a straight line with a correlation factor R2 = 
0,67 (Fig. 12), meaning that where the liberalization has been better achieved, the decline 
of the railway market share has been lower. 
As it has been observed for the degree of implementation of the railway reform and the 
degree of competition, the economic effects that can be so far assessed are heterogeneous 
across the different Member States. This heterogeneity might be explained by different 
political commitment with the reform, by specific national characteristics or by the fact 
that the reform is still ongoing. It seems however that positive effects in all the three 
fields may be observed in the “more experienced” countries. 
 
 
2.5 The quest for harmonization 
Together with the measures directed to the opening of the operation market to 
competition, the European Railway Reform has also sought to achieve greater levels of 
harmonization, able to consolidate a supranational railway market. 
Broadly speaking, the EU has promoted actions towards harmonization in the technical 
and the regulatory fields, with dissimilar success so far. While the steps towards 
technical integration have proceeded steadily, the attempts to promote common 
approaches to regulation have gone against a number of problems. 
The overview of the current situation has awaken a number of unanswered questions 
related to the harmonization process, like those concerning the determination of the 
optimal level of harmonization or the best steps to follow in order to create an integrated 
transport market. Behind them there is the fear that further divergence may only 
represent a threat for the efficiency and competitiveness of rail transport in relation to 
its competitors, road and air. 
 
2.5.1 Harmonization of railway markets in the EU 
Their historical development on a national scale, their strong links to national 
governments or the rigidity of their infrastructure are some of the factors that have 
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shaped the current heterogeneity of European railways. Traditionally more isolated than 
other sectors and deprived of competitive pressure, the national railway systems have 
often evolved along diverging tracks, building particular institutional frameworks and 
specific technical standards fit to their domestic conditions. The cumulative effect over 
time of these individual trajectories has ended up in the present situation, which still 
looks more like a patchwork than a common market. 
Against this background, the European Commission (2001a, pp. 26-30) has repeatedly 
stated the goal of creating a genuine internal rail market able to overcome the existing 
technical and regulatory barriers in order to set up a legally and technologically 
integrated railway area. In line with this objective, the EU has promoted several actions 
to improve the integration of national railways: 
• The development of the trans-European rail network. 
• The technical harmonization of the trans-European rail network through the 
development of common standards. 
• The elaboration of a common approach to rail safety. 
• The establishment of the European Railway Agency (ERA) to implement the 
EU interoperability and safety legislation and to act as a network integrator at 
the European level. 
• The development of common principles for the opening of rail transport to 
competition and the regulation of access to rail networks. 
As far as the technical aspects are concerned, harmonization policies have been launched 
since the mid nineties and are currently being developed at different levels of 
advancement. 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht defined the trans-European transport network, its 
development has progressed constantly. Already in 1994 the European Council held in 
Essen selected 14 priority transport projects for the EU, most of which corresponded to 
railways. Two years later the same projects were confirmed and included within the 
guidelines for the development of a trans-European transport network (TEN-T) set in 
the Parliament and Council Decision 1692/96/EC. In 2001, the EC (2001a, p.17) 
proposed the amendment of the priority projects arguing that some of them had already 
been concluded and others could be added. After an intense debate, the list of priority 
projects was finally updated through Decision 884/2004/EC, that increased their number 
to 30 (Fig. 13). 
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Fig. 13: TEN-T priority projects 
 
Source: EC, 2004b 
Together with the development of the infrastructure, measures have also been adopted 
in order to eliminate the existing technical barriers. The Rail Interoperability Directives 
(96/48/EC for the high speed network and 2001/16/EC for the conventional network) 
made it possible to launch the work needed to define the Technical Specifications for 
Interoperability (TSI), essential to ensure that trains can run safely and seamlessly 
throughout the entire trans-European rail transport network. In fact, the TSI define the 
requirements for interoperability and the parameters to be respected for all the 
subsystems and interfaces of the trans-European rail system. Since then, the process of 
technical harmonization has continued its steady course, as it is shown by the constant 
legislative development (Directive 2004/50/EC updating of the Railway Interoperability 
Directives or the recently approved recast - Directive 2008/57/EC). 
The introduction of a common approach to safety started with the enactment of the 
Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) within the Second Railway Package. The text 
established guidelines to develop common safety indicators, methods, targets and 
management systems and regulated the delivery of safety certificates and authorizations 
in the Union as well as the functions of Safety Authorities. 
Particularly relevant for the technical interoperability is the role of the ERA, set up to 
help create this integrated railway area by reinforcing safety and interoperability. Its 
main task is to develop economically viable common technical standards and approaches 
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to safety, working closely with railway sector stakeholders, national authorities and 
other concerned parties, as well as with the European institutions. 
In contrast with the progress performed in the previous technical aspects, the initiatives 
oriented to the harmonization of institutional and regulatory conditions, have progressed 
slowly and find important difficulties in many fronts. Though the EU promoted vertical 
separation, mandatory access regulation or pricing principles within an ideal of 
consistency, the reality has been diverging regulation. The heterogeneity of the system 
has even been increased by the preliminary results of the reform, which have brought in 
a large number of new stakeholders, multiplying the quantity of interfaces in the system 
and their complexity. 
The evidence of poor and slow success so far in the harmonization of regulatory 
aspects, together with the increased complexity observed in the present situation, has 
risen the point of whether the implementation of harmonization policies in these fields 
might be feasible or whether it could be improved. This consideration is particularly 
relevant as regards current diversity of railway infrastructure charges, which could be 
seen as the symbol of the failure of the European harmonization quest. 
 
2.5.2 Optimal harmonization level 
The promotion of harmonization policies by the European institutions and the 
resistances encountered so far at national level have fed the debate on what should be the 
optimal harmonization level11 for railway regulation across the Member States. On the 
one hand harmonization may deliver benefits such as lower input costs, better 
operational efficiency or access to wider markets. Moreover, as stated in the rationale of 
the railway reform, it may facilitate the introduction of competition in the European 
railways, improving their performance against less efficient competing modes. On the 
other hand, customization is often a cost effective answer to particular domestic 
conditions, generally better than a one size fits all practice, but imposes costs on those 
users shifting from one system to the other. As well, inadequate or excessive 
harmonization relative to the geographical, operational and traffic needs can generate 
additional costs for maintaining and using the network. 
The optimal harmonization level results from a trade-off between the benefits of both 
alternatives, and will certainly depend on the number of interfaces existing in the overall 
system, the number of real or potential users aiming to travel across national systems 
                                                
11 Harmonization is not an absolute concept; more precisely we should talk about harmonization level as 
a compromise between customization and total harmonization. 
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and the local specificities of every system. In line with these arguments, an extensive 
report on railway harmonization from the Australian Bureau of Transport and Regional 
Economics (2006, pp.47-63) points out the dependency of this trade-off on market and 
geographical operating environments, as well as on financial and safety risks. It also 
underscores the relevance of the inherited historical decisions, which influence the future 
evolution of the system. 
The problem remains in the quantification of the costs and benefits involved in the 
trades-off leading to a certain degree of harmonization. In a report to the European 
Commission, NERA (2000, pp.101-102) argued that such estimation would be 
unrealistic if conducted ex ante because of the indefinition of the alternatives to be 
compared and the relevance of indirect effects like greater flexibility or more 
competition. The distribution over time of costs and benefits was also pointed as an 
issue, given the temporal uncertainty of the benefits resulting from harmonization. 
As regards the particular case of international rail services, Bassanini and Pouyet (2000, 
p.18) demonstrated that in the absence of any regulatory harmonization the vertical 
separation produces particular problems for international rail traffic. They identified the 
double marginalization problem12 and the constituency effect13 and remarked that the 
natural output is suboptimal pricing of the rail system as a whole. Their result certainly 
suggests the need of some kind of harmonization of infrastructure charging, but should 
charges be harmonized? If yes, to what extent? These are questions without a clear 
practical answer so far. 
On the one side it seems that heterogeneity has certainly contributed to the poor 
development of the international rail services observed in the last years, delaying 
relevant performance improvements as well as appropriate investments. On the other, 
diversity in charging levels and structures may be preferred to harmonization in several 
circumstances, including different availability of State funding or new investments. From 
this second point of view, only the diversity of levels and structures will be able to 
reflect the infrastructure and train operating economics and the requirements of the 
domestic goods and passenger markets. 
Thus, there is no irrefutable evidence that charging levels and charging structures should 
be identical across the system, but it is still certain that harmonization can be promoted 
at different intensities and that a greater degree of harmonization seems to be desirable. 
                                                
12 The double marginalization problem arises as the vertical enchainement of two monopolies, the second 
having as input the price set by the first. 
13 The constituency effect results from the unilateral behavior of each infrastructure manager, that will 
ignore the effect on the welfare of the other of its own decisions. 
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The alternative to the efforts towards a greater level of harmonization has been clearly 
described by Nash and Niskanen (2000, p.4) in the following terms: “the result that the 
optimal approach to rail infrastructure charging varies so strongly with circumstances 
means that the prospects for the degree of harmonisation throughout Europe seen as 
necessary to promote international rail traffic may seem poor”. 
 
 
2.6 Synthesis 
From the beginning of the ‘90s, the European Union has undertaken a deep reform of the 
railway sector with the declared aim of revitalizing this mode, affected by a decreasing 
market share in spite of the significant raise in the overall transport demand observed 
during the last decades. This evolution has led to an unbalanced transport system, 
strongly relying on the road mode, in which increasing environmental and economic 
problems arise. 
To address this situation, the EU has promoted a step-by-step market opening directed 
to introduce competition in a sector where national monopolies have constituted the 
main industrial structure. The core principle for the implementation of the reform has 
consisted in the vertical separation of the infrastructure management and the operation 
business, with the opening to competition of the latter and the introduction of 
infrastructure charges as main results. Although this reform is still ongoing, a 
preliminary evaluation suggests that its degree of implementation, the degree of 
competition introduced in the market and the final economic effects are evolving slow 
and with poor success so far. 
Part of these shortcomes may be attributed to the failure in harmonizing the regulatory 
aspects of the reform across the Member States, together with the increased complexity 
derived from the reform itself. There is evidence that the combination of vertical 
separation and non-harmonized regulation may hinder the development of international 
rail traffic. This consideration is particularly appropriate in relation to the current 
diversity of railway infrastructure charges and has recently fostered the debate on what 
should be their desirable level of harmonization. The preliminary outcome of the ongoing 
discussion suggests the convenience of promoting a greater degree of harmonization. 
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Chapter 
3  
RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Within those networks where vertical separation has been enforced or where mandated 
access is compulsory, infrastructure charges are essential for the correct functioning of 
the whole railway system, either above and below the track. In fact, under these 
arrangements the level and the form of the charges act as the control element of the 
whole productive system of railway transport. They are the natural source of incomes 
for the infrastructure manager, often complementing public funding; they are a cost for 
the operator, influencing the supply of railway services and contributing to the 
formation of the final user charge; finally they set the conditions to access the network, 
favouring or limiting the effective opening of the operation business to competition. 
Fig. 14: Scheme of the multiple interests involved in the definition of track access charges  
 
Source: Bohrer 2007, p.3 
Furthermore, their definition involves both economic and political considerations. This 
double character derives from the monopolistic nature of the railway infrastructure 
business, requiring the adoption of regulations to set prices, and from the strong decision 
power in the hands of the public sector, which often sets the goals and aims to be 
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achieved by the infrastructure charges. The political character is reinforced by the 
existence of a large number of agents affected by the final form and level of the charges, 
often with conflicting interests and requirements (Fig. 14). On the other side, the 
economic theory provides a number of recommendations and guidelines as regards the 
setting of track access charges, including the principles that should drive them, the 
differentiation of their structure or the calculation of their levels. 
This chapter seeks to illustrate the specificities of the railway infrastructure charging 
activity, particularly in relation to the regulation and the pricing theory. This 
characterization will be the basis for the particularization of the conceptual framework 
proposed in chapter 5. 
Section 3.2 examines the distinctive aspects of railway infrastructure markets; Section 
3.3 analyzes the approaches to their regulation proposed by the economic theory; 
Section 3.4 treats the specific issue of pricing regulation; Section 3.5 provides a 
reflection on the pricing principles available in the economic theory and the problems 
related to their practical implementation; Section 3.6 elaborates on the differentiation of 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure; Section 3.7 is focused on the level of 
charges; All of them provide a specific insight on the situation in Europe. 
Section 3.8 analyzes previous works on the conceptualization of pricing policies and 
proposes a scheme for the decision process involved in the definition of railway 
infrastructure charges; Finally, section 3.9 presents a synthesis of the chapter. 
 
 
3.2 Railway infrastructure markets 
3.2.1 Definition and structures 
The vertical separation between the provision of train services and the infrastructure 
management has set the fundamentals for the development of a new railway related 
market at the interface between infrastructure managers and transport operators: the 
railway infrastructure market. Within it, the infrastructure managers allocate capacity 
use rights to the railway operating companies in exchange of the payment of an access 
charge (the railway infrastructure charge or track access charge). 
The goods sold in such market, the capacity use rights, are generally bundled in the form 
of train paths differentiated in time and space. They may also be characterized by their 
quality related to operational and/or technical features (e.g. gauge or maximum axle 
weight allowed). 
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The production of capacity use rights depends on the specific assets available to the 
IM, namely the railway infrastructure14. Accordingly railway infrastructure markets are 
strongly conditioned by the network inherited from the past, in terms of extension, 
technical characteristics, quality or state of maintenance and renewal. 
Obviously, the production and selling of capacity use rights shares the economic 
characteristics of the railway infrastructure itself. The more remarkable among them are 
the high level of fixed and sunk production costs (leading to a natural monopoly), the 
presence of indivisibilities that cause the lumpiness of any increase in capacity, the 
multi-product nature of the output (as it is possible to produce a large number of 
different train paths within the same infrastructure) or the strong inertia of the system 
(due the long useful life and rigidity of the network). 
As well, it also shares some of its “political” characteristics, as its conception as a 
public service. As noted by Campos et al. (2000, p.7) “the conception of rail 
transportation as a public or social service, irrespective of its profitability, is another of 
the defining elements that have determined the worldwide industry organization and 
performance during this century”. 
Railway infrastructure markets are intermediate markets strongly interdependent in their 
vertical relations (Fig. 15). In fact, the demand of infrastructure capacity is directly 
related to the demand of railway transport, result of the total volume of transport 
requested by the market and the particular intermodal competition conditions. The 
segmentation of the demand for infrastructure capacity and the formation of train paths 
depend as well on the particular segmentation of rail transport demand (e.g. freight, 
regional, long distance, etc.). 
Fig. 15: Conceptual diagram of the interdependencies between transport and railway 
infrastructure market  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
                                                
14 At European level, railway infrastructure was legally defined in Regulation 2598/70/EEC, which 
included the following elements: ground area, track and track bed, engineering structures, level crossings, 
superstructures, lighting installations, plants for transforming and carrying electric power for train haulage 
and the buildings used by the infrastructure department. 
Transport market 
Railway transport market 
Railway 
infrastructure  
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The intensive reform of railway sectors across the world with the objective of improving 
their organization and performance has changed their traditional structures, favouring in 
a number of cases the introduction of vertical separation and the creation of new railway 
infrastructure markets. Several classifications have been proposed for the resulting 
market structures, particularly as regards the degree of vertical separation and 
privatization (Fig. 16) or the degree of separation and competition in the operation 
business (Fig. 17). 
Fig. 16: Classification of railway infrastructure markets according to degree of privatization and 
separation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gómez Ibáñez, 2004, p.6 
 
Fig. 17: Classification of railway infrastructure markets according to degree of separation and 
competition  
 
Source: Nash et al. 2004, p.14 
 
These same three axes, together with a fourth one related to the type of regulation 
implemented to avoid the market power of the IM, describe the particular structure of 
the different railway infrastructure markets: 
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• Type of separation between the operation and the infrastructure business. On a 
growing scale from integration to separation it is possible to distinguish total 
integration, accounting separation, functional separation and institutional 
separation. Even in the case of total integration, the infrastructure manager may 
be obliged to sell capacity to other operators (e.g. US freight operators). 
• Type of competition in the operation segment. On a growing scale from totally 
opened to absence of competition four stages can be defined: competition in the 
market (free entry and exit, demand and supply determine prices and quality 
mixes), competition for the market (auction used to force potential monopolists 
to compete with each other for the right to be the single provider of a service), 
yardstick competition (based on performance comparison with similar entities) 
or absence of competition. 
• Type of ownership of the infrastructure business. It can be carried on by a State 
agency, a public company or a private company. 
• Type of regulation applied to the infrastructure manager. This point will be 
developed in the sections to come (3.3 and 3.4). 
 
3.2.2 Railway infrastructure markets in the EU  
The European Railway Reform has enforced the vertical separation of infrastructure 
management and transport operation across the EU, creating a railway infrastructure 
market on every national network, with its own technical and operational characteristics. 
Furthermore, the flexibility permitted by the European legislation concerning the type of 
separation, the type of competition, the type of ownership or the type of regulation, 
has allowed the development of different market structures. This section is aimed at 
briefly describing them. 
As regards the technical and operational characteristics of the European railway 
networks, they have been depicted in Table 7. The technical description of the network 
has been performed through the length of the network (km of line), the percentage of 
electrified lines and the percentage of lines equipped with more than one track. The 
operational description of the network has been done through the total traffic volume 
supported (in train-km), the intensity of use of the infrastructure (established on the 
basis of an estimated number of track-km) and the mix of the traffic (expressed as the 
percentage of the total traffic volume corresponding to freight services). 
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Table 7: Technical and operational characteristics of railway infrastructure markets in the EU-27 
Infrastructure (year 2006) Operation (year 2006) Country IM 
Length 
(km line) 
Electrif. 
(% line-
km)  
> 1 track 
(% line-
km) 
Train-km 
(000) 
Intensity  
(train-km 
/track-km) 
Freight 
(%train-
km) 
AT OBB Infr. 5.702 62% 36% 139.200 17.968 35,1% 
BE Infrabel 3.560 84% 77% 104.900 16.664 n/a 
BG NRIC 4.146 70% 23% 36.097 7.052 29,6% 
CZ SŽDC 9.491 32% 20% 148.839 13.123 22,2% 
DE DB Netz 34.128 57% 53% 1.016.354 19.441 24,2% 
DK Banedanmark 2.011 31% 46% 48.600 * 17.916 8,7% 
EE Eesti Raudte 801 16% 13% 8.300 9.141 71,1% 
EL Edisy 2.509 4% 19% 19.071 6.363 11,4% 
ES ADIF 12.991 59% 32% 175.000 10.206 20,6% 
FI RHK 5.905 52% 10% 50.880 7.858 36,1% 
FR RFF 29.547 48% 56% 537.222 11.681 25,0% 
HU MAV 7.648 34% 15% 95.100 10.769 18,7% 
IE Iarnród Éireann 1.919 3% 26% 18.242 7.550 20,5% 
IT RFI 16.295 70% 42% 345.695 14.905 19,2% 
LT LG 1.771 7% 22% 13.818 6.409 66,0% 
LU CFL 275 95% 51% 5.061 12.195 12,1% 
LV LDZ 2.374 19% 10% 16.769 6.422 56,3% 
NL ProRail 2.776 73% 67% 130.000 * 28.102 n/a 
PL PKP PLK 19.429 61% 44% 222.999 * 7.945 41,0% 
PT REFER 2.839 51% 21% 39.039 11.329 18,5% 
RO CFR 10.781 37% 28% 170.284 12.348 29,3% 
SE Banverket 9.957 78% 19% 124.000 10.495 35,5% 
SI AZP 1.228 41% 27% 18.794 12.063 42,7% 
SK ZSR 3.658 43% 28% 49.936 10.678 36,0% 
UK Network Rail 19.568 79% n/a 463.500 + n/a n/a 
Note: Electrif.: % of lines electrified; Intensity estimated as train-km/[(1+%lines > 1 track)*Length]; *: 
Data corresponding to year 2005; +: only passenger traffic; n/a: non available.  
Source: own elaboration with data from UIC (2007), López Pita (2006, p.21), Banverket (2007b, p.10), 
PKP PLK (2006a, p.31), ORR (2007, p.70), Infrabel (2007, p.92), OBB (2007, p.65), Brockhoff (2006, 
p.2) and Statistics Denmark (2006, p.10) 
 
As regards the type of separation, all Member States (except the Republic of Ireland, 
Northern Ireland and Estonia, for one of two networks) have achieved at least 
accounting separation of infrastructure and operations (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a, 
p.69). However, depending on their national situation in terms of historical, political and 
institutional settings, they have adopted one or another arrangement for their railway 
sector. At present, 13 Member States have implemented the full separation of 
infrastructure and operation activities by constituting two legally and functionally 
independent companies. However, in few of these cases (France, Czech Republic, 
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Finland and Slovenia) there is still a strong participation of the operation company in 
the network management activity (Hovald, 2006, pp.9-10). Twelve European countries 
have set up two different companies for infrastructure and operation, but they are still 
linked since they belong to the same holding company. A synthesis of these results is 
shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Vertical separation in the EU-27 
Full separation Partially integrated separation 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland 
Source: own elaboration with data from Steer Davies Gleave, 2005a 
 
The railway infrastructure markets in the EU are also different as regards the type of 
competition. Some Member States have introduced competition for the market 
mechanisms in the passenger transport segment15. This is the case of Austria (limited to 
regional passenger services), Denmark (progressive introduction for regional passenger 
services), Estonia (all passenger services), Germany (some regional passenger services), 
Italy (now being introduced for regional passenger services), Netherlands (some regional 
services), Portugal (one service), Sweden (all subsidized passenger services) and United 
Kingdom (all domestic passenger services) (ECMT, 2005, p. 69). 
The European scenario is more homogeneous as regards the type of ownership, as the 
infrastructure management activity in Europe is performed by entities directly or 
indirectly owned by the Member States (Table 9). Four major arrangements can be 
found: 1) Infrastructure managers integrated in the structure of the State in the form of 
an agency (e.g. Banverket or RHK); 2) Infrastructure managers established as public 
business entities owned by the State (e.g. ADIF or RFF); 3) Infrastructure managers in 
the form of stock companies, whose shares are owned by public holdings; and 4) The 
British arrangement, in which the control is exerted by the State though the company 
nominally belongs to various stakeholders without the emission of shares. 
It is noticeable the fact that the two European experiences that foresaw the privatization 
of the infrastructure management activity (the case of Railtrack in the UK and the case 
of EVR in Estonia) have ended up in the renationalization of their businesses. 
 
                                                
15 As regards the freight transport segment, the EU legislation only allows competition in the market 
mechanisms (see section 2.3.3.3). 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 52 
Table 9: Ownership and legal form of the national infrastructure managers in the EU-27 
Country Infrastructure 
manager 
Legal form Ownership 
AT OBB Infr. Joint stock company 100% owned by ÖBB Holding AG, in turn 
owned by the Austrian State 
BE Infrabel Public business entity 7,34% Belgian State, 92,66% SNCB Holding, 
in turn owned by the Belgium State (99,9%)  
BG NRIC State organization Bulgarian State 
CZ SŽDC State organization Czech State 
DE DB Netz Joint stock company 100% owned by DB AG, in turn 100% owned 
by the German State 
DK Banedanmark Public business entity Danish State 
EE Eesti Raudte Joint stock company 66% is privately owned by BRS (Baltic Rail 
Service), 34% Estonian State (until 2006). 
Renationalized since 2007 
EL Edisy Joint stock company 100% owned by OSE SA, in turn 100% owned 
by the Ministry of Economy 
ES ADIF Public business entity Spanish State 
FI RHK State organization Finnish State 
FR RFF Public business entity French State 
HU MAV Public business entity Hungarian State 
IE Iarnród Éireann Joint stock company 100% owned by CIÉ Group, in turn 100% 
owned by the Irish State 
IT RFI Join stock company 100% owned by FS, in turn 100% owned by the 
Italian State 
LT LG Joint stock company 100% owned by the Lithuanian State 
LU CFL Joint stock company Luxembourg State 
LV LDZ Joint stock company Latvian State 
NL ProRail Company limited by 
shares 
Dutch State 
PL PKP PLK Joint stock company Jointly owned by PKP S.A. and Ministry of 
Finance. 
PT REFER Public business entity Portuguese State 
RO CFR Joint stock company 100% owned by the Ministry of Transport, 
Construction and Tourism. 
SE Banverket State organization Swedish State 
SI AZP State organization Slovenian State 
SK ZSR State organization Slovak State 
UK Network Rail Company limited by 
guarantee 
Several entities, among them the DfT (UK 
State) 
Source: own elaboration with data from RAILCALC Consortium, 2008b, Annex B, pp.33-95; RDC 
(2007); ERAIL Consortium (2005a, p.15); ERAIL Consortium (2005b, p.10); ERAIL Consortium (2005c, 
p.15); Coutrouba et al. (2006, p.15) and TREND Consortium (2006, p.19) 
Lastly, the railway infrastructure markets of the Member States can be distinguished by 
the type of regulation implemented. This aspect is developed in sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.2. 
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3.3 Regulation of railway infrastructure markets 
According to the public-interest theory, governments must step in to regulate markets 
whenever markets fail to regulate themselves. These so-called market failures occur 
where the price mechanism that regulates supply and demand breaks down, leading to 
undesirable outcomes. This is obviously the case of monopolies. 
Regulation of railway infrastructure markets is aimed at minimizing the arbitrariness and 
the inefficiencies that could arise under monopolistic conditions. Under perfect 
competition conditions, the freedom of service providers to set prices tends to benefit 
users. In addition, it ensures that the providers will have an incentive to minimize costs 
while setting prices that guarantee their financial equilibrium. On the opposite, under 
monopolistic conditions the service provider is free to set the price that maximizes its 
profit, without any constraint on its efficiency or the service quality delivered. 
In this case, the role of regulation is to set infrastructure prices and service quality so as 
to ensure that users get an outcome similar to the one expected under effective 
competition. The choice of whether and how a government should regulate monopoly 
depends in part on the values or goals it considers important. 
The vertical separation of railway transport markets reduces the need for regulation to 
the segments of the industry where there still remain elements of monopoly power, but 
comes at the cost of an increasing regulatory complexity at the interface between its 
different segments. Additionally, the regulator has still to care about infrastructure 
prices and service quality, but also about non-discriminatory access to the network, 
which usually involves the consideration of multiple issues (e.g. information made 
available to operators, capacity allocation procedures, access to facilities, etc.). 
 
3.3.1 Regulatory options 
To protect the public interest objectives against the market power exerted by a 
monopoly there is a number of different regulatory systems that may be applied. In the 
particular case of railway infrastructure markets, the choice of one or another option 
depends on the government objectives and the specific structure of the market16. 
In broad terms, the regulation alternatives available may be distinguished among direct 
regulation, indirect (or incentive-based) regulation and mixed regulation depending on the 
                                                
16 There is an extensive literature dedicated to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
regulatory systems and to investigate which would be the more appropriate form of regulation for railway 
infrastructure. This debate is not detailed here, as it falls beyond the objectives of this thesis. 
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type of coercion involved. Direct regulation is anchored in the direct coercion of the 
regulated agent, normally through decision-power backed by legislative provisions. This 
alternative includes constraints and obligations such as structure regulation (enforcing 
certain company structures), the specification of terms ruling concession agreements and 
territorial licenses or security of supply requirements. Indirect regulation exerts indirect 
coercion on the behaviour of the regulated agent through the definition of economic 
penalties and rewards. Price regulation mechanisms such as revenue caps, performance 
agreements or bonus/malus systems fall within this category. Finally, mixed regulation 
applies a mix of direct and incentive-based regulation to guide the regulated agent. This 
form of regulation is applied in most countries, as direct regulation is often a necessary 
supplement to incentive regulation. 
Though these alternatives are available to any government, the historical evolution of 
monopoly regulation seems to design a trend towards an increasing use of indirect 
mechanisms, going from the nationalization of the industry to avoid the misuse of 
market power to new paradigms of regulation adapted to the recent privatisation and 
deregulation trends. 
If attention is directed now to the specific solutions available to policy-makers, it is 
possible to draw more detailed distinctions in the previous classification. According to 
Gomez Ibañez (2006, p.11) “the solutions to monopoly can be arrayed along a 
continuum according to the relative roles that markets and politics play in determining 
infrastructure prices and service quality”. Along this continuum, the author 
distinguishes commercial contracts, concession contracts, a discretionary approach (i.e. 
the creation of specialized regulatory institutions) and a public policy approach (Fig. 
18). 
Fig. 18: Classification of regulatory solutions to monopoly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gómez Ibañez, 2006, p.11 
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In the case of railways, regulation has been mainly performed from politics, in the form 
of concession contracts, discretionary regulation and public control (Gómez Ibáñez, 
2006, pp.29-32). 
When the regulation of the infrastructure business adopts the form of a concession 
contract, the concessionaire takes on operations and investment as well as commercial 
risk within the limits set in the contract. The contract is signed between the government, 
representing the public interest, and the infrastructure manager, usually selected through 
competitive bidding. The definition of concession contracts is intended to specify the 
outputs and economic compensations related to infrastructure provision, as well as to 
regulate as much as possible unpredictable events. Accordingly concession contracts 
clearly state key aspects such as duration, investment and other obligations, revenue, 
tariffs, regulatory regime, control, sanctions, renegotiation conditions, etc. (Estache, 
2000, pp.16-22). 
A more frequent form of regulation in the infrastructure business is discretionary 
regulation. This approach involves creating a government regulatory agency with the 
power to unilaterally establish the infrastructure firm’s tariffs and service standards. It 
is a more flexible approach than a contract, as the agency has the possibility to react to 
changing circumstances. Contrarily to the concession contract, the influence of market 
forces is reduced and the agency must set conditions to mimic what the competitive 
outcomes would have been. A specific problem of discretionary regulation regards its 
wide information requirements and the information asymmetry between the agency and 
the infrastructure manager (as technology, cost structure or demand are better known by 
the regulated agent). 
The settlement of regulatory agencies finds different degrees of decision independence 
from the government. In those cases in which the regulatory agency is closer to the 
government, it can suffer strong political pressures in the form of government objectives 
other than those dictated by the public interest. This is frequently the case for fiscal and 
distributional objectives. 
If the infrastructure business is integrated within the structure of the State, then it is 
generally the case for direct public control. Different options may be included within 
this concept, from the signature of framework agreements between the State and the 
infrastructure manager (as a way to set technical, economic and financial targets able to 
increase performance) to the direct imposition of government’s targets and goals. 
As regards the particular problem of regulating the access of operators to the network, 
three solutions are foreseen by the theory (Gómez Ibáñez, 1999, pp.12-14): 
• Track access charges publicly defined by the Member State or the regulator in 
order to provide access to the infrastructure. They may be complemented by 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 56 
some type of rule-based allocation of capacity able to solve conflicting demands 
on the access to bottleneck facilities. Their setting becomes particularly relevant 
in the case of partially integrated separation, where the infrastructure manager 
may have strong links to the incumbent operator. 
• Negotiated access between the monopolistic infrastructure provider and the 
operators. The agreements should clarify the access charges, services, and 
investments involved on both sides. This type of agreements should be reviewed 
by the regulator, to insure that the infrastructure provider is not abusing of his 
monopoly position. 
• A final strategy for coordinating vertically separated industries is to create a 
market for capacity rights in the monopoly infrastructure system. In the case of 
railways, this type of markets has not been developed, mainly because of the 
limitations found to clearly define the capacity and the difficulties encountered in 
designing appropriate auction mechanisms in situations of scarce capacity. As 
remarked by Gibson (2003, p.40), railway infrastructure capacity is non 
homogeneous and it is subject to network effects, interdependency and 
contingent valuation. These characteristics would require a hugely complex 
mechanism to introduce an auction-based approach to capacity allocation. 
 
3.3.2 Regulatory approaches in the EU 
In the EU, the basic approach to the regulation of railway infrastructure markets has 
been the establishment of access charges at the interface with operators and the 
constitution of regulatory agencies in order to control the monopolistic behaviour of the 
IM. Only in very specific cases the regulation of the infrastructure business has been 
provided through concession contracts17. 
In fact, the current legislation requires the constitution of a regulatory body independent 
from the infrastructure manager and the transport operating companies in its 
organization, funding decisions, legal structure and decision-making. The body is 
responsible for various regulatory functions, including complaints and appeals from 
applicants as well as for ensuring that infrastructure charges are set in accordance with 
EU legislation and are non-discriminatory. As well, the regulatory body shall supervise 
any negotiations between the infrastructure manager and applicants (Directive 
2001/14/EC, Art. 30). 
                                                
17 An example of this kind of regulation may be found in the concession contract defining the activity of 
the private infrastructure manager TP Ferro in the link Figueres-Perpignan. 
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Within this basic framework, a recent study by IBM (2006) on rail regulation in Europe 
identified three models of regulatory bodies (Fig. 19): 
• The Ministry regulatory model: includes Member States that have either named 
the Transport Ministry as the regulatory body, have no regulatory body with 
decision-making powers and/or have no standing organization that is responsible 
for regulatory matters in the rail sector. 
• The Railway Authority regulatory model: includes Member States that have 
assigned regulatory duties to a traditional railway supervisory authority dealing 
primarily with licenses, safety and other railway-specific administrative tasks. 
• The Special Regulatory Authority regulatory model: includes the Member States 
that have set an independent authority with decision-making powers that is 
specialised in regulatory matters, has specially trained staff, is provided with far 
reaching power to enforce their decisions and has already cumulated a 
considerable experience in regulatory cases. 
 
Fig. 19: Classification of  regulatory bodies in Europe. 2006 
 
Source: IBM, 2006, p.18 
 
In spite of the form of the regulator, under EU Law the access to the network is 
controlled by railway infrastructure charges and priority rules. Allocation of capacity 
must be performed by the infrastructure manager according to specific capacity 
allocation rules, and any secondary trading of capacity is explicitly forbidden (Directive 
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2001/14/EC, Arts. 13 and 14). To avoid discrimination of operators and increase 
transparency, the infrastructure manager must develop and publish a network statement 
with information about the technical nature and limitations of the network, access 
conditions, rules on capacity allocation as well as the tariff structure and the priority 
rules to be applied in case of conflicting demands (Art.3). The Directive 2001/14/EC 
also regulates investments in the network, requesting the IM to perform network 
capacity analyzes in order to identify bottlenecks, as well as specific plans to improve 
the quality and capacity of the infrastructure (Arts. 22, 25, 26). 
Currently almost all EU countries publish network statements in accordance to the legal 
requirements (RAILCALC Consortium, 2008b, pp.18-19). In rare cases they include 
explicit references to auctioning procedures (e.g. in Estonia – Eesti Raudtee, 2006, p.14) 
or negotiations (e.g. in Poland – PKP PLK, 2006b, p.26). 
In some markets, the implementation of infrastructure charges to regulate the access to 
the network and the setting of priority rules must be coordinated with the existence of 
franchising agreements. 
The main characteristics18 of such agreements in the EU can be resumed as follow: 
• They are mainly signed for regional passenger services. 
• They are awarded through a bidding procedure pointing at a minimum subsidy 
request or at an improvement of the quality/quantity of the supply. Frequently 
the agreements include a tight service specification on frequencies, timetables and 
rolling stock. 
• Their durations differ across Member States, in particular depending on the 
inclusion or not of rolling stock. Typical durations are 3-5 years (Sweden), 5-6 
years (Netherlands - without rolling stock), 7-9 years (UK, Denmark, Germany), 
10-15 years (Netherlands - with rolling stock) and 30 years (Portugal). 
• They are generally established on a net cost basis (transferring both cost and 
income risk to the franchisee). 
As regards their coordination with access charges, they normally include cost pass-
through provisions or facilitate adequate information on them and their likely evolution 
at the time of the bidding procedure. The second is the case of the passenger franchises 
in the UK, described by NERA (1998, pp.90-91) in these terms: “Where train services 
are franchised, in particular, fixed charges announced before franchise bids are 
submitted should not affect the profitability of franchised train operators (since train 
                                                
18 Based on ECMT (1998a, pp.74-75), Brenck et al. (2006, p.16), Dijk (2006, p.17), Alexandersson et 
al. (2006, p.7) and Kain (2006, p.4). 
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operators can pass these charges on to the franchising authority in the form of higher 
subsidy requirements or lower payments for the franchise)”. 
 
 
3.4 Price regulation 
The adequate control of the infrastructure provider requires the implementation of 
regulatory schemes able to influence directly or indirectly the prices applied in the 
market, bringing them closer to the equilibrium resulting from competitive conditions 
and guaranteeing fair access to the railway network. Nevertheless, other considerations 
intervene in the formation of prices. 
In fact, apart from looking for static and dynamic efficiency19 in the infrastructure 
market, the setting of prices must also allow the infrastructure manager to reach the 
financial equilibrium and avoid imposing excessive regulatory compliance costs. As well, 
pricing should ensure fair access to bottleneck facilities at the same time that it provides 
adequate resources and incentives for capacity improvement. Finally, it may also be 
subject to other governmental requirements in terms of equity or distribution effects. 
To give an answer to these requisites, regulators have a number of options to influence 
the prices in the infrastructure market and drive the behaviour of the monopolistic agent. 
 
3.4.1 Approaches to price regulation 
Once the decision to regulate the infrastructure railway market has been taken, there is a 
substantial menu of options from which to choose20. Next, they are briefly described 
and discussed. 
Direct price setting – the regulator directly sets the price of the capacity rights in the 
railway infrastructure market. The main criticisms to this approach come from the 
inefficiencies likely to arise as a result of political pressures and information asymmetry. 
                                                
19  Several definitions of efficiency are provided by the economical science. Allocative efficiency refers to 
the allocation of resources to the production of the goods and services most valued by society; Productive 
efficiency refers to the use of the minimum quantity of inputs to produce goods and services; Static 
efficiency is referred to the conditions prevailing in the present situation; Dynamic efficiency takes into 
account the evolution of the system, delivering adequate signals to the market for investment and 
disinvestment decisions. 
20 This section mainly builds on Campos et al. (2000, pp. 24-28), De Rus et al. (2003, pp.270-285) and 
King (1997, p.47). 
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Rate of return regulation (ROR) – under this scheme the regulator fixes the return on 
investment allowed to the infrastructure company in addition to its operational costs. 
As the financial equilibrium condition stands, in doing so, the regulator fixes indirectly 
the prices (calculated as a residual figure). The regulator has to define the asset base over 
which the return is allowed (regulatory asset base), the operational expenditures and the 
rate of return applied. Though it limits indirectly the revenues of the infrastructure 
company, this approach does not provide incentives for efficiency. On the contrary, it 
incentivates overinvestment and overvaluation of assets and frees the company from 
demand risk (which is passed directly to users). It poses strong information 
requirements on the regulator. 
Cost plus regulation – under this scheme, the regulator constrains the revenues of the 
infrastructure company not to be more than actual costs plus a mark-up. Prices are then 
derived from the total revenue requirement. The regulator needs to define the cost basis 
applied to set the regulation and the extra revenue allowed. This approach can also be 
applied on an efficient cost basis, though it can be very demanding in information. Like 
in the previous case, the action on the revenue side of the financial equilibrium does not 
provide any efficiency incentives (in fact it fosters increases in those costs included in 
the regulatory asset base). 
Revenue cap regulation – under this scheme, the infrastructure company is allowed to 
keep the difference between the total revenues, up to a permitted maximum, and the 
actual costs. The company is not guaranteed full cost recovery, but through efficiency 
and cost reductions will be able to increase its profit. Prices are indirectly limited by the 
cap on the revenue. The regulator fixes the period over which the incentives will be 
maintained and frequently allows adjustments to the revenue level with regard to 
efficiency improvement, inflation and the cost of essential supplies/energy. The 
independence of the cap from costs provides strong incentives to the infrastructure 
company for efficient management. However, the regulator needs to control the costs of 
the company in order to ensure its financial viability, especially when future 
investments are foreseen. 
Price cap regulation – the regulator allows the infrastructure company to increase its 
prices with inflation, less a “discount” reflecting all or part of the average increase in 
productivity in the sector. In this case the regulator sets a maximum average of the 
tariffs, below which the company has full pricing freedom. The price level is updated 
according to the RPI-X formula, where RPI is an inflation factor and X is meant to 
reflect potential cost savings by the firm due to either increased efficiency or 
technological progress. Prices are directly limited by the cap. 
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The regulator fixes the period over which the cap will be maintained (normally 3-5 
years) and, as in the previous case, normally allows adjustments to the revenue level 
with regard to efficiency, inflation and delivered supply / energy. This approach requires 
low information requirements: an estimation of the appropriate level of prices at the 
beginning of the first regulatory period, the estimation of the X factor and the time 
between reviews. 
When the regulated firm produces multiple services, the price cap is frequently set for 
the bundle of services provided (generally averaged after weighting services with their 
volume of sales). This approach provides incentives to efficiency and cost reduction 
because profit remains with the regulated company. As in the previous case, the 
regulator must ensure the financial viability of the company. 
With independence of the final election made by the regulator, the implementation of the 
mentioned schemes faces specific information requirements and decisions that may 
condition their outcomes to a large extend: 1) They must define the asset base or the 
cost base to be adopted for the calculation; 2) They must select valuation criteria and 
depreciation rules in order to calculate capital expenditures; 3) They must assess the 
level of operational costs of the network; and 4) They must ensure the financial viability 
of the infrastructure company. None of these requirements is simple when it is applied 
on a railway infrastructure network. 
 
3.4.2 Price regulation in the EU 
The regulation of prices in the European railway infrastructure markets is strongly 
conditioned by the EU legislative framework, that sets conditions on the financial 
equilibrium of the infrastructure business and on the basic pricing principles that must 
drive the determination of track access charges. 
According to this framework, most of the Member States have adopted direct price 
setting rules either based on costs or taking into account the willingness to pay of the 
demand. In this case, given the fact that charges are usually below the full cost level, the 
national administrations regulate the behaviour of the infrastructure managers through 
the signature of framework agreements linking the payment of public funds to the 
achievement of specific levels of performance. 
However, some Member States report price-setting procedures that place efficiency 
incentives within the definition of track access charges. One of these states is the UK, 
which establishes the value of the fixed charge to be paid by operators according to a 
price cap mechanism. The regulator defines the financial needs of the infrastructure 
manager for the five-year control period on the basis of efficient costs and then sets the 
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fixed charge accordingly (see section 6.4.3 for further details). Another case can be found 
in Portugal, which allocates a bundle of costs to prices taking into account an efficiency 
curve modulated for a seven year period (see section 6.4.5). 
 
 
3.5 Pricing principles 
Price systems exist to guide decisions in such a way as to reach the more efficient use of 
scarce resources. When price systems are applied to railway infrastructure, then the 
concerned scarce resource is capacity. Consequently, a system of access charges should 
serve to improve the utilization of the available capacity, guaranteeing rights of use to 
the most valuable services for society. Although certainly desirable, this objective is not 
the only one that can be reached by the infrastructure charging systems, that can also be 
set to recover a given level of costs, to optimise the network management, to orient 
investment decisions or to encourage productivity gains in the operation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure (ECMT, 1998b, pp.1-2). 
Unfortunately, there is not a pricing principle able to fulfil all the objectives at the same 
time, as a result of the particular characteristics of the railway infrastructure business, 
namely the presence of economies of scale, density and scope. The high amount of fixed 
costs makes incompatible to reach optimal efficiency and cost recovery at the same 
time. If the fixed costs are recovered through a fixed charge, then there is a risk of 
discrimination of new entrants, and so on. Therefore, the selection of a pricing principle 
implies a trade-off between alternative objectives of infrastructure pricing. 
In turn, the choice of the objectives that shall drive the selection of a pricing principle 
will result from the political and regulatory objectives established for the railway 
infrastructure market. 
 
3.5.1 Basic economic principles 
3.5.1.1 Marginal Cost Pricing  
The marginal cost21 pricing principle was first formulated by Hotelling (1938) in its now 
classical work “The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railways 
and utility rates”, in which he proved that marginal cost pricing is sufficient for welfare 
                                                
21 Marginal costs are specific variable costs related to the provision of a service or use of infrastructure. 
Marginal cost is the extra cost that is incurred by increasing output by one unit, and therefore can be 
expressed as the variation of the total costs with the production level. 
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optimality. Accordingly, marginal cost pricing should be adopted as principle in order to 
maximize social welfare, constituting the first best solution to the pricing problem. 
In the short run22, the marginal costs of rail infrastructure are the operation, maintenance 
and renewal costs that arise when an additional train runs in the network. Pricing railway 
infrastructure according to them minimizes the exclusion of railway operators, as every 
train able to pay its marginal costs will be admitted in the network. 
Fig. 20: Evolution of short run marginal costs with the quantity of output 
 
Note: MCuncongested – marginal costs in uncongested conditions; Q uncongested – maximum quantity of output 
in uncongested conditions; Q max – maximum quantity of output for the available capacity. 
Source: NERA et al. 1998, p.24 
However, due to the economies of scale existing in the rail infrastructure, the incomes 
generated by this principle will not be able to cover the fixed costs of operation, 
maintenance and renewal or the costs of upgrading and enlarging the network, resulting 
in deficit for the infrastructure manager. This deficit could be covered by general taxes, 
but at the cost of introducing distortive effects in the market. Another difficulty comes 
from the volatile nature of short run marginal costs when demand is approaching or even 
rising above the available capacity of the infrastructure (Fig. 20). In this case, the 
marginal costs should include disruption costs generated to other users or even scarcity 
costs (opportunity cost of the circulations priced off from the market). 
Other drawbacks of short run marginal cost pricing have been referred by Rothengatter 
(2003, p.124), who remarked the following points: 1) The practical measurement of 
SRMC is complex; 2) Equity is ignored, as general taxes must be used to cover the 
deficit; 3) Dynamic effects are ignored, as welfare maximization is achieved for the 
                                                
22 Depending on the period of time considered for the definition of marginal costs, it is possible to 
differentiate between: 1) Short run marginal costs (SRMC), calculated on the assumption that some 
production costs are fixed in the short term (e.g. infrastructure); and 2) Long run marginal costs (LRMC), 
obtained on the basis that all costs may be deemed variable with the output on the long run. 
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existing network without considering future investments or technology changes; 4) 
Financing issues are ignored; 5) Institutional issues are ignored; 6) Price distortions 
elsewhere in the economy are ignored; and 7) Implementing marginal social cost pricing 
may involve substantial administrative costs which may not always be justified by the 
benefits it brings. 
Nash (2003, p.348) replying to the previous assertions, admitted most of the criticisms 
raised, but also pointed out that this does not mean that a totally different theoretical 
approach to pricing policy needs to be adopted. He stated that “considerations such as 
budget constraints, equity, institutional issues, simplicity and price distortions elsewhere 
in the economy lead to a need to depart from pure marginal social cost pricing but do not 
change the position that the measurement of marginal social cost is the correct starting 
point in the development [of] any efficient pricing policy”. 
In the long run, the marginal costs of rail infrastructure also include the capital costs of 
expanding capacity to accommodate an increase in output. Pricing rail infrastructure 
according to them sets a price that is equal to the value of the resources that must be 
used to produce the transport performance in the future, ensuring the financial 
equilibrium of the infrastructure manager. Nevertheless, this approach finds difficulties 
because of the indivisibility of infrastructure assets, which imposes a long term forecast 
of which capacity enhancements will be carried in the future and at what cost. 
Fig. 21: Pigouvian taxation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In order to introduce marginal external costs in the charge and avoid the deadweight loss DWL, 
the price must include a tax t* able to shift the equilibrium from the private marginal cost curve AC ( ^p, 
^q) to the social marginal cost curve SRMC (p*, q*). The application of such a tax will generate extra 
revenues equal to the shaded area OR. 
Source: Rothengatter, 2003, p.124  
In addition to the selection of the time horizon in which to calculate marginal costs, the 
marginal cost pricing principle may choose to include or not external costs, derived from 
price 
quantity 
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effects on society such as ecological damage, congestion, noise, accidents, etc. In this 
case, externalities are included in the charge in the form of pigouvian taxation able to 
reflect social marginal costs. These taxes should be set equal to the difference between 
the marginal social cost (curve SRMC in Fig. 21) and the marginal private cost (curve 
AC) at the equilibrium between the marginal social cost and demand. 
3.5.1.2  Ramsey Pricing  
The basics of Ramsey pricing were set by Frank Ramsey (1927), who proposed it in the 
field of taxation after studying how to minimize the negative effects of indirect taxes. 
Ramsey pricing aims to maximize social welfare under the constraint of deficit coverage. 
It considers rail infrastructure as a multi-product natural monopoly and tries to find 
mark-ups for each of the products in order to cover the deficit that results from SRMC 
pricing. This involves varying charges reciprocal according to the elasticity of demand of 
each user or group of users. Ramsey prices are a second best solution as they deviate 
from unconstrained welfare maximization. 
Pricing railway infrastructure according to the Ramsey principle achieves static 
allocative efficiency under the constraint of deficit coverage, thus allowing the 
recuperation of a given cost target. As negative aspects it is to be noticed that it is a 
second best solution involving large information requirements (elasticities of the demand 
– e.g. willingness to pay of railway undertakings) and that it provides no incentives for 
the infrastructure manager investment once his deficit is covered (Peter, 2003, p.7). 
3.5.1.3 Non-linear pricing and two-part tariffs  
A non-linear tariff consists of various components, where each term is obtained by 
multiplying a basic cost parameter, such as tonne-km or type of train, by corresponding 
coefficients. 
More precisely, a two-part tariff consists of an access charge independent from the 
quantity consumed and a variable charge set as a price for every unit consumed. When 
applied to railway infrastructure, the fixed charge is generally aimed at recovering fixed 
costs, while the variable charge usually reflects marginal or variable costs. 
Two-part tariffs may be compulsory or optional (with self selection). In the first case, 
the operator must accept the payment of the fixed charge in order to access the network, 
while in the second he will be able to choose between the two-part tariff and a linear 
tariff. The operator will select one or another charging option depending on the total 
quantity of output consumed. The economic theory proves that in the particular case of 
a two-part tariff with self-selection there is an improvement with respect to a 
compulsory two-part tariff (De Rus et al. 2003, pp.202-204). 
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The main inconvenient linked to the use of two-part tariffs comes from the decreasing 
behaviour of unitary costs with respect to output, which may favours larger operators 
and penalize small ones, increasing the risk of exclusion of the latter from the market. 
Graphically, this fact is represented by the steeper slope that corresponds to a quantity 
of output q1 lower than q2 in a price – quantity graph (Fig. 22). 
Fig. 22: Discrimination between operators induced by two-part tariffs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A- level of the access charge; q1 – quantity demanded by operator 1; p1 – unitary charge paid by 
operator 1; q2 – quantity demanded by operator 2; p2 – unitary charge paid by operator 2. 
Source: adapted from García Álvarez et al. 2007, p.30 
3.5.1.4 Fully distributed costs pricing  
The fully distributed costs pricing principle takes as a starting point the level of short 
run marginal costs and then seeks to cover the financial deficit of the infrastructure 
manager by allocating the remaining costs according to selected parameters such as train-
km, revenues or the level of SRMC. 
As major strength, this system achieves the complete coverage of the deficit, thus 
avoiding distortions in the market through general taxation, but it does it at the expenses 
of efficiency. In fact, under this principle neither static nor dynamic allocative 
efficiencies are reached, as demand elasticities are not taken into account. Furthermore, if 
it is applied on a network-based approach, it can cause negative chain reactions in 
secondary parts of the network, which may become too expensive, pricing off some 
operators with the consequent increase in costs in other lines (Peter, 2003, p.8). 
Another limitations may result from the potential absence of equilibrium under this 
principle (it requires at least an intersection point between the demand curve and the 
average cost curve) and the difficulty of measuring total costs of providing the 
infrastructure. 
price 
quantity 
A 
p1 
p2 
q1 q2 
3. Railway infrastructure charging     
   67 
3.5.1.5 Average cost pricing  
The average cost pricing principle argues for setting prices equal to the average cost of 
provision of infrastructure services, so that prices cover both marginal costs and fixed 
overhead costs incurred through past investments. This approach involves the 
sometimes arbitrary apportionment of fixed costs to the trains running on the network. 
Average costs can be calculated in the short run by dividing the total costs of delivering 
all infrastructure services, given current capacity, by the number of services delivered. In 
the long run approach they will also include investment costs for capacity enhancement 
and enlargement. 
The average cost pricing principle is equivalent in most respects to fully distributed cost 
pricing, with which shares its main advantage (cost recovery) and important limitations 
like efficiency losses, potential absence of equilibrium or cost measurement difficulties. 
Moreover, the absence of relation between the cost drivers of infrastructure provision 
and the charges is more accused in this case, hindering the transmission of adequate 
incentives to the operators. 
 
3.5.2 Practical implementation 
The choice and implementation of pricing principles is not an easy task, as it must 
overcome a number of serious practical difficulties, as the specific situation of the 
infrastructure manager, the transport market it may serve and the characteristics of the 
demand. The choice has to be made also according to other transport markets, to prevent 
discrimination and to promote a system-wide efficiency. 
Moreover, the implementation must face several constraints arising from the real world 
that modify and shape the theoretical principles in order to make them applicable. In the 
end, as stated by Houpis (2004, p.47) “the access prices set by regulators in practice, 
will rarely if ever ‘equal’ their theoretical optimum. The expectation is however that the 
welfare implications of such ‘deviations’ are not as costly, as the additional effort and 
investment required to set access prices closer to the ‘optimum’ ”. 
Maybe one of the most relevant constraints regards the calculation and allocation of 
costs to services, as it is then necessary to deal with the multi-product nature of the 
infrastructure activity, the high level of common costs and the indivisibility of 
infrastructure assets. 
A particularly dramatic example is provided by the determination of short run marginal 
costs, which requires detailed cost studies to evaluate operating costs that can be traced 
to a particular train movement, wear and tear costs for maintenance and renewal of the 
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infrastructure, costs for energy consumption and additional timetable planning, 
management and administrative costs. Moreover, in the case of including externalities, it 
will also require the estimation of air pollution, global warming, noise, accident, or 
congestion costs. 
The strong orientation of the EU policy towards the adoption of the principle of 
marginal social costs for the pricing of transport infrastructure has played a major role in 
orienting research towards the estimation of marginal infrastructure and external costs. 
Several methodologies exist, which may lead to different results. Estimation of marginal 
costs can be characterised into two groups: top-down approaches, including econometric 
and cost allocation, and bottom-up approaches, mainly the engineering approach23. 
(IMPRINT-NET Consortium, 2006, p.15). However, there is still not agreement among 
researchers with respect to the level of railway infrastructure marginal costs, though the 
studies carried so far suggest that, in the case of railways, marginal cost pricing is likely 
to cover, at most, between 20%-30% of the total costs of infrastructure provision. 
The calculation of costs is neither easy when total cost is involved, as it is then 
necessary to provide a valuation of the capital costs linked to the infrastructure assets. 
In the case of railway networks the difficulty arises from their long useful life, their 
singularity and the high level of interdependency between deterioration and operation 
and maintenance patterns. 
As regards the first issue, most links of the rail networks were built decades ago and 
many of their components have been already replaced one or more times (according to 
their different useful lives). This makes hard to establish the production cost of the 
infrastructure, its useful life or its residual value, hindering the calculation of 
depreciation on a realistic basis. It also hampers the calculation of its value in use, as it is 
not easy to define the remaining useful life if the assets. Furthermore, the singularity of 
the rail network impedes any valuation according to market (there is not a market for rail 
infrastructure from where prices could be obtained). 
As regards the high level of interdependency, it poses further difficulties to calculate the 
useful lives and deterioration of the infrastructure assets, as they depend upon the 
combination of the level of investment in the infrastructure, the level of performance 
                                                
23 Econometric approach: The total expenditure is considered to be explained by different variables, 
among which the transport outputs. Based on cross-sectional and/or time series data an econometric 
analysis can be used to determine and estimate a total expenditure function from which variable 
expenditures can be derived. Cost allocation approach: This method uses practical experiences, simple 
calculations and/or expert judgements to establish the variability of each expenditure category registered 
in the available accounting data. Engineering approach: The total expenditure is disaggregated into sub-
categories, and for each of these categories, separate analyses provide the share of variable expenditures.
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permitted (e.g. axle loads) and the maintenance and renewal strategies followed by the 
IM. Additionally, many of the cost estimations performed so far rely on budgeted 
expenditures or real expenditures as a proxy to the yearly maintenance or renewal costs. 
This practice may introduce serious divergences with respect to the real costs arising in 
the network24. 
Cost allocation is also particularly problematic, as in the rail network economy only a 
share of the costs can be directly allocated to particular operations and services. Other 
parts of the total costs have to be allocated through models that relate rail track use with 
the consumption of particular resources. 
Another relevant point for the practical implementation of pricing principles results 
from financial considerations, particularly from the conditions existing on the financial 
equilibrium of the infrastructure business and the availability of State funding. The 
importance of the financial aspects makes that, on the ground, pricing principles are 
rather different than the ones formulated in the theory statements (Quinet, 1998, p.229). 
In many cases, the achievement of financial equilibrium for the infrastructure 
management activity requires the participation of governments. Depending on the 
availability and the forms of their contribution, the results of implementing a pricing 
principle will be different. It is thus necessary to acknowledge the existence of several 
forms of public contributions under a vertically separated scheme (Fig. 23), as well as 
the differences in the funding capacity across the Member States. Taking as example the 
European case, NERA (2004, p.ix) found differences greater than 1 to 15 in the unitary 
contribution of governments to the railway sector in year 2001 (Fig. 24). 
Fig. 23: Basic forms of public contributions to the rail sector 
 
Note: PSO – Public Service Obligation. 
Source: Perkins, 2005, p.12 
                                                
24 In fact, budgeted expenditures or real expenditures may indicate the availability of funds for a given 
year and not the costs produced in the network as a result of wear and tear, etc. 
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Fig. 24: Unitary level and form of State funding to the railway sector in Europe. 2001 
 
Note: PT-Portugal; FI-Finland; SE-Sweden; ES-Spain; GB-Great Britain; FR-France; DE-Germany; 
AT-Austria; CH-Switzerland; IT-Italy; BE-Belgium; DK-Denmark; NL-The Netherlands; NO-Norway; 
IE-Ireland; LU-Luxembourg; GR-Greece. 
Source: NERA, 2004, p.ix 
 
3.5.3 Pricing principles in the EU 
Taking into consideration the complex nature of the reformed railway sector and the 
natural monopoly characteristics of the infrastructure business, the European Union has 
defined through legislation the principles that must be observed when setting track 
access charges, in order to avoid potentially negative effects as the imposition of market 
power on operators (under a full separation scheme) or the price discrimination of new 
entrants in the market (under a partial separation scheme). 
According to Directive 2001/14/EC (Art.7) “the charges for the minimum access 
package and track access to service facilities shall be set at the cost that is directly 
incurred as a result of operating the train service”, making a reference to short run 
marginal cost pricing as the basic principle that should guide railway infrastructure 
pricing. The inclusion of opportunity costs of capacity and environmental costs is also 
foreseen. 
The directive admits departures from the pure marginal costs in the following terms 
(Art.8) “In order to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred by the infrastructure 
manager a Member State may, if the market can bear this, levy mark-ups on the basis of 
efficient, transparent and non-discriminatory principles, while guaranteeing optimum 
competitiveness”. This writing seems to admit Ramsey pricing for the allocation of 
mark-ups to railway services, with the condition that charges are not higher than full 
cost and that differentiation does not lead to discrimination of one operator with respect 
to the others in the same market segment (the “market can bear” rule). The directive 
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accepts as well the setting of higher charges in order to take into account the costs 
derived from necessary investment projects. 
The wide range of pricing principles permitted by such legal framework, going from the 
recovery of marginal costs to full costs, has found its manifestation in the disparity of 
philosophies adopted by infrastructure managers in the EU. 
The ECMT (2005, p.30) classified them according to four categories: 1) Charges based 
on marginal social costs (MC); 2) Charges departing from pure marginal social cost 
through the application of mark-ups (MC+); 3) Charges recovering full costs minus the 
costs funded by the State (FC-); and 4) Charges recovering full costs (FC). The results 
(Table 10) showed a preponderance of the principles based on marginal costs in Western 
Europe and of the principles based on full costs in Eastern Europe. 
Table 10: Pricing principles in Europe 
MC MC+ FC- FC 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, United 
Kingdom (freight) 
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Finland , France*, 
Romania*, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom* (pax) 
Germany, Italy, 
Poland 
Estonia*, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia 
Note: MC – Marginal cost; MC+ – Marginal cost with mark-ups; FC- – Full cost minus State subsidies; 
FC – Full cost. * Includes a fixed charge (two-part tariff). 
Source: own elaboration with data from ECMT, 2005, p.30 
As noted by the RAILCALC Consortium (2008a, pp.174-175), this classification is 
certainly useful to characterize the theoretical principles followed by the European 
infrastructure managers, but gathers together very different practices as regards their 
implementation. After an extensive review, the authors remarked a number of different 
implementation practices that could be included under the same pricing principle. 
In the field of marginal costs, they reported cases of infrastructure managers currently 
estimating an average marginal cost per gross ton-km through an econometric model and 
directly transforming it into a basic charge. Other IMs applying this same procedure, 
performed different cost calculations for passenger and freight services and distinguished 
the charges accordingly. Other IMs estimated an overall level of marginal costs through 
cost allocation and then set charges by allocating it to different vehicles depending on 
their capacity to damage the network. A similar diversity was found with respect to 
mark-up allocation among different market segments. In the case of full cost or full cost 
minus subsidies, some IMs distributed full costs according to drivers related to marginal 
costs (weight of the train, wear and tear on the network, etc.), while others made a 
simple distinction between fixed and variable costs with low relation to cost causation 
variables. 
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3.6 Charging structures 
Once defined the principles that will drive the pricing of rail infrastructure towards the 
selected objectives, they have to be detailed and particularized as regards the relevant 
costs in the network, the characteristics of the demand or the signals that want to be 
transmitted to the operation segment. Most of these actions are performed through the 
differentiation of the prices according to a number of components and variables25. 
By structure this dissertation refers to the components that will be included in the 
charge, the relation among these components and the parameters used to vary their 
levels. All these elements come together to differentiate the charge in the market, 
providing a number of signals to the railway operators as regards, for instance, cost 
causation, operational conditions in the network, suitable rolling stock to be bought or 
market segments to be further developed. 
 
3.6.1 Differentiation of charges 
The structure of railway infrastructure charges depends on a number of factors, 
including the cost structure of the infrastructure business, the characteristics of the 
demand, the aims of the charge (particularly in terms of incentives to the different 
agents) or the cost of implementing the structure (Fig. 25). 
Fig. 25: Analytical framework for the study of price differentiation 
 
Source: DIFFERENT Consortium, 2008, p. 1 
                                                
25 By component this thesis refers to the basic elements of the charge that are related through additive or 
multiplicative expressions. By variables it refers to the parameters needed to define the values of the 
components. A railway infrastructure charge that sums up a reserve charge A depending on the time band 
t and type of service S and an operation charge B depending on the type of line L, could be described as 
A(t,S) + B(L), where A() and B() are components and t, S and L are variables. 
3. Railway infrastructure charging     
   73 
The influence of the cost structure of the railway infrastructure business in the 
differentiation of the charges generally results from the implementation of cost-based 
pricing principles (e.g. marginal costs, average costs) that seek to allocate the costs 
caused in the network to the segments or services causing them. In this case, the level of 
aggregation of the cost information and the specific knowledge on the most relevant cost 
drivers will determine the boundaries of the differentiation exercise. 
The charging structure may be set as well to reflect different characteristics of the 
demand with the aim of maximizing the cost recovery reached by the infrastructure 
manager. In this case the structure of the charge acts as a tool for price discrimination of 
third degree26 that proxies the willingness to pay of the transport operating companies 
through observable characteristics (e.g. the type of goods being transported, the number 
of seats available, etc.). 
The structure of the infrastructure charge also depends on the specific aims set for the 
charging scheme in terms of incentivization of the different agents and particularly of 
railway operators. In this case the charging structure is generally modulated to reflect 
various train operating conditions, including: train speed, wagon mass and volume, train 
length, train frequency, etc. In general terms, the more relevant incentives allocated to 
the operation segment are devoted to promote the operational performance of the trains 
running on the network, to diminish the costs generated by the infrastructure damage 
and to optimize the use of the existing capacity. 
Though it may also include other dimensions of analysis, the transmission of the 
mentioned incentives requires the consideration of three basic axes of differentiation 
related to the vehicles running on the network (service/vehicle axis), to the infrastructure 
(infrastructure axis) and to the time (time axis). These axes have different roles 
depending on the incentive sought. Accordingly, the differentiation on the service/vehicle 
and the infrastructure axes is central to the transmission of incentives to reduce 
infrastructure damage; the differentiation on the service/vehicle and the time axes to 
incentive operational performance of the trains running on the network; the 
differentiation on the infrastructure and the time axes to optimize the use of the existing 
capacity. These relations are graphically represented in Fig. 26. 
                                                
26 According to the classification of Pigou (1938), it is possible to distinguish three degrees of 
discrimination, depending on the ability of the firm to discriminate buyers according to their willingness 
to pay: 1) First-degree discrimination - when consumers pay their maximal willingness to pay for each 
unit; 2) Second-degree discrimination - when the firm is better able to segment the market between 
different groups of buyers who have different demands; and 3) Third degree discrimination - when the 
firm can only imperfectly compartmentalize consumers according to their willingness to pay. The firm 
must use characteristics which it can directly monitor. 
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Fig. 26: Basic diferentiation axes and incentives provided to the operation segment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The degree of differentiation achieved in each of the axes – across infrastructure users, 
over time and spatially – will condition the specific effects of the incentives in the short 
and the long run. According to the economic rationale, the extent of the differentiation 
should depend on the additional welfare benefits associated to a better transmission of 
incentives as compared to the costs of implementing a more sophisticated pricing 
system.  
Fig. 27: Cost driver classification according to complexity and effectiveness levels 
 
Source: Teixeira, 2006, p.15 
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Together with the consideration of the underlying cost structures and/or the willingness 
to pay of the demand, the provision of incentives or the degree and dimensions of the 
differentiation, the design of a charging structure requires to select the variables that will 
be effectively used to charge the services running on the network. 
Usually, the selection of the charging variables results from the consideration of their 
effectiveness with respect to the aims of the differentiation, their simplicity and their 
facility to be measured and monitored. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to bring together 
these characteristics as increases in their effectiveness normally result in greater 
complexity and costs. An example of this argument can be found in the field of 
infrastructure costs, where the cost drivers with the greater ability to reflect 
deterioration increase the complexity of the system (Fig. 27). 
 
3.6.2 Charging structures in the EU 
The charging structure applied by each Member State is clearly dependent on the pricing 
principles and the objectives selected for the whole charging system. Moreover, the EU 
Law defines the nature of the elements that may form part of the charging schemes, 
though it does not include any specific provision on the functional relations or the 
variables to be adopted. Indeed, the Directive 2001/14/EC allows the inclusion of several 
additional elements in the railway infrastructure charging schemes, over and above the 
basic charges reflecting marginal infrastructure costs:  mark-ups, scarcity charges, 
environmental charges, discounts, performance regimes or reservation charges. 
The recent analysis performed by the RAILCALC Consortium (2008, pp.174-196) 
reviewed the charging schemes of the national infrastructure managers in the EU-27, 
identifying and classifying their basic elements. The research remarked the following 
aspects: 
• Basic charges usually recovered marginal costs due to operation, variable 
operation /maintenance /renewal costs or a given percentage of total 
infrastructure costs. They depended on the type of service, the type of line, the 
type of network, the vehicle or train characteristics and vehicle variables like 
speed and weight, etc. 
• Mark-ups above the marginal cost level are rarely based on pure Ramsey prices 
because of the need of estimating the elasticities of the demand. In consequence, 
the major part of charging schemes determines the mark-up in relation to a 
specific type of costs (i.e. depreciation costs) or a given percentage of the total 
costs. 
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• Reservation charges were differentiated in pure reservation charges levied before 
the use of the infrastructure and cancellation charges levied only in case of 
misuse of capacity. Pure reservation charges were found to be expressed in a 
wide range of forms: some were levied per train-path and others per train-km and 
some were intended to recover the administrative costs while others intended to 
recover part of the infrastructure costs. Cancellation charges are only levied in 
case of failure to use requested capacity. The amount of this second type of 
charges is levied according to different variables such as the anteriority of the 
cancellation to the circulation date, the percentage of volume of traffic requested 
that is misused, the time period, the number of train-paths, etc. 
• Congestion and scarcity charges, set to take account of the effects of increasing 
saturation of infrastructure capacity and ultimately the scarcity of capacity were 
applied in various Member States. 
• Performance regimes adopted the form of a bonus/malus charging scheme aimed 
at encouraging railway undertakings and infrastructure managers to minimise 
disruption and improve the performance in the railway network. Part of them 
were based on delay minutes accounting systems linked to economic penalties. 
• Few infrastructure managers applied environmental charges or subsidies, which 
were mainly related to emissions and noise. 
• Most of the infrastructure managers have introduced discounts available under 
certain circumstances, ranging from time-limited discounts to encourage the 
development of new rail services to discounts for charitable or nostalgic trains. 
 
When the attention is directed to the specific practice of every Member State, the more 
remarkable characteristic is, once again, the diversity in the type and number of elements 
adopted, with a variable number between 1 and 5 (Table 11). Though generally each 
element corresponds to a component (e.g. a mark-up appears as an independent term in 
the “charging formula”), it may also be split in more than one component (e.g. a basic 
charge levied as the sum of an operation charge and a maintenance charge). 
As regards the variables adopted in the charging schemes, diversity is also the norm 
among the schemes applied by the Member States. A study commissioned by the UIC 
and directed by Prof. López Pita, identified 46 different variables in the structures 
applied by twenty European national infrastructure managers (CENIT, 2006, p.41).  
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Table 11: Charging elements applied by national infrastructure managers in the EU-27 
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 Austria X X  X  X  
 Belgium X X   X  X 
 Bulgaria X      X 
 Chipre        
 Czech Republic X  X  X  X 
 Denmark X X  X X   
 Estonia X X     X 
 Finland X  X X    
 France X   X  X X 
 Germany X X   X X X 
 Greece X X      
 Hungary X    X X X 
 Ireland        
 Italy X X   X X X 
 Latvia X    X   
 Lithuania X      X 
 Luxemburg X X     X 
 Malta        
 Netherlands X    X X  
 Poland X    X X X 
 Portugal X     X X 
 Romania X    X   
 Slovakia X       
 Slovenia X X   X  X 
 Spain X   X   X 
 Sweden X  X X    
 United Kingdom X X  X  X  
Source: own elaboration with data from RAILCALC Consortium, 2008a, p.193. 
In spite of the extreme heterogeneity that this evidence may suggest, most of the 
variables seek to differentiate similar concepts. These similar concepts constitute the 
“axes” or “dimensions” of the differentiation applied by the different structures. A 
further analysis suggested the existence of nine axes among the charging structures of the 
Member States (Table 12): infrastructure, railway service, rolling stock, operation, 
traffic, time, capacity allocation process, contractual agreement (between the 
infrastructure manager and the operator) and geographical areas. 
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Table 12: Pricing variables applied by national infrastructure managers in the EU-27 
Type of variable          
(axis of differentiation) 
Variables 
Related to infrastructure Type of line, Line, Section, Maximum speed of the section, 
Station category, Switch type, Switch category, Type of facility 
Related to railway service Type of railway service, Type of passenger service 
Related to rolling stock Type of train, Traction unit category, Vehicle class, Length of the 
train, Technical vehicle speed, Weight of the train, Type of 
traction, Gauge, Number of pantographs 
Related to operation Delay in departure, Time of use of the infrastructure, Speed 
deviation, Type of stop at station, Speed, Distance covered, 
Distance run out of the limit, Type of operation, Type of path 
Related to traffic Traffic volume, Traffic density, Congested sections 
Related to time Period of the day, Period of the week, Time 
Related to the capacity 
allocation process 
Time preceding path allocation, Time preceding path use 
Related to the contractual 
agreement 
Type of contract, Contract duration, Difference in state agreed 
Others Region/geographical areas 
Source: adapted from Fernández Belmonte, Teixeira and López Pita, 2007, p.5 
 
 
3.7 Charging levels 
The complex chain of steps intervening in the setting of railway infrastructure charges - 
i.e. the overall regulation of the infrastructure manager, the price regulation mechanisms, 
the definition of the objectives and principles that should drive the pricing tool or the 
design of the structure – finds its final form in a set of components and variables (the 
charging structure) and levels. They are the only elements published in the network 
statement and thus directly perceived by the railway operators. 
Moreover, they are the driving force of the charging scheme, and the major leverage on 
the operation segment. This fact was clearly exemplified in a position paper of the 
Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Managers (CER, 2005, pp.5-6) 
that referred the complaints of the international freight operators as “Is structure the 
problem? [...]It’s the level of charges”. 
The characterization of the charging levels may adopt different forms. It is possible to 
examine the average level of a charging scheme (e.g. in terms of average charge or in terms 
of cost recovery), the level applied to some standard services (e.g. a standard freight 
3. Railway infrastructure charging     
   79 
train or a standard high speed train), the overall range of variation of the levels within the 
scheme (e.g. minimum and maximum unitary levels) or their specific variability with 
respect to the parameters included in the charge (e.g. relative variation of the unitary 
level with the type of service). 
 
3.7.1 Definition of charging levels 
The definition of the charging levels applied in the infrastructure network basically 
depends on the existence of price regulation mechanisms and the pricing principles 
adopted. Furthermore the allocation of prices to the different services requires an 
adequate coordination with the components and variables selected for the charge. 
As mentioned in section 3.4, the application of indirect price regulation mechanisms on 
the infrastructure manager may set strict boundaries to the average level of track access 
charges, in the direct form of price caps or through limitations in the rate of return or the 
revenues allowed to it. 
Fig. 28: Cost elasticity with respect to traffic for various road and rail case studies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Blue columns refer to rail case studies, purple columns to road case studies; O-Operation costs; 
M-Maintenance costs; R- Renewal costs; RM-Renewal and Maintenance costs.  
Source: GRACE Consortium, 2006, p.20 
The selection of a given pricing principle establishes the fundamental relation of the 
charging levels to costs or demand, influencing both, the methodologies to define the 
price and the level itself. If the selected principle is based on marginal costs, the levels 
will be limited by the cost basis selected (maintenance cost only, maintenance and 
renewal costs, external costs, etc.) and they will be expected to achieve a low cost 
recovery. According to the more recent case studies performed by the GRACE 
Consortium, they will generally be below the 30% of the total operation, maintenance or 
renewal costs considered (Fig. 28). If the selected principle is based on average costs, 
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the level of the charge will be defined by the level of total costs born by the 
infrastructure manager. If the selected approach is a full cost minus State subsidies, then 
the level will depend on both, total costs and the availability of public funding. 
The procedures to define the charging levels may be less clear in those cases where the 
willingness to pay of the demand is involved, mainly because of information asymmetry 
and the deferred nature in time of the economic decisions of the operating company (e.g. 
buying new rolling stock). 
Finally, the coordination between the level and the structure of the charging scheme is 
particularly relevant in order to reflect variations in the underlying demand and costs, 
but also to ensure the effectiveness of the incentives embedded in it (i.e. the intensity of 
the signals transmitted to the operators). Several considerations may be taken into 
account at this stage, particularly the achievement of an average level or the avoidance of 
cross subsidization between services, geographical zones, types of infrastructure, etc. 
 
3.7.2 Charging levels in the EU 
To complete this overview on the track access charges in the EU, something should be 
said on their economic influence in the railway transport production system. Few 
quantitative references exist in the literature about the weight that track access charges 
have on the competitiveness of railway undertakings. According to Scherp (2002, p.2) 
track access charges can represent up to 30 or 35% of the total production cost of rail 
freight services and therefore they are an important item in the competitiveness of 
railway undertakings. The final report of the Task Force on Track Access Charges set 
up by the European Commission (2005b, p.2) stated that infrastructure charges account 
for a significant part of the cost of a railway operator, and pointed out that rail freight 
operators pass on 5% to 25% of their revenues to the infrastructure managers. 
When charging levels are observed for every Member State, it is possible to identify 
relevant differences among them. Some countries had set up relatively high infrastructure 
charges, while others had deliberately set them at a low level. These differences in 
charging levels in the EU have been analyzed by several studies in the recent years, 
though with different finalities in mind. 
The ECMT studied the charges levied on average freight and passenger trains in order to 
assess the differences arising between Member States’ charging levels (Fig. 29). They 
highlighted the dispersion of current charging levels across the Member States, and 
pointed out that in some regions, like in parts of Western Europe and in the Baltic States 
there is little sign that the current level of charges has a significant negative effect on 
market development. 
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Fig. 29: Average access charges in selected European countries. 2004 
 
Note: Figures in €/train-km, excluding cost of electric traction; CEE- Central Eastern Europe; S-Sweden; 
N-Norway; NL-Netherlands; F-France; B-Belgium; P-Portugal; CH-Switzerland; I-Italy; SI-Slovenia; D-
Germany; SF-Finland; DK-Denmark; A-Austria; UK-United Kingdom; CZ-Czech Republic; BG-
Bulgaria; RO-Romania; H-Hungary; EE-Estonia; LT-Lithuania; LV-Latvia; PL-Poland; SK-Slovakia. 
Source: ECMT, 2005, p.40 
The UIC promoted a study, aimed at determining the effect that track access charges 
could have in the development of high speed services at European level. Within it, a 
number of national and international high speed relations (or with the potential to 
become such) were identified and the average value of track access charges calculated for 
each of them. The results obtained for the national relations showed again a great 
dispersion in the levels applied throughout the EU (Fig. 30). 
Fig. 30: Average access charges levied on selected European high speed relations. 2006  
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Source: CENIT, 2006, p.61 
The study found out that track access charges range from 25% to 40% of the revenues 
for links using new high speed infrastructures and concluded that, with such a weight in 
the operating expenses, the infrastructure charges play a key role in the high speed rail 
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economy (CENIT, 2006, p.7). The same study was updated one year later with the aim 
of observing the variations in the levels of the charges. The authors concluded that the 
level of track access charges presented a general trend to increase within the EU-27 
(CENIT, 2007, p.14). 
 
 
3.8 Conceptualization of pricing policies 
The multiplicity of decisions involved in the selection, definition and implementation of 
a charging scheme for the use of railway infrastructure, the strong interrelation between 
such decisions and other important fields of action (e.g. transport operation, use of 
public funding, environment, etc.) or their widespread effects on a number of 
institutions, actors and society at large, convert pricing in a political decision. This view 
is further reinforced by the existence of government’s specific objectives for railways, 
which often require a departure from commercial pricing and decision-making as 
proposed by the economic theory. 
The political nature of track access pricing has been openly recognized by the EU, who 
has seen it as a key element within the overall transport pricing policies fostered in the 
recent years (e.g. by publishing a White Paper and several directives or by promoting 
research). According to Schade and Doll (2006, p.317) “Transport pricing constitutes 
one of the basic transport policies of the European Commission emphasized first with 
regard to fair payment of transport infrastructure and more recently adding the objective 
of internalization of external environmental and social cost of transport. However, a 
large variety of options exist to introduce transport pricing and to make reasonable use 
of the revenues that are generated by such pricing policies.” 
Three particularities are characteristics of pricing policies: 1) The widespread nature of 
their effects across the transport system; 2) Their strong interrelation with other 
policies (e.g. investment or market regulation policies); and 3) The indefinitions that 
result from these strong interrelations. 
The widespread nature of its effects mainly results from its central role in the transport 
markets as well as from its function as instrument for the consecution of a wide number 
of objectives (Fig. 31). Its relevance for the introduction of competition in the rail sector 
has indirect effects on the efficiency of the transport system, the efficiency of transport 
operators, the modal share of rail, the development of a better use of the infrastructure, 
the environmental performance of transport or the employment and social protection 
policies. 
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Fig. 31: Hierarchy of transport policy goals in the EU 
 
Source: Barlünd, 2000, p.24 
Paradoxically, pricing policies alone may have a reduced effect in the solution of specific 
problems detected by the infrastructure managers, as they generally need to be packaged 
with other policies and measures in the fields of transport regulation, revenues use, 
investment in infrastructure, etc. In fact, as noted by NERA et al. (1998, p.2 and p.77), 
“it is important to recognise the limits of what can be achieved purely through the 
charging framework. Even though the correct price signals and incentives may be 
provided, there may be no guarantee that firms will respond appropriately”. For 
instance, “it is very unlikely that the charging framework alone can provide sufficiently 
accurate investment incentives”. This necessary interaction with other fields close to the 
pricing activity, has favoured the existence of some blurry areas as regards the elements 
that form part of the pricing policy and those which do not. 
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An example of this fact may be provided by the relation between regulation and pricing. 
While structural levels of regulation, as the vertical separation enforced in the rail sector, 
are clearly outside of the scope of pricing policy the more specific ones are no so easily 
distincted. This fuzziness is a frequent situation between economic-incentive price 
regulation and pricing principles, which may end in contradictory relations (e.g. a 
revenue cap and a cost based pricing principle). Another example may be provided by 
the need of setting priority rules in the access to railway infrastructure as a necessary 
complement of track access charges to guarantee non discrimination of operators under 
situations of scarcity. 
Several conceptualizations of railway infrastructure pricing policies may be found in the 
literature. They basically agree in the key aspects that should be included in the 
infrastructure pricing policy and in the main steps of the decision-making process. 
The MC-ICAM Consortium (2004, pp.6-7) identified five dimensions in pricing 
policies, notably: 1) The scope and coverage of the pricing system; 2) The level and 
composition of pricing measures; 3) The degree of differentiation; 4) The use of 
revenues; and 5) Supplementary measures and actions (including investment, non-price 
regulation issues and information provision services). As regards the decision-making 
dynamic, the MC-ICAM Consortium did not identify a number of clear-cut steps, but 
approached the implementation of pricing policies as a phased-in process in each of the 
dimensions. 
Fig. 32: Basic steps of pricing policy according to Ricci et al. (2001)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ricci et al. 2001, p.4 
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Ricci et al. (2001, p.4) included similar aspects in the concept of pricing policy, notably 
pricing principles, price determination and use of revenues, but also aspects related to 
the physical implementation of charging systems, like choice of technology or financing. 
They proposed a decision-making process related to pricing policies in urban transport, 
in which they distinguished four basic steps (adopting, designing, implementing and 
assessing) complemented by a specific focus on valuation methodologies (Fig. 32). 
Other researchers have concentrated their attention on the particular decisions regarding 
the establishment of charging schemes. Their analysis is thus centred in what could be 
named the charge setting procedure, leaving outside other considerations as the revenue 
use or the physical implementation and financing of the charging system itself 
(information systems, invoicing, etc.). 
Lopes (2008, p.116) examined the more relevant influences on the determination of a 
charging scheme and brought them together in a complex map (Fig. 33). She 
distinguished four categories of actors (society, rail transport users, infrastructure 
managers and rail operators) that interacted through cost-driven and demand-driven 
relevant aspects. The result of their interaction defined the final form of the charging 
scheme. 
Fig. 33: Influences on the establishment of a charging scheme according to Lopes (2008) 
 
Note: WTP – Willingness to pay. 
Source: Lopes, 2008, p.116 
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Building on the mentioned sources on pricing policies and on the contents previously 
developed in sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, this thesis proposes a scheme reflecting the main 
interactions between pricing objectives, principles, structures, levels and final 
implementation (Fig. 34). This scheme may also be interpreted as a conceptualization of 
the essential steps involved in the charge setting activity. 
Fig. 34: Proposed scheme for pricing policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: WTP – Willingness to pay 
Source: own elaboration  
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The scheme takes its origin from an initial idea or problem that can be treated through 
the implementation of a pricing policy. From this initial point two different but related 
flows are developed: one focused on the definition of the pricing policy itself and the 
other aimed at defining the complementary policies that will side it. 
The first flow starts by defining the objectives that must be fulfilled by the pricing 
policy in order to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem posed (e.g. cost 
recovery or social welfare). Depending on these objectives, policy-makers will select a 
pricing principle to be implemented (e.g. short run marginal cost pricing principle) and 
the relevant incentives desired for the final charge (e.g. reduction in the damage produced 
by heavy freight trains to the infrastructure). 
The principle selected will in turn condition the approach to demand (definition of 
market segments) and costs (definition of costs to be included in the charge). The 
approaches chosen to costs and demand will influence the estimation of the average level 
of charges and, together with the selected incentives, their differentiation through 
components and variables. The combination of the average level of charges and the 
differentiation will determine the final charging scheme. 
The implementation of the charging scheme will result from the interaction between the 
operationalization of the charging variables (its values and thresholds) and the specific 
methodologies adopted for calculating and allocating costs and/or for estimating the 
willingness to pay of the demand. The final outcome will be the charging practice, 
already able to be launched in the market. 
The second flow reduces the steps involved in the determination of complementary 
policies to the formulation of objectives, the choice of the adequate policies and their 
definition. Finally, the pricing policy and the complementary policies are implemented. 
The proposed scheme assumes a top-down interaction between the elements considered 
that is rather deterministic in its expression and that has been built on theoretical 
grounds. Though these characteristics may certainly limit its ability to explain a 
particular process of pricing policy definition in reality, they also provide a 
conceptualization able to bring together the basic “blocks” found in the theory. It is 
following this second quality and keeping in mind the first limitation, that this scheme 
will be used to operationalize the decision-making processes linked to pricing policies in 
chapter 5. 
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3.9 Synthesis 
The setting of railway infrastructure charges involves a number of interrelated decisions, 
fundamentally concerning the selection of a pricing principle able to fulfil the objectives 
sought, the design of a charging structure able to transmit the appropriate signals to the 
market and the calculation of the charging levels finally levied to the operators. 
The pricing principles are the foundations of the whole charging system, as they 
translate the wanted objectives into a limited number of guidelines. However, their 
selection is not an easy task, as none of the alternatives provided by the economic 
theory seems able to accomplish all the objectives desirable for the charge at the same 
time (e.g. social welfare, cost recovery, optimal investment in the network, 
encouragement of productivity gains, etc.). Their selection is thus linked to the specific 
political and regulatory objectives set for a given railway infrastructure market. The 
charging structures are responsible for the differentiation of prices in the market and the 
transmission of incentives to the various agents acting within it. Furthermore, its 
components and variables reflect specific market segmentation and reveal a particular 
allocation of costs to services. Together with the structure, the charging levels are 
responsible for the final form that the charge will have in the market. Their 
determination basically depends on the price regulation mechanisms and the pricing 
principles adopted, as well as on the adequate coordination with the components and 
variables selected for the charge. 
Moreover, the centrality of infrastructure charges in the vertically restructured railway 
markets, makes them sensitive to a full array of economic and political factors, that 
intervene in their definition through a complex chain including the objectives set for the 
railway sector, the structure of the infrastructure market (i.e. type of competition, 
separation or ownership adopted), the regulatory regime enforced (i.e. direct, indirect or 
mixed regulation), the price regulation mechanisms (e.g. direct setting, revenue cap, price 
cap, etc.), the pricing objectives and principles (e.g. marginal costs, average costs, etc.), 
the charging structure, the charging levels or their final implementation in the market. 
When observed for the European scenario, the whole of these factors reflects the 
opposed effects of integration and differentiation dynamics, the first ones introduced by 
the legislative efforts of the EU railway reform and the second ones derived from the 
inertia of the national railway systems and the predominance of domestic interests. On 
the one hand, the EU legislation has established the fundamental structure of railway 
infrastructure markets and determined the essential approach to their regulation, through 
the setting of access charges and priority rules at the interface with operators and the 
constitution of regulatory bodies able to supervise their application. It has set as well 
the pricing principles and the basic elements allowed in the charge. On the other hand, 
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the inherited technical and operational characteristics of the national rail networks, the 
inertia of the existing institutional arrangements or the ambiguity embedded in the 
common regulations have favoured the customization of the structural and regulatory 
characteristics of railway markets and the implementation of tailored infrastructure 
charges. The result so far is a great dispersion among price regulation provisions, pricing 
principles, charging structures, and charging levels applied throughout the EU-27. 
The multiplicity of decisions involved in the selection, definition and implementation of 
a charging practice for the use of railway infrastructure, the strong interrelation that can 
be observed between such decisions and other important fields of action (e.g. transport 
operation, use of public funding, environment, etc.) or their widespread effects on a 
number of institutions, actors and society at large, suggests that railway infrastructure 
pricing may be conceptualized as political decision. This approach seems to be justified 
as well by the general analysis performed on railway infrastructure pricing in Europe. 
Building on this evidence, this thesis has proposed a conceptualization of pricing 
policies able to bring together the basic “blocks” found in the theory. 
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Chapter 
4  
THE NOTION OF TRANSFERABILITY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last decades, changes in economy and society have led to increasing complexity 
and challenged the ability of governments to promote and implement their policies. The 
rising level of interdependence of the political decisions, the movement towards regional 
integration into wider political areas or the intensification of cross-national relations are 
clear manifestations of this new environment in which states and national institutions 
seek their way forward. Private companies have been involved in similar trends and 
today compete in more and more globalized and customized markets. 
This evolution has also offered new opportunities to both sectors. Governments have 
found an increasing availability of national experiences and the occasion for policy 
coordination, harmonization and transfer. Companies have found new sources of 
learning in the practices and processes of competitors and have took advantage of them 
in their innovation processes. New possibilities for learning, improving and transferring 
policies and practices have arisen. 
Accordingly, it has been necessary to develop a set of concepts, tools and 
methodologies to guide and improve the exchange of knowledge across institutions and 
its application in new environments and contexts. Two distinct disciplines have 
undertaken this task, developing theoretical and applied approaches to the notions of 
transfer and transferability: comparative politics and management science. The first one 
has been focused on the definition of concepts such as policy transfer, policy diffusion 
or convergence. The second one has been concerned with the practical transfer of 
successful experiences between private entities. 
As explained in section 1.3, the proposition of a conceptual framework for the 
assessment of transferability is intended to be consistent with the findings and notions 
elaborated by the current scientific knowledge. For that reason, the scope of this chapter 
is to explore and review the notion of transfer as it has been developed in other 
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disciplines, notably in comparative politics and management science, in order to provide 
a sound theoretical background for the conceptual framework proposed. 
Section 4.2 provides a short overview of the considerations underlying the decision of 
engaging in a transfer process; Section 4.3 examines the conceptualization and 
development of the notion of transfer performed in the field of comparative politics; 
Section 4.4 explores the development of benchmarking techniques in the field of 
management science; Section 4.5 proposes a conceptual relation between both 
literatures; Section 4.6 presents a synthesis of the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Looking outside 
Previously to the review of the basic literatures concerned with the notion of transfer, 
this section seeks to provide some answers to a previous but fundamental question: 
Why have some disciplines focused their attention on transfer? 
A first reason, purely theoretical, seems to have arisen from the evidence of strong 
similarities in policy across regions, which suggested the existence of transfers able to 
provoke a similar effect. Such finding called soon the attention of political scientists, 
who tried to explain the dynamics behind the convergence. This argument, referred to as 
the convergence problem, has been expressed by Bennett (1991, p.215) as “the 
theoretical concern about convergence arises from the observation by specialists in 
comparative politics that industrialized states face similar problems and have a tendency 
to solve them in a similar way”. 
A second reason, purely practical, could have come in the form of the wheel argument, 
which states that it is possible to learn from the experience of others without having to 
“reinvent the wheel”. Hence, transfer is nothing more than a practical solution to local 
problems and the attention of researchers should mainly be focused on the question of 
how to transfer. This reasoning is aligned with the observed practice in policy-making, 
which in many cases relies on the experience of others as a source for policies. In the 
words of Patel (2006, p.35): “It is widely accepted that the starting point for many 
innovations is a process of drawing on the experiences of others. Public service 
institutions tend to find an innovation and look at how it can be transferred”. 
A third reason, underscored in the introduction to this chapter, may be found in the 
increasing number of available experiences as a result of the rapid growth in 
communications of all types since the Second World War (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 
p.343). This trend has gone further, resulting in the development of transnational 
networks that operate between governmental and non governmental international 
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organizations, establishing a global discourse against which decisions are taken (Deacon, 
1997, p.60). On the economic perspective, the globalization trends have interconnected 
the activity of companies all around the world, enhancing the ability of transnational 
companies and institutions to transfer and diffuse managerial perspectives and 
approaches. 
A fourth reason, related to the previous one, that explains the interest of researchers on 
the transfer process, regards the increase in the number of transfers itself. Dolowitz 
(2000, p.2) argues that, “not surprisingly, the increase in the occurrence of policy 
transfer has led to an increased interest in the process. Certainly, as transfer is 
increasingly a feature of policy-making, it is important that the process be better 
understood”. 
These reasons, and probably others, have awaken the interest for looking outside in 
search of new policies and practices, as well as the interest for studying the conditions 
under which their transfer could be carried out. 
 
 
4.3 Comparative politics 
4.3.1 Conceptual literature on policy transfer 
Comparative politics is a branch of the political science that involves the systematic 
study and comparison of the world’s political systems through the application of the 
comparative method. It seeks to explain the way in which different governments 
respond to a common problem, with particular attention to the differences and 
similarities existing between them. 
Ethridge (1990, p.225) defined comparative politics as “the cross-national study of 
political structures and behaviours”; Rose (1991, p.446) further remarked “the focus is 
explicitly or implicitly upon more than one country, thus following familiar political 
science usage in excluding within-nation comparison. Methodologically, comparison is 
distinguished by its use of concepts that are applicable in more than one country”. 
Methodological considerations are central to this subfield of research, which defends the 
use of the comparative method in those cases where either experimental or statistical 
analysis are deemed unfeasible, which is the normal situation that arises when focusing 
on national States as the object of the research. This view is shared by Pennings et al. 
(1999, p.33), who stated that the comparative method is required in situations in which 
there is no possible recourse to experimental techniques or when the number of 
observations does not allow for the use of statistical techniques that are based on 
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comparable cases. 
The focus on methodological issues has allowed comparative politics to cover a broad 
range of topics and studies. Among them, attention has also been directed to policy 
transfer studies, which were originally developed in the US as a means to explain the 
adoption of policy and spread of diffusion throughout their federal system. Since then, 
and over the last twenty years, a rapidly growing literature has emerged on policy 
transfer and lesson-learning. 
The interest of political science in this area has been to improve the understanding of 
policy transfer and its causes, through the clear definition of the concepts and its 
operationalization through appropriate frameworks. It has been however a rather 
contested field of knowledge and there is a widespread opinion that “the scientific 
treatment of this issue is recent and to some extent is still in the process of proposing 
hypotheses” (Conde Martínez, 2006, p.99). 
What follows is a short insight in the conceptual literature on policy transfer. 
 
4.3.2 Definition of transfer-related concepts 
4.3.2.1 Policy transfer 
The main proponents of the concept in recent times have been David Dolowitz and 
David Marsh, who in 1996 defined policy transfer as 
“A multidimensional concept involving a process in which knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc., in one time and/or place is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions 
in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.344). 
Though ambiguous in its “multidimensional nature”, their definition already contained all 
the basic elements that are still identifying the concept: its dynamic character (it 
involves a process), its spatial and temporal dimensions (it involves two different 
realities separated by time and/or space) and its multi-level nature (it may involve 
policies, administrative arrangements and institutions). The concept refers to 
“knowledge” but from an applied perspective, as a needed condition for policy transfer 
is that this “knowledge” is “used” (i.e. put into practice). 
The authors added more precision to their initial explanation through a second definition, 
much cited, which clearly identified policy transfer as a process and the realities 
involved within it as “political settings”. The scope of the policy transfer was also 
extended to the “ideas” used in these “political settings”. 
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“Policy transfer is a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political setting” 27 (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.5). 
Building on this definition, Dolowitz and Marsh developed the concept in four 
distincted areas: 1) they analyzed the growth of policy transfer; 2) they proposed a 
framework for the analysis of transfer; 3) they suggested a continuum for distinguishing 
between different types of policy transfer; and 4) they explored the relation between 
policy transfer and policy failure. 
These developments, as well as their contribution to characterize more accurately the 
concept, have been the starting point for a contested and ongoing debate aimed at 
defining the boundaries between policy transfer and other concepts belonging to the 
same semantic field (i.e. policy change). The more relevant among them being policy 
learning, policy convergence and policy diffusion. 
4.3.2.2 Policy learning 
The policy learning concept was first proposed by Richard Rose. He first defined a 
“policy lesson” as 
“A detailed cause-and-effect description of a set of actions that government can 
consider in the light of experience elsewhere, including a prospective evaluation of 
whether what is done elsewhere could someday become effective here” (Rose, 1993, 
p.27). 
Consequently with the nature of the “policy lessons”, he then described the process of 
lesson-drawing, which included four analytically distinct stages: 1) Searching experience 
about programs that have been introduced elsewhere to deal with a similar problem; 2) 
Making a model, that is a conceptual model of how programs deal with a specific 
problem; 3) Creating a lesson, which means to design a program for adoption in the 
importer jurisdiction; and 4) Prospective evaluation across time and space, needed to 
estimate the consequences of adopting the lesson. 
The author also enumerated the alternative ways of drawing a lesson, distinguishing 
copying (complete duplication of the experience obtained from another jurisdiction), 
                                                
27 A slightely different definition was also provided by Dolowitz in 2000: “A process in which knowledge 
about policies, institutions and ideas developed in one time or place is used in the development of 
policies, institutions etc. in another time or place” (Dolowitz et al. 2000, p.3). Three years later, the same 
author defined policy transfer as “The process by which the policies and/or practices of one political 
system are fed into and utilized in the policy-making arena of another political system” (Dolowitz, 2003, 
p.101). 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 96 
adaptation (adjustment of the previous experience for contextual differences), 
hybridization (combination of elements from the importer and exporter jurisdictions), 
synthesis (combination of familiar elements from experiences in other jurisdictions to 
create a new one) and inspiration (use of experiences in other jurisdictions as an 
intellectual stimulus to develop a new one) (Rose, 1993, pp.27-34). 
As defined, the “policy learning” and the “policy transfer” concepts have several points 
in common: both of them refer to a knowledge already experienced that travels between 
two different realities and is implemented in the recipient one. Maybe a first distinction 
arises from the fact that “policy learning” does not make explicit the temporal dimension 
present in the “policy transfer” and focuses directly on the spatial dimension (i.e. 
importer jurisdictions and elsewhere-located exporter jurisdictions). 
The potential overlap and the semantic distinction between both concepts have been 
studied by several authors. Edward Page (2000, p.2) noticed that the emphasis of policy 
transfer has tended to be on understanding the process by which policies and practices 
move from exporter to importer jurisdictions, while the emphasis of lesson-drawing has 
tended to be on understanding the conditions under which policies or practices operate 
in exporter jurisdictions and whether and how could they work in a similar way in 
importer jurisdictions. 
Diane Stone (2001, p.8) remarked that though both terms refer to dynamics in which 
knowledge is used across time or space in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements and institutions, the emphasis of policy transfer is on understanding the 
process by which policies and practices move from exporter to importer while the 
lesson drawing concept is focused in using cross national experience as a source for 
policy-making. 
4.3.2.3 Policy convergence 
The policy convergence concept has been studied by Colin Bennet, who building on the 
previous comparative politics literature, noticed that countries with similar contexts and 
similar problems have a tendency to address them in similar ways. According to the 
author this similarity can be observed in different policy elements (political goals, policy 
instruments or policy styles, for instance). 
Bennet (1991, pp.217-220) suggested as well four possible causes for policy 
convergence: emulation (importation of ideas or policies from other models or 
jurisdictions which are perceived as leaders in policy innovation), elite networking28 
                                                
28 Also referred to as “dissemination” (see Conde Martínez, 2006, p.101) or “transnational policy 
communities” (see Stone, 2001, p.7). 
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(sharing of knowledge and formation of common patterns of understanding within 
transnational networks of experts and professionals), harmonization (requires the 
authoritative action of supranational institutions – e.g. the EU) and penetration (implies 
the coercion by an external agent). 
After Bennett’s pioneer work, there has been an intense debate about the relation 
existing between policy convergence and the different mechanisms of policy transfer. 
While some authors see convergence as the intrinsic result of policy transfer (Conde 
Martínez, 2006, p.100), others consider it the consequence of broader-scope transfer 
resulting from structural forces like industrialization, globalization or regionalization 
(Stone, 2001, p.6) or the effect of parallel domestic pressures without any participation 
of transfer mechanisms (Hoberg, 2001, p.127). 
This multiplicity of viewpoints has even led to new definitions of the concept mostly 
focused on the effect and not on its causes, as the one provided by Christoph Knill 
(2005, p.768), who after a thorough review of the previous literature defined 
convergence as “any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a 
certain policy across a given set of political jurisdictions over a given period of time”. 
Moreover, the author clearly remarked the differences between policy convergence – 
“the end result of a process of policy change” - and policy transfer  - “a process that 
might, but need not, lead to cross-national policy convergence” (Knill, 2005, pp.766-
768). 
4.3.2.4 Policy diffusion 
The conception of policy diffusion is twofold. On the one hand, the concept describes 
the “patterns according to which policies spread and the geographic and structural 
characteristics of countries which might explain them” (Freeman and Tester, 1996 
quoted by Stone). On the other hand, diffusion refers to a particular mechanism of 
policy transfer involving the transmission of knowledge over a long period of time, 
producing incremental changes in the recipient jurisdiction. Bennett (1991, p.220) 
suggested that diffusion refers to similar adoptions of policy without evidence of 
emulation, while Rogers (1995, p.13) highlighted the mediation role played by society in 
policy diffusion through communication and influence processes. 
Newmark (2002, p.152) noted that “diffusion research focuses on how innovations, 
policies, or programs spread from one government entity to another”, while policy 
transfer “typically involves cases in which one nation or government imports knowledge 
of policies or programs that exist abroad”. He also proposed a theoretical continuum 
upon which varying degrees of policy diffusion occur (Fig. 35). 
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Fig. 35: Diffusion continuum, as proposed by Newmark (2002) 
 
Source: Newmark, 2002, p.171 
 
4.3.2.5 Concept discussion 
As a result of the ongoing semantic debate, several authors have summed up their efforts 
in clarifying the concepts involved with the declared purposes of connecting their 
respective literatures and setting a sound basis for further empirical developments. 
A first attempt was already performed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.13) through 
their “policy transfer continuum”, which placed lesson-drawing as a voluntary and 
rational type of policy transfer (see Fig. 37). 
Stone reviewed the literature in the light of a hypothetical link between the concepts of 
policy transfer, policy learning, policy convergence and policy diffusion. She suggested 
that policy learning is a voluntary process that may or may not end in policy transfer. 
Policy transfer, in turn, may refer to both coercive and voluntarily processes. She also 
remarked that policy transfer could be a causal factor in convergence, although 
convergence can result from other factors. These differences in meaning led the author to 
conclude that, in spite of a considerable overlap, these terms are not interchangeable 
(Stone, 2001, pp.6-14). 
Drezner, while studying the relationship between policy convergence and globalization 
noticed that “while diffusion and transfer are concerned with process patterns, 
convergence studies place a particular emphasis on effects” (Drezner, 2001). 
As it has been seen before, Knill focused its attention in clarifying the analytical 
relationship between policy convergence and the related concepts of policy transfer and 
policy diffusion. He concluded that “convergence studies typically seek to explain 
changes in policy similarity over time. By contrast, transfer studies investigate the 
content and process of policy transfer as the dependent variable, while the focus of 
diffusion research is on the explanation of adoption patterns over time” (Knill, 2005, p. 
767). He summarized his view through Table 13, which also includes the concept of 
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isomorphism29. 
Table 13: Policy convergence and related concepts according to Knill (2005) 
 
Source: Knill, 2005, p.768 
 
Robert Hulme, while researching on the theoretical utility of policy transfer, concluded 
that the policy transfer framework provides an essential linkage that allows the diverse 
concepts and literatures to converse. He therefore defined policy transfer as “both a 
rational and an ideological strategy to deal with changing circumstance. Seeking 
workable, tried and tested, readily available definitions and responses from other 
countries and from the past is the means by which policy makers put their learning into 
effect” (Hulme, 2005, p.421). 
Though the debate is still open, the consulted literature seems to suggest the 
comprehensive scope of the policy transfer concept, which produces an overlap with 
concepts such us policy convergence, policy learning or policy diffusion, all integrated 
in the semantic field of policy change. The overlap between policy transfer and its 
related concepts is not total in any case, meaning that the related concepts seem to 
preserve part of their own significance outside of the policy transfer concept. It is also 
possible to suggest the existence of overlaps between some of the related concepts: 
policy diffusion may be one of the causes of policy convergence (Knill, 2005, p.767) 
and it may interact with the lesson-drawing mechanisms at its initial stages. None 
reference in the consulted literature sought to relate policy learning and policy 
convergence independently from policy transfer. 
The consulted literature also seems to admit a distinction in the focus intrinsic to each of 
the concepts involved. Policy convergence is a concept clearly centered on the effects of 
policy change; Policy transfer and policy diffusion seem to be concerned with the 
processes of policy change; Policy learning is apparently focused on the conditions 
                                                
29 Isomorphism is defined in organizational theory as a process of homogenization that “forces one unit in 
a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991, p.66 quoted by Knill, 2005, p.768). 
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allowing the transfer of knowledge, what we could locate in an interface between causes 
and processes. 
The literature also finds common points between policy transfer and lesson-drawing in 
the fact that both are about the transposition of policies and/or practices already in 
operation in one jurisdiction to another (Page, 2000, p.2) or in the fact that both give 
precedence to the actor and intention, thus assuming some rational judgment on the part 
of policy-makers (Stone, 2001, pp.5-6). Diffusion can also happen without a conscious 
participation of the actors involved (Newmark, 2002, p.152). 
From these impressions and with the only intention of clarifying the current stage of the 
conceptual debate in view of the following steps of this thesis (i.e. with any intention of 
entering into the mentioned conceptual debate), the semantic relations between policy 
transfer and its related concepts can be schematically represented as in Fig. 36. The 
graph maps the overlapping and relations between concepts, as well as their position 
with respect to two axes, one related to the focus of the concept (in terms of causes, 
processes and effects) and the other related to the awareness (i.e. consciousness) of the 
actors involved. 
Fig. 36: Mapping of policy transfer related concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
4.3.3 Concept development and criticism 
Setting aside for a moment the implications of the horizontal debate related to the 
semantic boundaries of the policy transfer concept, attention will be driven now on the 
vertical debate, that is on the progressive definition steps undertaken with the intention 
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of operationalizing the concept and the criticisms that it has raised. 
At this stage the focus will be concentrated on the following six issues: the assumption 
of rationality in policy transfer processes; the role of coercion in policy transfer 
processes; the existence of an one-dimensional policy transfer continuum; the 
consideration of different degrees of transfer; the relationship between policy transfer 
and policy failure; and the extent of the overall explanatory power of the policy transfer 
concept. It will be only in a next stage that the research will tackle the conceptual 
frameworks and models available in the political science for the analysis of transfer 
processes. 
4.3.3.1 The assumption of rationality in policy transfer processes 
According to the developments of Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer processes 
imply rational behavior from policy-makers. In most cases this rationality is not 
complete (perfect rationality30), but is shaped by imperfect information and the 
perceptions of policy-makers upon the decision-making situation (bounded 
rationality31). Particularly, the authors established a link between rationality and lesson 
drawing, by stating that in such a case “actors choose policy transfer as a rational 
response to a perceived process” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.14). 
This view has been challenged from various angles. A first criticism arises from the 
implicit adoption of a rational conception of the policy-making process that is 
embedded in the assumption of rational policy transfer. Defenders of other approaches, 
like incrementalism32 or the garbage can model33, argue that policy-making entails 
                                                
30 In political science, perfect or comprehensive rationality refers to a decision-making behaviour in 
which: 1) Policy aims or ends are identified in terms of the values of the policy maker; 2) All means to 
achieve those ends are identified; 3) The best means are selected;  4) Analysis of the decision-making 
context is comprehensive – i.e. all relevant factors/ possibilities have been considered (Jordan and 
Richardson, 1987, pp.9-14 quoted in Carney 2003). 
31 The concept of bounded rationality, as stated by Herbert Simon, is based on limitations to 
comprehensive rationality in terms of incomplete knowledge and information of the existing situation and 
the consequences of policy “solutions”; cognitive inability of decision-makers to consider every possible 
solution; the distinction between individual and organizational rationality and the difficulty of separating 
facts and values (as explained in Carney, 2003). 
32 The incrementalist approach to policy-making, as defined by Lindblom, argues that policy is not made 
once and for all but it is the result of chronological series of choices rooted in the existing policy and 
tested at every step against reality. 
33 The "garbage can model" conceives the policy making process as the interaction of four streams 
(problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities) within organizations. “Each of the streams 
has a life of its own, largely unrelated to the others. Thus people generate and debate solutions because 
they have some self-interest in doing so (e.g., keeping their job or expanding their unit), not because the 
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solving closely interrelated problems under conditions of great uncertainty in highly 
complex contexts. In this scenario, policy processes and outcomes could also be 
interpreted as the result of successive limited comparisons (Lindblom, 1959) or even the 
result of organizational anarchy (Cohen et al. 1972). 
A second argument is related to the conception of policy transfer as one more of the 
various elements that contribute to the wider process of policy change. Under this view, 
other structural considerations might prevail over the hypothetic rationality of lesson 
drawing and policy transfer, leading to an overall irrational output as result of the 
political change. This argument is strongly related to the debate about the explanatory 
power of policy transfer, treated later in this section. 
A third argument regards the contradiction arising between a rational policy transfer and 
the output resulting from the interaction of the opposed interests of multiple actors and 
governance levels. From this perspective the hypothetic rationality of policy transfer is 
thought to be dependent on the existence of a powerful central force or actor. 
A fourth argument states that rational behavior in policy transfer requires the actors to 
carry a complete evaluation of policy options available to them before engaging in 
transfer. Supporting this view, Lodge (2003, p.161) argues that policy transfer and 
learning rather represent “limited searches for templates that appear more legitimate, 
appropriate or successful” than a full evaluation of all available alternatives. This 
argument, though clearly opposed to perfect rationality, could however be fit within the 
bounded rationality concept as a particular case in which decision-makers are unable to 
consider every possible solution because of their predisposition (i.e. they are willing to 
consider only a limited number or type of policy solutions). 
4.3.3.2 The role of coercion in policy transfer processes 
As regards the role of coercion in policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, pp.346-
348) outlined three categories of coercion in policy transfer: 1) Voluntary transfer, as a 
voluntary decision of policy-makers resulting from dissatisfaction with existing 
domestic policy; 2) Direct coercive transfer, as the consequence of direct influence by an 
organization, country or supranational body; and 3) Indirect coercive transfer, meaning a 
transfer that is voluntary but driven by a perceived necessity to change policy (e.g. 
because of market forces or international policy developments). 
However, the authors note that “to establish a simple distinction between voluntary and 
coercive transfer is to oversimplify the process” and admit that many cases of transfer 
contain both voluntary and coercive elements (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, pp.13-14). 
                                                                                                                                          
solutions are generated in response to a problem or in anticipation of a particular upcoming choice.” 
(Cohen et al., 1972, p.2) 
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A first point of discussion is about the recognition of coercion in policy transfer. 
Though it may be evident in some clear-cut cases, like pressures exerted by militarily 
victorious powers, the conditions imposed by international organizations in the context 
of development policies or the obligations derived from international law (Hoberg 1991, 
quoted in Lodge, 2003, p.162), the level of coercion may be not so evident in its most 
indirect forms (e.g. smaller or less powerful regions may perceive the need to follow the 
policy of their larger neighbors to avoid consequences from divergence). 
This view is shared by Page (2003, pp.5-6), who states that “numerous circumstances 
can be envisaged when a country has little choice but to introduce a policy, but where it is 
difficult to talk about coercion being exercised by another organisation or country”. This 
author notes that there could also be circumstances under which transfer, though not 
coerced, is not voluntary and concludes that “coercion versus voluntary transfer is 
unlikely to be a simple variable, and not reducible to one dimension”. 
A second point relates to the change over time of the coercion levels exerted on the 
importer jurisdictions. In fact, the perceived need to transfer may vary over time 
depending on internal or external circumstances, therefore reflecting the pressure to 
change policy in general and the existence of opposing pressures in individual political 
systems (Hoberg, 2001, p.128). 
A third interesting point regards the relation between the effective level of coercion and 
the observed response from governments. As noted by Holzinger and Knill (2005, 
p.781) we should be careful about assuming a high level of coercion since e.g. there is a 
difference between a government being resistant to a policy transfer and a government 
which sees the policy as just not very high on its list of priorities. Further, the 
appearance of coercion may “help governments introduce policy not favoured by its 
citizens”. 
4.3.3.3 The existence of an unidimensional policy transfer continuum 
In order to clarify the different types of policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, 
p.13) suggested conceptualizing transfer “as lying along a continuum that runs from 
lesson-drawing to the direct imposition of a program, policy or institutional arrangement 
on one political system by another”. According to their idea, they represented perfect 
rationality and direct coercion as the opposite ends of a single axis over-arching the 
whole policy transfer concept (Fig. 37). 
This concept has been strongly opposed by Oliver James and Martin Lodge (2003, 
pp.185-186), who argued that the policy transfer continuum collapses the previously 
described dimensions of rationality and coercion, obscuring relevant differences 
important for the approach of public policy. The authors defend the independence of 
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both axes, that could converge only in the hypothesis of coercion exerted through the 
provision of information, and conclude that “the difference between voluntary action and 
coercion is normally seen as not being of the same kind as that between perfect and 
bounded rationality”. 
Fig. 37: Policy transfer continuum as defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) 
 
 Source: Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.13 
 
Monder Ram et al. (2007, p.782) qualify the unidimensional continuum as “simplistic” 
and support the argument of James and Lodge about the collapse of differing 
dimensions34, but they defend the value of this framework as a useful heuristic device. 
Carney suggested that the framework proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh should be seen 
in the light of a particular understanding of the term “coercion”, that could have been 
used to mean that policy transfer is voluntary but that regions may feel obliged to keep 
up or transfer policy to address a pressing need (Carney, 2003). 
4.3.3.4 The consideration of different degrees of transfer 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.351) built on Rose’s alternative ways of lesson drawing 
to propose a range of four options: copying, emulation, hybridization and synthesis35, 
and inspiration. They remarked that the type of transfer is likely to vary depending on 
the actors involved in the process or on the point within the policy-making process 
where the transfer occurs (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.13). 
This categorization seems to have been well accepted in the academic community, 
though it has also raised debate on some points. Page (2000, p.4) noted that the 
classification is clear when it is seen from the “lesson-drawing” perspective (where the 
                                                
34 They note as well that associating “perfect reationality” with “voluntary” transfer is problematic, since 
the latter often involves, at best, “bounded rationality”. 
35 Dolowitz and Marsh consider hibridization and synthesis as belonging to one single category. In their 
review of the policy transfer concept in 2000 they referred to it as combinations or mixture (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000, p.9). 
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analyst sets out what is being borrowed), but not from the “policy transfer” one (where 
the analyst tries to ascertain precisely what was borrowed). Carney (2003) referred to 
the eventual inclusion of a sixth category of transfer based on the conclusions of a case 
study developed by Dolowitz. This new category could be described as using the 
information gathered to “repackage old ideas and approaches under a new 
banner”(Dolowitz, 2003, p.103). 
Focusing on the effects that transfer could have on the political systems of the importer 
jurisdiction, Stone (2001, p.11) noted that policy transfer and lesson-drawing can occur 
across three orders of change: first order change involves “minor adjustments in the 
precise settings of policy instruments”; second order change involves “re-tooling, limited 
experimentation and introduction of new policy techniques” and third order change 
involves “a radical shift in the hierarchy of goals and set of instruments employed to 
guide policy”. 
4.3.3.5 The relationship between policy transfer and policy failure 
Another relevant point treated by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.17) regards failure of 
policy transfer processes. In their analysis the authors acknowledge the difficulties that 
may arise in the definition of “failure” and propose three factors able to produce to 
policy failure in a process of transfer: 1) uninformed transfer (may happen when the 
importer jurisdiction has insufficient information about the policy or institution 
transferred and how it operates in the exporter jurisdiction); 2) incomplete transfer (may 
happen when some relevant elements driving the success of the policy or institution 
transferred in the exporter jurisdiction are not transferred to the importer jurisdiction); 
and 3) inappropriate transfer (may happen when insufficient attention is paid to the 
social, economic, political and ideological differences existing between importer and 
exporter jurisdictions). 
The subsequent literature has shared the interest for this approach and agreed on the 
view that the transfer of successful experiences in one jurisdiction may not 
automatically lead to success in a different jurisdiction. 
Some theoretical points have been risen as regards the relationship between coercive 
policy transfer and policy failure or the limits existing between policy transfer and 
implementation literatures36 (Carney 2003). James and Lodge (2003, p.188) have gone 
further and have criticized the categorization of Dolowitz and Marsh because it is not 
able to explain policy failure in terms of the process of transfer. 
                                                
36 The relevance of this debate has been pointed out by Carney through the following single question: “If 
there is insufficient political will devoted to implementation, is this a failing of the transfer process?” 
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Attention has also been dedicated to the analysis of cases, with the intention of gaining 
further knowledge on the conditions that may lead to uninformed, inappropriate or 
incomplete transfer. 
Hulme (2005, pp.423-424), referring to several comparative case studies in welfare and 
education involving US and British policy, remarked that “selectivity and partiality on 
the part of the transferring agent are the overriding determinants of failure in policy 
transfer. Those elements of policies and structures that are left behind are often as 
significant as what is actually transferred”. 
As reported in Ram et al. (2007, p.781), Curran (2000) and Gibb (2000) analyzed the 
small and medium enterprises (SME) policy initiatives imported from other jurisdictions 
and concluded that results are poor because of a limited consideration of some of the 
aspects embedded in the transfer process. Furthermore, they openly criticized “the 
shallowness of small business research and policy thinking in relation to these 
phenomena”. 
In their own case study, they applied the transfer policy framework to the analysis and 
implementation of a transfer program related to supply diversity in the UK and 
concluded that “a programme transfer cannot be reduced to a mechanical set of 
operations. Rather, it requires an explication of conditions, complexities and character of 
the context into which the programme is to be transferred”. They also remarked the 
importance assumed by direct engagement with actors when trying to effect change by 
applying research findings in a particular context (Ram et al. 2007, pp.798-801). 
Some authors tackled the relation between policy transfer and policy failure from a more 
positive approach by proposing a number of factors affecting the likelihood of transfer 
and its success. 
Rose (1993, p. 132) suggested six hypotheses: 1) Transfer is more likely for programs 
with single goals; 2) Transfer is more likely for simpler problems; 3) Transfer is more 
likely in situations where the relationship between the problem and the “solution” is 
clearly perceived; 4) The fewer the perceived side-effects of a policy the greater the 
possibility of transfer; 5) The more information agents have about how a program 
operates in another location the easier it is to transfer; and 6) Transfer is more likely for 
programs with predictable outcomes. 
Other hypotheses found in the literature are: 1) There should be enough political, 
bureaucratic and economic resources to implement policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1999); 
2) If the policy is consistent with the dominant political ideology in the exporter 
country (Robertson, 1991); 3) The policy should not be “unique” or depend on 
“inimitable” organizations; 4) The smaller the departure form original policy the better 
the chances of success; 5)Transfer is more likely when there is interdependence (points 
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3-5 quoted in Carney 2003); 6) Transfer is more likely when there is geographic 
proximity (Rose, 1991); 7) Transfer is more likely when already exist informal policy 
communities (Stone, 2001). 
4.3.3.6 The extent of the overall explanatory power of the policy transfer concept  
Though treated in last place, this stream of the ongoing debate moves beyond the 
previous points to directly question the distinctiveness and explanatory power of the 
policy transfer concept. 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, pp.21-22) suggested that policy transfer could help to 
expand the understanding of the policy-making process as a tool to overcome some 
aspects of the prevailing rational-technocratic model. However, they also expressed 
clearly the limits of their framework: 
“While the research presented here certainly supports the position that policy 
transfer is a useful explanatory variable, it clearly doesn’t suggest that policy 
transfer is the sole explanation of any, let alone most, policy development. All we 
are suggesting is that an increasing amount of policy development, and particularly 
policy change, in contemporary polities is affected by policy transfer.” 
Page (2000, p.4) remarked the blurriness existing between policy transfer and the 
policy-making process, but suggested that research should not get stacked in trying to 
precisely identify the point of decision-making when transfer was adopted. 
Carney (2003) remarks that the interaction between policy-making and policy transfer 
can not be thought as limited to the selection of the source of policy ideas, because the 
importation of these ideas will be subject to the same conditions – incrementalism, 
governance, agenda-setting – as any other policy, regardless of the source. 
These considerations have been strongly contested by James and Lodge, who criticize 
both the assumption of increasing transfer in contemporary polities and the usefulness 
of the framework proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh. They described policy transfer as 
a too much ambitious framework gathering a set of diverse and conflicting theories, as a 
concept difficult to separate from other forms of policy-making and questioned its value 
to form measures of practical use. Furthermore, they attacked its distinctiveness and 
remarked the difficulties of gathering evidence about it (James and Lodge, 2003, pp.179-
193). 
Hulme (2005, p.418) shares the criticism of James and Lodge as regards its power to 
singly explain anything, but he defends the capacity of policy transfer to enhance the 
explanatory power of other perspectives and provide further insight in the processes of 
policy change. This view was also close to the one expressed by Evans and Davies 
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(1999, p.362) who conceived policy transfer as a common field able to integrate the 
research concerns of domestic, comparative and international politics. 
4.3.3.7 Conclusions on the concept development 
The review of the debate surrounding the development of the policy transfer concept 
offers a good basis to identify some of the relevant aspects that should be defined when 
building a framework to analyze a specific process of “policy / practice movement”. 
First, the framework should make clear the number and nature of the actors involved in 
the transfer process, the object of the transfer and the transfer sources taken into 
account (i.e. temporal or spatial transfer, transfer within countries or across countries, 
transfer within the same or across policy fields). 
Second, the framework should provide an assumption on the relation between the 
transfer and the policy-making processes. Policy transfer can be conceived as a separate 
process that starts and ends at given points of the policy-making process (which should 
then be defined) or it can be thought as belonging to the same stream (i.e. the policy 
transfer process can be assimilated to one specific way of making policy). Depending on 
the relative position chosen for both processes and on their starting and ending points 
the outputs and effects of the transfer will be different. 
Third, the framework should hypothesize the degree of rationality involved in the 
transfer process. The hypothesis should include both a consideration on the rationality 
of the actors involved and on the boundaries constraining their action. This hypothesis 
should also be stated for the whole policy-making process, as it could encompass the 
transfer process and condition the rationality of the final outcome (depending on the 
assumption made in the previous point). 
Fourth, the framework should take into consideration the existence of different degrees 
of coercion that can condition the whole transfer process. It should be able to deal with 
them by identifying the effects of coercion in terms of alterations to the process and in 
terms of the degree of discretion allowed to the actors. 
Fifth, the strong criticism to the concept of policy transfer continuum makes advisable 
to keep coercion and rationality as two separated dimensions within the framework. 
Sixth, the framework should define a criterion for transfer success / failure. This criterion 
could then be used as a starting point for defining a prospective analysis leading to 
conclusions on the transferability of different policies or on the preconditions required 
for transfer. In doing so it should keep in mind the aim stated for the process as well as 
the existence of different degrees of transfer. 
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4.3.4 Analytical frameworks and models 
4.3.4.1 Review of analytical frameworks and models 
Though some of the assumptions embedded in the policy transfer concept are still under 
discussion, several authors have proceeded further by developing theoretical frameworks 
and models intended to guide their analyzes and to support decision-makers involved in 
transfer processes. 
A first framework was proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh in 1996 (p.344) and improved 
in 2000 (p.8). In its final version, their model consisted of a series of questions both 
describing and structuring the policy transfer process in all its main dimensions. The 
seven questions to be answered were: 
• Why do actors engage in policy transfer? 
• Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfers process? 
• What is transferred? 
• From where are lessons drawn? 
• What are the different degrees of transfer? 
• What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? 
• How is the process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or policy 
“failure”? 
The authors justified their approach as a suitable way to understand better the transfer 
process, viewed as a key element of the analysis with irrelevance of considering policy 
transfer the dependent (a process that has to be explained) or the independent variable  
(an explanatory variable of policy change). 
Page (2000, pp.3-7) referred to this kind of framework as “the very basic questions of 
who, what, why, where and how policy transfer takes place” and enriched it with some 
relevant considerations: 
• Who – Agents of policy transfer (continuum from individuals to organizations) 
• What – Variable, several categorizations exist 
• When – The concept of policy transfer says little about the time period. Transfer 
is not necessarily based on a single act. 
• Why – The question includes several dimensions: coercive/voluntary transfer; the 
circumstances under which a country borrows from another; the type of 
objective pursued by the transfer;  the exporter country selection. 
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• How - The question is only valid if the importer can exert choice. The process 
can be diffuse and multifaceted, perhaps even unconscious on the part of those 
involved. Which are the preconditions that foster the transfer of innovations? 
How is demand for transfer induced? 
Page also remarked that the full series of questions can be seen both from a descriptive 
viewpoint (like a framework intended to describe transfer as a mean to highlight the 
policy-making process) or a normative viewpoint (like a framework intended to set the 
conditions that should drive the policy transfer process in a particular country). 
Though recognizing that the prime object of this framework is to improve knowledge 
about decision-making processes, Page (2000, p.2) insisted in the practical implications 
of correctly understanding the process. In its own words, the theoretical framework 
should help to define “which ways of transferring policies and practices are better or 
worse than others”. 
Other scholars selected another approach to the problem, preferring to narrow the 
policy transfer concept through the adoption of some simplifying assumptions and gain 
in its operationalization. We could say that by doing so they focused on policy transfer 
as a dependent variable that needed to be explained in some of its dimensions (and not 
all). 
Evans and Davies (1999, p.361) built their framework on the Rose’s definition which 
saw transfer as “an action-oriented intentional activity that takes place within a multi-
organizational setting” – that takes place consciously and results in policy action. In 
doing so, they explicitly renounced to other dimensions of policy transfer as those 
related to the general diffusion of knowledge, its application to intra-organizational 
situations or its temporal dimension. Rooted in this conceptualization, the authors 
developed their framework, which identified three levels in the nature of policy transfer: 
the global / transnational / international level; the macro-state level and the 
interorganizational level. 
On the one hand, they focused on the impact that structural processes external to the 
transfer process could have upon the context, strategies, intentions and actions of the 
agents directly involved in it. They relied on the structuration theory developed by 
Wendt37 and proposed to describe the action of external processes on agents through 
changes in exogenous and endogenous structures (Fig. 38). On the other hand, they 
analyzed the transfer processes at the interorganizational level employing the notion of 
                                                
37 Wendt describes social systems as the interaction and mutual determination between “structures” (i.e.  
sets of internally related elements which occupy a position within a social organization - practices, 
technologies, ideologies, territories, etc.) and “agents” (Wendt, 1987, quoted in Evans and Davies, 1999, 
p.370). 
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policy transfer networks38 as the mean to connect different levels of spatiality. They 
proposed twelve stages on the policy transfer process, all of which could be understood 
in the light of the development of policy transfer networks (Fig. 39). 
Fig. 38: Conceptual diagram of the action of external processes as defined by Evans and Davies 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Evans and Davies, 1999, p. 372 
Fig. 39: Conceptual diagram of the process of voluntary transfer as defined by Evans and Davies 
(1999) 
 
Source: Evans and Davies, 1999, p. 377 
                                                
38 Evans and Davies develop the concept of policy transfer network as a notion able to integrate previous 
literatures on policy networks, and epistemic communities (knowledge communities formed by experts 
sharing certain beliefs). 
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The framework resulting from the combination of both schemes understands transfer as 
a process happening in an interorganizational level that is framed by external processes 
happening at superior levels (global / transnational / international level and macro-state 
level). Therefore it provides a more structured basis for analyzing the interdependences 
and interactions arising between different levels at the occasion of policy transfer 
processes. 
Lodge (2003, pp.160-162) proposes a framework based on an institutional perspective, 
which assumes that policy transfer do not constitute rational decision-making in terms 
of a complete evaluation of all possible policy options. Accordingly, the policy transfer 
process has to be conceived as “limited searches for templates that appear more 
legitimate, appropriate, or successful”39. The selection and adoption of templates is 
conceived as dependent upon institutional mechanisms, as institutions are in relation 
with other policy environments (thus able to incorporate practices from other domains) 
and are able to provide legitimacy to the process. 
Lodge applied this framework to the regulatory reforms in the railway domain in Britain 
and Germany in order to assess the impact of three different institutional factors in the 
process: the presence of coercive pressures, the organization of the political – 
administrative nexus and the impact of societal actors. 
Mossberger and Wolman (2004, p.430) also adopted a restricted view of the policy 
transfer concept in order to enhance its practical consideration in day-to-day situations. 
In fact, they suggested to assimilate cross-national policy transfer to a specific type of 
prospective policy evaluation40. By doing so, they clearly placed the policy transfer 
concept in the sphere of policy-making. Once “brought down to earth” the concept, the 
authors focused their attention on the practical methodology that should be followed by 
decision-makers in order to succeed in a policy transfer process. 
They first hypothesized a perfectly rational approach to policy transfer made of three 
distincted steps: 1) Awareness (an adequate information search in both scope and 
accuracy); 2) Assessment (with particular regard to the similarity of problems and goals 
between the policies examined, their performance in their original contexts and the 
differences in settings between the exporter and importer contexts); and 3) Application. 
Then, they tested their approach against seventeen documented cases of policy transfer, 
noting the difficulties to match perfect rationality with the case studies in al the three 
steps. Finally, the authors admitted the impossibility of explaining real cases under a 
                                                
39 The author notes as well that “policies are attractive not necessarily for performance reasons, but for 
their ideational content as policy instruments”. 
40 Defined by the authors as the policy-makers’ attempts to assess the effect of a policy or program before 
it is put in place (Mossberger and Wolman, 2004, p.430). 
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perfectly rational approach, and suggested the use of several “rationally-bounded 
techniques”, such as directed search strategies for the first phase or heuristics for 
decision-making. 
Even more practical approaches to policy transfer have been developed in order to 
provide guidance to policy-makers. Some of them are briefly referred next. 
The Centre for Management and Policy Studies of the United Kingdom (CMPS) 
launched a project in 2000 intended to develop a methodology (a “toolkit”) to learn 
about and apply successful policies from abroad, as a way to improve the effectiveness 
of domestic policy-making.  They ended up by describing policy transfer as a two-
phase process, the first concerned with learning about another country’s policies or 
programs, and the second with learning from another country’s policies or programs 
(Fig. 40). The whole transfer process could happen at any stage of the policy-making 
process, depending on the problem to be addressed. 
Fig. 40: Conceptual diagram of the policy transfer process as defined by the CMPS (2002) 
 
Source: Wyatt and Grimmeisen, 2002, p.2 
The toolkit developed a five-step framework for policy transfer: 1) Scanning (surveying 
developments in a range of countries); 2) Selecting (one or more examples for detailed 
study); 3) Understanding (mapping the key elements of the chosen example); 4) 
Assessing (assess the relevance of the example to a different policy environment); 5) 
Recommending (recommend on the basis of the evidence: modify the policy or reject it if 
necessary) (Wyatt and Grimmeisen, 2002, pp.2-5). 
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has 
devoted particular attention to the sharing of information and knowledge on innovation 
in government. Within this focus, it has promoted discussion among experts on the 
approaches and methodologies for the transfer of best practices in governance and public 
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administration. 
Building on the experience gained from a series of pilot transfers in Asia, Sing Chahl 
(2006, pp.124-130) identifies four steps in the transfer of innovations: 1) Matching 
demand with supply (the main actor is the intermediary); 2) Defining the scope of the 
transfer (the intermediary acts as a broker between the two parties); 3) Adapting the 
innovation to local conditions (the intermediary’s role is that of a facilitator); and 4) 
Actual implementation of the transfer and its evaluation (the intermediary is an 
evaluator). In view of the real cases examined, he strongly recommends the elaboration 
of a mission statement able to define the key elements of a transfer: information 
dissemination and exchange, roles and responsibilities of actors/stakeholders, recognition 
of the innovation as a matched solution to the problem, education and adaptation, 
implementation plan, transfer (including a pilot demonstration) and follow-up. 
The European Commission has focused its attention on policy transfer and policy 
learning as “soft” instruments able to improve governance and reinforce the Community 
action in some fields where “hard” instruments like legislation are not available. These 
tools have been included in the Open Method of Coordination, a framework for 
encouraging cooperation and the exchange of best practice in policy-making across 
European institutions (EC, 2001b, pp.21-22). 
Among the several research projects undertaken to define such a coordination 
framework, the PREVALET project sought to develop a model for undertaking policy 
learning and transfer at the regional level. The model was called “soft open method of 
coordination”, and distinguished two stages: the policy learning stage and the policy 
transfer stage. The whole process was broken down into the following steps (Federighi 
et al. 2007, pp.9-10): 
•  Policy learning 
o Institutional motivation (definition of the reasons that cause governments 
to learn from others) 
o Selection of the pathway for policy learning (definition of the type of 
relation to be established among institutional partners) 
o Selection and analysis of measures (identification of the subjects to be 
studied in view of a possible transfer) 
o Evaluation and adaptation of measures (evaluation of the policy 
measures from the viewpoint of transferring them to the destination 
country) 
• Policy transfer 
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o Creation of institutional conditions for transfer (creation of the desire for 
change) 
o Choice of the process for the transfer (activation of the decision-making 
process whereby transfer becomes possible) 
o Decision-making process of the transfer 
o Implementation of the transfer (introduction as an experimental 
procedure) 
o Institutionalisation and follow-up (adoption of the innovation) 
 
Similar schemes have also been developed in Europe to guide the increasing activity of 
policy learning and transfer across cities in the fields of housing, transport and urban 
development and renewal (Stead et al. 2008, p.62). 
A good example of these initiatives in the field of transport is found in the METEOR 
project, an accompanying measure of the EC CIVITAS program for sustainability of 
European Cities41. The aim of the project was to monitor, evaluate and disseminate the 
results of transport policies implemented in the 19 cities participating in CIVITAS, with 
a special focus on the transferability of measures. 
The project defined transferability as “the ability to transfer/adopt in a given city 
successful measures previously adopted elsewhere, and achieve comparable results”, 
and sought to identify the conditions for transferability of measures within the studied 
cities - i.e. the conditions of applicability or context variables required for achieving 
comparable results (Macário et al. 2004 quoted in Macário et al. 2006, p.3). 
The project identified four stages in the transfer process: 1) Demonstration, where a 
best practice is identified in the originator city; 2) Transferability, where the 
compatibility of the best practice in the receptor city is appraised; 3) Assessment, where 
specific barriers to change and factors of success are identified; and 4) Implementation, 
where the good practice is implemented in the receptor city. Moreover, it proposed 10 
steps for transferring the CIVITAS’ measures: 1) Diagnostic of the problems; 2) 
Characterization of the city; 3) Analysis of the city context and implications of 
problems identified; 4) Search for similar contexts; 5) Selecting examples of source urban 
contexts; 6) Identify measures with potential for transferring; 7) Packaging and 
dimensioning the measures for transferring; 8) Ex-ante assessment of measures to 
                                                
41 The CIVITAS Initiative was first launched by DGTREN from 2002 to 2005. It included the 
participation of 19 European cities in testing and implementing measures to achieve the objective of 
cleaner and better transport. They implemented a total of 212 measures on sustainable transport that 
contributed to relevant improvements of transport in many of them. 
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transfer; 9) Identify need for adjustment; and 10) Implement measures and steer results 
(METEOR Consortium, 2006, pp.75-76). 
The project concluded that the most important driver for succeeding in a transferability 
process is the ability to adequately replicate the context, namely physical, cultural and 
institutional conditions. It also suggested the convenience of clustering different 
measures in order to improve their acceptability in the recipient city. 
A part from European initiatives, it is also possible to find national and regional 
initiatives in the field of transport policy transfer. One interesting example is the study 
“Transferability of Best Practice in Transport Policy Delivery”, commissioned by the 
Scottish Executive to identify best practices among a number of European regions and 
cities and assess its potential implementation in Scotland (Colin Buchanan and Partners, 
2003). 
The methodology adopted to assess the effectiveness of best practices if transferred to 
Scotland sought to identify success factors in the original practices and the ideal pre-
conditions accompanying them. Then, it compared these preconditions with the Scottish 
case, deriving appropriate conclusions on the transferability of the practices. This 
methodology allowed to identify some key barriers to transfers, mainly the financial 
costs, the organizational cost of setting up new organizations and transferring powers to 
them or the need of legislative changes. The study also suggested the convenience of 
implementing tests in small parts of the territory. 
4.3.4.2 Conclusions on the analytical framework and models 
The review of the frameworks proposed by the literature undertaken in the previous 
section allows to obtain some preliminary conclusions that could be relevant for the 
definition of a policy transfer framework. 
Though not extensive, the review provides examples for each level of detail, ranging from 
purely theoretical frameworks deduced from the conceptualization of transfer to 
frameworks induced from a number of practical cases. Thus, they are not likely to 
provide a unique and consistent lesson but various lessons that can be useful at different 
stages of the framework-building process. 
Highly conceptual frameworks, like the ones proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh and 
Page seem to be oriended to further develop the notion of policy transfer through the 
provision of some theoretical specifications. Most of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from them are similar to the points already noted when discussing the development of 
the concept, as they regard the nature of the key issues that should be defined when 
building a framework (e.g. actors, object, source, coercion, rationality, etc.) 
The frameworks proposed by Evans and Davies and Lodge are more precise in their 
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determinations and provide interesting refinements that should be taken into 
consideration when defining aspects such as rationality, coercion or preconditions in a 
policy transfer framework. 
The multi-level approach to transfer suggested by Evans and Davies represents a 
valuable structure for the analysis of the successive influence of external and internal 
processes through the international, national and domestic levels. This influence can be 
understood in terms of coercion (as it limits the range of action of the actors involved at 
each level), but also in terms of bounded rationality (as the external influences may limit 
the range of knowledge available to the actors involved) or preconditions (as these 
ranges may be very dissimilar in importer and exporter jurisdictions). 
The institutional approach suggested by Lodge fits well in such a scheme, as the 
limitations framing the search for templates to transfer are to be found in the transversal 
role of institutions,which are able to exert their influence through different levels or 
policy domains. 
When we move into more experimental frameworks, arising from theoretical 
propositions but then tested against a number of cases, the lessons regard the contents 
that should be included in the framework. The examination of the samples seem to 
suggest three issues common to many of them, if not to all. 
The first issue regards the open refusal of comprehensive rationality, which finds 
support on the evidence of the strong requirements embedded in this assumption (e.g. 
searching and assessing all the potential policies to transfer, conducting a complete 
assessment and identification of the potential implementation difficulties, etc.) and on 
the evidence of the heavy dependency of transfer on the more general political situation 
and decision-making process. This coincidence in the negative evaluation of the perfect 
rationality hypothesis seems to discard it for consideration in a policy transfer 
framework. 
The second issue concerns the identification of the main stages of the policy transfer 
process. Although the frameworks examined suggest a different number of steps, it is 
possible to find three phases or stages common to all of them: an information phase, an 
evaluation/adaptation phase and finally a decision/implementation phase. As in the 
previous case, this coincidence seems to suggest that the proposition of a new 
framework should at least include these three stages. 
The third issue is related to the process of constructing a model as a mean to work with 
different policies in terms of comparison between them, identification of preconditions, 
prospective assessment of their success or adaptation. This model is based on a set of 
synthesis and mapping procedures that are usually applied at the end of the information 
phase. When defining a new framework, this construction of a model should be kept 
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actively in mind, with a particular attention to two aspects: its capacity to enhance the 
focus on the main issues to be addressed and the risk of over-simplification, that could 
jeopardize the whole process. 
 
 
4.4 Benchmarking theory 
4.4.1 Conceptual literature of management science 
Management science emerged as a body of literature during the period 1890-1930, 
reporting the ideas and theories of engineers concerned with such problems as job 
definition, incentive systems, and selection and training. They conceived the idea of 
achieving a scientific management, understood as the application of the scientific method 
to labor, management and cooperation issues. 
These first reflections took form in what is considered the first statement of a general 
theory of management, the Administrative Industrielle et Générale published by Henri 
Fayol in 1916. For the first time management was thought as a separate body of 
knowledge that could be applied in any type of organization and therefore as a theory 
that could be taught and learned. 
From these classical and deterministic approaches, management science has evolved 
steadily, producing relevant achievements in the organization and control of businesses, 
resources and people through the continuous development of concepts, practices and 
techniques. Two characteristics have been constantly present across all this path, its 
focus on problem-solving and decision-making processes and its holistic approach to 
them. 
Management science has provided insight in planning and decision-making activities (e.g. 
setting organizational goals and plans, driving innovation and change, providing decision 
aids, etc.), organizational activities (e.g. organization design, human resource 
management, etc.), leadership (e.g. managerial communication, motivation, etc.), or 
control activities (e.g. operations management, managerial control methods, information 
systems, etc.). 
However, our attention will be directed to a small part of it, to a specific concept, 
benchmarking, which first appeared in the private industry at the end of the 70s42. Since 
then, the successful application of benchmarking has gradually spread within the 
                                                
42 The benchmarking concept was first developed by the American company Xerox in 1979, as a way of 
improving its shrinking competitiveness against Japanese firms. 
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industry but also outside of it, reaching fields like public sector management or 
governance. 
In few words, benchmarking could be defined as a process of organizational learning 
involving the comparison with external organizations oriented to the implementation of 
some selected processes and practices. Conceptually, it has been considered a 
performance management technique related to the goal-setting activity, though it is 
meant to be more inclusive and has also been portrayed as part of total quality 
management (Luthans, 2005, p.499). It has also been considered a component of the 
formal planning process of an organization (Camp, 1989) or as a management 
philosophy related to the search of continuous improvement. 
Besides its particular classification in a particular branch of management, benchmarking 
theory seems to offer a potential link to the policy learning and transfer theories, 
opening the door to synergies and complementary approaches between them. For this 
reason, this section is devoted to review the most relevant contributions produced 
within the benchmarking theory and to explore the potential links between this concept 
and the policy learning and policy transfer theories that could be useful in the definition 
of a transfer framework. 
 
4.4.2 Definition of benchmarking 
Benchmarking could be defined as the process of comparing the performance or capacity 
of any organization with that of best-in-class organizations. However, it must be noted 
that there is no universally accepted definition of benchmarking, but a number of them. 
This fact is probably the result of the dynamic and evolutive nature of the concept, 
which is used to refer to an increasing number of practical exercises. 
Scholars, consultants and practitioners have developed their own definitions and 
methodologies of benchmarking according to their knowledge and experiences. Some of 
the most quoted definitions found in the literature are: 
• “The search for industry best practices that will lead to superior performance” 
(Camp, 1989, p.28). 
• “A continuous, systematic process for comparing your own efficiency in terms of 
productivity, quality and practices with those companies and organizations that 
represent excellence” (Karlöf et al. 1992, p.ix). 
• “The pursuit by organisations of enhanced performance by learning from the 
successful practices of others” (Holloway et al. 1999). 
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• “The analysis of internal practices and processes in systematic comparison with 
those of others in order to identify and implement best practice” (Arrowsmith et 
al. 2004, p.312). 
•  “The process of identifying, learning, and adapting outstanding practices and 
processes from any organization, anywhere in the world, to help an organization 
improve its performance” (APQC, 2008, p.1). 
 
These and other definitions found in the literature share some essential elements that 
distinctively frame the concept of benchmarking: 1) They all refer to processes that 
require the comparison between one organization and other organizations external to it.  
2) The external organizations involved in the comparison are best in class (e.g. “superior 
performance”, “excellence”, “successful practice”, “best practice” or “outstanding 
practices and processes”); 3) The process is conscious and follows a definite and 
structured path (e.g. “continuous, systematic process” or “systematic comparison”). 
This fact suggests the application of rational methodologies to guide the benchmarking 
process from beginning to end; 4) the whole process is oriented to drive practical actions 
for performance improvement (e.g. “implement” or “adapting”); and 5) Benchmarking 
seems to be understood as a continuous process. Consequently, it does not end after the 
learning and adaptation of external processes or practices has been done, but it starts 
again on the new grounds. 
Nevertheless, the concept is still undefined about a number of relevant questions: 1) It is 
not clear which is its scope of application. Though the majority of authors in the 
literature regards benchmarking as a tool for increased competitiveness and improvement 
in private companies, there are also examples of its use in public entities or in broader 
contexts and levels (e.g. sector or national comparisons); 2) The best-in-class or the best 
practice are relative notions. There is no single "best practice" because best is not best 
for everyone. Differences in organizational contexts, missions, cultures and technologies 
result in the selection of different practices and entities for comparison; 3) The same 
remark is valid for the aim of the benchmarking exercise, as the notion of “performance” 
will depend upon the objectives predefined by the management of the organization in 
view of the problems and environment faced; and 4) The variability in scope and 
objectives inevitably leads to different methodologies, as they will be designed and 
suited for a particular scope and objective. 
In a similar way to the policy transfer literature, the management literature also faces 
problems in the definition of the semantic field linked to the notion of benchmarking 
(horizontal analysis), though in this case the difficulties seem to come from the dynamic 
nature and extended application of the process and not from a direct conflict with 
previous concepts. 
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In spite of this indetermination, the essential elements common to the various 
definitions of benchmarking offer an undubious value for the construction of a policy 
transfer framework. First of all because benchmarking shares the focus on the 
comparison and transfer of elements across different entities, which is central to any 
policy transfer framework. Second, because it provides a strong practical experience 
derived from its constant test against reality. In fact, while the policy transfer concept 
has been proposed as a means to better understand some policy processes seen in the 
real world (a kind of top-down approach to the transfer problem), the benchmarking 
notion has been proposed as a tool to modify reality (that is, a bottom-up approach to 
the transfer problem). Third, because the evolving and active nature of the concept has 
facilitated the development of several practical methodologies and models, proven in 
many cases by their successful implementation. 
In view of this potential interest, the next sections are dedicated to examine the “vertical 
development” of the benchmarking concept. Given the variability in scope and 
objectives of application for the benchmarking concept and the intention of searching a 
potential link to the policy transfer and learning literatures, this thesis distinguishes two 
broad fields of application: the private sector and the public sector. 
 
4.4.3 Benchmarking in the private sector 
4.4.3.1 Development of benchmarking 
According to several authors (Watson, 1993, p.5; Keegan, 1998; Arrowsmith et al. 2004, 
p.312), the comparison of work processes across the industry has been a common 
practice since World War II in the form of “reverse engineering” and “comparative 
statistical activity”. 
However, it was not until the late 1980s43 that the first formal methodology for 
benchmarking was made public by Xerox Corporation, after its implementation in the 
production department of the company (Xerox Manufacturing Operations) in 1976. 
This first exercise was a form of competitive benchmarking seeking to match the quality 
and performance of Japanese competitors and resulted in the introduction of total 
quality management (TQM) methods, leading the firm to a lasting success. 
Since then, benchmarking has deserved growing attention from scholars and 
practitioners, being implemented by an increasing number of companies all around the 
world. By 1992, 65% of Fortune 1000 companies were using some form of 
                                                
43 The concept was first explained by the Xerox engineer Robert Camp in its groundbreaking essay 
Benchmarking: the search for industry best practices that lead to superior performance. 
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benchmarking. Such companies include AT&T, Du Pont, Ford Motor, IBM, Eastman 
Kodak, Milliken and Motorola (Bartol et al. quoted in IMPROVERAIL Consortium, 
2003, p.13). In 1993, the MIT’s Commission on Industrial Productivity found that 
almost all successful US companies were doing so (Karlöf et al. 1993, p.2). According to 
Hinton et al. (2000, p.56), the majority of UK companies with more than 500 
employees applied some kind of benchmarking (Fig. 41). This increasing interest has 
also found its manifestation in the literature. A review conducted by Dorsch and Yasin 
(1998, p.96) refers 415 publications on benchmarking between 1986 and 1995, while a 
review conducted by Dattakumar and Jagadeesh (2003, p.176) refers more than 350 
publications as of June 2002. 
Fig. 41: Relationship between benchmarkers and industry type in the UK. 2000 
 
Source: Hinton et al. 2000, p.56 
All this activity has resulted in a quick development of the benchmarking concept and 
applications since the first Xerox’s exercise. It is possible to trace an evolution from 
“competitive benchmarking” (1976-1986) to “process benchmarking” or “generic 
benchmarking” (1982-1986) and then to “strategic benchmarking” (1990s), with the 
view in a future step leading to the concept of “global benchmarking” (Watson, 1994, 
p.6; Arrowsmith et al. 2004, pp.312-313). 
Anderson and Camp (1995, p.21) remarked two fundamental aspects in this evolution: 
the increasing use of “computer-based benchmarking” (i.e. based on well documented 
databases of best practices) and the change in focus of the benchmarking process. As 
remarked by the authors, "In early studies, the focus tended to be on performance 
measures, often of competitors, and for the purpose of setting more ambitious targets. 
Recent studies have examined how non-competitors and industrial outsiders learn how to 
improve business processes. Comparison of performance measures has developed into 
learning about best practices". 
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4.4.3.2 Categories of benchmarking 
The increasing interest of firms in the continuous improvement of their practices has 
favored the development of a set of concepts and a number of methodologies able to 
provide answers to a wide range of management problems, all of them under the label 
“benchmarking”. This multiplicity of cases has motivated the definition of several 
categorizations aimed at describing the contents, the scope or the relationships 
developed within the benchmarking exercise. 
The most common distinction refers to the contents of the benchmarking process. 
According to it, three types of benchmarking should be differentiated: 1) Performance 
benchmarking - aimed to identify the relative quality of the organization and to suggest 
means of improvement; 2) Process benchmarking - aimed to assist in improving specific 
processes within the organization; and 3) Strategic benchmarking – aimed to improve 
the overall performance of the organization by examining the long-term structures, 
management practices and business strategies that have enabled high performers to 
succeed. 
A second distinction relates to the referents adopted for comparison, which can fall in 
the following four categories: 1) Internal benchmarking - when comparisons are made 
between departments/divisions of the same organization; 2) Competitive benchmarking 
– when comparisons are made against organizations that deliver the same output to 
compare performance, processes, organization and results; 3) Functional benchmarking 
– when comparisons are made against partners drawn from different business sectors or 
areas of activity to find ways of improving similar functions or work processes; and 4) 
Generic benchmarking - when comparisons are made against partners drawn from 
different business sectors or areas of activity to address issues such as organization and 
strategy (Camp, 1995). 
A third distinction refers to the overall approach to benchmarking at company level, 
which can be done in three ways: 1) A bottom-up process of networking and experience 
sharing; 2) A top-down approach, used by large (often multinational) companies, which 
may be focused internally as well as externally as a means of control and not just 
learning; and 3) A global approach, seeking for a global model of continuous learning and 
improvement (Arrowsmith et al. 2004, p.313). 
4.4.3.3 Benchmarking in the private sector - Models 
With independence of the type of exercise selected, benchmarking involves a systematic 
process able to cope with the search of excellence outside and inside the organization, 
with the learning and adoption of operative contents and processes, and with their 
implementation. 
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This structured approach has been treated by benchmarking theory through the 
formulation of several sequential models able to guide the whole process. Watson (1994, 
pp.3-4) noted that most of the models proposed were built on the basis of the Deming 
cycle, that is a continuous looping composed of four functional elements: plan, do, 
check and act. On the top of this basic structure, the models available have suggested a 
different number of stages and steps. 
Robert C. Camp (1989, p.32) defined a process that distinguished four main activities: 
1) Planning – aimed at defining the objective of the benchmarking, selecting an 
appropriate process, selecting the most suitable benchmarking partners and collecting 
the data needed; 2) Analysis – devoted to understand the competitive gap with the 
benchmarking partners in present and future conditions; 3) Integration – aimed at 
communicating and building acceptance of the results within the organization; and 4) 
Action – devoted to implement the selected practices and monitor the results (Fig. 42). 
Fig. 42: Conceptual diagram of the benchmarking process as defined by Camp (1989) 
 
Source: Leonard, 2001, p.9 
Karlöf and Östblom (1993, p.65) arrived to a five-stage sequence, which they described 
as follows: 1) Decide what to benchmark – that is, to identify what needs to be 
benchmarked and what method should be applied; 2) Identify benchmarking partners – 
also includes establishing contact and interfaces with the benchmarked entities; 3) 
Gather information – this phase should supply the information needed, both internal 
and external; 4) Analyze – this is to understand the performance gap, as well as the 
operative contents and work processes which lead benchmarked partners to achieve 
excellence and 5) Implement for effect – Comprises the work of closing the gap identified 
by the analytical stage. 
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Spendolini (1992, p.11) after “benchmark the benchmarkings” (i.e. comparing several 
benchmarking processes) proposed a five-step sequence: 1) Define what is going to be 
benchmarked – includes defining the needs of the organization, establishing the internal 
information needs and identifying the critical success factors; 2) Formation of a 
benchmarking team; 3) Identification of benchmarking partners; 4) Collection and 
analysis of the benchmarking data; and 5) Action – includes the reporting of the process 
to the organization and the identification of possible improvements for products and 
processes (Fig. 43). 
Fig. 43: Conceptual diagram of the benchmarking process as defined by Spendolini (1992) 
 
Source: Spendolini, 1992, p.48 adapted by D.Simon and A. Franklin 
Freytag and Hollensen (2001, p.26) divided the process of benchmarking into seven 
phases: 1) which functions to benchmark; 2) importance of each subject area; 3) whom 
to benchmark against; 4) gather the benchmarking information; 5) identify performance 
gaps; 6) how to learn from the "best-in-class" (benchlearning); and 7) implementation of 
the changes (benchaction). 
The literature shows many other sequences for the whole benchmarking process, 
differing in the number of steps proposed and the focus of each of the phases. However 
it is possible to identify some similar points in the paths proposed, what suggests the 
existence of some “core steps” able to define the particularity of the benchmarking 
sequential model: 
• First, they all start from the definition of the scope that should be covered by 
the benchmarking process (a performance target, an operational process, a 
strategical decision). 
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• Second, they build up a model able to describe the item analyzed in quantitative 
terms (generally through the identification of critical success factors44 and the 
selection of quantitative indicators linked to them). It is this model which is used 
to properly identify the processes, practices and entities deserving attention in 
the comparison. 
• Third, they initiate a learning stage, in which they seek to find and understand 
the underlying causes of the differences between the processes, practices or 
entities compared. 
• Fourth, they analyze the potential for implementation of the relevant lessons in 
the organization. They are faced to issues such as the feasibility of their 
implementation, their more likely consequences on the organization and their 
eventual modifications or improvements. 
• Fifth, the lessons are implemented and monitored.  
Additionally to the description of the process, the industry has defined through self-
regulation the conditions that should be respected when conducting a benchmarking 
process. The most well-known initiative is the widely used APQC / SPI Code of 
Conduct promoted by the International Benchmarking Clearinghouse, which establishes 
principles such us legality, exchange (provision of value to all stakeholders), 
confidentiality, limited use (information should be used with the only purpose of 
improving processes within a company), preparation (perform all the preparatory work 
required), completion of the study, etc. (Watson, 1994, pp.50-54). Europe has followed 
this path by the approval of the European Code of Conduct to guide benchmarking 
encounters and to advance the professionalism of benchmarking. It is a document shaped 
in a similar way, formulating similar principles as the APQC but adapted to the 
European Competition Law (IMPROVERAIL Consortium, 2003, pp.126-129) 
4.4.3.4 Benchmarking in the private sector- Benefits 
The appeal and widespread adoption of benchmarking in the private sector may be 
found in its ability to address several relevant issues related to organizational learning, 
internal control or strategic management of the companies. 
On the one side, benchmarking offers an appropriate framework and methodology to 
                                                
44 “Quantitative measures for effectiveness, economy and efficiency; those few activities where 
satisfactory performance is essential in order for a business to succeed; characteristics, conditions or 
variables that have a direct influence on a customer’s satisfaction with a specific business process; the 
set of things that must be right if a vision is to be achieved” (Watson, 1994, p.260). 
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structure organizational learning. In fact, benchmarking provides an adequate tool to 
define customers’ requirements, to learn about the organization’s internal processes, to 
learn about competitors or to find out outstanding practices and processes through 
dynamic comparisons with others. 
On the other side, benchmarking can be a valuable mean of internal control for the 
organization, as it provides a deep understanding of processes through the identification 
of success factors and true measures of productivity. The comparison of indicators with 
internal and external organizations may be used to monitor inhouse performance. 
Moreover, the continuous nature of the benchmarking process provides a framework for 
a permanent evaluation. 
Furthermore, benchmarking may be used as a strategical planning tool able to identify 
effective goals and objectives, to quantify them in challenging target values and to drive 
change through a strong focus on processes. It may serve to find new areas of 
development. It may be of help in building a future-oriented vision centered in quality, 
excellence and worldwide competitiveness. It may even be adopted as a relevant 
ingredient of the corporative culture or to force cultural change. 
4.4.3.5 Benchmarking railway companies 
Recent years have seen an increasing production of benchmarking projects within the 
railway sector as a mean to improve their operational, commercial and managerial 
performance.  This boom is related to both, the fact that railways have traditionally been 
an isolated sector (with low interest for comparing or even sharing information) and the 
strong political action towards performance improvement and harmonization. 
The latest review of benchmarking projects in the railway sector was conducted in 2003 
by the EC-funded project IMPROVERAIL, which examined ten relevant projects45 as a 
basis to propose its own benchmarking methodology adapted to the rail sector. 
Their review found two categories of benchmarking projects: 1) Projects oriented 
towards the definition and selection of indicators and data collection; and 2) Projects 
aimed at comparing processes. They remarked that the first category of projects found 
difficulties in completing the benchmarking process and often remained blocked at the 
data collection phase. Furthermore, they pointed out the eventual unsuitability of 
                                                
45 The main projects examined by IMPROVERAIL were EQUIP (Extending the Quality of Public 
Transport), PRORATA (Profitability of rail transport and adaptability of railways), CoMET (Community 
of METros), Nova (community of medium sized metro systems), EUROPE TRIP (European Railways 
Optimization Planning Environment - Transportation Railways Integrated Planning), RAILBENCH 
(performed by FS), benchmarking initiatives from REFER EP and NS, BEST(Benchmarking European 
Sustainable Transport) and BOB (Benchmarking of Benchmarking). 
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available data and statistics for comparison purposes and the lack of co-operation from 
benchmarking partners as barriers found in some of the projects reviewed. 
As regards the nature of the benchmarking processes applied, they found that railway 
companies prefer to remain focused on competitive benchmarking instead of undertaking 
generic benchmarkings, a fact that seems to suggest that there is still ample room for 
learning from same-sector companies. With respect to the methodologies applied, they 
noted that the reviewed projects “in one way or another draw on the basic 
benchmarking methodology but all develop their own specific steps and points of 
gravity” (IMPROVERAIL Consortium, 2003, pp.78-79). 
When defining their own benchmarking methodology, the researchers of 
IMPROVERAIL noted the specificity of railway infrastructure companies and network 
operators in terms of size and complexity. They remarked the difficulties relative to 
their sometimes low comparability (different organization of business units as well as 
different classification of functions and outputs, different technical or accounting 
standards, etc.). 
They distinguished two approaches to benchmarking railway infrastructure companies 
or network operators: a unitary approach, focused on the railway network as a whole, 
and a segmented approach, which tries to select more comparable entities, organizational 
units or processes for benchmarking with similar entities in other railways. The first 
approach was retained good for carrying out a strategic benchmarking (e.g. focused on 
the definition of a vision and/or strategy for the whole entity) or analyzing processes 
driven at a network-wide level (e.g. commercial arrangements with external parties), but 
no benchmarking operational performance. On the opposite, the second approach was 
retained more suited to benchmark performance and processes. 
With these caveats in mind (i.e. complexity and low comparability of railway companies 
and multiplicity of approaches), the IMPROVERAIL team suggested the ten-step 
methodology depicted in Fig. 44. 
The benchmarking sequence proposed by IMPROVERAIL involves two consecutive 
processes. The first one, focused on the definition and metrics of the benchmarking 
exercise, starts by defining the vision and strategy of the railway company in terms of 
success dimensions (e.g. delivering service quality, railway safety, etc.). Critical success 
factors are identified and benchmarking partners searched accordingly. Products and 
processes involved in the consecution of critical success factors are then described 
through an appropriate set of KPIs. The second, aimed at analyzing and implementing 
external lessons or practices, starts with a careful study of the differences detected, 
identifying and eliminating external factors affecting performance which escape to the 
railway company’s control. Best practices and processes under the control of 
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management can then be identified and implementation plans elaborated. Once put into 
action, their results should be monitored, closing the whole cycle. 
Fig. 44: Benchmarking methodology proposed in the IMPROVERAIL project. 
 
Note: KPI – Key Performance Indicator. 
Source: Anderson et al. 2003, p.6 
 
Anderson et al. (2003, pp.4-5) further developed these concepts for their specific 
application to infrastructure management companies. They noted a number of specific 
motivations, other than improving performance, that could make benchmarking desirable 
for these entities46. They also remarked the great variability of the mechanisms for 
measuring performance across different European railways and the risk that the effects 
of superior practices could end up hidden by the influence of differences in geography 
and local economy conditions. 
4.4.3.6 Benchmarking in the private sector - Conclusions 
The private sector has undertaken the application of benchmarking driven by a strong 
result-oriented mentality. Accordingly, benchmarking has been primarily employed as a 
practical tool to identify and achieve quantifiable targets, avoiding less direct purposes 
as, for instance, building consensus or influencing other participants. This practical 
view, together with the adaptability and flexibility of the benchmarking concept, has 
been successfully used to pursue and attain different objectives (e.g. internal control, 
operational improvement, strategic planning, etc.). 
The frameworks and models adopted have evolved consequently, proving their 
                                                
46 They included: 1) Explaining the situation to stakeholders (e.g. regulator, financiers, government); 2) 
Justifying an appropriate level of financing from the government; 3) Justifying an appropriate level of 
track charges from the regulator; 4) Providing a better understanding and forecasting of costs and 
revenues, leading to better project predictability; 5) Setting target cost levels; and 6) Monitoring 
contractual performance (e.g. train operating companies, maintenance suppliers, etc.). 
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applicability to a wide range of entities (from other business units of the same company 
to organizations in completely different industries), their ability to draw useful lessons 
for every organizational level (corporative, business and operational levels) and their 
leverage to steer change in corporate’s visions and culture. 
All frameworks and models encountered in the benchmarking literature are built around 
two cyclical steps, learning and transfer, which irremediably suggest a link to the policy 
transfer and policy learning literatures. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
objectives, scopes and approaches of benchmarking may not be the same as those found 
in such fields. Moreover, the benchmarking process applied in the private sector is 
rather clear-cut: it is a rational process voluntarily undertaken by a company with the 
scope of driving changes that will only affect the organization and will be implemented 
in its limited and defined context. These characteristics are probably adequate for the 
analysis of practices in the management sphere, but may be not so suitable for its 
application in the policy-making sphere. 
Nevertheless, the frameworks and models arising from the vertical development of the 
benchmarking concept in the private sector provide some relevant elements that, a 
priori, would be worth of consideration when proposing a policy transfer framework. 
They are: 1) The specific attention devoted to the monitoring and understanding of 
internal practices as a pre-requisite for the whole process of comparison, learning and 
transfer; 2) The ordered and formal approach of the comparison process. Although the 
definition of indicators and the calculation of quantitative values would certainly be 
difficult in the policy sphere, a similar structure would certainly be helpful for the 
framework; 3) The temporal dimension of the comparison. In fact, the evaluation 
performed within the benchmarking exercise may go ahead the present moment, 
providing a dynamic approach to indicators and comparisons; 4) The strong orientation 
of the whole process towards a clear objective (best performance), which provides a 
strong consistency through all the steps. 
As already said, given the problems that may pose their transfer from a management 
sphere to a policy-making sphere, they should not be interpreted as specifications but as 
desirable characteristics of the new framework. 
 
4.4.4 Benchmarking in the public sector 
4.4.4.1 Development of benchmarking 
Since the early 1990s, the ability of benchmarking to manage organizations and improve 
their performance has received attention from the public sector, who has increasingly 
adopted this tool. 
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The UK recognized formally its relevance as a practical means of improving efficiency in 
the 1994 White Paper The Public Service: Continuity and Change and has since then 
engaged in a broad range of initiatives to benchmark government departments and 
agencies. Some of them were the performance benchmarking of the central government 
Executive Agencies against the private sector and similar entities in other countries; the 
elaboration of standards for the quality of public service (e.g. the 1991 Citizen’s 
Charte); the elaboration and publication of performance tables for individual schools, 
hospitals and ambulance trusts, local authority and emergency services; and the 
development of process benchmarking in some key areas of the public sector like human 
resource management or value for money studies (Cowper et al. 1997, pp.3-15). 
Also in the 1990s, Sweden established a rating system for the financial management of 
its government agencies, benchmarked its budget process against international partners, 
compared its public support for families against eight OECD Member Countries and 
implemented an annual benchmarking plan for local government authorities (Dahlberg et 
al. 1997, pp.23-33). 
Benchmarking gained further momentum in 1996, when the European Commission 
delivered the Communication Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European Industry 
in which defined it as “an instrument to promote change and continuous improvement of 
Europe’s competitive performance” (EC, 1996b, p.3). 
One year later, the Commission proposed the use of benchmarking as a valid instrument 
to optimize policies affecting competitiveness, with particular regard to the European 
employment strategy. Benchmarking was then seen as a relevant help with respect to 
two elements: 1) “The comparison of societal behaviour, commercial practice, market 
structures and public institutions across countries, regions, sectors and enterprises in 
order to identify best practice”; and 2) “applying reference to best practice as an 
instrument to identify changes required and to mobilise all actors of the economy and 
society to evolve in this direction” (EC, 1997, p.3). 
This view of benchmarking, conceived as a management tool that policy-makers could 
use to foster competitiveness, was expanded at the end of the decade with the 
development of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a governance alternative 
based on mutual learning and transfer of best practice across Member States. 
The OMC was first specified for the European Employment Strategy (EES), and then 
extended to other fields like the implementation of national action plans for 
employment, the use of regional and structural funds or the consultation on 
macroeconomic policy between the European Central Bank, the social partners and the 
European Commission. The concept was formally consolidated by the European 
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Council held in Lisbon in March 2000 as “a mean to help Member States to 
progressively develop their own policies by: 
• “Fixing guidelines for the Union with specific timetables in the short, medium and 
long terms for achieving the goals which they set. 
• Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different 
Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice. 
• Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by 
setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and 
regional differences. 
• Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as a mutual learning 
processes.” (European Council, 2000, § 37). 
 
Within this new approach benchmarking attains the status of a driver of EU policy 
(Arrowsmith et al. 2004, p.318). To say it in other words, benchmarking becomes the 
nucleus of a more complex and comprehensive strategy conceived as a “learning process 
for all” cooperative and respectful with national diversity. A strategy that has its own 
logic and can be seen as “a compromise between a logic of pure integration and a logic of 
simple cooperation” (De la Porte et al. 2001, p.4). 
Therefore, benchmarking has largely overcome its initial steps as a tool to improve 
performance in public sector units and has grown to be a tool for policy formulation and 
assessment. It is this latter aspect the more relevant for the objective of this thesis. 
4.4.4.2 Benchmarking in the public sector – Categories of benchmarking 
As already happened in the private sector, in the public sector the term “benchmarking” 
includes a wide set of concepts and methods that can be applied to different scopes and 
with different objectives in mind. 
The first distinction to be done regards the level of the public sector at which the 
benchmarking exercise take place, thus distinguishing 1) International level – when the 
exercise involves public entities from different countries (e.g. the EU); 2) National level 
– when the exercise involves public entities within the same country; and 3) Sub-
national level – when the exercise involves public entities within a particular region or 
local administration. 
As regards the EU level, in its 1997 Communication, the Commission distinguished 
three possible levels of benchmarking: the enterprise level (as treated in the previous 
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section 4.4.3), the sectoral level (concentrated on specific factors of the sector 
concerned) and the level of framework conditions (as a full evaluation of industry’s 
competitive situation and a diagnostic of the areas to be examined). It also noted the 
interest of conducting the latter type of exercise in the field of logistics and transport 
(EC, 1997, p.4). 
When it comes to the approaches related to the introduction of benchmarking into the 
public sector, the literature distinguishes two cases: 1) A top-down approach, where 
benchmarking is imposed externally, usually by a central department or management 
agency; and 2) a bottom-up approach, where individual organizations develop their own 
benchmarking projects and try to find relevant benchmarking partners (Helgason, 1997, 
p.3). 
This classification has been enlarged to three when it is referred to EU-level 
benchmarking: 1) the surveillance approach, used to seek and verify compliance at 
national and sub-national levels with Community policies or regulations; 2) the learning 
approach, used to analyze problems and make comparative assessment as a step 
towards best practice identification and building political consensus; and 3) the 
improvement approach, conceived as a combination of analytic and action orientation 
with “measurement sticks for self-evaluation” and “learning possibilities for 
improvement and adaptation”(HLGB, 1999, p.23). 
4.4.4.3 Benchmarking in the public sector –Theoretical  frameworks and models 
Dorsch and Yasin (1998, p.104), after conducting an extensive review of benchmarking 
frameworks, noted that the literature contained few examples of benchmarking initiatives 
in the public sector. Furthermore, they draw attention on the general lack of advanced 
models and frameworks able to explain the many facets of organizational benchmarking.  
In fact, most of the benchmarking frameworks and models proposed for the public 
sector are adaptations of those developed for the private sector. One example of this 
kind of frameworks can be found in Trosa and Williams (1996, pp.48-49), who 
proposed the following five-step sequence: 1) Understanding existing processes; 2) 
Selecting indicators; 3) Choosing benchmarking partners; 4) Relating process 
benchmarking and outcomes; and 5) Creating links between benchmarking, continuous 
improvement and evaluation. Another example is the nine-step sequence proposed by 
the European Commission (Fig. 45). 
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Fig. 45: Benchmarking sequence proposed by the European Commission 
 
Source: Deiss, 2000, p.63 
However, the literature also provides some innovative developments. Helden and 
Tillema (2005, pp.337-345) proposed a theoretical framework to investigate public 
sector benchmarking, built on a combination of economic and institutional reasoning 
(Fig. 46). 
Fig. 46: Theoretical framework for benchmarking in the public sector proposed by Helden et al. 
(2005) 
 
Source: Helden et al. 2005, p.342 
The economic reasoning was used by the authors to approach the effects of the 
benchmarking process. They suggested that benchmarking could be viewed as a 
substitute for market forces able to drive effectiveness and efficiency in the public 
sector. They tested this assumption against several policy documents and proposed 
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three economic hypothesis for the framework: 1) “benchmarking will improve the 
average performance of organizations”; 2) “benchmarking is a stronger incentive to 
improve performance for poorly performing organizations than for better performing 
organizations”; and 3) “benchmarking will diminish performance differences between 
organizations”. 
The institutional reasoning was used to approach the reasons why public sector 
organizations take decisions that are related to benchmarking. In this case the authors 
suggested the role played by institutional pressures and the organization’s response to 
that pressures47. Building on previous works, they suggested a complete set of factors 
related to the engagement of a public organization in a benchmarking project. The public 
organization will be more likely to engage in a benchmarking project: 1) the higher the 
degree of social legitimacy and/or economic gain perceived to be attainable; 2) the lower 
the disagreement from its stakeholders; 3) the higher its dependency upon stakeholders 
exerting pressure to engage in a benchmarking project; 4) the lower the degree of conflict 
with its organizational goals; 5) the smaller the extent of discretionary constraints 
imposed on it by a pressure to engage in benchmarking; 6) the more a higher 
governmental authority or the legislator plays a part in a pressure to engage in 
benchmarking; 7) the higher the number of organizations within its organizational field 
that have decided voluntarily to engage in benchmarking; 8) the higher the level of 
uncertainty in its environment; 9) the higher the degree of interconnectedness among the 
organizations within its organizational field. 
The authors refined their model with empirical research on the waste-water treatment 
benchmarking and concluded that “economic reasoning can only address particular 
explanations for response patterns of public sector organizations to benchmarking. It 
turned out to be useful to include complementary explanations that were derived from 
institutional reasoning”. 
Bessant and Rush (1999, p.8) proposed a methodology for benchmarking framework 
conditions, based on a Delphi survey promoted in 1999 by the European Commission. 
They acknowledged the differences between company activity and governmental policy 
benchmarking and stated that, though the essential process is common, “working with 
framework conditions may pose problems of focus and measurement”. The authors 
proposed a six stage methodology for benchmarking framework conditions (Fig. 47). 
                                                
47 Helden and Tillema based their model on two branches of the institutional theory (neoinstitutional 
theory and resource dependence theory) that presuppose that the behaviour of organizations is determined 
by different types of institutional pressures and responses to these pressures. The differences arise in the 
interpretation of the responses to institutional pressures: the neoinstitutional theory emphasizes the 
importance of compliance with external rules and standards, while the resource dependence theory 
stresses organizations’ abilities to influence their environments. 
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Fig. 47: Methodology proposed for benchmarking framework conditions by Bessant et al. (1999) 
 
Note: CSF – Critical Success Factor. 
Source: Bessant et al. 1999, p.8 
 
4.4.4.4 Benchmarking in the public sector - Benefits 
Though in a first time the public sector was mainly attracted by the benefits reported by 
benchmarking techniques in the private sector, it has been able to adapt and evolve this 
management tool in the pursuit of new specific goals and benefits. The introduction of 
benchmarking in the public sector has contributed to the questioning of existing 
experiences and to the enhancement of a problem-solving approach in the public 
administration, presenting itself as a valuable aid in the political decision-making 
process. 
At the operational level, the public sector has adopted benchmarking as a means to 
improve the learning abilities of public agencies through permanent comparison with 
similar entities. It has also taken advantage of benchmarking as a tool to control 
performance and delivery of public services and, in a second step, as a method to 
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introduce competitive pressure in non-market regulated activities through the linkage of 
incentives to the values of relevant indicators tested against the private sector or similar 
agencies. 
At the strategical level, the benchmarking tool has been integrated in the policy-making 
process as a way to identify areas for improvement, to provide assessment on policy 
options and to set quantitative targets for policy inputs, outputs and processes. Thanks 
to its structured approach, benchmarking has been able to improve not only the 
efficiency, but also the transparency and contestability of the policy-making process. 
Furthermore, its participative nature has enabled it as a framework for discussion, 
agreement and making of policies far more open and flexible than other approaches (e.g. 
based on coercive legislation). The participation of every stakeholder in the elaboration 
of goals and targets, the identification of best performers, and the scrutiny of progress 
acts as a source of legitimacy for the outcoming policies. 
The structured approach and the participative nature of benchmarking have also 
promoted its use as a powerful communication instrument able to justify and gain 
support for specific policies. 
4.4.4.5 Benchmarking transport policies 
Transport policy is a new area of application for benchmarking. In this field, 
benchmarking is aimed at understanding how other transport policies work in terms of 
inputs, processes and outcomes in order to improve transport policies currently 
applied. 
A first reference to the potential use of benchmarking to help setting policy in the 
transport sector can be found in the 1999 ECMT Conference “Transport 
Benchmarking. Methodologies, Applications and Data needs”. It concluded that 
“Benchmarking in its most complex ‘comparative analysis’ version48 really can be used 
to define policy” and remarked the need of formulating concrete, measurable, clear, 
quantified objectives, as well as the precondition of a high involvement of politicians in 
the process (ECMT, 2000, p.191). 
Until now, few research projects have been produced in this field. The main European 
contributions on transport benchmarking in a policy context have been delivered by the 
BEST (Benchmarking European Sustainable Transport), BOB (Benchmarking Of 
Benchmarking) and NATCYP (National Cycling Policy Benchmarking Program) 
                                                
48 This “version” is defined as “a multi-layer strategy to achieve greater effectiveness and higher quality 
services and encourage change” (Wobbe, 2000, p.10). 
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projects. Another relevant project in this field is the European Best Practice in 
Delivering Integrated Transport, commissioned by the  CfIT in the UK. 
The BEST project (2000-2003) was conceived as a thematic network bringing together 
European policy-makers, professionals and stakeholders working in the transport sector 
with a threefold objective: 1) To produce recommendations for the EC on the 
development of benchmarking as a practical tool to improve the implementation of 
sustainable transport policies throughout Europe; 2) To create an innovative dynamic of 
exchange of experience between the different transport sectors and sub-sectors; and 3) 
To build consensus, at a European level, on the key requirements for a successful 
benchmarking process and on the benefits of applying benchmarking in the transport 
sector. 
The project underscored the potential role of benchmarking as a means for developing, 
implementing and evaluating policy in the transport sector. It first provided a general 
framework for analyzing the interaction between benchmarking and public policy, which 
distinguished five types of relations (BEST Consortium, 2003, pp.3-12): 
• Policy on benchmarking – Development of political initiatives to support and 
promote the use of benchmarking. This approach focuses on the promotion of 
top-down driven benchmarking activities within the industry. 
• Benchmarking into policy – Refers to procedures to most effectively bring 
existing benchmarking data into the processes of policy formulation and 
implementation. This approach concentrates on the conditions under which the 
policy lessons already obtained from one administrative or operational context 
can be transferred to another. 
• Benchmarking for policy – Development of new benchmarking projects in 
particular areas in order to directly exploit and learn from them in the 
development of policies. This approach seeks to understand the framework 
conditions and processes existing in the industry and suggest areas for 
improvement through political action. 
• Benchmarking of policy – Application of benchmarking to compare the 
performance of different policies adopted by different administrations. This 
approach focuses on the evaluation of policies. As noted in the project, it is not 
clear the particular role of the “essentially managerial methodologies of 
benchmarking” with respect to the “well-established discipline of policy 
evaluation”. It is even suggested to “re-frame any questions about policy 
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benchmarking in terms of the comparative evaluation of particular policies or 
policy instruments”. 
• Benchmarking of policy-making – Application of benchmarking to compare the 
processes of policy-making in different administrations. This approach is 
concerned with the identification and dissemination of best practice in policy-
making. 
 
Fig. 48 provides a schematical representation of the abovementioned relations.  
 
Fig. 48: Different roles of benchmarking in relation to policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BEST Consortium, 2003, p.15 
 
The BEST project concluded that benchmarking is a suitable tool for policy-makers to 
develop, formulate, implement and evaluate transport policies at different levels - 
international, national, sub-national. Among the recommendations that should be 
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considered when using benchmarking in this context, they noted the following (BEST 
Consortium, 2002, pp.1-12): 
• The meaning of the term transport policy should be clearly defined, as well as the 
specific aspects to be benchmarked (e.g. policy-making process, policy 
objectives, policy instruments, policy outcomes, etc.) and the level of detail (e.g. 
policy, policy and programs, etc.). 
• Comparing the policy measures proposed is not a valuable process in itself. The 
benchmarking exercise should better concentrate on the impact of certain policy 
measures or instruments (relating these to objectives and outcomes) or on the 
process that leads to certain results in the area to which the policy applies. 
• The benchmarking exercise should start simply with limited objectives and a few 
indicators based on already available or easily available data. Only later it would 
be gradually able to develop the process to include other areas and issues.  
• The scope and level (international, national, sub-national) of the benchmarking 
exercise should be set in relation to the objectives to be achieved. 
• Cross-national comparison of transport policies must take into account differing 
external conditions and policy objectives, particularly as regards the assessment 
of the impact of policy measures in another context. Geographical, demographic, 
economic, institutional, social and cultural differences between countries need to 
be properly understood when identifying benchmarks and good practices. 
• The complexity of transport policy may also require a qualitative assessment of 
policy and performance in addition to quantitative measures. 
 
The BOB project was launched to provide practical support to the BEST project 
through the testing of use of benchmarking methods in relation to transport policy 
issues. Its work consisted in the development of three pilot studies, one of them related 
to passenger transport in rail, another to airport accessibility and a third one related to 
road safety. 
The BOB railway pilot carried out a detailed analysis on causes of delays through a 
nine-step benchmarking methodology49 focused on two main areas: institutional relations 
                                                
49 1) Identification of areas for benchmarking; 2) Identification of relevant dimensions; 3) Identification 
of indicators and of data needed; 4) Collection and collation of data; 5) Identification of benchmarks and 
choice of indicators; 6) Analysis of the reasons for performance differences. 7) Analysis of possible 
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– exploring the effects of the relation between administration, infrastructure provider 
and operators in punctuality – and performance criteria – exploring the effects of some 
operational aspects on punctuality. 
As regards the benchmarking exercise within the area of institutional relations, the 
project acknowledged the difficulty of identifying appropriate dimensions within it and 
the impossibility of defining ideal models as regards the structure of the railway sector 
(given the absence of consensus in this field). Concerning the identification of best 
practices, the project stated that “effective policymaking depends fundamentally on the 
national and regional settings and framework conditions in different countries. Although 
a common framework of rules is agreed upon in the EU, national and regional 
circumstances differ too much for easy identification of one single ‘best practice’.” (NEA, 
2003, p.21). 
The NATCYP project (2001) was promoted by the association Vélo Mondial with the 
twofold objective of providing good quality data on cycling policies and promoting / 
improving cycling policies worldwide. The project selected a number of issues to be 
addressed and proposed quantitative and qualitative indicators for each of them (targets 
and performance, policy-making process, tools and measures and barriers and support). 
The project acknowledged the value of benchmarking national cycling policies and 
remarked its added value in terms of sharing of information, identification of strengths 
and weaknesses of current policies and a better understanding of national practices as 
part of a wider political action. The exercise was also perceived by stakeholders as a 
good starting point for policy formulation and renewal (Vélo Mondial, 2001, pp.22-27). 
The UK White Paper A New Deal for Transport Better for Everyone (1998) recognized 
the value of improving transport policy through learning from best practice and declared 
it one of the objectives of the newly created CfIT - Commission for Integrated 
Transport (Dft, 1998, p.81). 
In 2001 this institution promoted the project European Best Practice in Delivering 
Integrated Transport, a comprehensive comparison of the UK’s approach to all modes 
of transport with that of the rest of Europe. The project involved the comparison of 
transport performance and policies at the national and local levels, the development of 
case studies on certain European cities and the assessment of the potential 
transferability of the best practices identified in these case studies to the UK. 
It concluded that the variation in progress towards attaining policy objectives, both 
between countries and within countries, were due to a number of influences, namely: 1) 
                                                                                                                                          
remedial measures; 8) Proposals for action and continuous improvement programmes; and 9) Monitoring 
of results (NEA, 2003, pp.9-10). 
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background factors that may well be beyond the influence of transport policies (e.g. 
contextual and cultural factors); 2) differences in the magnitude and treatment of 
common threats that are affecting all European countries (e.g. increasing car ownership, 
urban sprawl, etc.); and 3) integrated transport policy factors (e.g. policies effectively 
implemented) (WS Atkins, 2001, pp.67-75). 
4.4.4.6 Benchmarking in the public sector – Conclusions 
From the consulted literature, the application of benchmarking to the public sector 
seems to be twofold. In fact a clear distinction is drawn between benchmarking 
understood as a management tool imported from the private sector in order to enhance 
the learning processes, controllability and performance of public agencies, and 
benchmarking understood as a policy-making tool. While the first area faces similar 
considerations as those already made for the use of benchmarking in the private sector, it 
is at the policy-making level where the specificity of its use in the public sector lies. 
The addition of this new sphere of action to the idea of benchmarking has enlarged even 
more the range of fields, purposes and levels that may be included within this notion, 
leading to a further diversity of exercises and to a greater indefinition of the concept. 
As a management tool, benchmarking has progressively gained support in public 
administration as a way to improve performance, improve performance information, 
reproduce competitive conditions or assess performance of companies and services 
contracted by the Administration. 
In this case, the practical frameworks and models which are applied have been 
constructed on those already formulated by the private sector, though with a greater 
focus on “competitive benchmarking” as a way to enhance the comparability of 
indicators across agencies50. However, the application of benchmarking as a management 
tool in the public sector seems to go against greater difficulties than in the private sector. 
This is the case, for instance, of the selection of appropriate indicators to measure 
performance, since public sector’s activity is less likely to be described through simple 
and univocal indicators (e.g. as financial indicators in the private industry). 
As a policy-making tool, benchmarking has recently been incorporated to the public 
sector as a new way to explore different policy options, to gain political support to new 
ideas, to document and control the decision-making processes or to promote 
commitment through peer-to-peer pressure. This kind of application has received 
uneven attention from countries and supranational organizations, with some among them 
                                                
50 Thus avoiding other forms like functional or generic benchmarking that could be much more difficult to 
apply to the public sector. 
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ignoring its possibilities and others enhancing it to the level of policy-driver. Its 
application has also been different depending on the field, with greater presence in the 
areas of employment, education or economic policies and lower in others, like transport 
policy. 
The methodological frameworks adopted for its application in the policy-making field 
seem to be somehow undefined. Although they are frequently built on the “classical 
sequences” proposed within the private sector, the frameworks are challenged by the 
new questions posed by the connection between the benchmarking tool and the policy-
making process, as the involvement of the stakeholders, the use of qualitative methods 
as a complement to the quantification of indicators or the link to policy assessment 
procedures. An example of this new situation is provided by the problematic definition 
of “best practices” in the field of policy-making. The presence of several and potentially 
conflicting policy goals, the difficulties to reach agreement among several stakeholders as 
regards the indicators to be used or the low comparability of data may impede the 
consensus on the identification of successful practices, hindering the whole of the 
process. 
In both cases, benchmarking preserves the learning and transfer steps in a distinct 
manner. As a management tool these steps certainly allow for a link to the policy 
transfer and policy learning concepts; as a policy-making tool, the relation between 
benchmarking and the mentioned literatures becomes a matter of overlapping. In fact, 
there seems to be a blurry area in which policy evaluation, policy learning, policy 
transfer, policy-making and policy benchmarking overlap. However, it is necessary to 
still keep in mind that the objectives, models and approaches adopted in a benchmarking 
exercise may not be the same as those found in such fields. 
Globally speaking, the benchmarking process that is being applied in the public sector is 
not so clear-cut as the exercises seen in the private sector. On the one side it is still a 
rational process voluntarily undertaken by a public organization with the scope of 
driving changes. On the other it is also becoming a new arena for political interaction, a 
softer way of policy-making, a communication tool or a means to exert indirect pressure 
on some stakeholders.  Moreover, given the particular role of the public administration, 
the outputs and results of the benchmarking process are likely to spread across society, 
particularly when applied to policies. 
Though its application to the policy-making processes is still at an early stage, some 
valuable lessons can be already obtained as regards the construction of a policy 
transport framework. All of them arise from the difficulties and shortcomings identified 
when trying to apply the benchmarking tool to the policy-making sphere and therefore 
draw the current limitations of the methodology. They are: 1) the need of a clear 
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definition for the term policy and the aspects included in the comparison (e.g. goals, 
processes, outcomes, etc.); 2) the need of a clear focus for the whole benchmarking 
process; 3) the need to take into account strong differences among the original contexts 
of the practices analyzed; 4) the difficulty of finding univocal indicators and quantitative 
values for them; 5) the difficulty of defining best practice in an univocal way. 
 
 
4.5 Link between both literatures 
Once concluded the horizontal and vertical analysis of the key concepts proposed by 
the policy transfer and the benchmarking literatures, this section will elaborate on the 
nature and characteristics of the link that can be established between them. This step is 
not only undertaken to connect the nature and the steps specific to each of them, but 
mainly to: 
1) Evaluate their potential as foundations of a framework for the analysis of 
policy transfer; and  
2) Relate within a consistent approach the specifications and lessons obtained 
from each literature in view of the definition of such a framework. 
It has been previously noted that both literatures may be understood as different 
approaches to the same “transfer problem”, with the view arising from the comparative 
politics being a “top-down” approach and the view arising from management science 
being a “bottom-up” approach. It has also been noted that learning and transfer are two 
cyclical steps present in the benchmarking sequences studied, which seems to suggest a 
relation between the literatures in terms of processes. 
To further explore these potential links and others that may arise, the analysis has been 
focused in two areas – the concept and the process – and has differentiated four 
concepts related to the mentioned literatures: policy learning, policy transfer, 
benchmarking (policy-making tool) and benchmarking (management tool). 
Building on the consulted literature, each concept has been defined for a number of 
categories included in each area, so to provide a one-sight view on their more relevant 
characteristics (Table 14). 
 
 
 
 
4. The notion of transferability     
   145 
Table 14: Comparison between benchmarking and policy transfer literatures 
 Benchmarking 
 Policy learning Policy transfer Policy-making 
tool 
Management 
tool 
1) Concept     
Sphere Political Political Political Management  
Relation to 
policy-making 
Source for policy-
making 
Process of policy-making Process of policy-
making  
Tool for policy-
making 
Object Policies, programs Policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions 
and ideas 
Policies, measures Practices, 
processes, 
strategies 
Specific focus Understanding the 
conditions under 
which policies 
operate 
Understanding the process 
by which policies move 
Implementing best 
practice; 
continuous 
improvement 
Implementing 
best practice; 
continuous 
improvement 
Scope Spatial / temporal Spatial / temporal Spatial Spatial 
Character Voluntary; 
Rational 
Voluntary / Coercive; 
Rational / Non rational 
Voluntary; 
Rational 
Voluntary 
Rational 
2) Process     
1) Definition  Problem driven Several causes (coercion, 
international pressures, 
convergence...) 
Competition driven 
– performance gap 
Competition 
driven– 
performance gap 
2) Selection   
   (criterion)  
Used to deal with 
similar problem 
Several (geographical or 
ideological proximity, 
policy characteristics...)  
Excellence Excellence 
2) Selection   
  (methodology) 
Limited search for 
templates  
Limited search for 
templates  
Indicators 
(quantitative and 
also qualitative) 
Indicators 
(quantitative) 
3) Learning  Create a lesson 
(detailed cause and 
effect description of a 
set of actions) 
Understand the key 
elements 
Understand the 
causes beneath the 
“gap” 
Understand the 
causes beneath 
the “gap” 
4) Adaptation Prospective 
evaluation 
Preconditions, differences 
in context factors (actors, 
institutions, performance) 
“Translation” 
taking into account 
national and 
regional differences  
Specification for 
the recipient 
company 
5) Action Not specified Development of policies, 
administrative 
arrangements, institutions 
and ideas 
Setting of specific 
policy targets and 
adoption of 
measures 
Practical actions 
for performance 
improvement 
Source: own elaboration 
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Logically, this approach builds on an implicit interpretation of the concepts at the time 
of selecting a given definition or approach stated in the consulted literature. 
The four notions examined are related to the importation of elements from external 
entities. This common interest bridges both literatures at the conceptual level and makes 
them relevant for the definition of a transfer framework. However, any insight digging 
further in this common statement will find substantial differences across them. 
Benchmarking (management) is clearly outside of the political sphere. Therefore it may 
provide an adequate framework to import elements that fall within the management 
sphere, but it seems less useful to treat policies.  Benchmarking (policy-making), policy 
learning and policy transfer are inside the policy sphere, thus related to the policy-
making process. They all interact with the decisions involved in policy-making, either 
acting as a source of new ideas (particularly policy learning) or being part of the 
evaluation, selection or implementation steps of policy. However, their contributions 
are different in focus: the policy learning approach stresses on the conditions under 
which the policy operates, the policy transfer approach on the process by which it 
moves and the benchmarking approach on the policy elements responsible for 
excellence.  
All the four notions are interested in the spatial dimension of the problem (i.e. importer 
elements from other places), but the policy learning and policy transfer concepts 
encompass it and also take into account the temporal dimension (i.e. importing elements 
from past experiences). As regards their “character”, policy learning and benchmarking 
(policy-making and management) are mainly conceived as voluntary processes driven by 
rationality (bounded or not), while the policy transfer concept seems able to apply as 
well to non-rational or / and compulsory processes. 
When the analysis is performed on the processes proposed by the literatures, it shows 
that they share five stages: definition, selection, learning, adapting and action. There are 
however differences in the approach and contents of every step depending on the 
concept studied. 
Benchmarking (policy-making and management) and policy transfer are dependent upon 
the action stage, as it is necessary for studying the transfer process or to effectively 
drive improvements in the importer entity. Policy learning is less interested on this 
stage, as it concentrates on the conditions of the transfer and treats action as a kind of 
scenario for prospective evaluation. Similarly, the focus of policy transfer on the 
transfer process itself diminishes its interest in the learning stage, while it is relevant for 
the others. 
The definition and selection stages seem to be more defined in benchmarking (policy-
making and management) as a result of a univocal criterion and method for selecting 
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external experiences (excellence and evaluation of indicators). Policy transfer and policy 
learning follow a less systematic approach, which on the other side may be more 
suitable for treating the complexity of policy-making. 
The approach to the learning stage reflects variations among the four concepts, 
suggesting fundamental differences in the construction of models able to understand and 
work with reality. Benchmarking (policy-making and management) models the external 
experience in terms of processes and factors contributing to excellence and learns from 
them only in the measure that they can add value to the importer entity. Policy learning 
models the external experience in terms of conditions and causal relations between 
actions and effects. The learning process is comprehensive and is already interested in 
the limits and potential applications of the lessons drawn. Policy transfer understands 
the external experience in its core elements, those which are distinctive, in order to 
establish their transferability. 
Nonetheless, it is probably at the adaptation stage where the differences in definition 
among the concepts are the more visible, ranging from a clear-cut specification in the case 
of benchmarking (management) to an undefined prospective evaluation in the case of 
policy learning. In this case the greater sharpness found in benchmarking (management) 
can be explained as a result of the management environment, which allows a greater 
power for straightforward implementation, which is not the case in the political sphere, 
where debate and agreement are a requirement. 
From these evidences it arises that there are affinities between both literatures as regards 
the concepts and processes they propose for the search and application of lessons 
obtained from external experience. However, it is important to distinguish their scope of 
application according to three axes.  
The first one is the sphere where the transfer question lies. Here we should distinguish 
between the management and policy-making spheres, though they are not separated by a 
clear-cut and impermeable boundary between them51. The management sphere is clearly 
within the scope benchmarking literature and hardly admits any consideration from the 
policy transfer and learning literatures. 
Once in the policy-making sphere, the scope for each literature will be determined by 
the policy definition dimension and the complexity dimension. The policy definition 
dimension refers to the point of the political process at which the transfer problem has 
arisen. It may be understood as a continuum going from policy to practice. The 
                                                
51 Wyatt (2002, p.4) states this boundary in the following terms: “we can differentiate in broad terms 
between, on the one hand, policy making which involves the exercise of decision-making powers by 
politicians who are electorally accountable for their acts, and on the other hand managerial decisions 
by those with delegated responsibility for the operation of public services”. 
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complexity dimension makes reference to the specific complication of the transfer 
problem. It may be understood in terms of the number of levels, actors and interactions 
involved, the relevance of the specific policy field tackled and the uncertainty present in 
the decision-making system. 
According to these two dimensions, the relation between both literatures in the policy-
making sphere can be described as represented in Fig. 49. The scope of benchmarking 
literature is preferently located in well-defined and lowly complex steps of policy, while 
the scope of the policy transfer literature is complementary52. However, the boundaries 
between them are not clearly defined, as represented by the dashed interface. 
Fig. 49: Conceptual diagram relating policy transfer and benchmarking literatures in the policy-
making sphere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
This proposition supports the view of the comparative politics being a “top-down” 
approach and the view arising from management science being a “bottom-up” approach. 
This view is in harmony with the development of the benchmarking concept, eminently 
practical, which reached the policy sphere only after succeeding in the private and 
public sectors as a management tool. 
                                                
52 This approach, somehow places in a second level the specific focus of each literature (centered in 
conditions and transfer processes in the policy transfer literature and related to the search of excellence in 
the benchmarking literature). This decision has been taken in order to better focus on the methodological 
aspects of the transfer problem, in view of the objective set for this thesis. 
Policy learning / 
transfer 
Policy 
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Coming now back to the question posed (i.e. the evaluation of their potential to back a 
framework for the analysis of policy transfer with consistent specifications and 
lessons), its answer greatly lies on the definition of the interface DOC (see diagram). In 
particular, the evaluation of the complexity linked to the specific policy examined (point 
C) and its stage of development (point D) will orient it towards one, another, or both 
literatures. 
 
 
4.6 Synthesis 
In the last decades, changes in the economy and society have led to increasing 
complexity and challenged the ability of governments and corporations to promote and 
implement their policies. This evolution has also offered new opportunities in both 
sectors. Governments have found an increasing availability of national experiences and 
the occasion for policy coordination, harmonization and transfer. Companies have found 
new sources of learning in the practices and processes of competitors and have took 
advantage of them in their innovation processes. New possibilities for learning, 
improving and transferring policies and practices have arisen. Accordingly, it has been 
necessary to develop a set of concepts, tools and methodologies to guide and improve 
the exchange of knowledge across institutions and its application in new environments 
and contexts. Two distinct disciplines have undertaken this task, developing theoretical 
and applied approaches to the notions of transfer and transferability: comparative 
politics and management science. 
The efforts of comparative politics have been focused on the development of the policy 
transfer concept, still open as regards its relation to similar notions like policy learning, 
policy diffusion or convergence. The review of the ongoing debate provides a valuable 
input for the conceptual framework proposed in this thesis concerning the relation 
between transfer and policy-making, the consideration of rationality and coercion in the 
transfer process or the causes of transfer failure. The review of the frameworks 
proposed by the policy transfer literature presents a number of lessons that can be 
useful at different stages of the framework-building process. The most important ideas 
regard the multi-level approach to transfer, understood as the successive influence of 
external and internal processes, the open refusal of comprehensive rationality, the three 
basic steps of policy transfer (information, evaluation/adaptation and decision 
/implementation) or the key role played by synthesis and mapping procedures 
throughout the transfer process. 
Management science has produced the notion of benchmarking, also subject to debate 
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because of its dynamic nature and increasingly extended application. In the private 
sector, benchmarking has been primarily employed as a practical tool to identify and 
achieve quantifiable targets, but also to steer change in corporate’s visions and culture. A 
large number of frameworks and models has been developed, with common 
characteristics, as the cyclical steps of learning and transfer, the specific attention 
devoted to the monitoring and understanding of internal practices, the ordered and 
formal approach of the comparison process or the strong orientation towards a clear 
objective, certainly worth of consideration when proposing a policy transfer framework. 
In the public sector benchmarking has assumed a twofold function, as a management tool 
oriented to reproduce competitive conditions and as a policy-making tool able to explore 
different policy options, gain political support to new ideas, control decision processes 
or promote commitment through peer-to-peer pressure. It is in this second role where 
the notion of benchmarking explores its own limits with respect to the policy-making 
process, the multiplicity of stakeholders, the introduction of qualitative methods as a 
complement to quantification or its relation to policy assessment procedures. 
The presence of the learning and transfer steps in the benchmarking literature and the 
apparent overlapping of concepts such as policy learning, policy transfer and policy 
benchmarking suggests a link between the two literatures considered. This research 
proposes that both literatures may be understood as different approaches to the same 
“transfer problem”, with the view arising from the comparative politics being a “top-
down” approach and the view arising from management science being a “bottom-up” 
approach. Furthermore it defines the fields of application of each literature according to 
three dimensions. The first one is the sphere where the transfer question lies. Here it is 
necessary to distinguish between the management and policy-making spheres, with the 
management sphere clearly within the scope of the benchmarking literature. Once in the 
policy-making sphere, the scope for each literature is determined by the policy definition 
dimension, referred to the point of the process going from policy to practice where the 
transfer problem arises, and the complexity dimension, related to the specific 
complication of the transfer problem in terms of the number of levels, actors and 
interactions involved, the relevance of the specific policy field tackled and the 
uncertainty present in the decision-making system. According to these two dimensions, 
the scope of benchmarking literature in the policy-making sphere is preferently located 
in well-defined and lowly complex steps of policy, while the scope of the policy 
transfer literature is complementary. This view is in harmony with the development of 
the benchmarking concept, eminently practical, which reached the policy-making sphere 
only after succeeding in the private and public sectors as a management tool. 
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Chapter 
5  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSFERABILITY  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Building on the assumption that policies and practices can be effectively transferred, 
this chapter proposes a general framework to assess the transferability of policies and/or 
practices from one jurisdiction (exporter jurisdiction) to another (importer jurisdiction). 
In a second step, the general framework will be particularized for the specific analysis of 
railway infrastructure pricing policies and practices. 
Section 5.2 proposes and discusses the basic hypotheses and structures of a conceptual 
model valid for the analysis of the transferability of policies and practices; Section 5.3 
operationalizes this basic structure, identifying the most relevant issues to be included in 
the model and providing a practical approach to their assessment in the field of railway 
infrastructure pricing policies; Finally, section 5.4 summarizes the main findings of the 
chapter. 
 
 
5.2 Definition of a general framework for the assessment of 
transferability 
5.2.1 Introduction 
By framework this thesis understands a set of ideas and principles that provides the 
basis for the analysis of transferability. It is a conceptual structure that lies between the 
theoretical foundations of the policy transfer and benchmarking literatures and a real life 
simulation model. Accordingly, the framework proposed treats the key elements of the 
transferability problem although it does not arrive to the detail of a true real-world 
simulation model. Furthermore, the framework focuses on a given aspect of the transfer 
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problem, transferability, but ignores some other aspects of it that could also be of 
interest from other approaches. 
By transferability we refer to the condition of being transferable from the exporter to the 
importer jurisdiction. The exact meaning and implications of such condition will be 
further defined, but at this stage the fact of a policy and/or practice “being transferable” 
can be explained as a combination of the feasibility of its adequate importation from the 
exporter jurisdiction and its applicability to the local context of the importer 
jurisdiction. 
In simpler words, given a policy and/or practice likely to be transferred to the importer 
jurisdiction, the framework should provide the basic elements as to answer the following 
questions: 
• Could the policy or practice be transferred here? 
• Could it work here?  
• If not, what would it take to make it work here? 
This task is not a simple one. As it has been noted by Macário and Viegas (2006, p.3), 
performing a transferability exercise in the political sphere is not at all a deterministic 
exercise that can be described in a definite and detailed way. Indeed, complexity is 
inherent to the political sphere, often characterized by undefined objectives, criteria and 
procedures, in turn subject to political discussion themselves. Also for such reason, the 
conceptual and methodological considerations that will be developed here adopt the 
form of a framework. 
To build the general transferability framework, this thesis will take advantage of the 
potential embedded in the existing benchmarking and policy transfer literatures, already 
reviewed in the previous chapter. According to its concluding remarks, the benchmarking 
literature seems to be of greater relevance for the transfer of practices and policies in 
situations with a low level of complexity, while the policy transfer literature 
presumably should be better applied in highly complex and less defined situations. 
The resulting general framework is conceived as a first step able to promote discussion 
on transferability. Its particularization to the field of railway infrastructure pricing 
policies and practices will try to find further application as a tool able to assist the 
importer entities through the decisions involved in a transfer process. 
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5.2.2 Objective of the framework 
The point of departure for the analysis is what may be called the transfer problem: An 
entity wants to transfer and implement a policy or practice in its jurisdiction which has 
already been successfully applied by another entity in another jurisdiction where 
different conditions exist. In view of the existing differences, the entity would like to 
know whether that policy or practice has the potential to be successfully implemented 
under its own local conditions. If the policy or practice effectively has that potential, 
then it is said to be transferable. Accordingly, the assessment of transferability is 
conceived as a prospective exercise that tries to determine a priori how likely is a policy 
or practice of being successfully implemented in the importer jurisdiction by the 
importer entity. 
The general framework proposed in this section is aimed at elaborating the concepts and 
principles that should frame the transferability assessment of policies and/or practices. 
To further clarify the objective, it seems useful to describe as well what questions fall 
outside the scope of the transfer framework proposed. More precisely, the framework: 
1) It is not intended to provide guidance on best practice selection. In fact, such 
approach entails strong assumptions and heavy methodological requirements 
that are already embedded in the “best practice” notion. Actually, defining a 
practice as “best” implies that there is one best way to achieve the objectives 
pursued whereas in the policy field it is frequent that different practices 
succeed in similar goals in different contexts. Furthermore, it presupposes that 
the best practice has been compared with a wide set of similar practices at the 
national and international level. Consequently, the framework proposed here 
could be also used to assess the transferability of  “bad” or “worst” practices. 
2) It is not intended to provide guidance on the adaptation of policies and/or 
practices to conditions different than those prevailing in the exporter 
jurisdiction. Indeed, such approach requires not only to identify the elements 
of the policy and/or practice that are not compatible with the local conditions, 
but to explore the alternatives to these elements and assess the effects of those 
alternatives on the overall behavior of the policy and/or practice. 
3) It is not intended to provide guidance on the implementation of policies and/or 
practices transferred from other jurisdictions. Answering to that question 
would certainly require a much more detailed insight on the local conditions of 
the importer jurisdiction. 
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5.2.3 Relation to the literature 
As explained in the previous chapter, two literatures have been identified as potentially 
useful to root the present framework, as both are concerned with the transfer problem: 
the policy transfer literature (within the field of comparative policies) and the 
benchmarking literature (connected with management sciences). 
From their analysis, it has been possible to identify two particularities that could be able 
to condition their relevance for the proposed framework. First, they take different 
perspectives and approaches to the transfer problem within the political sphere. Second, 
they are both involved in a definition process, as illustrated by the wide amount of 
discussion produced in the last years, which sometimes achieves contrasting views on 
the same elements. Thus it appears necessary to clarify the criteria adopted when 
building the framework with respect to these two aspects. 
As regards the existence of different approaches, the previous section concluded that the 
relation to both literatures should be defined with respect to the dimensions of 
complexity and policy definition. 
For the general framework, that later on will be particularized for pricing policies, a high 
degree of complexity is assumed. This assumption considers that the transfer exercise: 1) 
will be extremely non-standardized and context-dependent; 2) will be closely interrelated 
with problems arising in other areas of policy-making; 3) will be subject to conditions of 
great uncertainty, both in the problem definition and the selection of the instruments to 
be employed; and 4) will take place in an environment populated by multiple 
stakeholders with potentially incompatible interests. In these circumstances, the 
quantitative and defined approach of the benchmarking literature will be mainly limited 
to the “practice” level, while the qualitative an undefined approach of the policy transfer 
literature will prevail at the “policy” and “measure” levels. 
As to the policy definition dimension, the general framework seeks to cover the whole 
decision-making path which links policy to practice, as a means to contain within it all 
the levels involved in the transferability assessment. In fact, assessing the transferability 
of a given policy necessarily requires taking into account its definition through programs 
and its application through practices in reality. Moreover, this approach will allow the 
framework to provide guidance at every step of the policy-making process. 
Those two assumptions may be graphically represented as in Fig. 50, which shows the 
scope of the framework in terms of complexity (point A) and definition (blue arrow) as 
well as its relation to the literatures examined (point B). 
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Fig. 50: Conceptual diagram showing the relation between the literature and the conceptual 
framework proposed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As regards the diversity of opinions and positions with respect to the concepts involved 
in each of the treated literatures, the framework proposed will necessarily select some of 
them, abandoning the others. The choice will be primarily justified on the grounds of 
suitability to the objective posed and practicability. 
It must be said that this criterion may produce an oversimplification of some concepts 
and some loss of consistency with respect to the ongoing debate. It should not be 
interpreted in any case as a selection of position or a criticism to some of the opinions 
present in the conceptual discussion, but only as practical choice in view of an easier 
operationalization of the framework proposed. 
 
5.2.4 Relation to the transfer process 
The assessment of transferability cannot be thought without connection to a transfer 
process, ongoing or potential. Therefore it seems necessary, as a previous step to its 
formulation, to clarify the relation existing between the proposed framework and the 
transfer process. In turn, this requires first to make explicit a conceptualization of the 
transfer process. 
The transfer process is conceived here as an ordered succession of five stages: definition, 
selection, learning, adaptation and action (Fig. 51). 
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Fig. 51: Graphical scheme of the transfer process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The definition phase includes the identification and characterization of a problem 
affecting the importer jurisdiction that has the potential to be solved through the 
importation of a policy and/or practice implemented in another jurisdiction. 
Consequently the transfer process is understood as a method whose aim is to solve an 
existing problem53. 
The selection phase performs the identification of a set of policies and/or practices 
applied by other entities that could be used to solve the problem. It then gathers 
preliminary information on the policies / practices so as to assess them and select the 
one that will be transferred. 
The learning phase produces a detailed knowledge on the selected policy/practice as 
regards its basic elements, its functioning in the exporter jurisdiction, its implementation 
and the conditions required for it to work. In doing so, this phase basically builds up a 
model of what the policy/practice is, how does it work and what does it need to work. 
The adaptation phase introduces changes in the basic elements of the policy/practice in 
order to improve its chances of success in the importer jurisdiction. Such modifications 
require a wide knowledge of the conditions prevailing in the importer jurisdiction. 
Finally, the implementation phase introduces the adapted policy and/or practice in the 
importer jurisdiction. This phase ends up the transfer process, though it can act as the 
starting point of other loops. 
 
                                                
53 The term problem is used here in its wider sense. For instance, it may also include the lack of benefits 
due to competitive pressure from best performing entities or the demands of a supranational entity for 
greater harmonization. 
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Fig. 52: Relation between the general framework for the assessment of the transferability and the 
transfer process 
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The interaction between the proposed framework and the transfer process happens at 
the selection phase (Fig. 52), where it provides the assessment of the transferability of 
the policies / practices. At this stage of the process, transferability is a necessary 
condition that must be fulfilled by the policies / practices in order to continue through 
the next stages of the process (further learning, adaptation and implementation). Within 
this view, it must be noted that transferability is not considered a sufficient condition 
for a policy/practice to be selected for transfer. 
When the proposed framework enters into action, the problem to be solved has been 
perfectly characterized and an exploratory search has produced relevant information on 
the policies/practices and their contexts. The output of the proposed framework is the 
evaluation of the transferability of the policies/practices examined from their original 
jurisdiction to the importer jurisdiction. This evaluation may result in the exclusion of a 
number of policies/practices assessed as non-transferable. 
In addition to this interaction, that should explicitly or implicitly be done in every 
transfer process, it is possible to conceive a second point of the process where the 
framework could be of utility. This is at the modification phase, where the availability 
of a deeper knowledge of the policy / practice that is going to be transferred may be used 
to evaluate the possibility of improving its transferability. At this point, the framework 
may be used to test different alternatives to improve the transferability, either through 
modifications to the policy/practice or through modifications of the context conditions. 
Therefore, the proposed framework has the potential to add value to the transfer 
process both directly, at the selection phase, and indirectly, through an enhanced overall 
knowledge of the practice and the improvement of the modification phase. 
 
5.2.5 Relation to the policy-making process 
As it has been already said, the framework proposed to assess transferability seeks to 
be useful for any level of definition within the continuum ranging from policy to 
practice. This broad scope of action requires a previous clarification of the policy-
making concept and sequence. 
Policy-making is understood here as a process able to convert the vision and goals of the 
political actors into actions and outcomes in reality. As a process, policy-making can be 
described as a sequence of activities. However, as it has been already the case for the 
concepts of benchmarking and policy transfer, the literature has not attained consensus 
on the stages that should be included. 
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Fig. 53: Basic policy-making sequence assumed for the definition of the general framework 
 
Source: Wyatt, 2002, p.5 
Building on the work performed by the CMPS, the framework will assume the basic 
policy-making sequence proposed by the UK Civil Service College (as quoted in Wyatt, 
2002, pp.4-7). This sequence can be represented as in Fig. 53, and consists of the 
following steps: 
• Idea / problem: a new cycle of policy-making may be initiated by the 
identification of a problem or, proactively, by the formulation of a new idea. 
• Setting of objectives: this step establishes explicit objectives for the initiative 
concerned. 
• Definition of options: this step generates alternative courses of action aligned 
with the formulated objectives. This stage may also include a preselection of 
options. 
• Analysis/Appraisal: this step evaluates the most likely consequences of the 
alternative courses of action proposed, including their economic impact. 
• Consultation: this step gathers external feedback on the alternatives under study 
through the use of techniques ranging from formal public consultation to sondage 
of opinion in less formal contexts. 
• Decision:  a decision is made by political actors. 
• Implementation: this step includes a wide range of possible activities oriented to 
give effect to the selected policy initiative. They may range from issuing a new 
position to the physical implementation of the measures needed. 
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• Maintenance: this step gathers all those functions and activities undertaken by 
policy-makers to maintain the implemented policy at work. 
• Monitoring: this step provides an ongoing supervision on the functioning of the 
policy implemented. 
• Evaluation: this step is aimed at determining whether or not, or to what extent, 
the policy has delivered the intended outcomes according to the time and budget 
foreseen. 
The relation between the policy-making process described through this sequence and the 
policy transfer framework happens in two different ways. 
The first one takes place through the policy transfer process. At some step of the 
policy-making process, decision-makers resolve to engage in a policy transfer process. 
This is more likely to happen in the first part of the policy-making cycle, from the 
formulation of an idea/problem to the implementation of policy, and particularly at the 
steps of definition of options and implementation. The assessment of transferability is 
one of the steps of policy transfer. 
Fig. 54: Conceptual diagram of the relation between policy-making, policy transfer and 
transferability assessment 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
This first type of relation is depicted in Fig. 54, which shows the relation between the 
policy-making cycle and the transfer processes starting at the steps of definition of 
options (and ending at the implementation stage) and implementation (which provides a 
loop within this same step for different levels of implementation). 
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The second type of relation is embedded in the assessment of transferability, which 
needs a policy-making reference model in order to perform its evaluation on the policy 
/practice being transferred. This point will be developed later in the framework (section 
5.2.7). 
 
5.2.6 Elements of the transfer framework 
The general framework proposed to assess the transferability of policies and / or 
practices is built on the assumption of a particular understanding of the transfer process, 
which is conceived from a set of elements. 
The elements are the basic inputs that should be available in order to assess 
transferability. The general framework proposed contains the following six elements: 
1) Jurisdictions and entities involved 
2) Aim of the transfer process 
3) Object being transferred 
4) Sources of policy transfer 
5) External influences  
6) Context conditions 
 
5.2.6.1 Jurisdictions and entities involved 
As a first input, the framework proposed needs to identify the entities and jurisdictions 
involved in the transfer process. An entity may be defined as an organization that has a 
decision-making power related to the particular policy field where the transfer occurs. A 
jurisdiction may be defined as the area and policy field over which the entity can exert 
its decision power and wants to execute the transfer54. 
In its simpler version, the transfer process only requires the participation of a single 
entity, the importer entity. As a response to a problem detected in its own jurisdiction, 
the importer entity decides to engage in a transfer process that will push it to select a 
relevant policy or practice applied in another jurisdiction. Then, the entity will learn 
about the policy / practice, will eventually modify it and finally will implement it in its 
                                                
54  In fact, though the entity may be capable of exerting its decision power over a larger policy field or 
area, it can foresee the transfer only for a part of it. The term jurisdiction will be used in the framework 
referred to this restricted meaning. 
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own jurisdiction. All along this process, the importer entity will not need to interact 
with the entity or entities that were responsible for implementing the policy or practice 
in its original context. 
The transfer process may also be engaged with an active participation of the entity or 
entities that were responsible for the implementation of the selected policy/practice in 
the exporter jurisdiction. This involvement would possibly result in a more accurate 
learning about the policy/practice that is being transferred. 
However, depending on the policy field and the degree of complexity of the object being 
transferred, there may be more than a single importer entity. For example, the transfer of 
policies against congestion in an urban area may require the participation of national, 
regional and metropolitan agencies as importer entities, given that the three networks are 
present in that area. 
The framework proposed assumes that an importer entity is able to perform by itself all 
the stages identified for the transfer process. So, it will have the ability to define, select, 
learn from, modify and implement a policy or practice previously applied in another 
jurisdiction. As well, the framework assumes that the importer entity is already in 
possession of a complete knowledge on the conditions present in its own jurisdiction. 
5.2.6.2 Aim of the transfer process 
The framework proposed needs a clear definition of the aim of the transfer process, 
which will be a central element to the whole assessment of transferability. 
According to the sequence assumed for the transfer process, this aim may be identified 
in general terms with the solution of the problem detected in the importer jurisdiction. 
Therefore its degree of concretion will be greatly dependent on the characterization of 
the problem, which can be done at different levels of definition. The concretion of the 
problem will spread through all the process of transferability assessment, constraining in 
turn its level of definition. This process of characterization may entail the breaking 
down of the initial problem in secondary problems, each of which can be at the origin of 
new transfer processes 
For instance, a metropolitan authority may identify congestion as relevant problem to 
be addressed. However, it will be able to characterize it at different levels of definition: 
as “congestion”, as “congestion in peak hours”, as “congestion in the trunk network in 
peak hours” or as “congestion in the West accesses to the city centre in the morning 
peak hour”. The level of detail achieved in the characterization of the problem will 
determine the degree of concretion of the policy transfer process and of the 
transferability assessment. 
Furthermore, once characterized the problem and before starting the selection phase, the 
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transfer process produces a search of entities that have faced a similar problem. The 
framework assumes that this search defines a number of cases related to a similar 
problem in the same policy field. This assumption excludes from the transferability 
assessment the  policies/practices originated in other policy fields or related to a 
different problem. Though it could be certainly possible to formulate some preliminary 
considerations about their transferability, a sound assessment would require a much 
more detailed knowledge than the one produced in a preliminary search. Moreover, the 
specific difficulties related to their modification and implementation is thought to fall in 
the domain of innovation. 
5.2.6.3 Object being transferred 
The framework proposed seeks to be useful for any level of definition within the 
continuum ranging from policy to practice. This statement means that the transfer 
process may be initiated at any point of the policy definition process. 
In order to operationalize this continuum, the framework distinguishes three types of 
objects that can be involved in a transfer process, each resulting from a different level of 
definition. These objects are policies, measures and practices: 
• A policy is defined as a course of action by which an entity seeks to solve a 
problem or reach an objective. It generally results from a process in which the 
entity translates its understanding of the problem into general objectives, 
proposes various alternatives and selects one. 
• A measure is defined as any of the actions undertaken by the entity in order to 
implement a given policy. A policy may be implemented through one or more 
measures, normally obtained through a selection process. 
• A practice is defined as the result of implementing a measure in the real world. 
The application of a measure to reality entails the choice of a wide number of 
technical, informational and managerial details that may lead to different 
practices. Contrary to policies and measures, which remain in a theoretical level, 
a practice can be observed in reality. 
For example, a metropolitan agency confronted to heavy congestion in the accesses to 
the city centre in peak hours, could seek to transfer a successful policy from abroad. In 
its search the agency could find different policy alternatives, like “increasing the offer of 
public transport along the corridors involved”; “promoting a higher occupancy of 
private vehicles traveling along the corridors involved”; “introducing a toll scheme in the 
accesses to the city centre” or a combination of them. In this case, the transferability 
assessment of the alternatives would be conducted over the object policy. 
If the metropolitan agency had already defined or selected a policy (e.g. “promoting a 
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higher occupancy of private vehicles traveling along the corridors involved”), it could 
seek to transfer successful measures already applied in other jurisdictions, among 
alternatives such as “building new HOV lanes”, “converting some lanes of the accesses 
into HOV lanes”; “provide economic incentives for car sharing”; “collaborating with 
companies generating demand on the corridors involved to define mobility plans” or a 
combined solution. In this case, the transferability assessment of the alternatives would 
be conducted over the object measure. 
If the metropolitan agency already knows what measure it wants to implement (e.g. 
“convert some lanes of the accesses into HOV lanes”), then several practices can be 
found in other jurisdictions. They would be differentiated by the number of lanes 
reserved for HOV, the occupancy rate of the vehicle giving access to these lanes, the 
physical segregation or not from the rest of the traffic flow, the control system avoiding 
misuse of the HOV lanes, etc. 
The nature of these three types of object likely to be transferred, policies, measures and 
practices, will be further clarified at the time of defining the levels involved in the policy 
transfer (section 5.2.7) 
5.2.6.4 Sources of transfer 
The framework proposed assesses the transferability of policies, measures or practices 
that have been previously preselected. The objects included in this set of preselected 
items are referred to as sources of transfer. 
The sources of transfer are policies, measures or practices that already exist, that have 
already been implemented somewhere and have proven feasible (I.e. the framework does 
not apply to objects never adopted before). Furthermore, the transfer process foresees 
two additional criteria to propose an object as a source of transfer. 
The first criterion limits the objects of transfer to those that have been implemented by 
other entities in order to solve similar problems. As previously explained, this criterion 
restricts the sources of transfer to those policies/practices that share a similar aim. 
The second criterion restricts the sources of transfer to those objects considered 
adequate by the importer entity. This criterion may involve several considerations from 
the importer entity. It may produce an assessment on existing policies/practices to 
detect best or successful practices; it may limit the sources of transfer to those 
originated in jurisdictions which share some basic characteristics with the importer 
jurisdiction; it may select them following the inertia of previous transfers (i.e. if the 
entity has already borrowed policies / practices from another entity, it will be more 
likely to consider policies / practices implemented by this jurisdiction); it may focus the 
search of policies/practices on ideologically similar jurisdictions, etc. 
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Depending on the conditions set by the importer entity to find adequate 
policies/practices, the sources of transfers will result from a rational process (more or 
less bounded), from an incremental approach to policy or from a decision taken with 
low or no relation to the problem posed. 
5.2.6.5 External influences  
The framework proposed acknowledges the presence of external influences that may 
condition the transferability of the different policies/practices preselected as sources of 
transfer. By external, the framework refers to influences originated outside the 
institutional environment of the importer entity and jurisdiction. According to this 
characteristic, the importer entity may accommodate or resist the external influences, 
but it has no direct or indirect power to change them. 
The external influences may act at various levels of the transfer process. They can drive 
the definition step, through a particular characterization of the problem, they may 
condition the preselection step, by imposing selection criteria to the importer entity, but 
they can also condition the possibilities of success for a policy/practice when it is 
implemented in the importer jurisdiction, thus its transferability. 
The form adopted by the external influences may vary, involving different degrees of 
coercion and definition. Sometimes they are expressed in the form of legislation 
applicable to the importer entity, while in other occasions their action is less defined and 
more vague (e.g. a convergence trend resulting from globalization). 
Not infrequently, a transfer process makes part of a policy-making process happening 
at a wider level, which may shape and influence the transfer process itself. An example 
of such external influence may be represented by the effects of decisions, 
recommendations and directives of the European Union on the transfer processes that 
may be undertaken by national governments. 
5.2.6.6 Context conditions 
Finally, there is a need to understand the local context in order to fully assess the 
opportunities and constraints embedded in a given transfer. Accordingly, the framework 
proposed must take into account the conditions and limitations to the transfer that may 
arise from the particular context existing in the importer jurisdiction. 
Context conditions are clearly distinguished from external influence because they shape 
internally the characteristics of the importer jurisdiction. In fact, context conditions may 
be related to the nature and characteristics of the importer entity, to the policy-making 
process or to the technological, institutional, economic or social settings prevailing in the 
importer jurisdiction. 
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When one or more of these conditions are openly incompatible with the implementation 
and/or functioning of the object being transferred, they become limitations to the 
transfer, which may be finally overcome or end up by excluding the transfer of the 
object. Examples of such limitations could be the absence of social and/or political 
support; the resistance to changes in legislation, policy or institutional frameworks; the 
absence of appropriate technology or management systems; potential environmental 
impacts; absence of resources for the transfer and the maintenance of the policy 
transferred, etc. 
5.2.7 Levels of analysis 
The general framework proposed seeks to cover the whole decision-making path that 
links policy to practice. To operationalize this continuum, three types of objects likely 
to be transferred have been already defined: policies, measures and practices (section 
5.2.6.3). 
This section will first provide a description of the decision-making process that 
connects these three objects and then, building on it, will define the levels of analysis to 
be considered in the assessment of transferability. 
According to their characterization measures and practices can be conceived as different 
levels of implementation of policies. Consequently, they should form part of the 
implementation step of the basic policy-making sequence (section 5.2.5). 
However the formulation of measures in order to implement a policy and their 
conversion into practices in the real world are not straightforward steps, but decision–
making processes in themselves. Once the policy has been decided, it is necessary to 
formulate, discuss and select the more appropriate measures to implement it. In turn, 
once the measure has been determined, a similar process will follow in order to delineate 
the details of its application to reality. For that reason, the implementation step of the 
basic policy-making sequence has been expanded to characterize the implementation of 
policies through measures until they become practices. This expansion has been 
conceived as a replication of the basic policy-making sequence for every level of 
definition (policy, measure and practice). As a result of that, the decision-making 
process linking policy to practice can be represented as a series of three decision-making 
cycles linked by their implementation steps (Fig. 55). 
The decision-making process can be conceived as a self-standing structure at every level 
of implementation (circular arrows in Fig. 55) or as continuous flow connecting policy 
and practice through a definition/implementation stream (light blue arrow) and a feedback 
stream (purple arrow). At every level the steps of the basic decision-making cycle are 
repeated, though with a higher level of concretion. For instance, the formulation of 
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objectives evolves from the general objectives of the policy to the partial objectives of 
the measure and then to the specifications of the practice. The consultation phase may 
probably evolve from a wide scope formal consultation to the local discussion of 
implementation issues with local stakeholders. 
Fig. 55: Expanded policy-making sequence adopted in the conceptual framework proposed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Coming back now to the analysis of transferability, it should be reminded here that its 
aim is to define whether a given policy, measure or practice is transferable or not to the 
importer jurisdiction. This assessment seeks to determine if the object transferred has 
the potential of being successfully implemented in the importer jurisdiction. 
The definition of three types of objects has been motivated by the need of reflecting 
different implementation levels in the policy-making process, each connected to a 
specific level of definition. The policy is related to the formulation of general objectives 
and wide courses of action, the measure is related to the translation of the general 
objectives into specific actions and the practice is their application to reality. 
Fig. 56: Multilevel structure proposed for the conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
According to a classical distinction present in the literature55, these levels can also be 
referred to as the strategical level, the tactical level and the operational level. 
This diversity between the possible objects of transfer as regards the point of the 
policy-making process where they act, their degree of definition with respect to the 
reality and their effects (strategical, tactical or operational) suggest that the criteria 
                                                
55 See for instance Macário (2005, p.22). 
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adopted to assess if their eventual implementation in the importer jurisdiction will be 
successful should also be different. 
For this reason the general framework for the assessment of transferability distinguishes 
three levels of analysis (Fig. 56): 
• A strategical level: it includes the assessment of transferability of policies and 
the analysis of the decision-making process involved in their definition. 
• A tactical level: it includes the assessment of transferability of measures and the 
analysis of the decision-making process involved in their definition. 
• An operational level: it includes the assessment of transferability of real 
practices and the analysis of the decision-making process involved in their 
implementation. 
 
5.2.8 Transferability criteria  
The general framework proposed is aimed at elaborating the principles that should frame 
the transferability assessment of policies and practices. This section will define with 
greater accuracy the notion of transferability and will propose a number of criteria that 
should be necessarily fulfilled to evaluate a policy, measure or practice as transferable. 
5.2.8.1 Implications of transferability  
Transferability has been defined in this thesis as the potential of a policy, measure or 
practice to be successfully implemented in the importer jurisdiction. 
In general terms, a policy, measure or practice will be successfully implemented in the 
importer jurisdiction if it is able to achieve there the outcomes that it has already 
attained in the exporter jurisdiction. In doing so it will be able to fulfill the aim of the 
transfer process, namely to solve the problem at the origin of the process. This 
statement can also be expressed in other words by saying that a policy, measure or 
practice should be considered transferable only as far as it maintains its ability to 
produce the selected outcomes through the transfer and implementation processes. In 
fact, such ability can be affected and limited along the transfer and implementation 
processes by a number of elements like the action of external influences or the 
limitations imposed by the particular context of the importer jurisdiction. 
It should be noticed from now that according to this definition, transferability by itself 
does not guarantee the success of a transfer process. Indeed, the transfer process can fail 
because of the lack of transferability of the original policy or practice, but also as a 
result of a bad characterization of the context conditions in the importer jurisdiction, as a 
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result of mistakes during the adaptation or implementation stages, etc. Consequently, 
though a policy or practice may be effectively transferable (i.e. may have the potential 
for being successfully implemented), it can also end up in an unsuccessful 
implementation because of a poor transfer. Therefore transferability is understood in 
this framework as a condition necessary but not sufficient for a successful transfer. 
The relation between policy success and transfer has been treated in the literature by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (section 4.3.3.5), who pointed out three types of failure in a 
transfer process: uninformed transfer (when the importer entity has insufficient 
information about the policy/practice transferred), incomplete transfer (when crucial 
elements of the policy/practice in the original jurisdiction have not been introduced) and 
inappropriate transfer (when the differences in contexts have not been taken sufficiently 
into consideration). 
This classification can be further refined, as the incomplete transfer of a policy or 
practice can be interpreted as the result of either a lack of adequate information on the 
object transferred, a poor execution of the transfer process or the resistances to change 
existing in the importer jurisdiction. Hence, the types of failure in a transfer process 
could be referred to as uninformed transfer (arising from impediments to the flow of 
information), ill-performed transfer (resulting from poor execution of the transfer 
process) and inappropriate transfer (resulting from mismatch between the conditions 
prevailing in the importer and exporter jurisdictions). 
Following the second classification, it can be said that transferability is concerned about 
the appropriateness of a given transfer. Accordingly its assessment will determine 
whether a given transfer is appropriate or not (i.e. whether a policy, measure or practice 
is transferable or not), but will not conclude anything on the final result of the transfer 
process. 
5.2.8.2 Transferability criteria 
A transferability criterion is a necessary condition to be fulfilled by the policy, measure 
or practice under study in order to be suitable for transfer to the importer jurisdiction. If 
the criterion is not fulfilled, then the transfer proposed will certainly be inappropriate 
and lead to the unsuccessful implementation of the policy, measure or practice in the 
importer jurisdiction. 
The general framework defined here proposes four transferability criteria: 
1) Indifference to context variation 
2) Indifference to external influences 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
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4) Multi-level compatibility  
The first criterion, indifference to context variations, means that the potential outcomes 
of the object transferred should not be impeded by the differences existing between the 
original context in the exporter jurisdiction and the context in the importer jurisdiction. 
As it has been previously noted (section 5.2.6.6), the notion of context embraces a large 
number of aspects, including technological, institutional, financial, economic or social 
features. Consequently, it is certain that the contextual conditions in the importer and 
exporter jurisdiction will not be the same, diverging in a wide number of points. 
However, at the moment of assessing transferability the resources available for the 
information search will be limited. It is thus necessary to focus the evaluation of this 
first criterion on the most distinctive context variations that could affect the 
implementation of the object transferred. 
For example, the appraisal of this criterion for the transfer of a policy aimed at 
increasing the occupancy rate of private vehicles in metropolitan areas, should probably 
consider the relevant differences between the exporter and importer jurisdictions as 
regards transport legislation, number of municipalities involved, coordination procedures 
between municipalities, available financial resources, car ownership, mobility patterns, 
social perception of the private vehicle, etc. Maybe between the importer and exporter 
metropolitan areas there will also be divergences in the number of taxi licenses, weather 
conditions or demographic structures, but a priori they do not seem relevant for the 
success of the policy transferred. At this stage, they should be excluded from the 
analysis. 
Once the more important context variations have been identified, the evaluation of the 
criterion should assess if they are relevant enough as to threat the outcomes of the object 
transferred. If this is the case, then it should also explore if their negative effects are 
likely to be overcome through adaptation of the object transferred or the local context 
conditions. At the end of this assessment, the object transferred will be considered 
indifferent to context variations (when there are not relevant context variations 
threatening its successful implementation or when they can be overcome through 
adaptations) or discarded as non-transferable. 
Following the previous example, the analysis could find relevant differences in the 
metropolitan mobility patterns that strongly diminish the potential beneficiaries of the 
policy in the importer metropolitan area, preventing the success of the policy in 
reducing congestion. If, additionally, no adaptation of the policy or the mobility 
patterns is feasible then the policy should be assessed as non-transferable between the 
two metropolitan areas. 
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The second criterion, indifference to external influences, means that the potential 
outcomes of the object transferred should not be impeded by influences external to the 
control of the importer entity. 
The external influences (section 5.2.6.5) may impede the successful implementation of 
the object transferred. To appraise this criterion, first it is necessary to identify those 
external influences able to condition the transfer of the object, then it has to be assessed 
if they are strong enough as to menace the outcomes of the object transferred and lastly 
if there is any possibility of adapting the object as to overcome the critical 
conditionings. At the end of this assessment, the object transferred will be considered 
indifferent to external influences (when there are not relevant external influences avoiding 
its successful implementation or when their effects can be overcome through 
adaptations) or discarded as non-transferable. 
In the example, the national government may be promoting the adoption of charging 
schemes as the solution to urban congestion. Several metropolitan areas may have 
already followed these guidelines with significant success. In this case, if the 
metropolitan agency pushes for the measure “construction of new HOV lanes”, 
following the experience of a foreign metropolitan agency, it may go against a strong 
external influence in favor of the adoption of charging schemes. The central government 
could put more pressure on the metropolitan entity through financial incentives for the 
adoption of the other solution, finally making the measure unfeasible. 
The third criterion, horizontal compatibility, means that the object transferred should 
not enter in open conflict with those objects already existing at its same level of 
definition (policies, measures or practices). Thus if the object being transferred is a 
policy, it should not be in open conflict with other policies already at work in the 
importer jurisdiction. 
To assess this criterion, it is necessary to identify the objects at the same level of 
definition (policies, measures or practices) that are currently at work or being 
implemented in the importer jurisdiction that could potentially conflict with the object 
transferred: objects related to the same problem, applied in the same physical area or on 
the same users, sharing the same resources, etc. Once identified, it should be verified that 
their objectives and resources are not incompatible (i.e. that implementing the object 
transferred is not contrary to the already implemented ones). If incompatibilities are 
detected, then it should be assessed if they can be avoided through adaptation of the 
object being transferred or the objects already implemented. If there are not 
incompatibilities or if they can be solved through adaptation, then the object transferred 
will be deemed horizontally compatible. 
If the importer metropolitan agency of the example seeks to import a policy restricting 
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the use of private transport so as to divert it to public transport, it should evaluate if its 
compatible or not with other already approved policies as building new road 
infrastructure to alleviate congestion. 
Fig. 57: Compatibility requirements resulting from the multilevel structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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are not incompatibilities or if they can be solved through adaptation, then the object 
transferred will be considered vertically compatible. 
If the importer metropolitan agency of the example seeks to apply a cordon toll in the 
city centre with a very high fare (measure), it may go against the objectives of other 
policies promoting the social integration between central and peripheral areas (policy). 
The horizontal and vertical compatibility requirements are represented in the scheme of 
Fig. 57 through green and lavender arrows. 
If the assessment of transferability concludes that the object evaluated is indifferent to 
context variations (i.e. the contextual differences between the importer and the exporter 
jurisdiction do not affect its outcomes), indifferent to external influences (i.e. the external 
influences do not prevent its implementation), horizontally compatible (i.e. it does not 
enter in conflict with other objects located at its same level) and vertically compatible 
(i.e. it does not enter in conflict with other objects located in superior levels), then it 
should be qualified as transferable to the importer jurisdiction. 
5.2.8.3 Additional considerations 
To further clarify the extent and implications of the transferability criteria, some 
additional considerations follow as regards the level of detail of the assessment, the 
inclusion of the temporal dimension, the interdependencies between factors and criteria 
and the formulation of preconditions for transfer. 
Level of detail – The assessment of transferability has been characterized as a screening 
step generally performed at an early stage of the transfer process. Given that 
transferability is a necessary condition for transfer (i.e. it suffice with a single unmet 
criterion to discard the transfer of the object under study), its assessment should be 
conducted in an iterative way so as to maximize its efficiency. 
At the beginning the information available would consist of a preliminary 
characterization of the policy, measure or practice as implemented in its original context. 
Building on it, the assessment should examine first the more evident barriers and 
limitations to transfer and detect areas where further information would be needed. If 
after this first round, the transferability of the practice seems positive or not clear, then 
it will be necessary to understand further aspects related to the object and jurisdictions 
involved through a more detailed learning and conduct a second loop on the criteria. In 
some cases this search of information will surely bring forward part of the work 
included in the learning phase of the transfer process. The increasing-detail loops should 
be iterated until a reasonable security on the transferability of the policy, measure or 
practice is achieved. 
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This deeper knowledge should be sought particularly when it seems that there could be a 
margin for the adaptation of the objects transferred in order to facilitate their fulfillment 
of the transferability criteria. If doubts on the result of adaptations persist, it could be 
advisable to come back on the transferability issue at the adaptation phase. 
Temporal dimension – The assessment of transferability should be aware of the 
temporal dimension involved in its analysis. The timings of policy-making may set the 
deadlines for the eventual implementation of the object transferred, thus providing a first 
reference for dynamic considerations. Based on it, the evaluation of transferability 
should also try to reflect on the evolution of the local policies and contexts or external 
influences to foresee if the limitations to transferability will still be valid at the moment 
of implementation. 
Interdependencies – Though the criteria proposed in the framework have been 
presented separately, in reality there will be strong interdependencies among them. In 
fact, the external influences and the local policies and measures will certainly play a role 
in shaping context conditions in the importer jurisdiction. In turn, the different context 
elements will be interrelated, as well as the local policies or the local measures. When the 
level of interrelation is high and there are not outstanding factors contrary to the transfer 
of the object studied, then the assessment of transferability may become increasingly 
complex (even unable to conclude on the transferability of the object). 
Preconditions for transfer – Contrary to the previous case of interdependency, other 
cases may show the existence of specific characteristics in the importer jurisdiction 
heavy enough as to justify only by themselves the inappropriateness of transfer, except 
for those objects able to meet some severe preconditions. The identification of such 
preconditions may be of great help in the assessment of transferability, but they should 
be treated always with an eye on their possible change over time. 
5.2.8.4 A cost-benefit perspective 
Though too complex to be operationalized, it is also possible to explain the evaluation of 
transferability in terms of costs and benefits. 
In fact, there is a strong economic rationale behind transfer. The importer entity has 
detected a problem that can be solved through policies and measures able to produce 
greater benefits than costs to society. In this circumstance, the importer entity can 
choose between different sources of transfer and the development of new policies and 
practices. Each possible alternative will be characterized by the benefits and costs that it 
is able to generate to society. 
In the case of transfers, their benefits will include the solution of the initial problem (if 
successfully implemented), while their costs will arise from the transfer process, 
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including the adaptation of the policies and practices transferred, the adaptation of local 
conditions (either context features or local policies, measures and practices), and the 
opposition to external tendencies. 
Within this logic, an object should be classified as transferable only in the measure in 
which it generates greater benefits than costs. Accordingly, the modifications of a policy 
or practice being transferable should be considered acceptable only in the measure in 
which they maintain a net benefit to society. 
 
5.2.9 Synthetic representation of the framework proposed 
From the perspective of an entity that has already detected and characterized a problem 
and that is looking forward to transfer to its own jurisdiction a policy that has already 
been successful abroad, the notion of transferability and its assessment could be 
characterized as represented in Fig. 58. 
Fig. 58: Conceptual diagram of the transferability assessment (policy level) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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The transferability assessment of the preselected policies is performed through the 
application of three criteria: indifference to context conditions, indifference to external 
influences and horizontal compatibility (in this case the multi-level compatibility does not 
apply, because the object being transferred is a policy and thus is not confronted with 
objects of “superior” levels). They are represented as three independent arrows that act 
on the field of transfer sources. 
As a result of the transferability assessment, only few of the preselected policies will 
fulfill the three criteria and thus be potentially transferable. The set of these policies is 
represented in the figure as a green ellipse (field of transferable sources). Logically, all 
the policies located within the ellipse (like the green point) are deemed transferable, 
while all of them located outside (like the red point) should be excluded from further 
steps of the transfer process.  
If the entity has already defined a policy, and is concerned about importing a measure or 
a practice from an external jurisdiction, then the assessment of transferability should 
also include the multilevel compatibility criterion, which reflects the link connecting 
policies, measures and practices through the different levels of decision-making. 
Fig. 59: Conceptual diagram of the transferability assessment  (all levels) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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5.3 Particularization of the general framework to the field of 
railway infrastructure pricing 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section is aimed at particularizing the general framework for the assessment of 
transferability to the specific case of railway infrastructure pricing policies and 
practices. This task requires to specify the nature and characteristics of the basic inputs 
defined in the general framework, to identify each of the levels of analysis there 
proposed and to adapt the four transferability criteria to the restricted field of railway 
infrastructure pricing. 
Though grounded on a specific knowledge about railway infrastructure pricing (see 
chapter 3), the level of detail attained in the particularization will remain at a rather 
theoretical level. It must be remembered here that the scope of this step is to 
particularize the framework, but not to develop a comprehensive model including all the 
possible variables of the problem. The next chapters will provide further validation to 
the framework through the development of case studies in which some relevant aspects 
will be also analyzed in more detail. 
The structure adopted for this section replicates the one already used for the general 
framework (see section 5.2), to make clearer the particularization of elements, levels of 
analysis and transferability criteria. 
 
5.3.2 Objective of the framework 
The application of the framework to railway infrastructure pricing, is driven by the 
existence of a transfer problem in that specific field: an entity with ability to take or 
directly influence decisions related to pricing policies on a given railway infrastructure, 
wants to transfer and implement a pricing policy, measure or practice that has already 
been successfully applied by another entity on another railway infrastructure. 
The decision to engage in the transfer process may result from many causes, as the 
inefficiency or unsustainability of a charging scheme already at work on the 
infrastructure, by external coercion to import that practice, by the opening of the 
railway infrastructure to on-track competition, etc. As a possible solution to this 
problem, the importer entity or entities have identified a pricing principle, scheme or 
practice applied in another network that could be of interest if implemented in the local 
infrastructure. This entity would like to know if it is feasible to implement successfully 
such a policy or practice on the railway infrastructure under its control. 
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5.3.3 Elements of the transfer framework 
The framework proposed to assess the transferability of policies and practices in the 
field of railway infrastructure pricing, requires a number of basic inputs in order to 
assess transferability. They were referred to as elements in the general framework and 
they are necessary for the assessment of transferability in the particular case treated 
here– i.e. the lack of any of them will left the assessment deprived of sufficient 
definition to conclude anything on the transferability of railway infrastructure policies 
and / or practices. 
The elements, as specified in the general framework, are: 1) Jurisdictions and entities 
involved; 2) Aim of the transfer process; 3) Object being transferred; 4) Sources of policy 
transfer; 5) External influences; and 6) Context conditions. 
Each of them is described next for the particular field of railway infrastructure pricing. 
5.3.3.1 Jurisdictions and entities involved 
The assessment of transferability has to be defined in relation to the entities and 
jurisdictions involved in the transfer process. Within the field of railway infrastructure 
pricing, the entity or entities intervening in the transfer process may be any among those 
having decision power at any stage of the process that goes from the definition of 
pricing policies to their implementation in the real world. In the European scene, such 
entities could be government ministries or agencies, regulators, charging bodies and/or 
infrastructure managers. 
On the other side, the jurisdiction over which the entity or entities exert their decision 
power and want to execute the transfer can be roughly described as a combination of 
services and railway infrastructure. 
The infrastructure services are rendered by the infrastructure manager to the operators 
running or willing to run on the network. Given their particular nature, the price of these 
services is regulated, opening a whole field over which pricing policies or practices can 
be enforced by decision-makers. All infrastructure services share the characteristic of 
being related to physical assets, the infrastructure. Examples of infrastructure services 
are the access to the track or to other facilities (stations, marshalling yards, refueling 
facilities, etc.), the traffic control, the provision of energy, the supply of communication 
services, etc. The railway infrastructure may be a link, a facility, a part of the network, 
the whole railway network, etc. It may refer to physical assets already existing at the 
present moment or that will be added to the current infrastructure in the future. 
The importer entity can undertake the trasfer process alone, gathering as many 
information as possible on the policy or practice that is to be transferred, or through 
collaboration with the infrastructure managers or governments responsible for its 
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implementation in the original jurisdiction. 
5.3.3.2 Aim of the transfer process 
The second input required to assess transferability in the field of railway infrastructure 
pricing is a clear definition of the aim of the transfer process, which according to the 
general framework may be identified as solving a given problem detected in the importer 
jurisdiction. 
In the field of railway infrastructure pricing, there can be several reasons behind the 
transfer. It may arise from the need of coordination with a neighboring network, the 
search of a greater incentivization of transport operators, the need to raise revenues 
without compromising the overall efficiency of the system, etc. 
5.3.3.3 Object being transferred 
According to the scope stated in the general framework, the transfer process can be 
initiated at any point of the definition process going from policy to practice. More 
specifically, the general framework distinguished three types of objects: policies, 
measures and practices. 
In its particularization for the field of railway infrastructure pricing, these three levels 
are still valid and can be directly linked to the pricing principles, the charging schemes 
and the charging practices: 
• A pricing principle is the basic element of the pricing policy by which the entity 
seeks to solve a problem or reach an objective (see section 3.5). It is aimed at 
achieving some objectives and not others and generally results from a process in 
which the entity translates its understanding of the problem into general 
objectives, examines various alternatives and selects one. 
• A charging scheme is defined as the set of elements that must be put in place by 
the decision-maker in order to implement a given pricing principle. It includes the 
charging structure (see section 3.6) and the average levels sought (see section 
3.7). A principle may be implemented through a variety of structures and levels, 
which are normally defined through a selection process. 
• A charging practice is defined as the result of the operationalization of charging 
schemes for their implementation in the real world. The application of a scheme 
to reality entails a wide number of technical, informational and managerial details 
that may lead to different practices. Contrarily to principles and schemes, which 
remain in a theoretical level, the practice can be observed in reality. 
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5.3.3.4 Sources of transfer 
As in its general version, the particularization of the framework assesses the 
transferability of principles, schemes or practices that have been previously preselected 
(sources of transfer). 
The sources of transfer are principles, schemes or practices that already exist, that have 
already been implemented in other jurisdictions and have proven feasible. As explained 
in section 5.2.6.4, they should have been implemented to solve a similar problem and 
should be considered adequate by the importer entity. 
In the case of railway infrastructure pricing, this precondition may be very demanding, 
particularly as regards the preliminary selection of infrastructure pricing principles. As 
it was exposed in section 3.5, pricing principles are strongly related to the set of 
objectives sought for the pricing policy. These objectives may be varied, like “favor the 
best possible use of the rail network”, “reach a level of cost coverage for operation and 
maintenance costs”, “contribute to the enhancement and enlargement of the network”, 
“reflect the quality of service provided to the operator”, “increase competitiveness of 
rail against other transport modes”, etc. and cannot be fulfilled simultaneously by the 
pricing policy. 
Thus, the preselection of pricing principles should already take this point into account 
and limit the sources of transfer to those principles that are not in open contradiction 
with the proposed objectives. 
5.3.3.5 External influences 
In order to assess the transferability of a pricing principle, scheme or practice from one 
jurisdiction to another, it is necessary to identify those external influences that may 
condition its successful implementation in the importer jurisdiction. Such influences are 
external to the importer entity or jurisdiction, which has no power to change them, but 
can only adapt or resist to them. 
In the field of railway infrastructure pricing, such external influences normally result 
from larger structural processes affecting the railway sector. In the case of the EU, they 
may result from the dynamics of Europeanization56, which exert a relevant top-down 
coercion on transport domestic policy. Their action may be direct, for instance through 
the enactment and enforcement of directives and resolutions that drive the objectives and 
shape the provisions of the national railway reform, or indirect, through the delivery of 
                                                
56 Europeanisation may be defined as “a process whereby domestic policies becomes increasingly 
subjected to European policy making”. This definition, as well as an in depth discussion of the concept 
may be found in Buller et al. (2002, pp.4-20). 
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recommendations, guidelines or best practices. They may also be accompanied by the 
mobilization of financial resources earmarked to specific objectives (e.g. through the 
awarding and allocation of EU funds).  
The Member States that receive provisions and guidelines through the supranational 
coercion of the EU may adopt them or resist them. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002, pp. 255-
263) differentiated three types of Europeanization mechanisms and proposed an 
analytical framework to predict the possible success of European policies according to 
the institutional compatibility, the particular interest constellation and institutional 
opportunity structures at the domestic level and the fit between domestic reforms and 
European regulatory objectives. 
Another type of external influence may result directly from the action of external 
market forces. This can be the case when a small country is obliged in the end to adopt 
regulations or provisions similar to those of a bigger neighbor. 
5.3.3.6 Context conditions 
To be able to assess the transferability of railway infrastructure pricing policies and /or 
practices, it is necessary to take into account the conditions and limitations to the 
transfer that may arise from the particular context existing in the importer jurisdiction. 
Table 15: Potentially relevant contextual variables 
Category  Variable 
Geography Climate, topography, demography, situation 
Transport market Market segmentation, transport volume, market trends, intermodal 
competition conditions, modal shares 
Railway market Type of separation, type of ownership, type of competition, degree of 
competition, market segmentation 
Regulation Type of regulation, type of regulator, service quality regulation, price 
regulation, access regulation 
Railway network Network length, network utilization, network complexity, technical 
characteristics, useful life, state of maintenance and renewal, enhancement / 
enlargement projects 
Operation conditions Type of services, type of rolling stock, average speeds, average delay, level 
of saturation 
Financial conditions Level of State funding, type of State funding, capital markets, other 
commercial revenues 
Management Information systems, accounting systems 
Political / Societal Acceptability, political environment, policy-making procedures, political 
commitment, institutional complexity 
Source: own elaboration  
In fact, the diversity observed among entities in the choices of pricing policies may be 
frequently explained by the differences existing between their original contexts. In the 
field of railway infrastructure, the relevant contextual differences may be relative to the 
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geographical conditions, the whole transport market, the railway market, the regulatory 
framework, the railway network, the operational, financial and management conditions 
or large societal and political issues. Without the intention of being exhaustive, Table 15 
presents some of the more relevant context variables that could interfere with the 
successful implementation of an external railway infrastructure pricing principle, 
charging scheme or charging practice. 
This does not mean that all the listed variables may have a direct effect on the 
transferability of a pricing principle, scheme or practice from one jurisdiction to another, 
but that they can have an influence if they reflect a strong difference between the 
importer and exporter jurisdictions. 
 
5.3.4 Levels of analysis 
The levels of analysis proposed by the general framework are maintained in its 
particularization for the railway infrastructure pricing field. Accordingly, schemes and 
practices can be conceived as different levels of implementation of principles, involving 
their own decision-making procedure (see section 5.2.7). 
Relating this decision-making model with the basic scheme proposed for pricing policies 
in section 3.8, it is possible to distinguish three levels of analysis (Fig. 60): 
• A strategical level: it includes the assessment of transferability of pricing 
principles and the analysis of the decision-making process involved in their 
definition. 
• A tactical level: it includes the assessment of transferability of charging schemes 
(levels and structures) and the analysis of the decision-making process involved 
in their definition. 
• An operational level: it includes the assessment of transferability of charging 
practices and the analysis of the decision-making process involved in their 
implementation. 
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Fig. 60: Particularization of the multilevel structure proposed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration  
 
5.3.5 Transferability criteria  
The general framework proposed four distincted criteria for the assessment of 
transferability (section 5.2.8), namely: 
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1) Indifference to context variation 
2) Indifference to external influences 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
4) Multilevel compatibility  
This section will detail each of them for the specific field of railway infrastructure 
pricing, suggesting some particular considerations as regards their relevance and 
appraisal. 
5.3.5.1 Indifference to context variations 
This criterion means that the potential outcomes of the object transferred should not be 
impeded by the differences existing between the original context in the exporter 
jurisdiction and the context in the importer jurisdiction. Once this criterion has been 
appraised, the object transferred will be considered indifferent to context variations 
(when there are not relevant context variations threatening its successful implementation 
or when they can be overcome through adaptations) or discarded as non-transferable. 
In the case of railway infrastructure pricing, a number of context variables have been 
pointed out as potentially relevant for the assessment of transferability (Table 15), 
meaning that in those cases where they reflect strong differences between the importer 
and the exporter jurisdictions, there might arise a case of incompatibility. 
Obviously, the relevance of each of the listed variables in order to assess transferability 
will not be the same depending on whether the level of transfer considered is strategical, 
tactical or operational. Some of them are predominantly related to one level, like the 
availability of State funding (principles), the type of rolling stock (schemes) or the 
average delay (practices). Others exert their effect across various levels, alone or in 
combination with other variables. 
Some geography-dependent factors may be relevant to explain diversity in transport 
markets and railway infrastructure, shaping the characteristics of track access charges. 
An example of this relevance can be seen in the transport market of the Baltic Republics, 
located as a small link connecting the long distance railway traffic originated in Russia to 
the sea. Their strategical position and their relatively small size, allow the infrastructure 
managers of these countries to charge full costs to freight operators. 
The overall size and possible evolution of the transport market will provide an upper 
bound to rail traffic, conditioning the degree of utilization of the network and thus the 
amount of variable costs. The characteristics of intermodal competition in the different 
market segments can provide a limitation of the infrastructure charging levels and may 
also condition the differentiation of charges across services and lines. 
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The structure of the railway infrastructure market will condition the pricing of railway 
infrastructure. Vertical separation is a precondition for the implementation of railway 
infrastructure charges. The type of competition introduced in every market segment or 
the number of operators effectively competing will have an influence on the demand for 
capacity and in the willingness to pay for it. The ownership of the infrastructure may 
have an influence on the access to financial resources (frequently cheaper in the capital 
markets when the infrastructure manager is publicly owned). 
The regulatory framework will influence the effectiveness of the incentives on the 
infrastructure manager or the degree of competition on the network. It can also 
determine direct or indirect limitations on the price levels that can result incompatible 
with the transfer of a given charging scheme. 
The physical condition of the network, as regards its length, equipment and complexity, 
may have a strong relevance for the operational conditions prevailing in the importer and 
exporter jurisdiction. In turn, this will condition the quality and cost of the service 
offered, which will influence the feasibility of a given charging scheme. Furthermore, the 
average age of the infrastructure, as well as its state of maintenance and renewal will be 
essential in the level of costs generated, influencing the adoption of a given pricing 
principle, scheme or practice. 
The mix of traffic and services, as well as the type of rolling stock running on the 
network or the basic operational performance of the railway undertakings, may require a 
particular structure of charges in order to provide efficient incentives to the market. 
Inversely, it may make irrelevant or counterproductive the incentives embedded in a 
charging scheme designed for different operational conditions. 
The availability of funds is another relevant context condition, as it may determine the 
minimum level of cost recovery that should be achieved by the infrastructure manager in 
order to meet the financial equilibrium. Strong deviations in the availability of State 
subsidies or in the access and costs of capital markets may condition the transfer of a 
railway infrastructure practice. 
Management procedures and systems can exert influence on the feasibility of a given 
transfer, particularly as regards the implementation stage. Differences in the accounting 
systems with respect to the exporter jurisdiction may alter significantly the level of the 
costs included in a charging scheme (e.g. through the consideration of different useful 
lives and depreciation functions) or the definition of the cost categories (e.g. which costs 
are allocated to the relevant activities of the infrastructure manager). 
Deviations in the political environment and commitment existing at the moment of 
implementing a railway infrastructure pricing practice may limit the success of the 
whole political process in which the transfer is involved, compromising the adoption of 
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some practices. Acceptability of a policy is another important consideration, as it will 
influence people's views of the policy instrument and condition the effectiveness of the 
proposed principles and schemes. 
5.3.5.2 Indifference to external influences 
This criterion means that the potential outcomes of the object transferred should not be 
impeded by influences external to the control of the importer entity. Once this criterion 
has been appraised, the object transferred will be considered indifferent to external 
influences (when there are not relevant external influence threatening its successful 
implementation or when they can be overcomed through adaptations) or discarded as 
non-transferable. 
Some pertinent external influences identified in section 5.3.3.5 as regards railway 
infrastructure pricing, were the direct coercion in the form of legal provisions, the 
indirect coercion in the form of best practices and recommendations, or the effect of 
external market forces. Their effect on the importer entity and its ability to adapt or 
resist to them, may influence the transferability of a given pricing principle or scheme. 
In the European case, Member States are supposed to comply with the provisions 
included in Directive 2001/14/EC as regards the design and implementation of a railway 
infrastructure charging scheme. As it has been previously remarked, this norm provides 
a wide number of requirements on the principles (section 3.5.3) and structures (section 
3.6.2) applied, which may conflict with the transfer of some objects. 
For instance, an infrastructure manager trying to increase the cost coverage of its 
charging scheme can be interested in transferring a two-part tariff with a fixed access 
charge. The implementation of such a principle would probably increase its cost 
coverage, but it would certainly go against the provisions of Directive 2001/14/EC as 
regards the potential discrimination of new entrants in the market. This external 
influence can, in the end, make impossible the successful implementation of the two-
part tariff. 
A relevant consideration in the assessment of the effect of such influences comes from 
the effective degree of coercion achieved by the external influence in the importer and 
exporter jurisdiction. In fact, EU directives may be subject to scope in their 
interpretation, while the penalties for non-compliance (e.g. fines) may not be 
particularly serious. If this is the case, the importer jurisdiction may still have room for 
voluntary decision, though probably will go against increasing pressures in the long run. 
A similar thought is valid for indirect coercions in the form of recommendations or best 
practices. Their influence on the importer and exporter jurisdiction may be different 
depending on their technical, political and managerial ability (that may make easier the 
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adoption of recommendations and practices already done and validated by a 
supranational institution) and their alignment with domestic interests. 
An indirect form of external influence may come through supranational funding linked to 
some decisions able to influence the transfer and implementation of pricing principles or 
schemes. The mobilization of financial resources at European level (e.g. for investments 
in the transeuropean network) may alter the financial equilibrium of the infrastructure 
and thus influence the viability of a given pricing principle or scheme. 
5.3.5.3 Horizontal compatibility 
This criterion means that the object transferred should not enter in open conflict with 
those objects already existing at their same level of definition (principles, schemes or 
practices). Once this criterion has been assessed, the object transferred will be 
considered horizontally compatible (when it does not conflict with other relevant objects 
operating in the importer jurisdiction at the same level) or discarded as non-transferable. 
In the case of railway infrastructure pricing, horizontal compatibility may be a concern 
as regards other policies acting on the importer jurisdiction that are directly or indirectly 
connected to pricing. This may be the case for policies related to intermodal 
competition, regulation of transport operating companies, regulation of access to the 
infrastructure, infrastructure investment, etc. 
Where such policies are already in place, it is necessary to check that their objectives 
will not conflict with the pricing policies likely to be transferred. This incompatibility 
may also arise as regards the financial resources available for the political action. Track 
access charges are a source of revenues that may be applied to fund the infrastructure 
manager or to fund other relevant policies and investments. At the time of transferring, it 
should be evaluated whether the transfer of given pricing principles may lead to a 
reduction of financial resources. 
At the level of charging schemes, particular attention should be driven to the incentives 
embedded in the transferred objects, as they could be in contradiction with the signals 
embedded in previously existing incentivization mechanisms. For instance, the 
introduction of a strict performance regime successfully tested in the exporter 
jurisdiction may conflict with the incentives embedded in a time-dependent structure. 
5.3.5.4 Multilevel compatibility 
This criterion means that the object transferred should not enter in open conflict with 
objects already existing at superior levels. Hence, the schemes transferred should not be 
in open conflict with the principles already at work in the importer jurisdiction and the 
practices transferred should be in agreement with the schemes and principles already set. 
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Once this criterion has been assessed, the object transferred will be considered vertically 
compatible or discarded as non-transferable. 
Accordingly, the introduction of charging schemes originated in other jurisdictions 
should not be incompatible with the pricing principles already adopted in the importer 
jurisdiction. The adoption of a specific practice should be aligned with the schemes 
already at work in the importer jurisdiction. 
For example, the adoption of a very detailed differentiation related to elements other 
than cost causation, may conflict with the effective application of a marginal cost 
principle throughout the network. The implementation of delay measurement points at 
final stations may be in contradiction with a very detailed performance regime taking 
into account time deviations in every link. 
5.3.5.5 Additional considerations 
A particular attention should be deserved to the comparability of information used in the 
assessment of transferability in the field of railway infrastructure pricing. As it has been 
noted in section 4.4.3.5, low comparability is a frequent situation when treating about 
railway infrastructure companies. Moreover, it may also affect the information available 
on the context conditions or the external influences. 
Comparability problems are likely to appear in relation to cost information or 
availability of public funding (differences in accounting norms), price levels (different 
purchase parity power), technical condition of the infrastructure and quality of service 
(differences in performance indicators), etc. 
 
 
5.4 Synthesis 
Building on the review of the transfer notion developed by the policy transfer and 
benchmarking literatures, the research proposes its operationalization through the 
concepts of transfer problem and transferability. The first is defined as the situation 
where an entity wants to transfer a policy or practice already successfully applied by 
another entity in another jurisdiction to its own jurisdiction. The second refers to the 
condition of being transferable from the exporter jurisdiction to the importer 
jurisdiction, meaning that the transferred policy or practice can be successfully 
implemented in the importer jurisdiction (i.e. it is able to achieve there the outcomes that 
it has already attained in the exporter jurisdiction). Accordingly, the assessment of 
transferability is conceived as a prospective exercise that tries to determine a priori how 
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likely is a policy or practice of being successfully implemented in the importer 
jurisdiction by the importer entity. 
A number of assumptions have been formulated as regards the position of the 
transferability assessment with respect to the literatures reviewed, the transfer process 
and the policy-making process. As regards its relation to the literature, a high degree of 
complexity is postulated for the transfer exercise on the consideration that it will be 
extremely non-standardized and context-dependent, closely interrelated with problems 
arising in other areas of policy-making, subject to conditions of great uncertainty and it 
will take place in an environment populated by multiple stakeholders with potentially 
incompatible interests. In these circumstances, the quantitative and defined approach of 
the benchmarking literature will be mainly limited to the “practice” level, while the 
qualitative an undefined approach of the policy transfer literature will prevail at the 
“policy” and “measure” levels. As regards its relation to the transfer procedure, the 
research proposes a five-step process (definition, selection, learning, adaptation and 
action) and assumes that the transferability assessment happens at the selection phase. 
Transferability is thus conceived as a necessary condition that must be fulfilled by the 
policies or practices studied in order to continue through the next stages of the transfer 
process. Finally, it is assumed that the relation between transferability assessment and 
the policy-making process takes place through the transfer process (i.e. at some step of 
the policy-making process, decision-makers resolve to engage in a policy transfer 
process, one of whose steps is the assessment of transferability). The connection 
between the transfer and the policy-making processes is supposed to happen in the first 
part of the policy-making cycle, from the formulation of a problem/idea to the 
implementation of policy, and particularly at the steps of definition of options and 
implementation. 
On the basis of the mentioned assumptions, the research has defined a general 
framework for the assessment of the transferability of policies, measures and practices 
between different jurisdictions. The framework is conceived as a set of elements, levels 
and criteria. The elements are defined as the basic inputs that should be available in order 
to assess transferability. They are six: the jurisdictions and entities involved; the aim of 
the transfer process; the object being transferred; the sources of policy transfer; the 
external influences acting on the importer jurisdiction; and the context conditions 
prevailing in the importer jurisdiction. The levels of analysis are defined with the aim of 
particularizing the assessment of transferability for the different stages of the policy-
making process. They are three: the strategical level (focused on the transferability 
assessment of policies and the decision-making process involved in their definition), the 
tactical level (focused on the transferability assessment of measures) and the operational 
level (focused on the transferability assessment of practices). Finally, the general 
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framework states four transferability criteria, understood as necessary conditions to be 
fulfilled by the object being transferred (either policy, measure or practice) in order to be 
suitable for transfer to the importer jurisdiction. An object should be qualified as 
transferable to the importer jurisdiction if it is able to fulfill the criteria of indifference to 
context variations (i.e. the contextual differences between the importer and the exporter 
jurisdiction do not affect its outcomes), indifference to external influences (i.e. the 
external influences do not prevent its implementation), horizontal compatibility (i.e. it 
does not enter in conflict with other objects located at its same level in the policy-
making process) and multilevel compatibility (i.e. it does not enter in conflict with other 
objects located in superior levels). 
In a second step, the general framework has been particularized for the consideration of 
railway infrastructure charging policies and practices. The approach adopted has 
maintained the formal structure of the general framework and specified each of its 
elements, levels and criteria for the field of railway infrastructure charging. The 
application of the framework to railway infrastructure pricing, is driven by the existence 
of a transfer problem in that specific field: an entity with ability to take or directly 
influence decisions related to pricing policies on a given railway infrastructure, wants to 
transfer and implement a pricing policy, measure or practice that has already been 
successfully applied by another entity on another railway infrastructure. The type of 
objects likely to be transferred and the corresponding levels of analysis are identified 
with the pricing principles (strategical level), the charging schemes (tactical level) and 
the charging practices (operational level). The context conditions are established with 
respect to categories like geography, transport market, railway market, regulation, 
railway network, operation conditions, financial conditions, etc. The external influences 
are identified with larger structural processes affecting the railway sector (e.g. the 
Europeanization dynamics embedded in the EU railway reform). The transferability 
criteria have been adapted to the particularities of the context conditions and the external 
influences, as well as to other pricing principles, charging schemes or charging practices 
already acting on the importer jurisdiction. 
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Chapter 
6  
CHARACTERIZATION OF CASE STUDIES 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Within the design of this research, case studies are conceived both as a means to 
complete the characterization of the framework proposed to assess the transferability of 
railway infrastructure charges and as a method to test its validity. Three steps are 
central to ensure the achievement of these objectives: the selection of cases, that should 
be as much representative as possible; their documentation, that should be detailed 
enough as to correctly depict policies, practices and contexts; and their analysis, that 
should be able to illustrate and challenge or verify the assumptions made in the 
proposed framework. 
The selection of case studies has been limited in scope to the EU-27, where the diversity 
of railway infrastructure charges applied by the Member States and the political 
influence of the EC towards greater harmonization, makes rather likely the development 
of transfers in the future. This choice has as well the advantage of a greater availability 
of information on the practices under study. 
The documentation of the case studies has been envisaged as both descriptive and goal-
oriented. It is descriptive because it gathers and presents detailed information on the 
railway infrastructure pricing principles, charging schemes and charging practices 
followed by several entities, according to a wide number of information sources 
available. It is goal-oriented because it already structures the collected information in 
view of the main concepts included in the transferability framework proposed. 
The analysis of the case studies has been designed as a way to further explore the 
feasibility of the framework proposed when it is applied in the real world. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the literature does not provide any documented case of transfer 
of railway infrastructure charges between European countries. This circumstance shapes 
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and limits the type of analysis performed, which is more oriented to prove the 
conceptual strength of the framework proposed to integrate different informations and 
formulate reasonable hypotheses for the assessment of transferability. 
The scope of this chapter is to select and document a number of case studies that will be 
used in chapter 7 to provide further validation to the assumptions of the transferability 
assessment framework proposed in section 5.3. 
Section 6.2 presents the selection criteria and the case studies chosen for the validation 
of the conceptual framework; Section 6.3 provides a detailed characterization of the 
context and conditions prevailing in the selected importer jurisdiction; Section 6.4 briefly 
characterizes the context and the railway infrastructure pricing practices observed in the 
exporter jurisdictions; Section 6.5 presents a brief synthesis of the information gathered 
and the case studies selected for their development. 
 
 
6.2 Selection of case studies 
The fragmentation of practices and circumstances observed in the EU provides a rich 
field for the identification of case studies able to illustrate and validate the conceptual 
framework proposed. Twenty-five national infrastructure managers are currently 
applying charging schemes in the networks under their management, with different 
principles, structures and levels. Their contexts are even more diverse with respect to 
market structure, regulation, operational conditions, financial resources, etc. The number 
of cases that could be developed goes already up to 576 only as a combination of the 
possible importer and exporter national jurisdictions, and to many more if the different 
possible objects of transfer are considered. 
Hence, it seems necessary to formulate some criteria able to guide the selection of the 
importer and exporter jurisdictions and the objects of transfer. 
According to the transfer process proposed (see section 5.2.4), the assessment of 
transferability is undertaken in a preliminary stage, what conditions the information 
available on the practices and the contexts of the external jurisdictions. Contrarily, the 
importer entity has a wide knowledge on the context and circumstances that are 
distinctive of its own jurisdiction. To simulate to a certain extent this particularity, it 
has been decided to select the same importer entity and jurisdiction for all the cases and 
to do it according to a criterion of maximum information available. As a result of these 
considerations, the national Spanish national rail network has been selected as the 
importer jurisdiction and the Spanish Public Works Ministry as the importer entity. 
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Though performed on practical criteria, this selection is not perceived as unrealistic, 
given the later start of the railway reform in effective terms in Spain and the increasing 
interest shown by the Spanish Public Works Ministry on the subject of rail 
infrastructure charges. 
As to the selection of the exporter jurisdictions, three criteria have been formulated 
• The maturity achieved in the practice of rail infrastructure pricing, which has 
been evaluated according to the year of introduction of infrastructure charging 
schemes (positive for the jurisdictions with at least 10 years of experience). This 
criterion assumes that the importer entity will be more interested in bringing in 
practices from the more experienced railway networks. 
• The size of the railway infrastructure market in the exporter jurisdiction. It is 
presupposed that the importer jurisdiction will be more likely to introduce 
practices applied in the larger markets (more than 30 million transport units-km 
in year 2005). This assumption would also be reasonable if analyzed from a 
European scale, as it seems more probable a process where the practices spread 
from larger to smaller markets. 
• The geographical proximity to the importer jurisdiction. It seems more likely 
that the importer entity will adopt policies or practices from the neighboring 
networks (one or two borders ahead of the importer jurisdiction). This condition 
is also aligned with the harmonization of railway infrastructure charges on 
international corridors including the importer jurisdiction. 
It should be noticed that the selected criteria are in agreement with the factors affecting 
the likelihood of transfer and its success mentioned in section 4.3.3.5. In fact, the 
availability of information on the object being transferred or the degree of prediction of 
the outcomes are related to the geographical proximity and the maturity of the practice. 
The existence of interdependences is also related to the geographical proximity, in the 
form of international traffic and border agreements. 
The application of the three mentioned criteria has led to the selection of the rail 
networks managed by RFF (France), DB Netz (Germany), RFI (Italy), Network Rail 
(UK), Banverket (Sweden) and REFER EP (Portugal), as they are the only exporter 
jurisdictions in the EU-27 fulfilling at least two of the three conditions. The results of 
the evaluation for the selected exporter jurisdiction are shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Evaluation of selected exporter jurisdictions  
Exporter jurisdiction Maturity of 
practice 
Market 
extension 
Geographical 
proximity 
RFF (France) Yes Yes Yes 
DB Netz (Germany) Yes Yes Yes 
Network Rail (UK) Yes Yes Yes 
Banverket (Sweden) Yes Yes No 
REFER (Portugal) Yes No Yes 
RFI (Italy) No Yes Yes 
Note: Criteria - Maturity (Yes- prior to 1998; No- equal or later than 1998); Market size (Yes- traffic 
volume greater than 30 million transport units-km in year 2005; No- traffic volume inferior to 30 million 
transport units-km in year 2005); Geographical proximity (Yes- one or two borders ahead of the impoter 
jurisdiction; No- more than two borders ahead of the importer jurisdiction). 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Once the importer and exporter jurisdiction have been identified the construction of the 
case studies requires selecting the objects that will be transferred between them. The 
selection criteria applied to these objects have been their distribution across the levels 
defined in the conceptual framework (two objects for each level: strategical, tactical and 
operational) and the representativeness of the object transferred in the exporter 
jurisdiction (though it has been applied on a subjective basis, it seeks to reflect the 
idiosyncrasy of each railway administration). The selected objects are presented in 
Table 17. 
Table 17: Selected objects and levels of analysis for the case studies  
Exporter 
jurisdiction 
Level Object 
RFF (France) Tactical Charging scheme for high speed services 
DB Netz (Germany) Tactical Charging scheme for freight services 
Network Rail (UK) Operational Congestion cost calculation and allocation procedure 
Banverket (Sweden) Strategical Marginal social cost pricing principle 
REFER (Portugal) Operational Infrastructure cost calculation and allocation procedure 
RFI (Italy) Strategical Full cost minus subsidy pricing principle 
Source: own elaboration 
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6.3 Characterization of the importer jurisdiction 
6.3.1 The Spanish railway model 
Spain addressed the reform of the railway sector with the 2003 Railway Law (Ley 
39/2003 del Sector Ferroviario), which came into force on the 1st of January of 200557. 
In line with the EU requirements, the new model implied separation between 
infrastructure management and railway services, creation of a license system for railway 
undertakings, opening of national and international transport to new railway operators, 
strengthening of railway administration and the creation of a regulatory body for the 
sector. 
The Railway Law entrusted the management of the railway infrastructure to the public 
business entity Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles (RENFE), that changed its 
name to Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (ADIF) and integrated the 
former public business entity Gestor de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (GIF), dedicated 
to the management of the high speed network. The Railway Law created as well a new 
public business entity, RENFE-Operadora, in charge of the rendering of railway 
transport services to the public. RENFE-Operadora assumed the assets dedicated to the 
transport activity that previously belonged to RENFE. 
Fig. 61: Layout of the Spanish railway sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Public Works Ministry ( www.fomento.es ; 2008-04-25) 
Furthermore, the Railway Law introduced the figure of the Comité de Regulación 
Ferroviaria (CRF), with the duty to safeguard the plurality of railway services, to 
guarantee equal access conditions and to resolve conflicts in the market when new 
                                                
57 The enforcement of the Railway Law 39/2003, initially set for May 2004, was delayed until 2005 in 
order to allow the completion of the regulatory framework for the rail sector (Real Decreto Ley 1/2004) 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 198 
operators other than RENFE-Operadora will start their operations. The layout resulting 
from the railway reform is depicted in Fig. 61. 
Under the new model, the State is still the dominant actor in the railway sector, through 
the activity of the Public Works Ministry. This institution is responsible for: 1) the 
strategic planning of the railway sector and its development; 2) the general planning and 
regulation of the railway sector; 3) the definition of the national financial framework for 
railways, which includes the financing of the infrastructure manager and the financial 
compensations for public service obligations; 4) the definition and supervision of the 
track access charging regime; and 5) the awarding of licenses and security certificates to 
railway companies (Railway Law 39/2003, Art.81). 
ADIF is a public business entity attached to the Public Works Ministry with own legal 
personality, full capacity to operate and own assets. It is in charge of the construction 
of the new railway infrastructure mandated by the Public Works Ministry (with 
recourse to own or external resources) and is also responsible for the management of the 
infrastructure to which is entitled or that is entrusted to it by the State through specific 
agreements. Additionally, ADIF prepares and publishes the Network Statement, 
allocates infrastructure capacity to railway undertaking requesting it, provides and set 
charges for additional, complementary and ancillary rail transport services and levies 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure (Railway Law 39/2003, Art.21). 
RENFE-Operadora was created as well as a public business entity attached to the Public 
Works Ministry with own legal personality, full capacity to operate and own assets. Its 
main objective is the provision of railway transport services for both, passengers and 
freight, which also includes the maintenance of the rolling stock. RENFE-Operadora is 
allowed to undertake any other commercial action convenient or required for the correct 
accomplishment of its main objective. The Railway Law also defined the transitory 
steps to be followed by RENFE-Operadora in order to adapt to the entry into force of 
the planned liberalization provisions58. 
In order to be able to provide transport services, the new entity inherited the operation 
business units of the former RENFE: Suburban services, Regional services, High speed 
services, Long distance services, Freight services and Maintenance of rolling stock. In 
addition, RENFE-Operadora received those assets, liabilities and rights formerly 
belonging to RENFE but required for the provision of railway transport services. These 
assets were finally defined in year 2006 through the Ministerial Order 2909/2006, which 
                                                
58 In this sense, the Railway Law 39/2003 guarantees to RENFE-Operadora the allocation of capacity for 
the operation of freight services until the publication of the network statements and the exclusivity of the 
operation of passenger services until the entry into force of the European legislation opening this segment 
to competition. 
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assigned to RENFE-Operadora the equipments needed for the maintenance of rolling 
stock, the rolling stock itself and the buildings and equipments required for the 
administration and the central services of the entity. RENFE-Operadora received as well 
the shares and capital contributions that RENFE held in subsidiaries or other companies 
related with the provision of railway transport services. 
The CRF is a collegiate body integrated within the Public Works Ministry. It is 
responsible for the supervision and control of the railway market in order to safeguard 
plurality in the provision of railway services on the network, guaranteeing no 
discrimination among public and private companies in their access to the mentioned 
services. It also ensures that track access charges are set according to the provisions 
stated in the Railway Law and are not discriminatory and solves conflicts that may arise 
between the infrastructure manager and the railway operators regarding the structure or 
application of charges related to additional, complementary and ancillary services 
(Railway Law 39/2003, Art.82). 
The reform of the sector was preceded by an intensive debate concerning the allocation 
of the debt belonging to RENFE among the newly created stakeholders ADIF and 
RENFE-Operadora and the State. The financial and economic studies accompanying the 
draft of the Railway Law presented several options with different effects on the 
viability of the new entities and the deficit of the State59 (Izquierdo et al. 2004, p.591). 
Although at a given moment of the process the State supported the allocation of the 
debt mainly to the new public business entities60, the final solution consisted on the 
assumption of 5.459 million € by the State, 1.379 million € by RENFE-Operadora and 
1.087 million € by ADIF (RENFE, 2004a). With this arrangement RENFE assumed the 
debt derived from the acquisition of new high speed rolling stock, ADIF assumed the 
debt linked to the Madrid-Seville high speed line and the State assumed 3.659 million € 
due for the historical debt of the entity and 1.799 million € due for the financing of 
investments in infrastructure (Art. 5 of Decree 7/2004). These decisions granted a sound 
financial and economic basis to the new stakeholders at the beginning of their activity. 
The picture of the Spanish railway sector is completed with the presence of 
Ferrocarriles Españoles de Vía Estrecha (FEVE), an integrated railway company 
depending from the Public Works Ministry managing the narrow-gauge network, and 
                                                
59 The mentioned financial and economic studies presented four different scenarios, here expressed in 
million €: 1) ADIF - 0, RENFE-Operadora - 1.357, State - 5.883; 2) ADIF - 5.883, RENFE-Operadora - 
1.357, State - 0; 3) ADIF - 2.036, RENFE-Operadora - 1.357, State - 3.847; 4) ADIF - 4.345, RENFE-
Operadora - 1.357, State - 1.538. 
60 The Public Works Minister announced before summer that ADIF should assume 4.344 million € of 
RENFE’s debt, RENFE-Operadora 1.357 million € and the State 1.538 million € (Chamizo, 2003). 
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four regional integrated railway companies (Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 
Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat Valenciana, Euskotren and Serveis Ferroviaris de 
Mallorca). In year 2006 these five railway companies summed up nearly 9% of the total 
rail passenger-km produced in Spain, while RENFE-Operadora carried the remaining 
91% (Ministerio de Fomento, 2007a, p.286). 
 
6.3.2 Considerations on the Spanish railway reform 
The layout of the railway sector previously described has been designed in order to 
minimize the burden of the railway system on the public accounts, according to the rules 
stated in the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 95). 
For the purposes of describing income, expenditure and financial flows, and balance 
sheets for every institutional sector, the ESA-95 has adopted as the basic statistical unit 
the institutional unit, which is defined as “an elementary economic decision-making 
centre characterised by uniformity of behaviour and decision-making autonomy in the 
exercise of its principal function” (European Council, 1996a, Annex A, § 2.12). As 
producers, the institutional units are classified into different types depending on their 
nature (public or private61 / profit or non profit62) and their production, which can be for 
the market, for own final use or for other non market purposes. 
Public producers can be classified as market producers or other non-market producers, 
depending on the so-called “50% criterion”: they are market producers if more than 50% 
of the production costs are covered by sales and non-market producers otherwise. The 
implications of this criterion are rather relevant, as public institutional units regarded as 
market producers are classified outside of the general government sector63 and, when 
they do not have an independent legal status, treated as quasi-corporations owned by 
the government. Public institutional units regarded as non-market producers are 
classified in the general government sector and consolidated within it. 
Sales are accounted excluding taxes on products but including all payments made by the 
general government or the institutions of the European Union and granted to any kind of 
                                                
61 A public producer is defined as “a producer controlled by the general government or, in the case of 
non profit institutional unit, controlled and mainly financed by the general government” (European 
Council, 1996a, Annex A, § 3.28). 
62 A non profit institutional unit is defined as “a legal or social entity created for the purpose of 
producing goods and services whose status does not permit them to be a source of income, profit or other 
financial gains for the units that establish, control or finance them” (European Council, 1996a, Annex A, 
§ 3.31). This distinction is however unnecessary when treating with public producers. 
63 They are classified in the non-financial or financial corporations sectors 
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producer in relation to its activity, i.e. all payments linked to the volume or value of 
output are included, but payments to cover an overall deficit are excluded. Sales are only 
used in valuing market output, as other non-market output is valued at costs. Production 
costs are the sum of intermediate consumption, compensation of employees, 
consumption of fixed capital64 and other taxes on production. For this criterion other 
subsidies on production are not deducted. To ensure consistency of the concepts sales 
and production costs when applying the “50% criterion”, the production costs should 
exclude all costs made for own-account capital formation. 
In addition to this definition of sales and production costs, the ESA-95 states that the 
“50% criterion” should be applied by looking over a range of years: only if the criterion 
holds for several years or holds for the present year and is expected to hold for the near 
future, it should be deemed fulfilled. Minor fluctuations in the size of sales from one 
year to another do not necessitate a reclassification of institutional units (European 
Council, 1996a, Annex A, § 3.33). 
The “50% criterion” defines an indirect condition on the layout of the railway sector and 
its public agents, as depending on the nature of their products (market or non-market) 
they will consolidate or not as general government sector. If considered non-market 
producers, the public expenditure on them has to be accounted as non-financial 
expenditure; if classified as market entities, the public expenditure has to be treated as a 
financial investment without effects on public deficit. 
Consequently with these norms, the focus of the Spanish railway reform has gone to 
ensure the classification of the newly created entities ADIF and RENFE-Operadora as 
public market producers. This classification entails the financial nature of the public 
capital contributions to the railway sector, avoiding them to be consolidated as debt. 
In the case of ADIF, the first aim of the reform has been to define an entity capable to 
fulfill the “50% criterion” on the long term in spite of the strong investment already 
committed through the ongoing infrastructure plans. The relevant variables considered in 
order to attain this goal were the ownership of the infrastructure, the definition of a 
depreciation scheme for ADIF and the level of the railway infrastructure charges (the 
two first factors acting on the cost side of the problem and the latter one on the income 
side). 
• The ownership of the infrastructure. 
The ownership of the infrastructure contributes to the production costs of the 
infrastructure manager through depreciation and to the sales through the charges 
                                                
64 The inclusion of capital consumption is particularly relevant from the perspective of the infrastructure 
management activity, as it includes depreciation of fixed assets. 
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for the use of infrastructure and the economic compensations for its 
management. Depending on the type of line, the net contribution to the 
fulfillment of the “50% criterion” may be positive or not. 
When the infrastructure is owned by the State and entrusted to ADIF, 
depreciation is not accounted in the production costs, while track access charges 
and economic compensations for its management are summed up to sales. On the 
other side, the State has to pay for the depreciation, which contributes 
effectively to public deficit. 
• The depreciation scheme applied to fixed assets entitled to ADIF. 
The choice of a given depreciation scheme for the fixed assets entitled to ADIF, 
defines the contribution of infrastructure to the production costs of a given year. 
If the selected scheme is linear over time, it will have a fixed contribution with no 
correlation to sales, therefore increasing the risk of no-compliance of the “50% 
criterion” in the first years of operation (when traffic is generally expected to be 
lower). If the selected scheme is somehow linked to the output produced (e.g. 
train-km), it will also correlate to the ability to generate sales, thus reducing the 
risk of non-compliance. 
• The definition of railway infrastructure charges. 
As it will be explained later in this chapter (section 6.3.7), the definition of 
railway infrastructure charges in the Spanish railway model has been done 
according to financial considerations rooted on this rationale.  
 
6.3.3 Policy objectives for the railway sector 
The Public Works Ministry is in charge of the definition of the national transport and 
railway policy, and its implementation through the strategic planning activity. 
In year 2005 the Public Works Ministry issued its Strategic Infrastructure and 
Transport Plan (PEIT), which defines the principles and objectives that will drive the 
Spanish transport policy in the period 2005-2020. Within the PEIT framework and with 
a particular focus on railway transport policies, the Railway General Directorate (DGF) 
has elaborated the Railway Transport Sector Plan in close collaboration with ADIF, 
RENFE-Operadora and FEVE. However, this plan has not been enacted yet, as it is still 
involved in the strategic environmental impact evaluation process (www.fomento.es; 
2008-04-30). 
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Building on an extensive diagnostic of the Spanish transport system, the PEIT 
formulates the basic guidelines for the national railway transport policy until year 2020 
(Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, pp.66-69): 
• Consolidation of the new railway model arising from the EU railway reform.  
• Promotion of a central role for railways in the intermodal system for the 
transport of passengers and goods on trunks and high demand corridors. 
• Setting a target for reduction in total travel times for all interurban links, to be 
reached in stages according to the planned development of the network. The 
resulting travel times must, within the Plan’s horizon, place rail in a competitive 
position in relation to air transport in links using the high speed trunk routes for 
distances of less than 700 km. On other routes, the reference for improved travel 
times will be that for private vehicle transport over distances of more than 300 
km. 
• Construction of a high performance network in line with Directive 96/48/EC on 
the interoperability of European high speed rail. The network will be designed 
mainly for mixed traffic, including cross-border rail links, although on routes 
where demand volumes and characteristics require it, the new infrastructures will 
be exclusively for passenger traffic. 
• A strategy to improve rail share in the movement of freight across medium and 
long distances, by improving the quality standards offered by rail, in line with 
freight market’s demand. 
• Definition of a freight transport network in line with Directive 2001/16/EC on 
the interoperability of the conventional rail system, including lineal infrastructure 
and equipments, which will provide sufficient capacity in the most important 
corridors. 
• Contribution to the accessibility throughout the country with regional services 
adapted to local characteristics in accordance with priorities and resource 
allocation by the relevant territorial administrations. 
• Definition of a new framework for the development of regional services, based 
on agreements between operators and regional administrations and the 
coordination between them and long distance services as regards timetables and 
charges.  
• Priority attention to the maintenance of the network, with improvements in its 
management by the allocation of necessary resources, estimated in terms of 
safety and efficiency criteria, and implementation of an updated system for 
preventive and integrated maintenance. 
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• Maintenance of high safety standards in rail transport throughout the process of 
migration toward a European safety system, setting up a national authority in 
the field as part of the European safety agency. 
• The suburban networks will be completed in the major metropolitan areas and 
major cities, and priority will be given to the modernization of rolling stock. 
• Closed, unused lines will be analyzed with a view in placing a value on these 
public assets according to their potentialities. 
• Establishment of intermediate temporal horizons for the development of the 
network and the patterns of services, drawing up rail transport sector plans 
every eight years. 
In line with these guidelines and until the Railway Transport Sector Plan is finally 
approved, the Public Works Ministry has set the national priorities for the rail transport 
policy in 2005-2008 (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, pp.95-96). Within this period, the 
two main actions are the consolidation of the new institutional framework and the 
investment program in the network. 
The consolidation of the institutional framework is focused on the definition of clear 
relationships between the infrastructure manager ADIF and operators (initially RENFE-
Operadora). This consolidation will require the development and review of the current 
pricing system for the use of railway infrastructure and the gradual introduction of 
competition in the freight transport market. 
Fig. 62: Spanish railway network planned for year 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2005a) 
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The investment program is focused on the delivery of the high performance links 
currently under construction, as well as the interventions on the conventional network 
improving operation conditions for freight services, intermodality and interoperability. 
From 2009 to 2020, action will be aimed at improving passenger and freight services, 
progressively enlarging the high performance network and interoperability with the 
French network (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, pp.96-97). Within this period, the 
possible introduction of competition in rail passenger transport is foreseen. According 
to these priorities, in year 2020 the railway reform will be probably completed, with 
freight and passenger rail services competing on an extended and specialized railway 
network including high performance links for exclusive passenger traffic, high 
performance links for mix traffic and conventional links (Fig. 62). 
The PEIT states as well that the transport activity of RENFE-Operadora has to be 
understood as a central element of the intermodal chain of public transport services and 
that its railway services have to be defined in every case according to different but 
complementary goals. Building on this basis, the PEIT defines transport policy 
objectives for four different types of services (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, pp.103-
104): 
• Long distance passenger services: the priority must go for the creation of high 
frequency services in the high performance corridors, coordinating schedules and 
facilitating connections with other railway services and road transport. 
• Regional passenger services: they should be coordinated with long distance 
services and seek complementarities with public road transport. They should be 
set accordingly to regional interests and defined within the framework of 
agreements between RENFE-Operadora and the regional administrations. 
• Suburban passenger services: they should reach a progressive integration with 
metropolitan public transport services, and be focused on corridors with high 
demand and high frequency requirements. These services are to be analyzed 
within the specific framework of urban mobility. 
• Freight services: they should be oriented to the provision of intermodal 
transport services in high demand corridors and promote the international 
activity with complementary strategic partners among operators from other 
countries. 
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6.3.4 Railway network 
The scope of the railway reform is centred in the General Interest Rail Network 
(REFIG), which is defined in Art. 4 of the Railway Law 39/2003 as the rail 
infrastructure that is essential to ensure a common railway transport throughout the 
whole territory of the State or whose joint management is required for the correct 
operation of such common railway transport system. The inclusion or exclusion of rail 
links in the REFIG is the competence of the Public Works Ministry. 
ADIF manages the larger part of the REFIG (the remaining part being managed by 
FEVE), which has increased steadily in the period 2005-2008 (Table 18) as a result of 
the enlargement of the high speed network, a trend that is expected to be continued in 
the next years. 
Table 18: Evolution of the railway network managed by ADIF 
Type of network 2005 
(July) 
2006 
(May) 
2006 
(December) 
2008 
(April) 
High speed network 1.010 1.056 1.237 1.563 
Conventional network 11.759 11.714 11.715 11.736 
Mixed network 21 21 21 21 
Narrow gauge network 18 18 18 18 
 TOTAL   12.808 12.809 12.991 13.338 
Note: Km of railway line. Classification of the network according to the track gauge: High speed network 
(international gauge – 1.668 mm); Conventional network (Iberian – 1.435 mm); Mixed network (both 
international and Iberian); Narrow gauge (1.000 mm). 
Source: own elaboration with data from ADIF (2005), ADIF (2006a), ADIF (2007b) and ADIF (2008) 
The part of the REFIG managed by ADIF includes infrastructure within a wide range of 
technical characteristics as regards gauge, electrification (Table 19), maximum speeds 
(Table 20) or signaling systems. 
Table 19: Electrification in the railway network managed by ADIF 
Type of network Single track Double track TOTAL 
Electrified 3.601 4.450 8.051 
Non electrified 5.210 56 5.266 
 TOTAL   8.811 4.506 13.317 
Note: Km of railway line. 
Source: ADIF 2008, p.25 
Broadly speaking it is possible to distinguish three types of infrastructure: the new high 
speed infrastructure (UIC gauge, speeds greater than 250 km/h, double track, electrified), 
the Mediterranean corridor (Iberian gauge, maximum speed of 220 km/h, double track, 
electrified) and the conventional network (Iberian gauge, speeds below 160 km/h). This
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distinction, which reflects as well the different quality of the infrastructure services 
rendered to the operators, has been incorporated to the current infrastructure pricing 
system through the variable type of line (see section 6.3.9).  
Table 20: Maximum speeds in the railway network managed by ADIF 
Maximum speed Length 
> 250 km/h 1.247 
200-250 km/h 487 
160-200 km/h 215 
140-160 km/h 4.725 
100-140 km/h 3.601 
< 100 km/h 3.063 
 TOTAL   13.338 
Note: Km of railway line. 
Source: ADIF 2008, p.25 
As regards the level of congestion present in the network, it is generally low (occupancy 
below 80% of the predefined train slots) with the exception of some single track links 
and some links closed to the main urban areas (Fig. 63). 
Fig. 63: Saturation levels in the Spanish railway network. 2006 
 
Note: Green – occupancy below 50% of the predefined train slots; Yellow – occupancy between 50% and 
80% of the predefined train slots; Red – occupancy above 80% of the predefined train slots. 
Source: ADIF, 2006c, p.16 
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6.3.5 Railway infrastructure market 
The Spanish transport market is dominated by road in both passenger and freight 
markets. According to the EC (2006a, pp.19-32), in year 2005 the railway mode carried 
4,6% of the total ton-km transported by land in Spain, while road reached the 92%. In 
year 2004, rail carried as well the 4,7% of the total pax-km transported by land, with 
road transporting the 94%. This weak share of rail is expected to increase as the new 
high speed network enters into service and the operation segment is opened to 
competition. 
The railway market is still in a transition phase towards the new model and, though in 
evolution towards greater competition in the operation market, the great majority of the 
transport activity is still performed by the public operator RENFE-Operadora. A 
consequence of this situation is that today, the railway infrastructure market may be 
described as a combination of a monopoly (with a single provider of infrastructure 
services – ADIF) and a monopsony (with a single consumer of infrastructure services – 
RENFE-Operadora). 
The next sections provide further insight on the structure of the Spanish railway 
infrastructure market as regards the type of separation, the type of ownership and the 
type and degree of competition. 
6.3.5.1 Type of separation 
Since the first of January 2005, Spain has enforced separation between infrastructure 
management and transport operation activities. The model adopted has been the one of 
institutional separation, through the creation of two independent companies: ADIF and 
RENFE-Operadora (Fig. 64). 
Fig. 64: Vertical separation in the Spanish railway sector 
 
Source: Campos, 2005, p.16 
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6.3.5.2 Type of ownership 
Prior to the restructuring of the sector, the REFIG was entitled to the integrated railway 
companies RENFE and FEVE and to the high speed infrastructure manager GIF. When 
the reform entered into force, the railway lines managed at that moment by RENFE 
ceased to come under its jurisdiction and reverted to the State, except for the high speed 
railway line Madrid-Seville, which became property of ADIF. Additionally, ADIF 
received all the assets belonging to GIF, the patrimonial property65 belonging to RENFE 
(except the assets required for the railway transport operation business) and all the 
stations, terminals and other fixed assets permanently required for the rendering of 
infrastructure services. With independence of its ownership, the entire rail network 
entitled to the State and being managed by RENFE at the enforcement of the Railway 
Law 39/2003 was entrusted to ADIF on December 31st 2004, with the only exemption 
of the rail links Lleida-La Pobla de Segur and Quart de Poblet-Ribarroja66. 
Table 21: Ownership structure of the General Interest Railway Network 
 State ADIF TOTAL 
 
Single 
track 
Double 
track Total 
Double 
track 
Single 
track 
Double 
track Total 
Electrified 3.611 2.903 6.514 1.010 3.611 3.913 7.524 
Non electrified 5.236 30 5.266  --   5.236 30 5.266 
 TOTAL   8.847 2.933 11.780 1.010 8.847 3.943 12.790 
Note: Km of railway line, year 2005, excluding narrow gauge lines entitled to FEVE 
Source: Public Works Ministry ( www.fomento.es; 2008-04-30) 
The ownership of the railway infrastructure constructed after the enforcement of the 
railway reform is allocated to the State or to ADIF on a case-by-case basis depending on 
financial criteria (see 6.3.2). Until now, all the new links constructed or under 
construction have been entitled to ADIF and only the high performance link Ourense-
                                                
65 The Law on Public Administration Property (Ley 33/2003) makes a clear distinction between 
patrimonial property and public domain property, the latter being those assets devoted to the public use or 
recognized as such by law. The Regulation of the Railway Sector (Real Decreto 2387/2004) defines as 
public domain railway property those assets within the public domain zone established in art. 13 of the 
Railway Law 39/2003 and defines as patrimonial assets of the infrastructure manager the stations, 
terminals and other fixed assets excluded from the concept of “line” with the exception of those entirely 
built within the public domain zone or those built in the future with State or third parties resources. The 
concept of line is defined in the Annex of the Railway Law 39/2003 as the railway infrastructure 
connecting two points integrated by platform, superstructure, civil engineering works (as bridges, tunnels 
and overpasses) and signalling, safety, lightening and track telecommunication equipments. 
66 Both lines were excluded from the General Interest Rail Network and transferred to regional 
administrations (Ministerio de Fomento, 2004 and Ministerio de Fomento, 2005c). 
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Santiago has been entitled to the State. The ownership structure of the General Interest 
Railway Network resulting from the reform is indicated in Table 21. 
 
6.3.5.3 Type and degree of competition 
The railway model adopted in Spain foresees on track competition for rail freight 
services.  New operators have been entering slowly in the Spanish market and, as of 
May 2008, ten railway undertaking licenses have been delivered for the production of 
railway freight services in Spain (Table 22). One more operator, Euro Cargo Rail, 
belonging to the EWS Group and previously licensed in France, has been included in the 
Special Railway Registry (Vía Libre, 2008-01-24). In addition to these companies, four 
more entities are in possession of certificates for the request of capacity (Transfesa, 
Logística y Transporte Ferroviario, Container Train and Conterail). 
Table 22: Railway undertakings licensed in Spain 
Company Date of awarding 
RENFE-Operadora 27/09/2005 
COMSA Rail Transport SA 27/09/2005 
Continental Rail S.A. 21/10/2005 
Press Cargo Tren S.A.  16/03/2006 
Acciona Rail Services SA  13/06/2006 
Activa Rail SA 04/07/2006 
Traccion Rail SA 24/07/2006 
Eusko Trenbideak - Ferrocarriles Vascos SA 24/08/2006 
Arcelor Mittal Siderail 21/12/2007 
Logitren Ferroviaria SA 30/04/2008 
Source: own elaboration with data from (ADIF, 2007c), (Vía Libre, 2008-05-28) and DGTREN 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/market/licence_en.htm;2008-05-06) 
Most of the new entrants are subsidiaries of the main Spanish construction groups. This 
is the case of Acciona, COMSA, ACS, Azvi and Torrescamara. 
• Acciona Rail Services started the operation of rail freight transport at the 
beginning of year 2007, with a regular service transporting coal from the port of 
Gijón to the power station of Unión Fenosa at la Robla (León). Since December 
2007 the company also operates a daily service between the Port of Algeciras 
and Barcelona in collaboration with RENFE-Operadora (www.acciona-
railservices.com; 2008-05-06). 
• COMSA Rail Transport provides handling services in railway terminals and 
transport of construction materials for railway works. In January 2008 it has 
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started the operation of rail services from the automobile factory of SEAT in 
Martorell to the port of Barcelona (COMSA, 2008). 
• Continental Rail (property of ACS) started its activity transporting construction 
materials to the building sites of the new high speed lines. RENFE-Operadora 
and Continental founded a joint venture named Construrail67, which in February 
2007 started regular services connecting Madrid and the Port of Valencia 
(http://www.continentalrail.es; 2008-05-06;  http://www.constru-rail.es; 2008-
05-06). 
• Traction Rail (owned by Azvi) is currently testing a rail service between the rail 
freight terminal of Huelva and the biodiesel production plant located in 
Valdetorres (Vía Libre, 2008-06-08). 
• Logitren Ferroviaria (Torrescamara group) has been recently licensed and expects 
to start operation by the end of 2008 (Vía Libre, 2008-05-28). 
Other two licenses have been awarded to entities already present in the railway market. 
This has been the case for EUSKOTREN, the public regional railway operator of the 
Basque Country or Activa Rail, owned by the logistic operator Transfesa, in turn owned 
by Deutsche Bahn, RENFE-Operadora and SNCF68. 
Finally, a license has been awarded to Arcelor Mittal Siderail. The iron and steel 
company will operate trains between its factories in Gijón and Avilés and the port of 
Gijón (Fernández et al. 2006). It is the only new entrant which has declared a “level 2” 69 
traffic activity (Líneas, December 2007). Two more companies have already requested 
the operating license: Corporación General de Transportes and Ferrocarriles del Suroeste 
(En Punto, February 2008). 
The declared objectives of the new entrants are, in words of their association AEFP, the 
cooperation with the current agents of the sector, the increase of the market share of 
railways and the diversion of traffics from other transport modes (http://www.aefp.es 
2008-06-10). It strikes to the eye the soft position with respect to the incumbent, as 
none of these objectives suggests an active competition for the market of RENFE-
                                                
67 Participated by Continental Rail (51%) and RENFE-Operadora (49%). 
68 DB acquired the 60% of Transfesa in year 2007 with the approval of the EU competition authorities. 
RENFE-Operadora has entered into negotiations with DB in order to increase its share in Transfesa (now 
20%) and define collaboration strategies (Ruiz del Árbol, 2007; Deutsche Bahn AG, 2008d). 
69 Art. 61 of the Regulation of the Railway Sector defines three types of services (hauling, passenger 
transport and freight transport) and three traffic levels: level 1 (less than 1 million transport units – km), 
level 2 (between 1 and 10 million transport units – km) and level 3 (more than 10 million transport units – 
km). 
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Operadora. This first impression is apparently confirmed by the large number of 
agreements between the incumbent and the new entrants. RENFE-Operadora holds 
shares in Transfesa (also owner of Activa Rail) and Construrail and has reached 
agreements with Acciona Rail and with COMSA Rail70. It is still to be seen whether the 
activity of Deutsche Bahn, through its new subsidiaries Transfesa, Activa Rail and 
EWS, will follow this trend or will bring direct competition to the freight unit of 
RENFE-Operadora.  
It is still too early to evaluate the economic relevance of the new entrants in the market, 
both in terms of share and growth, but apparently it is progressing slowly and receiving 
critizisms with respect to the barriers still present in the access to the market. The new 
entrants complain about the requirements from RENFE-Operadora to hire some of its 
former employees under the same working conditions they had, the sale of rolling stock 
to foreign companies in order to avoid their availability for them or the reduced learning 
facilities for train drivers (El Confidencial Digital, 2008-06-03). 
 
6.3.6 Railway infrastructure market regulation 
The Public Works Ministry is in charge of the overall organization and regulation of the 
Spanish railway sector. This activity has been performed through the definition of the 
legal basis of the sector, the signature of framework agreements with the public business 
entities ADIF and RENFE-Operadora, the setting of a specific regulatory body for 
railways and the control of access to the operation market. ADIF is involved as well in 
the regulation of access to the network, through the delivery of safety certificates to the 
operators and the allocation of capacity to them. 
6.3.6.1 Legal basis and framework contracts 
The Public Works Ministry is responsible for the development of the railway’s sector 
legal framework, which has been done through the Railway Sector Regulation (Real 
Decreto 2387/2004), the Statutes of ADIF and RENFE-Operadora (Real Decreto 
2395/2004 and Real Decreto 2396/2004) and other relevant norms concerning the 
separation and coordination of railway activities (Orden FOM/2909/2006 and Orden 
FOM/32/2005), the safety certification (Real Decreto 810/2007), the capacity allocation 
process (Orden FOM/879/2005) and the setting of track access charges (Orden 
FOM/898/2005 and Orden FOM/3852/2007). 
                                                
70 RENFE-Operadora signed an agreement with FGC and COMSA Rail for the future operation of 
services between the factories of SEAT in Martorell and Zona Franca (Europa Press, 2008-06-05). 
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The Railway Sector Regulation defines the railway infrastructure, the additional, 
complementary and ancillary infrastructure services, the railway transport services, the 
inspection services, the Special Railway Registry (Registro Especial Ferroviario) and 
the Railway Regulation Committee (Comité de Regulación Ferroviaria). The Statutes of 
ADIF and RENFE-Operadora define the juridical form, the functions and the general 
organization of each entity, as well as a framework for their staff, property and financial 
resources.  
Additionally, the Public Works Ministry and the Ministry of Economy and Finance are 
jointly responsible for the definition of the Program-Contracts driving the relationship 
between the public business entities ADIF and RENFE-Operadora and the State 
(Contrato-Programa Administración General del Estado – ADIF 2007-2010 and 
Contrato-Programa entre la Administración General del Estado y la entidad pública 
empresarial RENFE–Operadora 2006–2010). These contracts define the objectives, 
quality of service and financial targets to be achieved by the public business entities in 
exchange of a financial contribution from the State. They both have duration of 4-5 years 
and include provisions for the follow-up and renovation. 
From the perspective of the State, the Program-Contracts are key elements for the 
successful implementation of the new model and the promotion of rail transport, as they 
are seen as a very efficient way to drive the policies of public railway entities. In line 
with this concept, the Public Works Ministry points out that it is of great importance to 
define a stable framework for the relation between the administration and the railway 
public operator leading to the adaptation of RENFE-Operadora to the new context and 
to a dynamic change in railway services. This framework is to be established within a 
Program-Contract including aspects such as significant improvements to service quality, 
linked to the multiple actions proposed in rail infrastructure or the definition of service 
standards and services of general interest (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, p.103). 
 
6.3.6.2 Railway regulatory body 
The Spanish Government has created a regulatory body within the Public Works 
Ministry, the Railway Regulation Committee (CRF). 
The Committee is composed of a chairman, a secretary and four members, appointed 
from the civil servants of the Public Works Ministry. Their activity is regulated through 
the provisions of Decree 2387/2004. The members of the Committee were appointed in 
March 2005 and the constitution meeting was held on June 9, 2005 (www.fomento.es; 
2008-05-26). The initial set-up of the Railway Regulation Committee foresaw the total 
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integration of this body within the Public Works Ministry and its dependency from the 
State Secretariat for Infrastructures and Planning (Fig. 65). 
This layout already received the criticism from the Advisory Bodies in the occasion of 
the discussion and approval of the Railway Law. The Social and Economic Council 
pointed out the inconsistency of this regulatory framework with respect to the 
regulatory schemes applied in other economic sectors and the biased composition of the 
Committee, with all its members belonging to the Public Works Ministry (CES, 2003, 
pp.15-16). On the other side, the Council of State highlighted that the Railway 
Committee was conceived as an administrative body with no independence, which could 
lead to malfunctions in its regulatory activity (Consejo de Estado, 2003). 
Fig. 65: Position of the Railway Regulation Committee with respect to the Spanish Administration 
 
 Source: Ministerio de Fomento, 2005b 
These advices were not taken into account in the text of the Railway Law, but they were 
considered two years later, when the Government mandated the Public Works Ministry 
to draft a law modifying the Railway Law in order to set up an independent Railway 
Regulation Committee (Resolución de 1 de abril de 2005). As a response to this 
mandate, the Public Works Ministry argued that the Railway Regulation Committee had 
been already created and that the limited dimensions of the railway market in Spain 
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made advisable to place the Committee within the structure of the Public Works 
Ministry71. In accordance to this rationale, the Ministry drafted a decree instead of a 
law, which also received a negative advice from the Council of State72 (Consejo de 
Estado, 2006). Up to now (May 2008), the Government has not enacted any decree or 
law with effects on the situation of the Railway Regulation Committee. There is no 
evidence either of any resolution or decision published from the Committee. 
6.3.6.3 Access regulation 
In order to operate in the rail transport market, the new entrants have to be in 
possession of a railway undertaking license awarded by the Public Works Ministry and 
a security certificate awarded by ADIF (Railway Law, art.44). 
The railway undertaking license is unique for the whole REFIG, and certifies that the 
applicant has the legal form, professional capacity and financial capacity required for the 
operation of transport services, as well as an appropriate insurance coverage. The 
consecution of the railway undertaking license implies a declaration of activity in terms 
of type of railway service and traffic volumes. Once awarded with a railway undertaking 
license, the transport operating companies are registered in the Special Railway 
Registry. The inscription in the Special Railway Registry is also granted to operators 
licensed in any other EU Member State. 
The safety certificate is awarded to railway undertakings on the bundle of services and 
railway routes on which they intend to perform their activity, and it is a precondition 
for the request of capacity to the infrastructure manager. 
Additionally, Art. 31 of the Railway Law 39/2003 foresees the possibility of giving 
access to the network to entities other than railway undertakings. This is the case for 
transport agents, shippers and operators of combined transport that, although do not 
have the consideration of railway undertakings, are interested in the production of 
railway services. These applicants are however requested to provide a certificate in 
order to ask for the allocation of capacity. 
                                                
71 The Ministry supported this statement on the three following points: 1) that the railway market has only 
been opened to freight operators, 2) that there is only a reduced number of railway undertakings and 3) 
that railway only holds a market share lower than 4% (Informe de la Secretaría General Técnica del 
Ministerio de Fomento, de 29 de junio de 2006). 
72 The Decree would allow the modification of the Railway Regulation (Real Decreto 2387/2004), but it 
would keep untouched the contents of Art. 82 of the Railway Law 39/2003, which states the dependency 
of the Railway Regulation Committee from the Public Works Ministry. On this basis, the Council of State 
retained that the proposed draft did not comply the specifications of the mandate from the Government 
(Consejo de Estado, 2006). 
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6.3.6.4 Capacity allocation 
ADIF is responsible for the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity in the terms set 
in the Railway Law 39/2003 and the Ministerial Order 897/2005. This activity is 
performed within the Traffic area of the infrastructure manager. 
The allocation of capacity to a railway operator grants the use of a specific time band so 
that it can run a train between two points during a specified time period. The allocation 
of capacity implies the access to all the infrastructure required, including junctions and 
crossovers, as well as receiving the train operating control service, including signaling 
(Art.6, Ministerial Order 897/2005). This definition already states the double nature of 
the capacity allocation process, which includes both a regulatory perspective (i.e. the 
access to the network/market of the different operators) and a technical perspective (i.e. 
the definition of the railway schedule). 
In order to better reflect the capacity needs of different railway operators, ADIF has 
established four types of train-path requests: regular train paths (SERVITREN), 
occasional train-paths (TRENDÍA), special train-paths with application (Immediate 
train-paths) and special train-paths without application73 (ADIF, 2007b, pp.63-64). 
In order to facilitate the whole capacity allocation process, ADIF provides to the 
railway operators the Capacity Manual containing a general estimation of the train paths 
available in every link. First the network is segmented according to homogeneous traffic 
characteristic and the timetable is divided in eight periods of three hours from 0h to 24h. 
Second, three types of service are defined: passenger - long distance services, passenger - 
short and medium distance services and freight services. Lastly, the Capacity Manual 
provides a number of train paths for every type of service in each link and in every 
period74 (ADIF, 2006c, pp.3-9). 
ADIF manages the capacity requests with the aid of several technical models that 
integrate the technical capacity of the line and its level of saturation, the possibility of 
defining an operating plan according to traffic and the frequency of existing or potential 
traffic. The capacity allocation process, leading to the working timetable, has four main 
steps (Fig. 66): 
                                                
73 Regular train-paths refer to those requests with a relevant operating frequency (40 days in the 
Timetable period), while the occasional train-paths refer to requests with low frequency and that are 
usually communicated with a short notice (up to 24 hours before the requested departure). Special train-
paths refer to requests resulting from exceptional and justified circumstances (ADIF, 2007b, pp.63-64). 
74 Additionally, the Capacity Manual provides the distribution of real circulations in the link according to 
time (on an hourly basis) and type of service on a representative day. The estimated number of train paths 
and the number of real circulations on the representative day are then used to calculate an overall 
saturation level for every time period (ADIF, 2006c, pp.3-9). 
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Fig. 66: Capacity allocation process. ADIF 
 
Source: (ADIF, 2007b, p.74) 
• Capacity allocation: capacity is first allocated according to the capacity available 
on each line and depending on the traffic types defined in the Capacity Manual. 
If some requests for a specific traffic type cannot be satisfied within the pre-
allocated capacity, then they will be allocated within the residual capacity of 
other traffic types (if it is technically feasible). If several requests are still 
competing for the same slot, then ADIF will apply priority rules75 or/and 
propose a rerouting of the train in those cases were feasible alternatives exist. 
• Technical adjustment on mesh: once the requests have obtained capacity, the 
infrastructure manager coordinates the requests at network level relying on 
technical criteria. This process may alter the schedules proposed by applicants 
due to technical or network compatibility reasons. Some services on specialized 
lines, regular services and long distance services may receive preference in this 
                                                
75 Priority rules are defined in the Art. 11 of Ministerial Order 897/2005. The priority order is there 
established as follows: 1) Priorities established by the Public Works Ministry for every type of service 
and line; 2) Service types that take priority on specialised lines; 3) Services declared as public interest; 4) 
Train paths allocated and actually used during the period of the previous Working Timetable; 4) 
International services; 5) Those requests subject to an existing agreement; 6) The greatest frequency for 
which a train path is requested in a Working Timetable; 7) System efficiency. 
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adjustment. At the end of this phase, a preliminary allocation of capacity is 
issued. 
• Coordination phase: the infrastructure manager communicates the preliminary 
allocation to the applicants, who may accept or reject it, provide suitable 
comments and enter into negotiations with the infrastructure manager. At the end 
of this process a working timetable project is issued. 
• Argument phase: the applicants have a 15 day period to present their arguments. 
 
6.3.7 Price regulation 
The Spanish Government has adopted an approach to pricing of railway infrastructure 
based on direct regulation. According to the Railway Law, the definition of rail 
infrastructure charges is the responsibility of the Public Works Ministry, as they are 
public prices that can only be modified through a legislative procedure76. However, it is 
the responsibility of the infrastructure manager to levy them on the railway 
infrastructure under its administration (Railway Law 39/2003, Art. 73). 
Article 76 of the Railway Law mandates that incomes from track access charges are to 
be allocated to the railway infrastructure manager, and that they will have to be taken 
into account when defining additional contributions from the State to the infrastructure 
manager within the framework of yearly agreements or Program-Contracts. The incomes 
arising from these charges belong to the infrastructure manager, and they will be 
deducted when calculating the financial support from the State in any agreement or 
Program-Contract (Art. 74). 
Finally, article 77 states that the levels of track access charges and charges for the use of 
stations and other railway facilities will be set by the State through a Ministerial Order, 
that will have to be backed by a financial report justifying the proposed amount. 
As specified in the Economic Report joined to the draft of the Railway Law 39/2003 
(Ministerio de Fomento, 2002), the setting of track access charges must be performed in 
such a way as to ensure the accomplishment of the accounting criteria set by the ESA-
95 by both public entities ADIF and RENFE-Operadora (see section 6.3.2). 
Additionally, charges should be set at a level able to ensure the profitability of the  
                                                
76 Public prices refer to the charges for the minimum access package and the access to stations and other 
installations. Charges for additional, complementary and ancillary services are private prices defined by 
ADIF. In Spanish legislation, charges within the first category are referred to as “cánones”, while the 
charges belonging to the second group are referred to as “tarifas”. 
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operation business. The first condition will be referred to as accounting criterion and the 
second one as profitability criterion. 
The overall system that has been adopted for the definition of railway infrastructure 
charges in Spain can be synthesized as in Fig. 67. First, the process takes into account 
the expected demand as well as the future operation and investment activity of RENFE-
Operadora to define the evolution of the financial conditions of the entity and its ability 
to pay. Track access charges are then defined in relation to the ability to pay of the 
operator. 
Fig. 67: Conceptual scheme of track access charges definition in the Spanish railway network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration, based on Ministerio de Fomento (2002) and INECO et al (1998) 
The level of track access charges defined in such a way is then analyzed from the 
perspective of the infrastructure manager ADIF, which must comply the 50% 
accounting criterion. The Public Works Ministry disposes of several leverages to 
equilibrate the whole system, particularly through the infrastructure ownership model 
(allocating the capital costs to the State or to ADIF) adopted and the financial support 
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to the operation and infrastructure management activities through the signature of 
contract programs. 
Within this adjustment, the accounting and profitability criteria act in opposite 
directions. In fact, the profitability criterion provides a superior limit to the level of 
charges (as profitability depends on the financial resources left after the payment of 
track access charges), while the accounting criterion represents an inferior limit to the 
level of charges (as charges contribute to the commercial incomes of the infrastructure 
manager that have to be maintained above the 50% limit). 
 
6.3.8 Pricing principles 
Although the payment of compensations for the use of the railway infrastructure had 
been previously treated in Spanish legislation77, the definition of a charging regime 
applicable in the whole railway network was first included in the Railway Law 39/2003, 
which specifies the principles and the structure of the charges, as well as the criteria to 
be adopted in their quantification. 
In its article 73, the Railway Law states the principles driving the setting of track access 
charges in the following terms: “Track access charges will be defined according to 
general principles of economic feasibility and efficient operation of infrastructure, market 
conditions and financial equilibrium in the rendering of services, as well as according to 
equal treatment, transparency and no discrimination”. Compensations for the unpaid 
environmental, accident or infrastructure costs incurred by the competing transport 
modes and considerations reflecting congestion, introduction of new railway services or 
incentives for under-utilized lines are also admitted. 
In its article 74, the Law defines the cost relatedness of the different components 
included in the charge (see section 6.3.9). Apparently, the operation charge should 
reflect variable infrastructure management costs, the reservation charge fixed 
infrastructure management costs and the traffic charge would be a mark-up oriented to 
recover part of capital costs. 
Somehow, the proposed system would be able to charge a proxy to short run marginal 
costs (through the operation charge) and increase the recovery rate through a reservation 
                                                
77 The economic compensation for the use of railway infrastructure first appeared in the State General 
Budget Accompaniment Law 53/2002 (Ley 53/2002 de Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas y del Orden 
Social), defining the charges to be paid to the former high speed infrastructure manager GIF. The levels 
of the charges were defined in the Ministerial Order 1587/2003 (Orden FOM/1587/2003,por la que se 
fijan las cuantías para la aplicación de los cánones ferroviarios establecidos en los artículos 23 y 24 de 
la Ley 53/2002). 
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charge applied to all services and a traffic charge only applied to high speed services 
according to their potential ability to generate incomes (measured in seat-km, which 
suggests a kind of Ramsey pricing).  
However, no references other than the present writing of the Railway Law are available 
to support the application of a marginal cost approach to charging. Moreover, the 
influence of the price regulation mechanism presented in the previous section (based on 
the demand side) could even be contradictory with a pricing principle based on the cost 
side of the price setting problem. 
 
6.3.9 Charging structure 
Article 74 of the Railway Law defines the structure and quantification criteria for the 
track access charges in the REFIG. The compensation due to the infrastructure manager 
for accessing the network comprises four different types of charges: 
• Access charge (α) for the general use of the network. It is levied once in every 
timetable period and it should be differentiated according to the activity 
declaration of the railway operators and the links of the network in which they 
develop their activity78. It should recover costs related to administrative 
management procedures associated to the infrastructure manager’s relation with 
the railway operators (e.g. staff and equipment for general administration, 
publication of the network statement, elaboration of operation plans, capacity 
allocation and supervision of running trains). 
• Reservation charge (β) for the availability of the requested train path. It is levied 
proportionally to the length of the reserved train path and it should be 
differentiated according to the type of infrastructure, the type of service, the 
type of train and the time period. It should reflect fixed maintenance, operation 
and rail infrastructure management costs. 
• Operation charge (γ). It is levied on the basis of the network length effectively 
used by the railway undertaking and it should be differentiated according to the 
type of infrastructure and the type of service. It should recover the variable 
maintenance, operation and management costs of rail infrastructure. 
                                                
78 Both informations have to be provided in the licensing process of railway undertakings, which 
differentiates activity according to the type of service (freight/passenger). Additionally, the homologation 
procedure for the request of capacity takes into account the volume of traffic (Art.81, Real Decreto 
2387/2004, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento del Sector Ferroviario). 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 222 
• Traffic Charge (δ). It is levied taking into account the economic value of the 
railway service, measured in terms of capacity offered (e.g. seats-km, ton-km, 
TEU-km). It should be differentiated according to the type of infrastructure and 
the time period. It should reflect the financial costs related to depreciation of 
fixed assets and, when appropriate, the costs required for a reasonable 
development of railway infrastructure. 
The charging scheme levied by ADIF, has been synthesised through expression [1]:  
! 
C =
" T( )
T
+ # P,L,S( ) + $(L,S) + %(P,L,S) &
seats
train
       [1] 
 
Where: 
C track access charge (per train-km) 
T traffic volume (train-km in one year) 
P time period 
L type of line 
S type of service 
 
The values of the main variables intervening in the Spanish charging scheme are defined 
according to bands: 
• Traffic volume (T): N1 if it is less than 1 million train-km/year; N2 if it is 
between 1 and 5 million train-km/year; N3 if it is between 5 and 10 million train-
km/year; N4 when it is between 10 and 15 million train-km/year; and N5 if it is 
greater than 15 million train-km/year. 
• Time period (P): Peak from 7:00 to 9:29 and from 18:00 to 20:29; Normal from 
9:30 to 17:59 and from 20:30 to 23:59; and Valley from 00:00 to 06:59. 
• Type of line (L): A1 for the high speed lines Madrid-Barcelona, Córdoba-Málaga 
and Madrid-Valladolid; A2 for the high speed lines Madrid-Sevilla, La Sagra-
Toledo and Zaragoza-Huesca; B for the Mediterranean Corridor; and C for the 
rest of lines. 
• Type of service (S): V1 for passenger services traveling at a maximum speed 
greater than 260 km/h; V2 for passenger services traveling at a maximum speed 
lower than 260 km/h; M for freight services; P for test services. 
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6.3.10 Charging levels 
Since the enforcement of the Railway Law in year 2005, the Public Works Ministry has 
defined twice the level of track access charges and charges for the use of station and 
other railway facilities, through Ministerial Order 898/2005 and Ministerial Order 
3852/2007. The latter established the values indicated in Table 23 for the coefficients 
appearing in expression [1]. 
Table 23: Coefficients and charges set by the Public Works Ministry in 2007. 
α (Access charge) 62.424-1.466.964 € / year 
β (Reservation charge) 0,05-3,54 € / train path-km 
γ (Operation charge) 0,06-2,08 € / train path-km 
δ (Traffic charge) 0-0,0131 € / seat-km 
Source: own elaboration from Ministerio de Fomento (2007h) 
To assess the relative relevance of the charging components included in the Spanish 
charging scheme, an estimation has been performed for the reservation, operation and 
traffic charges (Table 24). These figures should be completed with the access charge 
associated to the overall traffic volume carried by the operator. In the case of RENFE-
Operadora, the value of the access charge has been estimated at around 0,01 €/train-km. 
Table 24: Unitary track access charges under the current Spanish charging scheme. 
  Type of service 
Time band Type of line V1 V2 M P 
Peak A1 10,21 7,56  0,88 
 A2 9,76 7,14  0,79 
 B1 3,54 0,58 0,38 0,06 
 C1  0,26 0,38  
Normal A1 6,88 4,40  0,88 
 A2 6,51 4,11  0,79 
 B1 0,82 0,26 0,11 0,06 
 C1  0,26 0,11  
Valley A1 2,87 1,51  0,88 
 A2 2,70 1,39  0,79 
 B1 0,62 0,16 0,11 0,06 
 C1  0,16 0,11  
Note: Figures in €/train-km, includes reservation, operation and traffic charges. Traffic charge 
calculated on the hypothesis of 350 seats/train. Time period, type of line and type of service as specified 
in section 6.3.9. 
Source: own calculations from ADIF 2008, pp.104-114. 
It is also possible to analyze the results of these estimations on the basis of the services 
provided by the operator, which are necessarily a combination of the infrastructure-
related variable and the service-related variable. It is possible to classify them as high 
speed services (service V1 running on infrastructure A1 or A2), Euromed services 
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(service V1 running on infrastructure B), high speed regional services (service V2 running 
on infrastructure A1 or A2), conventional passenger services (service V2 running on 
infrastructure C or B) and freight services (service M running on infrastructure C or B). 
According to this segmentation, the relative levels of the railway infrastructure charge 
can be presented as in Table 25. 
Table 25: Relative level of charges for different services under the current Spanish charging 
scheme. 
 Time period 
Service Peak Normal Valley 
AVE 38,4 26,0 11,0 
Euromed 13,6 3,2 2,4 
HS regional 28,2 16,4 5,8 
Conventional passenger 1,0 1,0 0,6 
Conventional passenger 
(Mediterranean corridor) 2,2 1,0 0,6 
Freight 1,5 0,4 0,4 
Note: Figures expressed as a relative index with respect to the conventional passenger service running on 
the time band Normal. Includes reservation, operation and traffic charges. Traffic charge calculated on 
the hypothesis of 350 seats/train. Time band as specified in section 6.3.9.  
Source: own calculations from ADIF 2008, pp.104-114 
It is interesting to notice that the time-band related incentives embedded in the Spanish 
charging scheme vary with the service provided by the operator. Particularly, they 
provide stronger signals for those services running on the Mediterranean corridor, either 
Euromed or conventional services, and for freight trains running on the conventional 
network. In this cases, the price of the train-km in the peak hour goes up respectively to 
4,25 times, 2,2 times and 3,75 times its price of the normal hour. 
 
6.3.11 Transport operation conditions 
RENFE-Operadora performs its activity in two markets clearly differentiated in terms 
of technical, operational and economic characteristics: passenger and freight rail 
transport. The first can be considered the core activity of the entity, as in year 2005 
accounted for 79% of the traffic volume and 78% of the traffic incomes. The freight 
market had a secondary relevance, contributing with the complementary part of volume 
and income (i.e. 21% and 22% respectively). This situation is depicted in Fig. 68, which 
additionally details the contribution of the basic segments of the passenger transport 
market.  
In year 2005, RENFE-Operadora transported a total traffic volume of 19.809 million 
passenger-km. The main contribution to this figure came from the segment of suburban 
services (42,5%), followed by the long distance services (31,9%), the regional services 
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(13,9%) and, lastly, the segment of high speed services, which represented the 11,7% of 
the activity in the passenger transport market. 
Fig. 68: Transport activity performed per type of service. RENFE-Operadora. 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Traffic volume shares have been established on the basis of train-km. 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, pp.36-71)  
The suburban segment is characterized by the high number of passengers transported 
over short distances (around 20 km on average) in urban and metropolitan areas. The 
demand in this segment presents strong peaks associated to commuting, which has 
resulted in a generally oversized provision of seats-km leading to low occupancies. In 
2005 the suburban services unit of RENFE-Operadora carried more than 90% of the 
total volume of passengers, running an average of 3.692 daily circulations over a network 
length lower than 2.000 km (RENFE-Cercanías, 2006, p.9). 
The regional segment transports passengers over medium distances (around 100 km on 
average), generally in larger metropolitan areas or polycentric urban systems. As in the 
previous case, variations in demand produce low occupancy ratios. The activity of this 
segment is strongly dependent on the geographical specificities of each region. In year 
2005, the 65% of the traffic incomes generated by the regional services unit of RENFE-
Operadora was generated in only three regions: Catalonia, Andalucía and Castilla y León 
(RENFE-Operadora, 2006, p.47). 
The long distance segment is characterized by a relatively low number of passengers 
being transported over long distances (around 500 km on average) on the conventional 
network. Its origins and destinations are located along main national corridors and some 
international relations79. The demand here is less fluctuating than in previous segments, 
allowing for greater occupancies. Part of the services being performed in this segment 
will be progressively substituted by their high speed counterparts. 
                                                
79 RENFE-Operadora provides international services in cooperation with CP and SNCF. 
25%
8%
17%
28%
22% Suburban
Regional
High speed
Long distance
Freight
32%
19%
7%
21%
21% Suburban
Regional
High speed
Long distance
Freight
Traffic volume Traffic income 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 226 
Table 26: Main operational parameters per type of passenger service. RENFE-Operadora. 2005 
OPERATIONAL 
INDICATORS 
(YEAR 2005) 
Suburban Regional High speed 
Long 
distance 
TOTAL 
Passengers (million) 458 28 7 13 505 
Passenger-km (million) 8.417 2.745 2.325 6.322 19.809 
Train-km (million) 57 33 12 37 139 
Seats-km (million) 21.770 7.824 3.869 9.810 43.273 
Occupancy (%) 38,7% 35,1% 60,1% 64,4% 45,8% 
Average seats per train  382 239 319 262 310 
Average trip length (km) 18,4 99,5 324,0 502,1 39,2 
Perceived quality index (i)  7,45 6,62 7,70-8,10 (a) 7,20 n/a 
Punctuality index (ii)  98,9 96,6 97,4-99,6 (b) 95,8 n/a 
Note: (i): Defined through surveys to the costumers on a scale 0 (worst) – 10 (best); (ii): Defined as the 
percentage of trains arrived punctual (i.e. with a deviation to schedule below a threshold differently 
defined for every type of service); (a): Range of values including different services: long distance, medium 
distance and Talgo 2000; (b): Range of values including different corridors/services: Madrid-Seville line; 
Madrid-Lleida line and Talgo 2000 services; n/a: Not applicable. 
Source: own elaboration with data from RENFE-Operadora, 2006, pp.36-67 
The high speed segment is rapidly progressing in Spain, as the new links of the high 
performance network are being opened to traffic. They include both long distance and 
medium distance services, with an overall average distance near to 325 km. As in the 
case of the long distance segment, demand is rather stable. In year 2005, the long 
distance high speed services represented the 78,8% of the total incomes generated by the 
high speed services unit of RENFE-Operadora. 
The main operational parameters of the services provided in 2005 by RENFE-
Operadora in each segment are detailed in Table 26. 
Year 2006 saw an increase in the passenger transport activity performed by RENFE-
Operadora, which rose up by 2,28% with respect to the previous year and reached a 
total volume of 20.260 million passenger-km. The volume of activity corresponded in a 
58,2% to the suburban and medium distance services and in a 41,8% to the high speed 
and long distance services.  
The evolution of the operational parameters (Table 27) was positive as well with 
respect to the previous year. The increase in the number of passengers (2,2%) and 
passenger-km (2,28%) was absorbed by a slightly lower increase in the trains-km (0,9%) 
and the number of seat-km offered (2,1%), which lead to a greater number of seats per 
train (1,1%) and to an improvement in the occupancy by 0,19%. The overall evolution 
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of the perceived quality and the punctuality index cannot be exactly defined, but 
apparently the lower bounds of both indicators remained stable. 
Table 27: Main operational parameters per type of passenger service. RENFE-Operadora. 2006 
OPERATIONAL 
INDICATORS 
(YEAR 2006) 
Suburban / Medium 
distance services 
High speed /Long 
distance services 
TOTAL 
Passengers (million) 498 18 516 
Passenger-km (million) 11.792 8.468 20.260 
Train-km (million) 94,3 46,4 140,7 
Seats-km (million) 31.175 12.999 44.174 
Occupancy (%) 37,83% 65,1% 45,9% 
Average seats per train  331 280 314 
Average trip length (km) 23,7 465,3 39,2 
Perceived quality index (i)  6,61 - 7,72 (a) 7,25 n/a 
Punctuality index (ii)  96,3 - 99,7 (a) 95,7 - 99,7 (b) n/a 
Note: (i): Defined through surveys to the costumers on a scale 0 (worst) – 10 (best); (ii):  Defined as the 
percentage of trains arrived punctual (i.e. with a deviation to schedule below a threshold differently 
defined for every type of service); (a): Range of values including different services: suburban, high speed 
medium distance and conventional medium distance; (b): Range of values including different 
corridors/services: Long distance services, Madrid-Seville line; Madrid-Lleida line and Talgo 2000 
services; n/a: Not applicable. 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2007a, pp.34-51)  
The rail freight market segment faces a completely different situation, with a steady 
decline of its market share with respect to other modes and a reduction in most of its 
operational parameters over time. On the top of it, the liberalization provisions have 
entered into force with the allocation of the services rendered in the terminals to the 
infrastructure manager, which increases the planning and operational complexity of the 
services. 
The position of RENFE-Operadora in the freight transport market has reflected the 
declining situation with a reduction of its activity between in years 2005 and 2006. In 
this period the total volume transported evolved from 11.071 million ton-km to 11.012 
million ton-km and the containerized traffic from 340 to 335 million TEU-km. All the 
main operational indicators related to the freight transport activity reflected this 
tendency (Table 28), with reductions in the number of tonnes transported (-2,4%), in 
the ton-km and TEU-km carried (-0,5% and -1,5% respectively) and in the train-km and 
ton-km offered (-1,7% each). 
 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 228 
Table 28: Operational activity in the freight transport market. RENFE-Operadora. 2005 - 2006 
OPERATIONAL 
INDICATORS 2005 2006 
Tons (million) 25,5 24,9 
TEU (million) 0,7 0,7 
Ton-km (million) 11.071 11.012 
TEU-km (million) 340 335 
Train-km (million) 36,1 35,5 
Ton-km offered (million) 28.313 27.825 
Ton km offered / train 785 784 
Average trip length – ton (km)  434 442 
Average trip length – TEU (km) 503 479 
Perceived quality index  5,14 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, pp.68-71), (RENFE-Operadora, 
2007a, pp.52-55) and (RENFE-Operadora,2007b, p.61) 
Part of this decline can be certainly explained by the low value of the perceived quality 
index, which only reached a score of 5,14 over 10 in year 2006. The more critical aspects 
pointed out by the shippers as regards the perceived quality were the delivery time, the 
absence of usual interlocutors and the quality of the general information provided80. 
 
6.3.12 Economic results from transport operation 
The activity of RENFE-Operadora in the passenger transport market summed up traffic 
incomes of 1.145 million € in year 2005, while the activity in the freight transport 
market reported 323 million €. The maintenance of rolling stock unit mainly produced 
services for the transport operation units and additionally gained 8 million € from 
external clients. The operational incomes of the entity also included subsidies to 
suburban and regional transport segments (277 million €), incomes from other activities 
(93 million €) and transfers (248 million €). On the operational expenditures side, the 
main items were staff (635 million €) and external services (977 million €). In relative 
terms, staff expenditures were particularly relevant in the maintenance unit, where 
accounted for 52% of its total expenditures. The external services were predominant in 
the high speed unit, representing 83% of its total expenditures. 
                                                
80 The surveys were conducted on 76 shippers and provided the following scores for the mentioned 
critical aspects: delivery time (4,72); absence of usual interlocutors (5,51) and the quality of the general 
information provided (5,85) (RENFE-Operadora, 2007b, pp. 60-61). 
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Putting aside the subsidies to operation and including depreciation and variations in 
provisions, none of the units of RENFE-Operadora achieved profits in 2005, and it is 
only thanks to the subsidies that suburban and regional trains attained positive figures. 
In relative terms, the more negative result among the units was reached by the freight 
unit, whose loss equalled 18% of its total incomes. The maintenance unit was second, 
with a loss equal to 16% of its incomes and the long distance unit third with a ratio of 
13%. 
Table 29: Unitary incomes, expenditures and profits per market segment. RENFE-Operadora. 2005 
 
Operational incomes 
(€/train-km) 
Operational expenditures 
(€/train-km) 
Operational profit / loss 
(€/train-km) 
Suburban  10,1 (6,9*) 8,0 2,1 (-1,1*) 
Regional  6,8 (4,0*) 6,0 0,9 (-2,0*) 
High speed 21,6 18,9 2,7 
Long distance 11,4 11,4 -0,1 
Freight 9,7 10,4 -0,7 
Note: (*) Excluding subsidies to operation. 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, pp.36-71) 
The analysis of incomes and expenditures on a product unit basis provides further 
insight on the economic performance attained in each market segment (Table 29). The 
high speed services emerged as the ones with greater ability to generate incomes (21,6 
€/train-km) and cover their operational expenditures with traffic incomes. Long distance 
services were rather close to operational equilibrium at 11,5 €/train-km but still 
presented a small operational loss. Freight services produced less than half of the 
unitary incomes of the high speed services (9,7 €/train-km), generating a significant loss 
of 0,7 €/train-km. The unitary loss produced by suburban and regional services was even 
greater, but thanks to subsidization they contributed positively to the operational result. 
Their ability to generate incomes, subsidies excluded, was equal to 6,9 €/train-km and 
4,0 €/train-km. 
Though the structure of operational incomes remained rather similar for all the services, 
relevant differences could be observed as regards the structure of their operational 
expenditures on a unitary basis (Fig. 69). 
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Fig. 69: Detail of unitary incomes and expenditures per market segment. RENFE-Operadora. 2005 
Note: Figures in €/train-km; INC.: Operational Incomes ; EXP. : Operational Expenditures. 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, pp.36-71). 
• Unitary staff expenditures varied between 1,8 €/train-km for high speed services 
and 3,3 €/train-km for freight services.  
• Unitary expenditures in traction energy were significantly lower for regional 
services (0,5 €/train-km) and higher for freight services (1,5 €/train-km). 
Suburban and high speed services expended the same amount in traction energy 
in unitary terms (1,2 €/train-km). 
• Unitary expenditures in charges and services provided by ADIF were 
predominant in high speed services, were accounted for 6,2 €/train-km. In freight 
services they reached 2,2 €/train-km, in long distance services 1,4 €/train-km and 
in suburban and regional services remained around 0,5 €/train-km. 
• Unitary expenditures for other external services were maximum again for high 
speed services (7,9 €/train-km), followed by long distance services (4,6 €/train-
km), suburban services (1,7 €/train-km), freight services (0,8 €/train-km) and 
regional services (0,7 €/train-km). 
• Transfers from the transport service units had as main destination the 
maintenance of rolling stock unit. They accounted for 2,2 €/train-km in freight 
services, 1,7 €/train-km in long distance, 1,5 €/train-km in regional services, 1,3 
€/train-km in suburban services and 0,8 €/train-km in high speed services. 
The unbalance between incomes and expenditures here depicted for most of the services 
is further increased when taking into account depreciation, a particularly relevant item 
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for the high speed (3,0 €/train-km) and suburban transport units (1,6 €/train-km). Long 
distance services faced a depreciation equal to 1,1 €/train-km, freight services bore 0,9 
€/train-km and regional services 0,5 €/train-km. 
The evolution of the economic performance of the service units of RENFE-Operadora 
since year 2005 shows a different behavior. Year 2006 saw an increase in the unitary 
profit of suburban and medium distance services as a result of a greater increase in 
unitary operational incomes and subsidies than in unitary operational expenditures. On 
the other side, the high speed and long distance services reduced their unitary profit by 
10% and the freight services incremented their unitary loss by more than 22%. A 
summary of these trends is offered in Table 30. 
Table 30: Unitary incomes, expenditures and profits per market segment. RENFE-Operadora. 2006 
 
 Operational 
incomes (€/train-
km) 
Operational 
expenditures 
(€/train-km) 
Operational 
profit / loss 
(€/train-km) 
2005 8,9 (5,9*) 7,4 1,5 (-1,1*) 
2006 9,7 (6,2*) 8,2 1,6 (-2,0*) 
Suburban and 
medium distance 
Var. 05/06 +9,0% (5,1%*) +10,7% +1,0% (-81,8%*) 
2005 14,2 13,4 0,7 
2006 15,3 14,6 0,8 
High speed and 
long distance 
Var. 05/06 +8,0% +9,1% -10,2% 
2005 9,9 10,6 -0,7 
2006 9,7 10,6 -0,8 Freight 
Var. 05/06 -1,6% -0,1% -22,3% 
Note: (*) Excluding subsidies to operation 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2007a, pp.36-59) 
From year 2006 to now (June 2008), the progressive implementation of the provisions 
defined in the strategic plan of RENFE-Operadora for the period 2005-2009 has 
attempted to invert the negative tendency observed in the profitability of the different 
market segments. However, the results obtained in 2007 apparently did not represent a 
major change with respect to the 2006 situation, with a 5% increase in operational 
incomes and 4,5% in operational expenditures (RENFE-Operadora, 2008). 
Nevertheless, there is the generalized opinion that the entrance into operation of new 
high speed relations and the restructuring of the commercial offer in other segments will 
certainly contribute to invert the currently observed trend. Some recent facts already 
support this view. In October 2007, José Salgueiro, CEO of RENFE Operadora declared 
an expected increase in incomes of 25% in year 2008 thanks to the operation of the new 
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high speed services to Barcelona, Málaga and Valladolid (EFE, 2007-10-09). Moreover, 
at the end of the first quarter of 2008 RENFE-Operadora announced that the freight 
services unit had reached for the first time a positive operational result (Vía Libre, 2008-
06-05).  
The economic forecasts of the Program-Contract between RENFE-Operadora and the 
State also support this view. More precisely, they foresee a 50% increase in the 
operational incomes between 2006 and 2009. Operational expenditures will present a 
lower growth in the period, with a significant moderation after 2008. The combination of 
both trends is expected to result in increasing operational profits over the period. 
The growth in total incomes will be supported by greater unitary incomes per passenger 
(a yearly growth in the range 4,5%-7% depending on the type of passenger service, 
2,1% for freight) and a strong increase in demand (8,2% in passenger services and 4,1% 
on freight services)81. 
 
6.3.13 Economic and financial relations in the Spanish railway 
sector 
The predominance of financial considerations among the criteria intervening in the 
definition of railway infrastructure charges in the Spanish railway network, makes 
necessary the characterization of the financial relations among the key actors of the 
sector. 
6.3.13.1 Public contributions to the railway sector 
The Public Works Ministry, together with the Ministry of Economy and Finance is in 
charge of the definition of the General State Administration’s financial framework for 
railways, which includes the financing of the central railway administration, the 
infrastructure manager and the financial compensations for public service obligations. 
As regards the principles driving the financial framework, the PEIT underscores the need 
of maintaining an appropriate level of investment in the infrastructure network together 
with an adequate regulation of transport services, including their financial needs. In this 
sense, the Public Works Ministry supports the “user pays” view of the European 
Union as the main economic tool for regulating transport demand and ensuring that 
financial resources required do not become an unaffordable burden for the public budget. 
However the Ministry recognizes that the possible path leading from the current “tax 
                                                
81 Own calculations on the basis of Annex 1 of the Program-Contract between RENFE-Operadora and the 
State.  
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payer pays” to a system in which the user bears all the costs related to transport activity 
will need a long transition time. In fact, the financial framework for rail is still mainly 
based on State budget resources, which are assigned according to the principle of the 
single fund, avoiding any earmarking of taxes (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, pp.169-
170). 
From a practical point of view, the definition of the financial framework for railways 
faces the constraints set on the public budget by the budgetary discipline of the Stability 
and Growth Pact82 and the extensive investment program in the railway network 
planned for the next years. 
On the one side, the Stability and Growth Pact limits the public deficit to less than 3% 
of GDP in the short term and in the medium and long-term seeks the balance or surplus 
of national accounts (European Council, 1997a). This commitment, combined with high 
investment levels, has fostered the adoption of deferred and indirect financial schemes 
for part of the State contribution to the rail sector and the increasing involvement of 
private capital. 
Table 31: Investment programs in rail transport defined in the PEIT 2005-2020  
Program Estimated investment 2005-2020 (million €) 
% on total PEIT 
investment 
Railway transport (excluding urban interventions) 108.760 43,7 
High performance 83.450 33,53 
Maintenance and improvement of conventional network 18.000 7,23 
Level-crossings suppression 3.560 1,43 
Rolling stock 3.750 1,51 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento (2005a) 
On the other side, the development of the investment programs established in the 
strategic plan, and particularly the construction of the high speed rail network, requires 
the intensive allocation of financial resources. A total amount of  € 108.760 million will 
be spent in railway transport over the period 2005-2020 (Table 31). The PEIT foresees 
that the public budget will supply 81,4% of the funds needed, while the remaining 
18,6% will be obtained through off-budget financing (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a, p. 
184). 
Building on these premises, the Spanish Government has defined a financial framework 
which is largely based on the contribution of the State to the execution of the PEIT’s 
investment plan through the funding of various investment agents. The key stakeholders 
                                                
82 The Stability and Growth Pact, adopted by the European Council in 1997, aims to ensure more rigorous 
budgetary discipline through surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies within the euro zone. 
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in this scheme are the General Directorate of Railways (within the Public Works 
Ministry), the infrastructure manager ADIF, the public railway operators FEVE and 
RENFE-Operadora and the State Agency for Land Transport Infrastructure (SEITT). 
In quantitative terms, in year 2007 the financial framework for the rail sector accounted 
for 4.89583 million €, equivalent to 2,60% of the total National Budget and 0,47% of the 
2007 GDP84. The allocation of these financial resources to the key stakeholders is 
depicted in Fig. 70. 
The financial contribution from the 2007 National Budget was delivered through three 
different programs: 
• Program 441M - Subsidies to Land Transport, which included the transfer of 
funds from the Directorate General of Railways to the public entities RENFE-
Operadora (595 million €) and FEVE (87 million €). 
• Program 451N - Management and General Services of the Public Works 
Ministry, which included capital contributions from the State Secretariat for 
Infrastructure and Planning to ADIF (1.204 million €) and SEITT (2.331 million 
€). The SEITT is responsible for investments in roads and railways entitled to 
the State. Regarding railways, part of the investment was performed through 
ADIF within the framework of two agreements between the State Secretariat for 
Infrastructure and Planning, ADIF and SEITT  (921 million €). 
• Program 453A - Railway Transport Infrastructure, which included a capital 
contribution from the Directorate General Railways (DGF) to RENFE-
Operadora (404 million €), a capital transfer from DGF to FEVE (31 million €) 
and direct investment in the network from DGF (1.574 million€), part of which 
done through ADIF (783 million €). Other relevant concepts within this program 
were a capital transfer to the Figueras-Perpignan concession85 (67 million €), a 
capital contribution to railway infrastructure developers (1 million €) and current 
expenditures of DGF (11 million €). 
                                                
83 Own figure, calculated as the addition of different concepts detailed in the National Budget Law for the 
year 2007 and the Program-Contract between the State and ADIF. It does not include the direct 
investments in railway infrastructure managed by the SEITT in year 2007. 
84 In year 2007 the National Budget amounted 188.417 million € (http://www.minhac.es; 2008-05-07). 
According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute, the 2007 GDP represented 1.049.848 million € 
(http://www.ine.es; 2008-05-07). 
85 50 year concession on the high speed rail link Figueras-Perpignan awarded to the consortium TP Ferro 
(ACS, Dragados and Eiffage). The concession contract included construction costs estimated in 952 
million € and public subsidies for 540 million € to be paid by the European Commission, the Spanish 
Government and the French Government (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005d). 
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Fig. 70: National budget allocation to main public stakeholders in the Spanish railway sector. 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures in € million; Colour code: Blue – Capital contribution; Green – Transfer; Orange – 
Capital transfer; Purple – Payment for services rendered; (*) Only part of the capital transfer to the 
SEITT will effectively revert in the railway sector. 
Source: own elaboration based on data from the National Budget Law for the year 2007 (Ley42/2006 de 
Presupuestos Generales del Estado), the Program-Contract between the State and ADIF and the 
Program Contract between the State and RENFE-Operadora. 
A cornerstone of this scheme is represented by the agreements signed between the State 
Secretariat for Infrastructure and Planning, ADIF and SEITT within the framework of 
the Program-Contract between the State and ADIF for the period 2007-2010. The first 
agreement is devoted to the promotion of investments in the railway network entitled to 
the State and foresees a total investment of 2.127 million € (Ministerio de Fomento, 
2007e). The second agreement is dedicated to the construction of the high speed link 
Ourense-Santiago and amounts to 1.715 million € (Ministerio de Fomento, 2007d). 
In addition to the investments done through ADIF, the SEITT performs other 
investments in the railway network through specific agreements with the Public Works 
Ministry. In year 2006 the SEITT awarded railway construction contracts for 182,4 
million €86, while in year 2007 the amount rose to 263,8 million €87. 
The basic structure of the financial framework is expected to be maintained in the 
following years, as it is suggested by the Program-Contracts signed by the State with 
                                                
86 Amounts awarded for the links “Variante ferroviaria de Camarillas” (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006a),  
and Lebrija-El Cuervo and Utrera-Las Cabezas de San Juan in the high speed line Sevilla-Cádiz  
(Ministerio de Fomento, 2006b). 
87 Amounts awarded for the links Villaverde de Medina-Villafranca de Duero, Villafranca de Duero-
Coreses and “Acceso a Zamora” in the high speed line Madrid-Galicia (Ministerio de Fomento, 2007f) 
and the link Las Cabezas de San Juan-Lebrija in the high speed line Sevilla-Cádiz  (Ministerio de 
Fomento, 2007g). 
PUBLIC BUDGET 
Directorate General Railways State Secretariat for Infrastructure 
and Planning 
ADIF RENFE-
Operadora 
SEITT FEVE 
2.770 
1.204 2.331 (*)   404   87    595 31 783 
921 
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ADIF and RENFE-Operadora, the agreements signed between the State Secretariat for 
Infrastructure and Planning, ADIF and SEITT, and the agreements signed between the 
Public Works Ministry and the SEITT88. The stability of this scheme has been 
confirmed as well by the amounts allocated to the different investment agents in the 
2008 National Budget (Ley 51/2007 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado). 
Within this scenario, the financial contributions from the State to the infrastructure 
manager ADIF and the public operator RENFE-Operadora are expected to reach 10.556 
million € in the period 2008-2010. 
 
6.3.13.2 Economic relations between RENFE-Operadora and the State 
The increased opening of the railway markets to competition, with year 2010 as the 
most likely date for the liberalization of passenger services, will be a milestone for the 
relations between the State and the public railway operator RENFE-Operadora. In fact, 
according to the Railway Law 39/2003 and the Decree 2396/2004, the current 
contractual relation between both stakeholders will necessarily change once the market 
opening is enacted. Until then, the relations between the State and the operator are 
regulated through the Program-Contract 2006-2010, conceived as a transitional 
framework towards the open competition scenario89. 
The nature of the Program-Contract is defined in the fourth transitory provision of the 
Railway Law 39/2003 that states that it should define the basic action guidelines, the 
investment levels and the commitments required by RENFE-Operadora to fulfill its 
objectives. In accordance to this provision and in line with the framework stated for the 
national transport policy in the Strategic Infrastructure and Transport Plan (PEIT), in 
January 2007 the State and RENFE-Operadora signed the Program-Contract defining 
their mutual objectives, commitments and obligations for the period 2006-2010. 
The main common objective stated by the signatories for the period is the definition of 
an explicit economic and financial framework for RENFE-Operadora oriented to 
strengthen its competitiveness in view of the liberalization. This objective is specified in 
the fifth clause of the contract, which details the following aims: 
                                                
88 Agreement for the improvement of the suburban rail network in Catalonia (Ministerio de Fomento, 
2007b) and agreement for the construction of a high speed link between Olmedo and Zamora (Ministerio 
de Fomento, 2007c). 
89 According to the fourth transitory provision of Railway Law 39/2003, the Program-Contracts should be 
extinguished once the passenger rail transport market will be opened to competition. 
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• To foster the development of railways through the provision of high quality 
railway services integrated in the national transport policy.  
• To increase the rail market share through the acquisition of new clients, the 
development of new products and the search of new business areas. 
• To develop an integrated management system and to optimize the current 
organizational model with respect to the objectives stated in the PEIT for the 
regeneration of railway transport.    
At the tactical and operational levels the Program-Contract advocates for a more 
business-oriented structure focused on its main markets, the development of specialized 
management and control tools within each area of activity90, the promotion of a greater 
involvement of private initiative in the business and the definition of a strong 
technological focus. 
In line with the abovementioned aims, the Program-Contract establishes the mutual 
commitments between the State and RENFE-Operadora at the economic and financial 
levels. In this regard, the Program-Contract defines the contributions that will be paid to 
RENFE-Operadora by the State, the level of investments, the maximum indebtedness 
allowed to the operator, the adjustment of its human resources and the financial results 
to be obtained in the period. 
The contributions from the State to the operator are mainly provided in the form of 
subsidies for the rendering of unprofitable suburban and medium-range services and 
contributions for the stabilization of its final results and in the form of capital 
contributions (see Table 32).  
The evolution of the amounts suggests a progressive phasing out of the contributions for 
stabilization, which is in line with the competition scenario. As far as the subsidies for 
suburban and medium-range services are concerned, provision nº 2 of decree 2396/2004, 
states that until the opening of the passenger rail transport market arrives, RENFE-
Operadora will be able to perceive subsidies and compensations from the State for the 
rendering of unprofitable passenger railway services. Once the passenger transport 
market will be opened, PSO commitments will be awarded under a competitive regime 
by the Public Works Ministry (Art. 53 of the Railway Law 39/2003). 
 
 
 
                                                
90 The redefinition of the areas of activity within RENFE-Operadora is oriented as well to clarify and 
improve the control of the payments in exchange of public service obligations. 
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Table 32: Expected economic contributions from the State to RENFE-Operadora. 2006-2010 
Item 2006 
(M€) 
2007 
(M€) 
2008 
(M€) 
2009 
(M€) 
2010 
(M€) 
TOTAL 
(M€) 
TRANSFERS 558,1 595,0 584,7 490,9 395,8 2.624,5 
Subsidies for suburban and 
medium range services 
300,5 316,5 343,4 347,5 349,9 1.657,8 
Contributions for stabilization 257,6 278,5 227,0 143,4 45,9 952,4 
Compensations for suburban and 
medium range services in 2007 
0,0 0,0 9,7 0,0 0,0 9,7 
Compensations for the Human 
Resources Plan 
0,0 0,0 4,6 0,0 0,0 4,6 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 404 404 449 479 404 2.140 
TOTAL 962,1 999,0 1.033,7 969,9 799,8 4.764,5 
Note: Figures in million € 
Source: 11th clause of the Program-Contract 2006-2010 between the State and RENFE-Operadora. 
Although it is not possible to know the allocation of the contributions from the State 
between suburban and regional services in the period 2006-2010, the 2005 annual report 
of RENFE-Operadora states that the contributions from the State in that year allocated 
181 million € to suburban services and 68 million € to regional services (RENFE-
Operadora, 2006, p.130). 
RENFE-Operadora has kept as well the agreements for the rendering of transport 
services signed between the former RENFE and the regional administrations. In the 
financial year 2004, RENFE renewed the agreements signed with eight regional 
governments (Extremadura, Catalunya, Galicia, Murcia, País Vasco, La Rioja, Cantabria 
and Navarra) (RENFE, 2005, p.26). In the financial year 2005, RENFE-Operadora 
reported the renewal of agreements for the rendering of transport services in low traffic 
lines in nine different regions (Navarra, Extremadura, La Rioja, País Vasco, Cantabria, 
Galicia, Castilla y León and Aragón) and the modification of the agreement with the 
Catalan Government (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, p.44). Lastly, in the financial year 
2006, RENFE-Operadora renewed the agreements with five regional administrations 
(Navarra, La Rioja, Galicia, Castilla y León, Aragón and Madrid) (RENFE-Operadora, 
2007a, p.37). 
The overall economic relevance of the agreements between RENFE-Operadora and the 
regional administrations is however limited. In year 2005 RENFE-Operadora accounted 
incomes from agreements with regional administrations for 28,3 million € (RENFE-
Operadora, 2006, p.143). One year later, this figure rose up to 32,5 million € (RENFE-
Operadora, 2007a, p. 19). 
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6.3.13.3 Economic relations between ADIF and the State 
The economic and financial relations between ADIF and the State may be differentiated 
according to the main activities of the infrastructure manager: the construction of the 
new high speed links and the management of the network. 
The construction activity is driven by the State, who entrusts the construction of new 
rail links to ADIF through specific administrative resolutions. In turn, ADIF has the 
legal ability to perform the construction activity internally, to contract it out under the 
Law on Public Administration Contracts (Decree 2/2000) or to award it under a 
concession contract (Art. 22, Railway Law 39/2003). When ADIF was created in 2005, 
it inherited the construction commitments belonging to the former high speed 
infrastructure manager GIF91. Later on, these commitments were partially modified and 
enlarged at the beginning of year 2007 by a resolution from the State Secretariat for 
Infrastructure and Planning92. 
The political will to construct a high performance rail network throughout the whole 
country has been internalized by ADIF through its strategic plan for 2006-2010, which 
includes investments in the network summing up more than 20.000 million €.  
Approximately 90% of this amount will be dedicated to the high performance rail 
network. (ADIF, 2007a, p.11). 
In 2005 ADIF invested 2.842,5 million € in the construction of the high speed network, 
attaining a cumulated investment of 13.215 million €93. At the end of the year 1.053 km 
of the high speed network were already in operation, while 1.185 km more remained 
under construction (ADIF, 2006b, p.17). In 2006 ADIF invested 3.273 million € in the 
construction of the high speed network, pushing the cumulated investment up to 16.309 
million € (ADIF, 2007a, p.35). During the year, the high speed rail network in operation 
                                                
91 The transfer is stated in the third additional provision of Decree 2395/2004 (Real Decreto 2395/2004). 
These commitments already included the following high speed links: Madrid-Barcelona-Zaragoza-French 
Border; Madrid-Segovia-Valladolid-Medina del Campo; Córdoba-Málaga; Madrid-Comunidad 
Valenciana-Región de Murcia; Variante de Pajares; HSL of the Basque Country; Ourense-Santiago; 
Navalmoral de la Mata-Cáceres; Soria-Calatayud; Segovia - HSL Madrid-Valladolid and Bobadilla-
Granada (ADIF, 2007a, p.17). 
92 This resolution entrusted to ADIF the links Venta de Baños-León-Asturias, Valladolid-Burgos-Vitoria, 
Límite de la Región de Murcia - Murcia and Cáceres-Mérida-Badajoz. The resolution also removed 
previous commitments for the construction of the links Soria-Calatayud and Segovia - HSL Madrid-
Valladolid (Resolución de diciembre de 2006, de la Secretaría de Estado de Infraestructuras y 
Planificación). 
93 Cumulated investment on the high speed network at 31st December 2005, excluding the lines already in 
full operation when ADIF started its activity (i.e. the Madrid-Seville line). 
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grew up to 1.247 km and the network under construction descended to 1.081 km 
(ADIF, 2007a, p. 23). 
These strong investments in the high performance network are mainly supported by the 
public budget through capital contributions and payments for the construction activities 
performed in high performance network entitled to the State, European funds and loans. 
ADIF is currently receiving economic compensations from the State for the construction 
activities performed in the link Ourense – Santiago on behalf of the State. The Program-
Contract signed between the State and ADIF defines the payment of 1.715 million € in 
the period 2007-2010 and regularizes previous financial agreements for investments in 
this link. Additionally, ADIF receives EU funds devoted to the co-financing of studies, 
projects and construction works on the high performance network. Specifically, ADIF 
benefits from Cohesion Funds, ERDF Funds and TEN Funds. At the end of year 2006, 
the cumulated amount of the EU funds awarded to ADIF for the high performance 
network amounted to 10.253 million €94, of which 7.254 million € had already been 
recovered (ADIF, 2007a, pp.37-38). 
ADIF has also taken advantage from capital markets to finance its constructing activity, 
within the limits set by the State for its indebtedness. In year 2005 the infrastructure 
manager reported a debt of 2.201 million € with the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
for investments in tangible fixed assets (ADIF, 2006b, p.43). In year 2006, the Public 
Works Ministry agreed a credit line of 10.000 million € with the EIB to finance the 
infrastructures defined in the PEIT. From the total amount, the Ministry expected to 
allocate 2.000 million € to ADIF (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006c). At the end of year 
2006 the debt contracted with the EIB reached 3.109 million € (ADIF, 2007a, p.40). 
Debt will also be a relevant financial source in the period 2007-2010. In fact, the 
National Budget Law (Ley 42/2006, de Presupuestos Generales del Estado) has 
authorized ADIF to increase its debt by a maximum of 705 million € during year 200795. 
For the period 2008-2010 the Program-Contract between the State and ADIF foresees a 
maximum increase in the debt with financial entities equal to 1.800 million €. 
In addition to the investments in the high performance network, ADIF performs 
investments in the conventional network in exchange of payments from the State. These 
                                                
94 7.308 million € from Cohesion funds awarded to the Madrid-French Border line, Madrid-Valladolid 
line and Madrid-Levante line; 2.785 million € from ERDF funds awarded to high speed links in 
Andalucía, Asturias, Castilla y León, Castilla la Mancha, Murcia and Valencia regions; 161 million € 
from RTE funds directly awarded to ADIF. 
95 The presented amount represents the net increase in debt allowed in year 2007, including short and long 
term debt. 
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investments include renewals and the replacement and modernization of assets, as well 
as other activities In year 2005 ADIF invested 545 million € in the conventional 
network (ADIF, 2006b, p.32), amount which decreased to 386 million € in year 2006 
(ADIF, 2007a, p.35). The Program-Contract signed between the State and ADIF defines 
the payment of 2.127 million € in the period 2007-2010 for this activity. 
The management of the railway infrastructure includes its maintenance and operation, as 
well as the management of its control, traffic and safety systems. The maintenance 
activity is defined as the bundle of conservation, repair, technological update and 
replacement operations requested to preserve the railway infrastructure in adequate 
operation and safety conditions. The operation activity includes the preparation and 
publication of the network statement, the allocation of infrastructure capacity, the 
rendering of additional and ancillary services and the control and inspection of railway 
infrastructure. The management of control, traffic and safety systems regards the 
management, verification, inspection and supervision activities of the equipments 
ensuring the operation of control, traffic and safety systems (Real Decreto 2387/2004, 
Art.41). The latter activity, i.e. the management of control, traffic and safety systems, 
has to be performed within ADIF and cannot be entrusted to third parties (Real Decreto 
2395/2004, Art.11). 
The internal organization of ADIF does only reflect partially these main areas of 
activity, as only the maintenance activity is clearly allocated within the Directorate 
General for Infrastructure Development. In year 2006, the expenditures related to 
maintenance amounted to 732 million €. 
The maintenance activity areas perform preventive and corrective maintenance, but also 
improvements in the rail network (in the form of renewals and replacements). A relevant 
part of these activities is externalized: in year 2006 ADIF contracted out 238 million € 
in relation to the infrastructure maintenance in the conventional network and 132 million 
€ in relation to the maintenance of the high speed network96 (ADIF, 2007a, p.39). ADIF 
performs the supervision and control of the maintenance tasks in the whole network, 
                                                
96 ADIF contracts out the maintenance of the relevant technical systems of the high performance lines 
(e.g. infrastructure and track, catenary, switches, etc.). Generally the contracts are referred to specific 
sections and have a multi annual duration. For instance, the maintenance of the infrastructure and track of 
the Madrid-Seville line was divided into three contracts (section I – Mora, Section II – Calatrava and 
Section III – Hornachuelos) and awarded to three different contractors for the period 2006-2009 for 25 
million €. The maintenance of all the switches in the line during the same period made part of a single 
contract for 24,8 million €. The maintenance of the catenary was awarded through a single contract for 
9,9 million € (Europa Press, 30 de septiembre de 2005). 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 242 
with the help of the geographic information system GEOMIF and the operation 
management system SFINGE97. 
The operation and the management activities are mainly performed inhouse, with the 
exception of external contracts for the provision of some additional and ancillary 
services. Particularly relevant was the signature of a contract for the energy provision to 
the network in year 2007, which amounted 234,4 million € for the supply of electricity 
and 52,2 million € for the supply of oil (ADIF, 2007a, p.31). 
ADIF receives compensations for the management of the rail network entitled to the 
State. In year 2006 they reached 635 million € (ADIF, 2007a, p.4), and according to the 
Contract-Program with the State they will sum up 3.438 million € in the period 2007-
2010. These amounts do not include the improvements in the conventional rail network, 
which are financed as investments. 
6.3.13.4 Economic relations between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora 
Since January 1st 2005, RENFE-Operadora performs the operation of railway services 
on the railway network administered by the infrastructure manager ADIF. The State has 
defined the legal framework ruling the relations between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora 
and, particularly, the allocation of capacity (Ministerial Order 897/2005) and the charges 
for the use of railway infrastructure (Ministerial Order 898/2005). In addition, the State 
has set up the Commission for the Coordination of Railway Activities98, which may 
intervene in the resolution of conflicts between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora and 
provide guidance in the different interpretations of the legal framework. From an 
economic point of view, the State fixes the charges for the use of railway infrastructure, 
the charges for the use of stations and other installations and the security tax, all of them 
to be paid by RENFE-Operadora to ADIF. 
In years 2005 and 2006, RENFE-Operadora paid 122 million € (RENFE-Operadora, 
2006, pp. 16) and 162 million € (RENFE-Operadora, 2007a, p.18) respectively in 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure and charges for the use of stations and other 
installations (Table 33). The difference between both amounts is partially explained by 
the fact that in year 2005 the passenger services running on the conventional network 
only had to pay the access charge and the trains running on the high speed network were 
                                                
97 SFINGE is only implemented for the management of the high speed network (http://www.adif.es, 
2008-05-16). 
98 The Commission for the Coordination of Railway Activities (Comisión de coordinación de las 
actividades ferroviarias) is dependent from the State Secretariat for Infrastructure and Planning. Its 
functions are defined in art. 4 of Ministerial Order 32/2005. 
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granted a discount of 10% in the capacity reservation, running and traffic charge 
(transitory provisions 1 and 2 of Ministerial Order 898/2005). 
Table 33: ADIF incomes from track access charges. 2005-2006  
  2006 (M€) 2005 (M€) Variation 05/06 
Charge for the use of rail infrastructure 105,3 68,8 53% 
Access charge 1,4 1,4 0% 
Capacity reservation charge 56,1 28,4 97% 
Operation charge 29,8 20,6 45% 
Traffic charge 18,0 18,4 -2% 
Charge for the use of stations and other installations 55,9 53,0 5% 
Charge for the use of stations 49,4 47,5 4% 
Charge for stabling and use of the platforms 4,4 3,6 21% 
Charge for the use of siding tracks 0,1 0,2 -49% 
Charge for the use of gauge changing installations 1,9 1,7 16% 
TOTAL 161,2 121,8 32% 
Note: Figures in million €.  
Source: own elaboration with data from (ADIF, 2006b, p.52) and (ADIF, 2007a, p.47) 
This figure is expected to grow steadily in the next years, as it has been stated in the 
Program-Contract 2007-2010 between the State and ADIF. The clause nº 6 and the 
annex nº 4 of this contract foresee the evolution of incomes due to track access charges 
depicted in Fig. 71. 
Fig. 71: Expected evolution of incomes from track access charges. ADIF. 2007-2010 
445,3
272,7
255,1
131,6
84,8
68,8 99,693,186,7
61,256,553,0
192,8
141,3
121,9
544,9
365,8
341,8
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
M
il
li
o
n
 !
Charge for the infrastructure use
Charge for the use of stations
and other installations
TOTAL
 
Note: Figures in million €.  
Source: own elaboration with data from the Contract-Program between the State and ADIF, pp. 82-83 
 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 244 
Table 34: Agreements in force between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora 
Agreement ADIF 
RENFE-
Operadora 
Scope 
Payments 
(2005) 
Service level 
agreement  
(2005-06-07) 
ADIF 
RENFE-
Operadora 
Framework agreement for the 
monitoring of quality in the 
provision of services 
--- 
Multi-operator stations 
(2005-06-07) 
Passenger stations 
All passenger 
services 
Provision of services  
?? 
Regional services 
stations (2005-06-07) 
Passenger stations 
Regional 
services 
Provision of services  
?? 
Suburban stations  
(2005-06-07) 
Passenger stations 
Suburban 
services 
Entrustment of suburban 
stations to RENFE-
Operadora 
ADIF        
(12,7 M€) 
Energy supply 
(2005-06-07) 
Telecommunications 
and energy 
RENFE-
Operadora 
Provision of fuel and electric 
energy to traction units 
RENFE-O     
(185 M€) 
Telecom services 
(2005-06-07) 
Telecommunications 
and energy 
RENFE-
Operadora 
Provision of 
telecommunication services 
?? 
Provision of aid  
(2005-06-07) 
Traffic 
Rolling stock 
maintenance ; 
Freight services 
Provision of aid in case of 
accident 
ADIF         
(2,8 M€) 
Hauling services 
(2005-06-07) 
Traffic Freight services 
Hauling of special machinery 
to its working place 
ADIF          
(0,5 M€) 
Transport services 
(2005-06-07) 
Maintenance in 
conventional network 
Freight services 
Transport of materials 
required for maintenance 
activities 
ADIF         
(9,7 M€) 
Maintenance of rolling 
stock (2005-06-07) 
Maintenance in 
conventional network  
Rolling stock 
maintenance 
Maintenance of ADIF rolling 
stock in freight terminal 
ADIF         
(1,9 M€) 
Maintenance of rolling 
stock (2005-06-07) 
Freight terminals 
Rolling stock 
maintenance 
Maintenance of ADIF rolling 
stock in freight terminal 
ADIF         
(5,3 M€) 
Provision of services 
in freight terminals 
(2005-10-28) 
Freight terminals Freight services 
Framework agreement for the 
provision of services in the 
freight terminals 
?? 
Note: The fields ADIF and RENFE-Operadora refer to the business units of each entity involved in the 
agreement; --- : No payments involved; ??: Disaggregated information not found. 
Source: own elaboration with data from (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, p.29), (González, 2005a), (González, 
2005b) and (ADIF, 2006b, p.50) 
In addition to track access charges, ADIF is also responsible for the levying of a security 
tax on passengers through the railway operation companies. The incomes generated by 
this tax are also incorporated to the patrimony of ADIF. In year 2005 the incomes 
generated by the security tax amounted to 12,8 million €  (ADIF, 2006b, p.51) and in 
2006 they reached 13,4 million € (ADIF, 2007a, p.47). For the period 2007-2010 the 
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Program-Contract with the State foresees that security taxes will reach a total amount of 
57,2 million €. 
On their side, RENFE-Operadora and ADIF have formalized their relations with respect 
to the mutual rendering of services in the interface through the signature of 12 specific 
agreements (Table 34). The most relevant among them is the Service Level Agreement, 
which defines the overall framework for the relation between both entities and creates 
two follow-up committees at strategic and operational levels. The agreement sets up 
indicators related to the planning of activities and the quality of the services offered to 
the final user (punctuality, regularity, accident risk, track quality, etc.)99. The agreement 
foresees the definition of reference values for the indicators, and the possible 
implementation of an economic bonus/malus system linked to the performance of each 
entity. Up to know (May, 2008) the service level agreement has not involved any 
transfer of money between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora.  
Fig. 72: Economic relations between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora. 2006 
 
Note: Figures in € million; Colour code: Blue – Track access charges and charges for use of stations and 
other installations; Purple – Security tax; Orange – Energy; Green – Other agreements.  
Source: own elaboration based on data from (ADIF, 2007a) and (RENFE-Operadora, 2007a) 
The economic relevance of all the agreements attained more than 380 million € in year 
2005100 and more than 410 million € in year 2006101. The economic relations between 
both stakeholders in the year 2006 are synthesized in Fig. 72. 
                                                
99 The agreement integrates the previous monitoring system of the Traffic business unit (now under 
ADIF) and incorporates new indicators related to the planning and scheduling of railway services, 
management and feedbacks (González, 2005a). 
100 In its 2005 Annual Report, ADIF refers incomes from the railway operators equal to 335 million € and 
payments for agreements with railway operators up to 49,6 million € (ADIF, 2006b, pp.53-54). In the 
same year, RENFE-Operadora refers payments to ADIF of 147,5 million € (services without including 
energy) and 198 million € for the provision of energy. RENFE-Operadora refers incomes from ADIF 
equal to 35,8 million € (RENFE-Operadora, 2006, p. 116). 
101 In its 2006 Annual Report, ADIF refers incomes from the railway operators equal to 373 million € and 
payments for agreements with railway operators up to 44,9 million € (ADIF, 2007a, pp.48-49). In the 
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6.4 Characterization of the exporter jurisdictions 
 
6.4.1 Réseau Ferré de France (France) 
In France the reform of the railway sector started with the enactment of the Law 97-135 
of 13 February 1997, which split the integrated company SNCF in a new State owned 
infrastructure manager, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), and a “new” SNCF, focused on 
the transport operation business. This separation of RFF and SNCF introduced formal 
independence between operation and the essential functions of the infrastructure 
manager. However, there still exists a close relationship between both entities, as the 
management of traffic, as well as the operation and maintenance of the network are 
carried out by SNCF on behalf of RFF. SNCF is remunerated by RFF, which sets the 
objectives and the principles for each function102. Although since April 1st 2006 the 
railway freight transport market is opened to competition in France, the entrance of new 
operators is being quite slow (with 8 licensed railway undertakings in March 2007, 
according to http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail, 2008-07-23). 
RFF is a public business entity103 under the French Ministry of Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, whose main objective is “to manage the railway infrastructure 
and to contribute to the revitalization of the railway mode within the perspective of 
sustainable development” (RFF, 2007a, p.1). The infrastructure manager is responsible 
for the allocation of capacity, the maintenance and operation of the network, the 
development of the rail network and the levying of track access charges. 
The principles driving the definition of railway infrastructure charges were initially set 
in Decree 97-446, which in its Art. 2 dictates that “track access charges take into 
consideration the infrastructure costs, the transport market situation, the conditions of 
supply and demand, the needs for optimal use of the network and the harmonization of 
the conditions of intermodal competition”. This expression was partially changed by the 
amendments of Decree 2003-194 (Art. 30), which added a reference to the “cost of the 
                                                                                                                                          
same year, RENFE-Operadora refers payments to ADIF of 147 million € (services without including 
energy) and 216,5 million € for the provision of energy. RENFE-Operadora refers incomes from ADIF 
equal to 47,5 million € (RENFE-Operadora, 2007, pp.18-19). 
102 According to RFF’s annual report for the year 2005, SNCF received from the infrastructure manager a 
basic annual fee equal to 2.597 million €, which represented 59,7% of the total RFF’s operating expenses 
in that year. This figure is to be augmented by various other types of remuneration totalling €79 million 
(summing up bonuses, research agreements, reimbursement of expenses related to malicious damage and 
sales of rail supplies) (RFF 2007b, p. 22). 
103 RFF has the legal form of an Établissement Public de l’État à caractère Industriel et Commercial 
(EPIC), a State organization whose accounting rules and management methods are similar to industrial 
and commercial enterprises. 
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environmental effects generated by the operation of trains”. It is remarkable how these 
principles do not make any explicit mention to the marginal costs of the infrastructure, 
opening the way to a flexible approach to pricing on the cost side. 
The structure and the amount of the charging elements and components are yearly fixed 
by the Ministry of Transport on proposal of RFF. The tariffs are mainly determined on 
the basis of financial considerations and are not based on a detailed methodology to 
calculate the marginal cost of the infrastructure. The incomes obtained by RFF from the 
pricing of railway infrastructure are rather relevant, and in year 2006 the track access 
charges represented a 52,96% of its operational expenditures in the period (RFF, 2007b, 
p.22). 
Fig. 73: Cost coverage in the French rail network in year 2005 
 
Note: Figures in M€; TGV – High speed trains; IdF – Îlle de France; Corail – Intercities; Fret – Freight; 
TER – Regional trains; Cm – Variable costs; CF – Fixed costs; K – Capital costs; Redevances – track 
access charges. 
Source: RFF – COPIL interministériel, in French Parliament, 2008, p.13 
At present, charges partly cover the costs associated to traffic management, 
maintenance, renewals and investments. However their weight is allocated unevenly 
across the different railway services, with a very relevant contribution from the high 
speed services to the cost coverage (Fig. 73). The economic relevance of the track access 
charges in the French railway system is expected to grow in the next years, mainly due 
to the investments programmed for the network, the decreasing contribution from the 
State due to the constraints on public deficit and debt, and the strong financial position 
of the national operator SNCF (French Parliament, 2008, p.15). RFF justifies the raise 
in the level of charges for the high speed services in the need of renewal in many parts of 
the network, but it proposes to combine this measure with a mix of policies leading to 
minimize their effect on final users (Sauvant, 2008, p.7). The forecasted increases in the 
level of track access charges have found the opposition from the incumbent operator 
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SNCF, who argues that they already account for more than 30% of its total expenditures 
(Leboeuf, 2008, p.8). 
The French pricing system (minimum access package) is defined to cover the marginal 
costs of infrastructure as well as to contribute to the development costs of the network 
through a two-part tariff scheme. The fixed part of the charge adopts the form of a 
“soft” access charge (α) while the variable part includes a running charge (δ) and a 
train path reservation charge (β). The structure of this scheme has remained 
substantially unchanged for the last three editions of the network statement (with some 
minor changes in the classification of lines and the modulation coefficient (γ) modifying 
the train path reservation charge), though the values have been steadily increasing (see 
RFF 2005 and RFF 2006). 
Although in 2004 Remond indicated a correspondence between costs and charges in this 
scheme (with the access charge recovering timetable establishment costs and the running 
charge approximating marginal operation and maintenance costs) (Remond, 2004), the 
network statement suggests that tariffs are mainly determined on the basis of financial 
considerations and are not based on a detailed cost-related methodology (RFF, 2007c, 
p.38). According to this source, charges are calculated using data from the information 
systems of RFF for a grouping of the network into categories and sub-categories of 
elementary sections reflecting infrastructure and traffic characteristics. Nevertheless, it 
seems out of discussion the allocation of mark-ups and maybe scarcity costs through the 
network groupings, since the sub-categories of a category have the same infrastructure 
characteristics but imply different prices. This effect can be observed for the high speed 
lines, where their geographical situation, associated to different subcategories, produces 
higher prices when approaching main cities (e.g. Paris). 
The charging scheme applied by RFF can be synthesized in expression [2]: 
! 
C ="(L) + #(L,P) $ %(S,s,l) + &(S)   [2] 
Where: 
 C track access charge (per train-km) 
 L line or section 
 P time period 
 S type of service 
 s speed  
 l length of the route 
 
The values applied by RFF in its 2009 network statement for the coefficients appearing 
in expression [2] are indicated in Table 35. 
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Table 35: Coefficients and charges adopted by RFF in its 2009 network statement 
α (Access charge) 0-1,051 € / train path-km 
β (Train path reservation charge) 0-15,137 € / train path-km 
γ (Modulation coefficient) 0,6-1,3 --- 
δ (Running charge) 0,459-1,428 € / train-km 
Source: own elaboration from RFF 2007d 
The RFF’s charging scheme includes a very strong differentiation of charges depending 
on the combination of line type and time period in which the train runs. The charging 
scheme classifies the sections of the network into nine different types of line (Table 36) 
and defines three different time periods common to the entire network (peak-normal-
valley). 
Table 36: Types of line considered in the RFF’s charging scheme for the timetable 2009 
 Categories Designation 
Total length  
(km) 
Network 
part 
High-traffic   A 289 1,0% Suburban 
Medium-traffic   B 1.022 3,5% 
High-traffic   C 7.210 24,8% Main interurban 
Medium-traffic   D 5.897 20,3% 
Other lines All E 12.888 44,3% 
High-traffic   N1 718 2,5% 
Medium-traffic   N2 456 1,6% 
Low-traffic   N3 322 1,1% 
High speed 
LGV Est   N4 317 1,1% 
Note: Total length of the network as of June 2007; Categories C* and D* included within categories C 
and D. 
Source: EIM and CER, 2008, p.19 
For high speed trains the classification of line sections is related to the volume of traffic 
supported by them104, while the classification in time periods is, as said, the same as for 
the rest of the network. The amount of the unitary track access charges is almost equally 
dependent on both variables. The unitary track access charges levied on the high speed 
links are detailed in Table 37.  
In the case of conventional passenger services, the unitary track access charges remain 
significantly lower than those for high speed services (e.g. the unitary charge for a 
conventional passenger train running on a medium traffic main interurban line in a 
“normal” time period is about 20% of the unitary charge of a high speed service running 
                                                
104 A new category has been set for the recently opened LGV Est (N4) This category, cheaper than the 
rest, has been probably defined in order to incentivize the utilisation of the new link during the ramp-up 
phase. 
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on a medium traffic high speed line in the same period). However there is a strong 
penalty for the services running on suburban lines, particularly in peak hours, which 
may make the level of both charges comparable.  
Table 37: Unitary track access charges for high speed passenger services under RFF charging 
scheme for the timetable 2009 
 Line N1  
(high traffic) 
Line N2 
(medium traffic) 
Line N3  
(low traffic) 
Valley 8,58   (+7%) 3,91  (-51%) 3,50 (-56%) 
Normal 14,89   (+85%) 8,03  (-) 5,32 (-44%) 
Peak 17,62   (+119%) 10,43 (+30%) 7,27 (-9%) 
Note: Figures in €/train-km, includes access, running and train path reservation charges. Values in 
brackets reflect the variation with respect to the unitary charge for a train running on a medium traffic 
line on a normal time period.  
Source: own calculations from RFF 2007d 
Differentiation according to the time period is also relevant in high traffic main 
interurban lines, but results negligible in the case of medium traffic interurban lines and 
other lines (Table 38). This behavior (greater differentiation and levels in suburban lines) 
is also found in the case of passenger regional services, though with different reference 
values. In the case of regional services, the charge for a train-km run on a medium traffic 
main interurban line in a “normal” time period goes down to 0,89 €/train-km, instead of 
the 1,48 €/train-km of conventional passenger services. 
Table 38: Unitary track access charges for conventional passenger services (except regional 
services) under RFF charging scheme for the timetable 2009 
Suburban lines  Main interurban lines Other lines 
  
Line A   
(high traffic) 
Line B   
(medium traffic) 
Line C/C*  
(high traffic) 
Line D/D*   
(medium traffic) Line E 
Valley 3,33  (+14%) 2,21 (-24%) 2,21 (+49%) 1,44  (-3%) 1,43  (+0%) 
Normal 6,58  (+125%)  2,92 (-) 2,21  (+49%) 1,48  (-) 1,43  (-) 
Peak 16,29  (+458%) 4,79  (+64%) 3,02  (+104%) 1,48  (+0%) 1,43  (+0%) 
Note: Figures in €/train-km, includes access, running and train path reservation charges. Values in 
brackets reflect the variation with respect to the unitary charge for a train running on a medium traffic 
line on a normal time period.  
Source: own calculations from RFF 2007d  
The charges applied to freight services follow a pattern similar to the ones applied to 
conventional passenger services, though their level is lower (for freight traffic running on 
a medium traffic main interurban line in a “normal” time period the unitary charge stays 
between 0,49 and 0,53 €/train-km) and they include the effect of the modulation 
coefficient γ. This coefficient is designed so that it provides strong incentives for lower 
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priority train paths in suburban and high traffic main interurban lines at the same time 
that it has no relevant effect on the charge on medium traffic main interurban lines and 
other lines (see Table 39). 
Table 39: Unitary track access charges for conventional passenger services under RFF charging 
scheme for the timetable 2009 
Suburban lines  Main interurban lines Other lines 
  
Line A   
(high traffic) 
Line B   
(medium traffic) 
Line C/C*  
(high traffic) 
Line D/D*   
(medium traffic) Line E 
Valley 1,61-2,93          
(+ 18-22%) 
0,93-1,47          
(- 31-39%) 
0,93-1,47     
(+ 90-179%) 
0,47                   
(- 5-11%) 
0,46        
(+0%) 
Normal 3,56-7,15          
(+ 161-198%)  
1,36-2,40          
(-) 
0,93-1,47      
(+ 90-179%) 
0,49-0,53           
(-) 
0,46-0,47      
(-) 
Peak 9,38-19,78        
(+ 589-725%) 
2,48-4,82         
(+ 82-101%) 
1,42-2,53  
(+190-380%) 
0,49-0,53    
(+0%) 
0,46-0,47  
(+0%) 
Note: Figures in €/train-km, includes access, running and train path reservation charges. Ranges have 
been defined according to the modulation coefficient γ. Values in brackets reflect the variation with 
respect to the unitary charge for a train running on a medium traffic line on a normal time period. 
Source: own calculations from RFF 2007d 
The values applied by RFF to the different services in the 2009 network statement, 
together with the cost recovery ratios provided in Fig. 73, confirm the existence of mark-
ups for high speed services and suburban services (particularly in the region Île de 
France), while the conventional and freight services are charged at lower rates. The 
charging scheme provides strong incentives for the rerouting or rescheduling of these 
services when approaching the main cities. This fact can be appreciated in Fig. 74, which 
illustrates the classification of the network sections in the vicinity of Paris. 
Fig. 74: Classification of railway sections in region Île-de-France. Timetable 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RFF 2007e  
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6.4.2 DB Netz (Germany) 
The railway reform in Germany started in 1993, with the merging of the railway 
companies from the Federal Republic and the former Democratic Republic in a single 
entity owned by the State, Deutsche Bahn AG. In year 1999, Deutsche Bahn was 
transformed in a holding integrating different subsidiary companies, each focusing on one 
different part of the railway business. At this stage, the railway infrastructure was 
allocated to the company DB Netz AG, which is currently responsible for its 
management. The third step of the reform foresees the privatization of the different 
subsidiary companies, granting their independence (Goujon, 2004a, p.2). After some 
years of discussion the privatization stage seems to have taken off. According to the 
Federal Government, there will be two companies: the infrastructure that will continue 
to be fully owned by the Federal Government and one stock corporation combining 
passenger transport, freight transport and logistics. Up to 24,9% of this corporation will 
be privatized (German Federal Ministry of Transport, 2008). 
Fig. 75: Evolution of the German rail freight market – Market share of new entrants 1994-2007 
 
Source: Fried, 2008, p.3 
The early reform accomplished in Germany has found its reflection in the high number 
of new operators entering the market. At the end of year 2006, 347 railway undertakings 
were licensed in Germany (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail, 2008-07-23). However the 
market share of the new entrants in the operation business is still reduced. In the same 
year 2006, they run the 13% of the total train path-km operated in the DB Netz 
network (Deutsche Bahn, 2007, p.24). Still, the trend is increasing very fast, as it is 
reflected by the evolution of the German rail market freight (Fig. 75). The main 
transport policy objectives behind this reform have been expressed through the two 
statements “More traffic onto rail” and “Tax payer relief” (Deutsche Bahn, 2008a). 
These objectives have been internalized by the infrastructure branch DB Netz, through 
the strong business orientation of its activity (through the marketing of customer 
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oriented track usage offers) and the further development of the rail network (Deutsche 
Bahn, 2007, p.25). 
DB Netz AG is responsible for the setting of track access charges, which are verified by 
the Federal Network Agency, the Regulatory Body in charge of the supervision of the 
main network economies in Germany (Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railway).The principles driving the setting of track access charges are in line with 
Directive 2001/14/EC, transposed to the German legal framework in June 2005 through 
modifications in the 1993 General Railway Law (Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz, AEG) 
and the regulation on railway infrastructure use (Eisenbahninfrastruktur-
Benutzungsverordnung, EIBV) that came into force in August 2005. Article 14.4 of the 
AEG sets the general principle for the charging framework, stating that “Infrastructure 
managers have to calculate their infrastructure charges […] in such a way that their 
costs (plus a return on investment which can be borne by the market) can be covered”, 
which is developed in detail in articles 21-23 of the EIBV. 
The German charging scheme is aimed at full cost recovery for the minimum access 
package (the maintenance and management have to be fully covered by track charges), 
taking into account governmental grants and interest-free loans. The 
RAILIMPLEMENT study estimated that 45-50% of total costs are covered by public 
investment funds. Since 64% of DB Netz’s total track revenues is paid by regional 
transport (where 2/3 is subsidized by the state), the total public share of infrastructure 
cost coverage is approximately 65 to 70% (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005b, p.12). 
The German pricing system for the services of the minimum access package is aimed at 
full cost recovery (minus State subsidies) and consists of a train path charge levied per 
train-km. The train path charge is a linear charge designed as the product of a basic 
category price (α) related to the line, a product multiplier (β) related to the train path 
quality, an utilization factor (γ), a minimum speed factor (δ) and a regional factor (ε) 
only applied to regional traffic. This expression is complemented by a payload 
component (φ) and a performance regime based on delay minutes accountancy (DB 
Netz, 2007b, pp.3-15). The structure of this charging scheme has been evolving during 
the last years, with the elimination of some special factors (tilting trains, steam 
locomotives, out-of-gauge trains), the simplification of other factors (e.g. the reduction 
of different weight classes to a single threshold) or the inclusion of the minimum speed 
factor and the performance regime (see for instance DB Netz, 2005, pp.2-11). 
The procedure followed to define the train path charge is based on the allocation of costs 
derived from network operation, maintenance, administration and investment after State 
contributions (Ludwig, 2006, p.3). However, it also takes into account the viability of 
the market in terms of competitiveness and expected growth of the different demand 
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segments (EIM and CER, 2008, p.30). With independence of the global optimization 
process, leading to the conciliation between cost recovery and demand for infrastructure 
services, it is possible to link some of the components of the train path charge to 
specific purposes: 
• The utilization factor (γ) is related to the intensity of use of the different links of 
the network, increasing the amount of the overall charge for the most used links.  
According to Kandels, the purpose of this factor is to enable better capacity 
management and redirect traffic flows to routes with low traffic volumes 
(Kandels 2005, p.11), which suggests its correlation with demand and not with 
costs (Fig. 76). 
Fig. 76: Sections of the German network affected by the utilization factor compared to the 
infrastructure utilization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Red links on the left graph represent sections where an utilization factor of 1,2 was 
applied in year 2005. Red bands on the right graph represent infrastructure utilization in year 
2004 (proportional to the wide of the band). 
Source: Kandels, 2005, p.11 (left) and Deutsche Bahn, 2008b, p.13 (right) 
• The regional factor (ε) is related to the financial viability of the regional services 
operated in each of the States. The factor is set in order to improve the cost 
coverage ratio for these services and can be reviewed in the case of increases in 
regional subsidies or relevant increases in the number of train path orders (DB 
Netz 2007b, p.11). 
• The product multiplier (β) seems to be related to the willingness to pay of the 
different railway services through the consideration of the priority allocated to 
different train path products (Fig. 77). 
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Fig. 77: Product multipliers adopted in the DB Netz charging scheme 
 
Source: Bohrer, 2004, p.18 
The charging scheme applied by DB Netz on a link of the network has been synthesized 
through expression [3]: 
! 
C ="(L) # $(S,H) # %(L) # &(s) # '(S,L) +((W )        [3] 
Where: 
 C track access charge (per train-km) 
 L line or section 
 S type of service 
 H type of train path – priority 
 s speed 
 W train weight 
The values adopted by DB Netz in its price list for year 2008 for the coefficients 
appearing in expression [3] are indicated in Table 40. 
Table 40: Coefficients and charges adopted by DB Netz in its 2008 price list 
α (Basic category price) 1,59-8,09 € / train path-km 
β (Product multiplier) 0,5-1,8 --- 
γ (Utilization factor) 1-1,2 --- 
δ (Minimum speed factor) 1-1,5 --- 
ε (Regional factor) 1,05-1,91 --- 
ϕ (Payload component) 0-0,92 € / train path-km 
Source: own elaboration from DB Netz 2007b, pp.3-15. 
The multiplicative specification of the charging scheme is designed to provide strong 
incentives to the market. The scheme contains two components (δ and Φ) that become 
relevant only when the operator exceeds some limiting operational thresholds: a speed 
lower than 50 km/h and a gross weight greater than 3.000 tonnes. Made exception of 
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them, the charging scheme of DB Netz for a given service is mainly dependent on the 
line or section (L) selected by the operator and the train path priority (H). 
In order to estimate the relevance of each of these variables in the formation of the final 
unitary price a simple sensitivity analysis has been carried out for four different types 
of service, namely high speed services, conventional passenger services, regional 
passenger services and freight services. The calculation hypotheses assumed for each 
type of service are: 
• High speed services: they run on sections F Plus (maximum speed above 280 
km/h) or F1 (maximal speed above 200 km/h); they reserve an express train path 
or a long distance regular interval train path. 
• Conventional passenger services: they run on sections ranging from F1 to F5 
(maximum speeds above 100 km/h); they reserve an economy train path, a long 
distance regular interval train path or an express train path. 
• Regional passenger services: they run on lines F6, Z1 or Z2; they reserve an 
economy train path, a long distance regular interval train path or an express train 
path. They can be affected by any of the regional coefficients defined in the DB 
Netz 2008 price list. 
• Freight services: they run on lines ranging from F1 to F5 (maximum speeds 
above 100 km/h); they reserve a standard or an express freight train path. 
For each of the types of service described, the proposed sensitivity analysis defines the 
values of the variables L and H that maximize or minimize their contribution to the 
unitary track access charge. Then, it calculates the unitary track access charge and 
evaluates the variation in this charge due to changes in each of the two variables (from 
the minimizing to the maximizing value). The results are presented in Table 41. 
The value of the unitary charge levied within every type of service can be substantially 
different depending on the combination of L and H chosen. The relative range of 
variation for the unitary charge is different for every type of service, as well as the 
weight of each of the variables L and H in this variation. The relative range of variation 
(ratio between the maximum and the minimum values of the unitary charge) goes from 
2,57 for high speed services to 4,78 for conventional passenger services, with 
intermediate values of 4,07 for regional services and 4,39 for freight services. In all the 
cases the relevance of the variable L is greater than the relevance of variable H. The 
relative weight of H with respect to L is respectively equal to 6,7% (high speed), 48,2% 
(conventional passenger), 63,3% (regional passenger) and 39,2% (freight services). 
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Table 41: Unitary track access charges for different type of services depending on priority and 
section variables under the German charging scheme 
  Priority (H) 
Type of service Section (L) Min Max Variation 
Min 6,80 7,42 9% 
Max 16,02 17,47 9% High speed 
Variation 136% 136%  
Min 1,86 3,35 80% 
Max 4,94 8,90 80% Conventional passenger 
Variation 166% 166%  
Min 2,29 4,12 80% 
Max 5,18 9,32 80% Regional passenger 
Variation 126% 126%  
Min 1,86 3,07 65% 
Max 4,94 8,16 65% Freight 
Variation 166% 166%  
Note: Figures expressed in €/train-km; Calculation hypotheses: High speed – Lmax (FP, γ=1,2), Lmin 
(F1, γ=1,0), Hmax (express train path), Hmin (long distance regular interval train path); Conventional 
passenger– Lmax (F1, γ=1,2), Lmin (F5, γ=1,0), Hmax (express train path), Hmin (economy train path); 
Regional passenger– Lmax (Z1, γ=1,2, ε=1,91 ), Lmin (F6, γ=1,0, ε=1,05), Hmax (express train 
path), Hmin (economy train path); Freight – Lmax (F1, γ=1,2), Lmin (F5, γ=1,0), Hmax (express freight 
train path), Hmin (standard train path). 
Source: own calculation based on DB Netz 2007b, pp.3-15 
Fig. 78: Maximum speeds in the German rail network. 2008 
 
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2008c 
From this analysis, it arises that in spite of the apparently complex multiplicative 
specification ruling the calculation of track access charges on the DB Netz network, the 
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more relevant factor for a train operator is still the type of section used, and in a 
secondary place the requested priority for its service. The classification of the links of 
the network within different section types is done according to the maximum speed and 
the type of traffic running on them (Fig. 78). Therefore, it is only partially based on 
technical data, allowing further considerations in the classification of those links with 
maximum speed below 200 km/h. 
 
6.4.3 Network Rail (United Kingdom) 
The reform of the British railway system started in 1994 with the enactment of the 
1993 Railways Act, which restructured the sector into one infrastructure manager 
(Railtrack), 25 passenger train operating companies (TOCs), seven freight train 
operating units, three rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) and several ancillary 
businesses, and enabled the Secretary of State for Transport to transfer them to the 
private sector. The passenger rail services were franchised to various private companies 
and the infrastructure manager was floated on the London stock exchange in 1996. 
This model, the only in Europe combining full separation and full privatization of the 
railway business, led to substantial off-track competition, to the removal of potential 
barriers for accessing the market and to relevant incomes for the Exchequer (Preston, 
1999, pp. 1-7). 
However, there also existed some concerns about the investment policy followed by 
Railtrack. These concerns became a tragic reality in year 2000, when the investigations 
following the Hatfield accident pointed out rail fatigue cracking as its main cause and 
revealed a widespread incidence of this phenomenon all over the network. They also 
identified a number of significant failings in Railtrack’s performance that had contributed 
to the failure to maintain the line in a safe condition and concluded that  “At the time of 
the derailment and over the previous two years, the culture within Railtrack which 
conditioned decision making on safety and performance issues, was biased towards 
performance-driven decisions. In particular, there was a bias towards minimizing train 
delays and quantifying rail failures in terms of broken rails but failing to focus on the 
poor quality of maintenance that was the root cause of the rail breakage.” (ORR, 2006, 
p.123). 
The financial burden of the major repairs required in the network deteriorated the results 
of the company, which following an application to the High Court from the British 
Government, was placed into administration on October 7th 2001. After a year in 
administration, Railtrack was sold by its parent company Railtrack Group PLC to a 
newly created company, Network Rail, which took over responsibility for Britain’s rail 
network.  
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Network Rail is a “not for dividend” private company limited by guarantee that owns 
the national rail network infrastructure and manages it under a network license granted 
by the Department for Transport (DfT)105. According to its legal form Network Rail 
operates in the private sector and belongs to its members106, among which there is the 
Department for Transport. This layout keeps and intentional ambiguity as regards the 
public control of the infrastructure manager, which has been described by the 
economic’s editor Larry Elliott in the following terms: “Network Rail may technically be 
a not-for-dividend private company with its debts underpinned by the government, but it 
is nationalised in all but name” (Elliott, 2006).  
The activity of Network Rail is mainly regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) 
107, which is the combined economic and safety regulator108. ORR is responsible for 
setting Network Rail’s access charges, establishing the baseline outputs that the 
company should provide to ensure that it is an efficient steward of the national railway 
network and enforcing the conditions set out in its network license. ORR also licenses 
operators of railway assets, approves agreements for access by operators to railway 
facilities and enforces domestic competition law.  
The operation of passenger services is mainly performed by the 25 TOCs in possession 
of the rail franchises for running passenger services in England and inter-city services to 
and from Scotland and Wales109 (Fig. 79). These franchises are awarded by the DfT, 
who since 2006 is responsible for specifying, awarding, and monitoring the contracts to 
the train operating companies110. The operation of freight services is basically performed 
by four main freight operating companies: English, Welsh and Scottish Railway (EWS), 
                                                
105 The network license was first issued by the Secretary of State on March 1994 to govern Railtrack’s 
activities, but enforced and amended by the Rail Regulator, which strengthened the company’s network 
license on 27 June 2002. 
106 According to Network Rail’s Webpage, the members of the company are drown among the rail 
industry and the general public (http://www.networkrail.co.uk, 2008-07-30)  
107 The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) was established on 5 July 2004 by the Railways and Transport 
Safety Act 2003 (Art. 15-17). It replaces the Office of the Rail Regulator. 
108 Condition 6 of the Network License specifies that Network Rail shall be a member of the Rail Safety 
and Standards Board (RSSB), beeing subjected to the compliance of the obligations and agreements 
reached within this institution still exists, however; established in 2003 on the recommendations of a 
public inquiry, it leads the industry's progress in health and safety matters. The Rail Safety and Standards 
Board is responsible for imposing monetary penalties to Network Rail if it fails to fulfil its obligations. 
109 There are also some rail services operated on an open access basis (i.e. outside the franchise 
arrangements). Examples include the Heathrow Express or Hull Trains. 
110 In 2006, using powers in the Railways Act 2005, the Department for Transport took over most of the 
functions previously held by the now disappeared Strategic Rail Authority (SRA). 
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Direct Rail Services Limited, Freightliner Ltd and GB Railfreight Ltd. In spite of the 
complexity existing in the provision of rail transport services, the operation companies 
have attained steady increases in traffic and performance for both passenger and rail 
services, supporting the effectiveness of the British railway reform (Goujon, 2004b, 
p.4). 
Fig. 79: National rail passenger operators in Great Britain. 2007 
 
Source: Doe, 2007 
The current structure of the British rail sector has been simplified and synthesized in the 
scheme of Fig. 80. 
The clear relations among the different stakeholders and the existence of a strong 
regulatory body, helps to define objectives and risks in a more effective way. In this 
context, Network Rail’s task is to provide an optimal suite of rail infrastructure services 
in the short and long-term. 
The charge setting procedure in Britain is part of a broader regulatory process in which 
the revenues and the financial framework for the infrastructure manager are defined for 
the next five-year period. 
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Fig. 80: Structure of the British rail sector. 2007  
Source: own elaboration, adapted and updated from Kamleh 2006, p.4 
The procedure foreseen for the period 2009-2014 starts with the definition by the UK 
Government111 of the outputs expected from the rail sector (in terms of safety, 
performance and capacity) and the availability of public funding for their achievement. 
Then the ORR, as independent economic regulator, determines whether the outputs 
sought by the Government are affordable and deliverable within the funding that the 
Government is providing. Second, Network Rail proposes its approach and financial 
needs for meeting these output specifications, detailing investments, expenditures, track 
access charges and other incomes for the period112. Third, the ORR makes a final 
decision on the efficient level of expenditures for Network Rail and the track access 
charges, both in level and structure, to be applied by the infrastructure manager. The 
                                                
111 The participation of the Government at this stage of the process has occurred for the first time in the 
track access charges review for the period 2009-2014, after the strong criticisms made by the Transport 
Committee of the House of Commons in 2004. At that time the Committee concluded that “A model of 
railway governance is required which restores to the Government control over the public interest, public 
expenditure, rail policy, and objective setting; while allowing the railway industry full operational 
responsibility for the delivery of improved infrastructure, train service outputs and strategy objectives.” 
(House of Commons, 2004, p.66). The definition of the output is performed through the High Level 
Output Specifications (HLOS). 
112 Network Rail has coordinated the scheduling of the regulatory reviews with its own planning activity, 
therefore it will deliver its Strategic Business Plan for the same period, 2009-2014, after several 
consultations to other industry stakeholders (including ORR) (http://www.networkrail.co.uk 2008-08-01). 
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whole procedure builds on detailed consultancy studies and a strong participation of all 
the relevant stakeholders. 
The Government objectives for railways were stated in the 2007 White Paper, which 
declared the ambition for a railway “able to handle double today’s level of freight and 
passenger traffic”; “even safer, more reliable and more efficient than now”; “able to 
cater for a more diverse, affluent and demanding population”; and “able to reduce its 
own carbon footprint and improve its broader environmental performance” (DfT, 
2007b, p.7). These objectives mainly cover England and Wales, as since 2006 rail policy 
has been devolved to the Scottish Ministers, who now have the responsibility for 
specifying and funding the network infrastructure in Scotland. 
In setting track access charges, the Office of Rail Regulation considers that the charging 
regime should promote the objectives of its funders and broad economic development, 
incentivise efficient utilization and development of the network, optimize the whole of 
industry costs, avoid discrimination between network users, provide practical, cost-
effective and objective operation and comply with relevant legislation, including EU 
Directive 2001/14/EC (Jones, 2005, p.4). 
The charging scheme proposed for year 2008 in the United Kingdom is based on 
marginal cost estimations and includes a specific mark-up levied on franchised train 
operators intended to ensure the full recovery of Network Rail’s efficient costs. 
According to this scheme charges are classified in variables and fixed. Variable charges 
related to the minimum access package are the variable usage charge (α) (levied per 
train-mile and depending on the vehicle class) and the capacity charge (β) (levied per 
train-mile according to the service group). The fixed charge (γ) is unique and it is levied 
on an annual basis to the franchised operators. The electrification asset usage charge (δ) 
is levied as a mark-up on the electricity charge, levied per kWh. The scheme is 
completed with a performance regime and a possession regime (Network Rail, 2006, 
pp.37-38). Though not yet approved, the track access scheme for the period 2009-2014 
will probably define a mark-up on freight-only lines and possibly introduce some route-
based factors in the variable charge (Network Rail, 2007, pp.5-6). 
The calculation procedures applied are specific for every charging component: 
• The variable usage charge (α) allocates usage-related costs to individual vehicles 
in proportion to their relative propensity to cause damage to the network. 
Usage-related costs are based on a top-down analysis of Network Rail’s short 
run incremental costs, while the allocation to different types of vehicles relies on 
a bottom-up engineering model. This approach was proposed to ORR by the 
consultant Booz Allen Hamilton in 1999 (BAH, 1999) and then first applied for 
the control period 2000-2004 (ORR, 2000a). A revision of the methodology was 
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conducted within the 2005 structure of costs and charges review (BAH and 
TTCI, 2005) and is being conducted again for the definition of charges for the 
control period 2009-2014 (TTCI, 2008 and Halcrow Group, 2008). 
Fig. 81: Part of variable charges in the UK charging system. 2001-2009 
 
Notes: CP2 – Control Period 2; CP3- Control period 3. 
Source: Thomas, 2004 
The top-down model used for setting the charges applied in 2008 is still the one 
introduced in year 2000. This model assesses the total costs to the infrastructure 
manager of operating, maintaining and renewing the network and estimates the 
variability of these costs by asset category. The variable elements of costs are 
identified on the basis of a national “network average” estimate, for each asset 
type, of the variability of damage and cost with usage at the prevailing network 
average traffic density (Fig. 82). 
The bottom-up model distributes the total usage-related costs to individual 
vehicle types according to the equivalent gross tonne miles (EGTMs) operated 
by each type of vehicle. The calculation of EGTMs is made separately for track 
and structures. In the first case it includes the type of train (loco-hauled or 
distributed traction), the operating speed, the axle load and the unsprung mass. 
In the second case, the calculation takes into account the type of vehicle (single 
axles or boogies), the axle load and the operating speed (BAH, 1999, p.34).  
Further improvements foreseen for the definition of the variable usage charge 
include a more detailed break down of activities and asset types in the top-down 
model and the refinement of the engineering models through the inclusion of 
tangencial forces and rolling contact fatigue. 
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Fig. 82: Estimation of cost variability per asset type in the British rail network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BAH, 1999, p.32 
 
• The capacity charge (β) allocates additional congestion costs113 to different 
service groups (i.e. services with similar unitary congestion costs).  
This charge was introduced for the first time for the control period 2000-2004 
(ORR, 2000a), in order to recover the additional performance regime costs arising 
from the difficulty of recovering from disruption on a more congested network. 
It also intended to avoid the transaction costs resulting from the case-by-case 
negotiations between Railtrack and the franchised operators. Initially the charge 
was designed to vary by route section and time band, reflecting the costs of the 
so-called “Congested Related Reactionary Delay (CRRD)”. Three years later, 
ORR introduced the average rate per service group as a simplification able to 
improve its practical implementation, namely the development of a suitable 
billing system. 
The calculation of the additional congestion costs relies on the assumption that 
there is a relationship between capacity utilization and delay. This relationship 
is approached through a statistical analysis for every route section and time 
band114 building on the broad operational data sets provided by the information 
                                                
113 The pricing system in Britain includes a performance regime that already takes into accout part of the 
costs arising in the network because of delays. The capacity charge is aimed to recover the network 
effects of delays that are not already covered by the performance regime. 
114 The congestion costs are calculated for 2.500 route sections and 13 time bands defined around a week. 
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systems of the infrastructure manager. The costs are then calculated for every 
section and time band as the product of the additional delay caused by the 
operation of an additional train in the network (obtained from the capacity 
utilization – delay relationship) and the costs arising from that delay (ORR, 
2000b, pp. 1-3). Under the current simplification, these detailed costs are 
averaged for different service groups and allocated according to mileage. Freight 
operators are granted a 10% discount over the charge applied to franchised 
passenger operators, which reflects their greater flexibility in pathing their 
services. 
• The fixed charge (γ) is obtained as a residual figure intended to cover the gap 
between ORR’s determination of Network Rail’s total revenue requirement and 
all the other sources of revenue (variable track charges to franchised passenger 
train operators, station charges, freight and open access charges, property 
income and government grant). ORR calculates it for the five-year period 
following a standard “building block” methodology (see Fig. 83). 
Fig. 83: Determination of the fixed charge in the United Kingdom  
 
Note: O&M – Operation and Maintenance. 
Source: ORR, 2003a, p.31 
This methodology calculates the revenue requirement of Network Rail as the 
sum of allowed expenditure on operation and maintenance of the network, the 
amortization of the regulatory asset base (RAB) and the allowed return on 
assets, minus the projected income from other sources. The fixed charges are 
calculated by allocating the revenue requirement to routes and then dividing it 
among franchised passenger train operators on the basis of the vehicle miles 
operated. As a final step in the calculations, the Regulator checks again that the 
level of access charges he is proposing does not make it unduly difficult for 
Network Rail to finance its relevant activities. 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 266 
The charging scheme applied by Network Rail has been synthesized through expression 
[4]: 
! 
C = " V( )# + $ S,L,P( ) +
% S,O( )
T
+ & M( ) '
Energy _consumption
train ( km
  [4] 
 Where: 
 C track access charge (per train-km) 
 V vehicle 
 S type of service 
 L line or section 
 P time period 
 O operator 
 T traffic 
 M type of traction 
The values of the coefficients appearing in expression [4] for the period 2007-2008 are 
listed in Table 42. 
Table 42: Charges adopted by ORR for the period 2007-2008 
α (Usage charge) 0,02-0,81  € /vehicle-km 
β (Capacity charge) 0,00-1,33 € /train-km 
γ (Fixed charge) 29.549.085-907.144.644 € /year 
δ (Electrification charge) 0,013 € /kWh 
Note: Exchange rate 1 GBP = 1,33 EUR; 1mile = 1,609 km. 
Source: own elaboration from Network Rail 2008, p.43-44, ORR 2003b and ORR 2003c 
From the abovementioned figures it appears clear the relevance of the fixed charge, 
which is only applied to franchised services (i.e. passenger services). On average, and for 
the previous year 2006-2007, the fixed charge amounted 10,05 €/train-km115. As regards 
the relevance of the variable charge, we rely on the recent estimation performed by 
Geoff Jones for two different standard services running on the British rail network 
(Table 43). The first service (service 1) is a fast inter-city along the West Coast Main 
Line operated with a class 390 “Pendolino”; the second service (service 2) is a coal train 
hauled by class 66 locomotives with a total laden weight of 3.000 tons. The calculation 
takes into account a distance of 150 km for both services. 
 
                                                
115 According to ORR, the total amount due for the fixed charge in year 2006-2007 equalled 
3.502.444.702 GBP (ORR 2003c, p.2) while the traffic scheduled by the passenger operators in that 
period amounted 463.500.000 timetabled train-km (ORR 2007, p.18) 
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Table 43: Estimation of unitary track access charges to be paid by some standard services under 
Network Rail’s charging scheme for the timetable 2007-2008. 
 Service 1 
(Intercity on the West Coast 
Main Line operated by a 
class 390 Pendolino)  
Service 2 
(3.000 tons freight 
service hauled by class 
66 locomotives) 
α (Usage charge) 2,07 8,83 
β (Capacity charge) 0,80 0,00 
δ  (Electrification charge) 1,27 0,07 
TOTAL 4,14 8,90 
Note: Figures in €/train-km; Exchange rate applied: 1 GBP = 1,33 EUR. 
Source: adapted from EIM and CER, 2008, p.38  
 
6.4.4 Banverket (Sweden) 
Sweden was the first country in the world to separate operation and infrastructure 
management. This separation started in 1988, well before the Directive 91/440, when the 
Transport Policy Act took the infrastructure management role away from the integrated 
company Statens Järnvägar (SJ), to give it to the newly created Swedish National Rail 
Administration (Banverket)116. 
Fig. 84: Regulatory structure of the Swedish Railway Sector in 1988 and in 2005 
 
Source: Alexandersson et al. 2006 
Since then the railway sector has evolved from a regulatory structure characterized by 
the presence of a single monopolist in all market segments (SJ) to a structure in which 
freight services are opened to competition on the tracks, unprofitable passenger services 
(regional and interregional) are awarded under a competitive tendering procedure and 
                                                
116 Further information on the first steps of the Swedish railway reform can be found in Alexandersson 
and Hultén, 1999. 
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profitable regional services are still operated under the monopoly of SJ (Fig. 84). Within 
this arrangement, the State assumes new investments and the major part of 
infrastructure costs (upgrading and renewal). Banverket is mainly funded through State 
contributions, which cover the residual costs, while the regional railway services are 
funded directly by the competent regions. 
Banverket is an authority under the Ministry of Industry, Employment and 
Communication, aimed to ensure the financing of railway infrastructures, the technical 
management of the network and the regulation of the access to it on behalf of the 
Ministry of Transport. All of these activities are steered by the Swedish national 
transport policy goals, which seek “to secure a transport system for the general public 
and industry throughout Sweden that is both socio-economically efficient and sustainable 
in the long term” (Banverket, 2007a, p.23). In turn, this overall goal is decomposed in six 
long term sub-goals, namely: an accessible transport system, a high quality of transport, 
safe traffic, a sound environment, a positive regional development and a transport 
system that offers equal opportunities. Furthermore, Banverket delivers the user 
licenses, allocates the operation slots for the full timetable and is in charge of the 
calculation and levying of infrastructure charges, which have to be approved by the 
Swedish Parliament. 
The principles ruling the setting of railway infrastructure charges are laid down in the 
chapter 7 of the Railway Act 519/2004, which basically transposes the contents of 
Directive 2001/14/EC, though clearly stating the marginal cost principle as the basis of 
the overall charging scheme. Consequently with the application of this principle, the 
economic relevance of track access in year 2006 was limited, representing the 7,34% of 
Banverket operational expenditures in the period117 (Banverket 2007b, pp.57-63). 
Since the first implementation of the Railway Act, the railway infrastructure charging 
scheme applied by Banverket has remained unchanged for the timetables 2007, 2008 and 
2009 both in structure and values. As said, the charging scheme is based on the recovery 
of short run social marginal costs, which are levied through the sum of three different 
fees: a track charge levied per gross ton-km, an accident charge levied per train-km and 
an emission charge levied per litre of diesel fuel and dependent on the type of diesel 
traction. These fees are complemented by a train path charge and two special charges 
aimed to the partial recovery of fixed infrastructure costs: a special charge for passenger 
traffic levied per gross ton-km and a special charge per crossing of the Oresund Link 
levied only to freight trains per crossing (Banverket, 2008, pp.65-70).  
                                                
117  Ratio of incomes from track access charges over operating expenditures. Depreciation and financial 
expenditures are excluded.  
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The calculation procedures followed by Banverket to define the value of these charges 
are well documented: 
• The track charge (α), reflects the maintenance and operation average marginal 
costs identified by Andersson through an econometric analysis on the Swedish 
rail network (Andersson, 2006) 
• The accident charge (β) has been determined by studies on the change of the 
socio-economic costs associated with accidents involving railways when traffic 
volumes change. Suicide is not included in the calculation (Banverket, 2008, p. 
67). 
• The emission charge (γ) has been set at a level that corresponds to a gradual rise 
over ten years to a level based on the carbon dioxide tax on diesel fuel that 
applies to road traffic118. It is based on a study focusing on fuel consumption 
among different types of vehicles (Banverket, 2006, p.75). 
There is no so much public information on the train path charge (δ) and the special 
charge on passenger traffics (ε), though they seem to be related in some way to the costs 
arising from the construction of the Öresund link. That is clearly the case for the second 
special charge, levied on the freight trains crossing the bridge. 
The charging scheme applied by Banverket on a standard link of the network (i.e. 
different from the special section of the Öresund link) has been synthesized through 
expression [5]:  
( ) ( ) WS
kmtrain
nconsumptiofuel
MWC !++
"
!++!= #$%&'        [5] 
 Where: 
 C track access charge (per train-km) 
 W gross weight 
 S type of service 
 M type of traction 
 
The values adopted by Banverket in its 2009 network statement for the coefficients 
appearing in expression [5] are indicated in Table 44. 
 
 
                                                
118 In spite of this definition, the values recovered for this concept have remained unchanged over time. In 
fact, the network statements for 2008 and 2009 do not refer the same definition. 
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Table 44: Charges adopted by Banverket in its 2009 Network Statement. 
α (Track charge) 0,032  € cents/ gross ton-km 
β (Accident charge) 7,1 € cents/ train-km 
γ (Emission charge) 2,4-4,3 € cents/ litre of fuel 
δ (Train path charge) 2,75 € cents/ train-km 
ε (Special charge) 0-0,086 € cents/ gross ton-km 
Note: Exchange rate 1 SEK = 0,11 EUR. 
Source: own elaboration with data from Banverket, 2008, p.70  
In order to assess the relative relevance of the charging components of the Banverket’s 
charging scheme, a quick calculation has been performed for three different standard 
services (Table 45): Service 1 – passenger service with electric traction; Service 2 – 
freight service with electric traction; and Service 3 – freight service hauled by a diesel 
locomotive. 
It appears that the more relevant variable is the gross weight of the train, which acts 
through the track charge (α) in the case of freight services and through a combination of 
the track charge (α) and the special charge (ε) in the case of passenger services. It is also 
noticeable the effect of the emission charge, which in the example represents an increase 
of more than 20% in the final price for a diesel freight train (under the hypothesis of a 
consumption equal to 0,015 l/ton-km). 
Table 45: Estimation of unitary track access charges to be paid by some standard services under 
Banverket’s charging scheme for the timetable 2009. 
 Service 1 
(passenger, electric 
traction, 450 tons)  
Service 2 
(freight, electric 
traction, 1.500 tons) 
Service 3 
(freight, diesel, 
0,015 l/ton-km  
1.500 tons) 
α  (Track charge) 1,31   (26,6%) 4,35   (97,8%) 4,35   (80,3%) 
β  (Accident charge) 0,07   (1,4%) 0,07   (1,6%) 0,07   (1,3%) 
γ  (Emission charge) 0,00   (0,0%)   0,00   (0,0%)   0,97   (17,9%)   
δ  (Train path charge) 0,03   (0,6%) 0,03  (0,6%) 0,03   (0,5%) 
ε (Special charge) 3,51   (71,4%) 0,00   (0,0%)   0,00   (0,0%)   
TOTAL 4,91  4,45  5,42  
Note: Figures in €/train-km;  Exchange rate applied: 1 SEK = 0,11 EUR; For every charging component, 
the figure in brackets shows its contribution to the total charge applied to the service considered. 
Source: own calculations from Banverket 2008, p.70 
Accordingly to these values, the charging scheme applied by Banverket seems to 
provide strong incentives for the operators to reduce the gross weight of the trains as 
well as to improve the fuel efficiency and the traction system of their rolling stock. 
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6.4.5 REFER EP (Portugal) 
In April 1997, Portugal started the institutional reconfiguration of the railway sector by 
enacting the Decree 104/97, which created REFER E.P. (Rede Ferroviaria Nacional) as 
an infrastructure manager independent from CP (Comboios de Portugal). Few months 
later the new framework was completed with the creation of an independent regulatory 
body, the INTF (Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferroviario). 
Since the vertical unbundling of the sector, the property of the network is supported by 
the State, whereas its operation, maintenance and conservation are provided by the 
infrastructure manager as a public service. Up to date only one operator other than CP 
has obtained the license to operate in Portugal119. 
REFER is the public business entity responsible for managing the infrastructure of the 
Portuguese Railway System, in terms of construction, conservation, maintenance, 
management of property assets and capacity management in order to provide the market 
with a competitive, efficient, safe and environmentally sound transport infrastructure. 
REFER reports directly to the Ministries of Finance and of Public Works, 
Transportation and Housing and to the regulator INTF, who, among other tasks, is 
responsible for the approval of track access charges. 
The principles ruling the setting of railway infrastructure charges were first fixed in 
Decree-Law 270/2003, which adopted the legal content of Directive 2001/14/EC, and 
then developed through the INTF regulation 21/2005. In its chapter III, the regulation 
remarks the “direct cost principle” and provides in a very precise way the methodology 
that should drive the calculation of the basic charge for the minimum access package in 
the Portuguese rail network. It also provides guidance on the application of other 
elements foreseen in the European legislation, such as mark-ups, scarcity charges or 
performance regimes120. 
The charging scheme for the minimum access package applied by REFER is oriented to 
recover the direct costs related to the use of the infrastructure (which constitutes a 
proxy for the marginal costs). This objective is fulfilled through the so-called charge for 
                                                
119  The referred company is Fertagus, which was awarded with the concession of the operation of the 
suburban line Eixo Ferroviário Norte/Sul near Lisbon for 30 years after an international competitive 
tendering procedure (http://www.barraqueiro.com and http://www.fertagus.pt; 2008-07-15). 
120 It is noticeable the degree of development and consistency of the mentioned regulation in the 
definition of principles and methodologies that should drive the calculation of track access charges. 
Though until now only a performance regime has been added to the basic charge, the norm goes well 
beyond the Directive 2001/14/EC in the definition of costs to be included in the charges, the market 
conditions to be respected when applying mark-ups or the inclusion of incentives for the reduction of 
infrastructure management costs.  
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essential services, levied per train-km and dependent on the line used, the type of 
railway service and the type of route (electrified/non-electrified). In addition, a 
cancellation charge and a performance regime based on delay minutes accountancy are 
also applied (REFER, 2007, pp.41-49). The overall charging scheme has remained stable 
over the last three years, with some variations in the values levied (see REFER 2006, 
pp.41-49 and REFER 2005, pp.43-52). 
The calculation of the charge for essential services has been done according to the 
methodology proposed by the Universidade Autonoma da Lisboa and the Universidade 
Catolica do Porto and reflected in Regulation 21/2005. This procedure is based on the 
definition of homogenous groups (that is, sections with equal technology and operation 
conditions, equal type of services provided and equal cost structures) and the allocation 
of traffic dependent cost categories to them. Then unitary charges are calculated for 
every homogeneous group by dividing the costs that are directly related to each essential 
service by the useable capacities in every part of the network where the services are 
offered. It is remarkable that costs are calculated for the reference optimal network 
management conditions and for a full use of capacity. Furthermore a transitional mark-
up is set to guarantee the cost recovery in present conditions (UAL & UCP, 2000). 
The current system is based in 9 homogeneous groups and allows the recovery of seven 
cost categories: track maintenance, bridges and tunnels maintenance, traffic control costs, 
telecommunications, signaling maintenance, level crossings and general costs directly 
related with traffic. The allocation of costs to each of the operators and homogeneous 
groups is done according to expression [6]: 
! 
TUi = (CKAi
g "
g=1
G
# C1g ) + ( f ig "
g=1
G
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c=1
C
# C1g ) + f i "C4 + Mi       [6] 
  
Where: 
 TUi Track use charge for operator i 
CKAig Weighted km circulated by operator i in homogeneous group g 
(weighting coefficient = 1 (passenger), 2,56 (freight) 
C1g   Estimated track maintenance cost in homogeneous group g 
fig   Proportion of CKA run in homogeneous group g done by operator i 
C2g  Estimated signalling, stations (operation and control, 
telecommunications, tunnels and bridges, and level crossing costs in 
homogeneous group g 
fic    Proportion of CKA run in the influence area of control post c done by 
operator i 
6. Characterization of case studies     
   273    
C3c   Estimated cost for control post c. 
fi    Proportion of CKA run in the whole network by operator i 
C4   General costs directly related with traffic 
M  Transitional mark-up 
The C coefficients are calculated for the reference optimal network management 
conditions and a transitional mark-up is set to guarantee the cost recovery in current 
conditions. The mark-up is considered to tend to zero over a stated period (7 year) as a 
result of cost efficiency improvements (UAL & UCP, 2000, pp.122-132). 
In spite of the complex calculation procedure shown above, the charging scheme applied 
by REFER adopts a rather simple form for the operator, that can be synthesized 
through expression [7]:  
! 
C ="(L,S,M)        [7] 
 Where: 
 C track access charge (per train-km) 
 L line or section 
 S type of service 
 M type of traction 
Table 46: Unitary track access charges to be paid under REFER’s charging scheme for the 
timetable 2009. 
Line 
 Service 1 
 (passenger, 
electric 
traction) 
Service 2 
(passenger, 
non electric 
traction) 
Service 3 
(freight, 
electric 
traction) 
Service 4 
(freight, non 
electric 
traction) 
Average 
HG 1 1,46 1,35 1,52 1,41 1,44 
HG 2 1,38 1,33 1,41 1,35 1,37 
HG 3 1,2 1,12 1,27 1,15 1,19 
HG 4 1,37 1,29 1,38 1,31 1,34 
HG 5 1,52 1,49 1,53 1,5 1,51 
HG 6 1,57 1,39 1,6 1,44 1,50 
HG 7 1,23 1,08 1,27 1,13 1,18 
HG 8 --- 1,77 --- 1,95 1,86 
HG 9 --- 1,32 --- 1,57 1,45 
Average 1,39 1,35 1,43 1,42 1,40 
Note: Figures in €/train-km; HG: homogeneous group. 
Source: REFER, 2008, p.42 
According to REFER’s network statement for year 2009, the value of α varies between 
1,08 and 1,77 €/train-km for passenger trains and between 1,13 and 1,95 €/train-km for 
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freight trains, mainly depending on the line used and only to a minor extent on the type 
of traction (Table 46). Roughly speaking, the unitary values of the charge for essential 
services remain included within a band of 1,4 €/train-km ± 20%, with the exception of 
the services running on the lines included in homogeneous group 8. This group gathers 
non-electrified lines with low levels of traffic (less than 50 trains per day). 
 
6.4.6 Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (Italy) 
The reform of the Italian railway sector took off in year 2000, with the enactment of the 
Ministerial Decree 138-T of October 31st 2000, which renewed the concession of the 
management of the rail network to the national railway company Ferrovie dello Stato 
(FS) with the condition of transferring it to a specifically created infrastructure 
management company (Art. 1.2). In December 2000 the entity Ferrovie dello Stato 
Holding was created and entitled with the activities other than the infrastructure 
management, which remained within FS. On July 1st 2001, FS changed its name to Rete 
Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) and the Italian Treasury Ministry transferred its property to 
Ferrovie dello Stato Holding, which then changed its name to Ferrovie dello Stato As a 
result of this process, the infrastructure management activity remained in RFI, a 
company belonging to the national holding FS. 
The operation of transport services is performed by Trenitalia, the public operator 
integrated within the holding FS, and a number of new entrants, particularly actives in 
the trans-Alpine freight transport market. At the end of year 2006, 44 railway 
undertakings were in possession of a license and 16 among them had the safety 
certificate (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail, 2008-07-26). The market share of the new 
entrants in that year represented the 8% of the train-km run in the network, though it 
reached the 25-30% in the Alpine passes (Macchiati, 2008, p.6). 
RFI performs its activity under the supervision of the State, which has defined its 
financial contributions to the infrastructure manager within a framework agreement 
(Contratto di programma 2007-2011). RFI defines its mission as “the execution of 
investments dedicated to the building of new lines” and also remarks other objectives as 
“ensuring the safety of the operation in the whole network, to develop the technology of 
systems and materials, and to provide the maintenance of an efficient network” (RFI, 
2004, p.7). The relevance given in this statement to the construction activity is in line 
with the efforts performed in the last years for the extension of the High speed / High 
capacity network (Fig. 85). 
RFI is in responsible for the levying of track access charges in its network. The charges 
are fixed by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport after their approval by the 
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CIPE (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica). The CIPE is a 
pan-governmental institution that carries out the determination and evaluation of the 
charging system for the access to national infrastructure (including both railways and 
motorways). The CIPE also approves all investment projects that are undertaken in 
Italy, assessing their feasibility. According to the TREND project, the responsibility of 
the infrastructure manager in the definition of the charge level is likely to increase in a 
near future, becoming freer from governmental approval (Gruppo Class, 2005, p.25). 
Fig. 85: Extension of the high speed / high capacity network in Italy 
 
Source : http ://www.rfi.it (2008-07-26) 
The structure of the infrastructure charges to be levied in the Italian network was 
defined as early as in March 2000 through the Ministry Decree 43/T, complemented by 
the Ministry Decree 44/T. The main principle underlying this scheme was the recovery 
of the operation costs arising from the use of a technologically efficient infrastructure. 
The difference between their amount and the total operation costs should be covered by 
the State through a discount. This discount would be decreasing in time as the railway 
infrastructure improved its condition (CIPE, 1999a). 
This framework remained unaltered when the three Directives of the First Railway 
Infrastructure Package were transposed into national law with the Legislative Decree 
N.188 of 8 July 2003. In its article 17.3 the decree specifies that the determination of 
the charge for the minimum access package takes into account the direct and indirect 
costs of circulation and the costs of the energy used by the infrastructure manager in its 
activity, as well as the direct general expenses and the quote of the indirect ones. In 
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order to state the final charge, eventually compensations and public contributions are 
deducted. 
Therefore the charging scheme applied today by RFI in its network is still the one 
specified in the Decree 43/T, though since 2000 its levels have been updated twice 
(Decree 11 April 2003 and Decree 18 August 2006). Accordingly with the cost basis 
underlying the scheme, the cost recovery attained is limited. In year 2007, the incomes 
from track access charges represented the 22% of the operating expenditures (RFI, 
2008a, p. 199 and p. 211). 
The charging scheme applied by RFI is differentiated according to three types of line 
(trunk lines, complementary lines and nodes). For each type a fixed access charge (α) 
and a variable charge (δ) are defined. The fixed access charge takes into account the 
quality of the railway infrastructure and is dependent on the section used. The 
parameters taking part in the variable charge depend on the type of line: for trunk lines 
traffic density, wear and tear causation and speed deviation are taken into account; for 
complementary lines type of infrastructure is considered; for nodes the use of stations 
and the time spent at the node are relevant (RFI, 2006a, Annex). Furthermore, the 
charging scheme includes a performance regime in the form of a delay-minutes 
accountancy system based on the outcomes of the European Performance Regime, 
managed by RFI for the UIC since 2000. 
The Italian Administration follows a top-down approach to define the track access 
charges, which starts with the definition of the total amount to be recovered and its 
allocation to the fixed and variable parts of the charge. The amount to be distributed 
among the charges is equal to the operational cost basis (as mentioned in decree 43/T) 
reduced by an amount K1, equal to a compensation from the State to the infrastructure 
manager because of the increased costs derived from the bad technological condition of 
the network. A 40% of the resulting amount is allocated to the fixed access charge (α), 
while the remaining 60% is allocated to the variable charge (δ). 
The fixed access charge (α) is then differentiated according to the type of line and the 
technical characteristics of the section. As it has been mentioned before, the Italian 
charging scheme distinguishes three types of lines, internally broken down into sections 
(Fig. 86). The groups taken into account in the distribution of the fixed charge are: main 
nodes, trunk lines (double track – maximum speed 250 km/h), trunk lines (double track – 
maximum speed 200 km/h), trunk lines (conventional double track lines), trunk lines 
(single track lines), complementary lines (secondary lines), complementary lines (low 
traffic lines) and complementary lines (shuttle lines). 
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Fig. 86: Example of infrastructure classification for charging purposes in the Italian network 
 
Source: Marzioli, 2004, p.8 
The variable charge (δ) is made of two components: a distance-dependent component 
(β), applied in types of line other than the main nodes and a time-dependent component 
(γ) applied in the main nodes. The distance dependent component has been defined as a 
unitary rate (€/train-km) that is affected by a modulator. The modulator integrates three 
variables, all with the same weight (1/3 each): P1 – speed deviation from optimal speed, 
P2 – saturation of the section, and P3 – deterioration of the infrastructure (15% 
allocated to the catenary and 85% allocated to track). Though the expressions retained 
for each of the variables are continuous, as detailed in [8], [9] and [10], the values 
applied in the charging scheme are organized within bands. 
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capacityij  capacity defined for section j in period i 
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Where: 
β1   weight for track deterioration 
β2   weight for catenary deterioration 
speedj   speed of the train running on section j 
weightj   weight of the train running on section j 
n_pantographsj number of pantographs of the train running on section j 
speed_tj  speed of the reference train 
weight_tj  weight of the reference train  
n_pantographs_tj number of pantographs of the reference train 
 
The time-dependent component has been obtained as a unitary rate (€/train-min) 
affected by a modulator dependent on the time period and the category of the stations 
used within the node. 
It is noticeable that the described top-down cost allocation procedure followed does 
only establish the equivalence between costs and charges at the national level, and 
therefore it does not guarantee cost relatedness for specific lines. This fact is referred by 
the Italian Administration as the “network solidarity” principle (CIPE, 1999b, p.3). 
The differentiation criteria included in the charging scheme are clearly oriented to the 
provision of adequate incentives to the operators. More precisely they are oriented to 
promote the behaviors listed in Table 47. 
Table 47: Incentives foreseen in the Italian charging scheme 
Incentive Provision adopted in the charging scheme 
Avoid misuse of reserved capacity The fixed charge is levied as a reservation 
charge 
Avoid partial use of the reserved capacity  The fixed charge makes the overall payment 
degressive with distance 
Avoid diverging speeds in the network Parameter P1 – Speed deviation 
Avoid infrastructure deterioration Parameter P2 – Infrastructure deterioration 
Avoid misuse of scarce capacity Parameter P3 – Saturation of the section 
Avoid excessive node use Time dependent charge in nodes 
Promote distribution of demand over time Consideration of different time periods 
Promote use of alternative routes Price differentiation between trunk and 
secondary lines 
Promote use of secondary stations at nodes Price differentiation for main stations within a 
node 
Source: adapted from CIPE 1999b, pp. 9-10 
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On the top of the amounts defined for the track access charge, the State provides a 
subsidy to the railway operators in the form of a discount (K2) administered by the 
infrastructure manager. This discount is structured in two components, one depending 
on the number of train-km run in sections with bad technological conditions (K2a), and 
another linked to the total volume of traffic run by the railway operator (K2b). The 
component K2a is linked to the additional costs resulting from the need of two drivers in 
several sections of the network and is calculated as the direct and indirect salary costs of 
the second driver, distinguishing day and night shifts. The amount due for this concept 
cannot be greater than the variable part of the charge (δ). The component K2b is paid 
yearly to the operators as an indemnity for difficulties in connections, in train formation 
and non-scheduled stops. The application of the discounts K2a and K2b to the 
operators has been the origin of several ongoing disputes between RFI and the new 
entrants in the market121. 
Fig. 87: Calculation of track access charges in the Italian rail network 
Source: own elaboration 
                                                
121 According to Decree 44-T, the discount K2 should be applied until the technological conditions of the 
network allow the running of trains with a single driver. In several sections RFI has already accomplished 
the works updating the signalling systems to this condition, but it has not issued the regulations allowing 
for the use of a single driver. In this scenario RFI has refused the discount to several new entrants, who in 
turn have raised a number of complaints to the Italian Antitrust Agency (AGCM). In view of the facts, the 
Agency has promoted an infringement procedure against FS and RFI (AGCM, 2007). In order to clarify 
the situation, the Transport Ministry has enacted the Ministerial Decree 92-T, which links the application 
of the discount K2 to the issuing of the adequate regulations but also to its remboursement to RFI by the 
State. 
Gross cost basis (Decree 43/T) 
State subsidy (K1) Net cost basis 
Σ Fixed charges 
(allocated to 
infrastructure sections) 
Σ Variable charges  
(allocated to infrastructure 
sections; different modulators) 
Σ Discounts per 
section (K2a) 
Gross amount due for track access 
charges (over one year) 
Yearly 
discount 
(K2b) 
Net amount due for 
track access charges 
(over one year) 
 
40% 60% 
K2a ≤ variable 
charge (for 
every section) 
K2a and K2b  ≤ 80% of 
the track access charge 
due by the operator 
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The whole calculation procedure followed by the Italian Administration in order to 
define the charging scheme to be applied by RFI is graphically presented in Fig. 87.  
This complex procedure is not perceived directly by the operator, who is confronted 
with a charging scheme as the one synthesized in expression [11]: 
! 
C =
"(L)
l
+ #(L,P,s
1
,s
2
,W ,g) + $(L,P) /s
2   [11] 
Where: 
 C track access charge (per train-km) 
L line or section 
l length of the route 
P time period 
 s speed (s1: running speed, s2: commercial speed)  
W gross weight  
 g number of pantographs 
 
The values adopted in 2008 by the Italian Administration for the coefficients appearing 
in expression [11] are indicated in Table 48. 
Table 48: Coefficients and charges adopted for the Italian network in the 2008 timetable 
α (Fixed charge) 0,00-66,58 € /train path 
β (Distance dependent component) 0,68-3,40 € /train-km 
γ (Time dependent component) 0,82-5,36 €/min 
Source: own elaboration with data from RFI 2007c 
An analysis has been conducted in order to estimate the relevance of each of these 
coefficients (α, β, γ) in the formation of the final unitary price. 
The amount of the fixed access charge (α) depends on the type of line and the technical 
characteristics of the section used by the train. However, its impact on the unitary 
charge (i.e. per train-km) is determined by the distance effectively run by the train in the 
section considered. Table 49 provides some estimation of the fixed access charge unitary 
values, obtained by dividing the access charge by the average length of the sections 
within each type of line (therefore implicitly assuming that train runs all over the 
section). 
The amount due for the distance-dependent component (β) is linked to the type of line 
and, only when the train runs on trunk lines, to modulation parameters relying on other 
technical variables. In this case, each of the modulation parameters considered in the 
charging scheme (P1, P2 and P3) has a different weight in the final amount of the 
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distance dependent component (β). This fact can be appreciated in Table 50, which 
shows the contribution of each modulator to the unitary amount of β. 
Table 49: Unitary fixed access charges to be paid in the Italian network in the 2008 timetable 
Type of line Technical characteristics of the section Fixed charge 
(€) 
Unitary charge 
(€/train-km) 
Main nodes a Main node 53,26 1,17 
Double track – Maximum speed 250 km/h 66,58 0,43 
Double track – Maximum speed 200 km/h 58,58 0,38 
Conventional double track lines 55,92 0,36 
Main network b 
(trunk lines) 
Single track lines 50,59 0,33 
Secondary lines 47,93 n/a 
Low traffic lines 0,00 n/a 
Complementary 
network c  
Shuttle lines 23,24 n/a 
Note: a) Average length calculated as length of node lines obtained from RFI 2008b (910 km), divided by 
the number of links associated to the nodes according to RFI 2006a (40) and multiplied by 2 (the train 
runs on two links before leaving the node); b) Average length calculated as length of the trunk lines 
obtained from RFI 2008b (6034 km) divided by the number of sections included in this category 
according to RFI 2006a (39); c) In the complementary network, the access charge is only paid once and 
not in every section, making impossible to provide a reliable estimation at this stage; n/a non applicable. 
Source: own elaboration with data from RFI 2008b and RFI 2006a 
Table 50: Influence of the modulators P1, P2 and P3 in the unitary amount of the distance 
dependent component (β) in the Italian charging scheme for year 2008 
 Parameter P1 Parameter P2 Parameter P3 TOTAL (β) 
Variables included L, P, s2 L, P W, g, s1  
Contribution to the 
distance dependent 
component (β) 
0,34-1,70 
€/train-km 
0,10-0,51 
€/train-km 
0,24-1,19 
€/train-km 
0,68-3,40 
€/train-km 
Note: L – line or section, P – time period, s2 – commercial speed, W – gross weight, g – number of 
pantographs, s1 – running speed. 
Source: own elaboration with data from RFI 2006a 
In the case of the modulation parameter P1, the type of section (L) and the time period 
(P) define the preferred operation conditions in the line and set a benchmark that is to be 
compared against the commercial speed of the train (s2). The value of the modulator 
reflects the speed deviation from the benchmark in a progressive way until a maximum 
Transferability assessment of rail infrastructure charges 
 282 
value for deviations greater than 100%122. The operator can influence the value of P1 by 
choosing a route more adapted to the conditions of its services or/and adapting their 
commercial speed to the optimal speed of the section. 
In the case of the modulation parameter P2, the type of section (L) and the time period 
(P) directly define its value, which can only be influenced by the operator through the 
rerouting or rescheduling of its services. 
In the case of the modulation parameter P3, the deterioration of the infrastructure (both 
track and catenary) produced by the trains running on the network is compared against 
the deterioration produced by a reference train123. The expression driving the value of 
the modificator reveals the low importance of the number of pantographs and the 
predominant role of the running speed and the weight in the relative deterioration124. 
However, the modulator P3 caps the influence of the relative deterioration for values 
greater than 3,5. The operator can reduce the effect of the modulation parameter P3 
through the reduction of the weight or the running speed of the services operated in the 
network. 
The amount due for the time dependent component (γ) is only relevant in the main 
nodes and is related to the time period and the category of the stations within the node 
used by the train. When analyzed on a unitary basis (per train-km), it is necessary to 
introduce the commercial speed within the node (including stops at stations) to reflect 
the time dependent nature of γ. Table 51 provides some estimation of the time 
dependent component unitary values in the time period 9:00-22:00, presented for 
different values of the commercial speed and categories of station. 
 
                                                
122 Implicitly, the values adopted by the modulator P1 penalize more the speed deviations when the train 
runs faster than the optimal reference speed (only case when the deviation can be greater than the optimal 
speed itself). 
123 The characteristics of the reference train are weight (W) equal to 500 tons, running speed (s1) equal to 
80 km/h and number of pantographs (g) equal to 1 (RFI, 2006a). 
124 Neither the Ministerial Decree 43-T or the RFI’s Network Statement specify the units to be considered 
in the calculation of P3, but if the units to be adopted are the ones used to define the reference train (tons 
and km/h), the deterioration produced on the catenary appears to be negligible and the variable g 
irrelevant. 
 E.g. for the train type the deterioration, calculated according to [10] is:       
( ) ( ) 12000.720.218015,05008085,0 2 +=!!+!!=ionDeteriorat   
In these circumstance the deviation in the deterioration could be approached with the expression k·W·s12, 
with   k = 3,125·10-7 h2/ton·km2. 
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Table 51: Estimation of some unitary time dependent charges (γ) to be paid in the Italian network 
in year 2008 
 Commercial speed at the node  (including stop at station) 
 10 km/h 30 km/h 50km/h 
Central stations 24,77 €/train-km 8,26 €/train-km 4,95 €/train-km 
Other stations 6,19 €/train-km 2,06 €/train-km 1,24 €/train-km 
Source: own elaboration with data from RFI 2006a 
Lastly, a synthetic calculation has been performed to assess the amount of track access 
charges to be paid by some standard services running on the Italian network. The 
estimation has studied six different services (three passenger services of 450 tons 
running at 80, 120 and 160 km/h and three freight services of 1.500 tons running at 60, 
80 and 120 km/h) running on links of the main and complementary network at different 
time periods. The implicit hypotheses for the estimation are: 1) that the commercial 
speed in the link is equal to the running speed (therefore no stops are considered); 2) 
that the density factor driving modulator P2 is more than 75% in the time periods 6:00-
9:00 and 9:00-22:00 and is between 50% and 75% in the time period 22:00-6:00. 
Table 52: Estimation of unitary track access charges to be paid by some standard services under 
RFI’s charging scheme for the timetable 2008 
 Passenger Passenger Passenger Freight Freight Freight 
Time period 6:00-9:00 80 km/h 120 km/h 160 km/h 60 km/h 80 km/h 120 km/h 
Trunk lines 450tons 450tons 450tons 1500tons 1500tons 1500tons 
Double track  
(Maximum speed 250 km/h) 1,72 2,58 3,15 2,00 2,58 2,58 
Double track 
(Maximum speed 200 km/h) 1,57 3,10 3,78 1,95 2,42 3,10 
Conventional double track lines 1,55 3,09 3,77 1,83 2,40 3,09 
Single track lines 2,20 3,73 3,73 1,89 3,05 3,73 
       
Secondary line 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 
 
 Passenger Passenger Passenger Freight Freight Freight 
Time period 9:00-22:00 80 km/h 120 km/h 160 km/h 60 km/h 80 km/h 120 km/h 
Trunk lines 450tons 450tons 450tons 1500tons 1500tons 1500tons 
Double track  
(Maximum speed 250 km/h) 2,30 2,58 2,47 2,58 3,15 2,58 
Double track 
(Maximum speed 200 km/h) 1,67 2,42 2,52 1,95 2,52 2,42 
Conventional double track lines 1,55 2,51 3,09 1,93 2,40 2,51 
Single track lines 1,52 3,05 3,73 1,79 2,37 3,05 
       
Secondary line 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 
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 Passenger Passenger Passenger Freight Freight Freight 
Time period 22:00-6:00 80 km/h 120 km/h 160 km/h 60 km/h 80 km/h 120 km/h 
Trunk lines 450tons 450tons 450tons 1500tons 1500tons 1500tons 
Double track  
(Maximum speed 250 km/h) 1,55 2,30 2,41 2,41 2,41 2,30 
Double track 
(Maximum speed 200 km/h) 1,50 2,93 3,61 1,67 2,35 2,93 
Conventional double track lines 1,49 3,60 3,60 1,66 2,34 3,60 
Single track lines 2,03 3,56 3,56 1,72 2,88 3,56 
       
Secondary line 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 
Note: Figures in €/train-km, includes access charge and distance related component. 
Source: own calculations with data from RFI 2006a  
The results of the estimation (Table 52) range between 1,03 €/train-km and 3,75 €/train-
km and reveal a joint effect of the access charge and the modulation parameters which 
not always provides a clear signal to the operators. E.g. a slow heavy freight train may 
pay a lower charge than a fast light passenger train when running in the 6:00-9:00 period 
(given the reduced optimal speed in that time period and the weight of the speed when 
defining the relative deterioration of the infrastructure). 
As referred previously, the values resulting from the calculation of the charges should be 
reduced by the amount of the discount K2a (as defined in Decree 44-T). It should be 
noticed that the values of the discounts applied are high in relation to the average fees, 
ranging between 0,145 and 1,703 €/train-km for trains running distances up to120 km 
and between 0,206 and 1,703 €/train-km for trains running distances greater than 120 
km. 
 
 
6.5 Synthesis 
The selection of case studies able to illustrate and challenge the assumptions made in the 
proposed framework has been performed through three steps. First the importer and 
jurisdiction has been chosen taking into account the availability of information, as way 
to proxy the informational conditions expected for the transferability assessment. Then 
the exporter jurisdictions has been selected through the application of a threefold 
criterion including the maturity achieved in the practice of rail infrastructure charging, the 
size of the railway infrastructure market and the geographical proximity to the importer 
jurisdiction. Finally, the objects to be transferred have been selected on the basis of their 
distribution across the levels defined in the conceptual framework (pricing principles, 
charging scheme and charging practice) and the representativeness of the object 
transferred in the exporter jurisdiction. According to this methodology, the network 
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currently managed by ADIF has been selected as importer jurisdiction and the networks 
managed by RFF (France), DB Netz (Germany), RFI (Italy), Network Rail (UK), 
Banverket (Sweden) and REFER EP (Portugal) as exporter jurisdictions, setting the 
basis for the development of six case studies. 
The charging systems currently applied in the importer jurisdiction and the exporter 
jurisdictions have been characterized in detail, confirming the high level of diversity 
among the practices followed in the EU as regards their objectives, principles, 
structures, levels and calculation procedures. This variety of options confirms the 
starting point of this research, i.e. the potential interest of transferability, and is 
considered an adequate starting point for the formation of case studies able to explore its 
limitations.  
The charging system currently applied in the importer jurisdiction (network managed by 
ADIF in Spain) is strongly conditioned by financial considerations linked to the ongoing 
expansion of the high speed network and the future opening to competition of the 
passenger railway market. The overall regulation of the charges applied has been 
designed in order to fulfill the conditions set in the European system of accounts ESA-
95 to avoid the consolidation of ADIF and RENFE-Operadora with the general 
government sector. The principles followed to determine the charge mainly rely on a 
cost related basis for freight, suburban, regional and long distance services and on the 
ability to pay of operators for the high speed services. The structure adopted follows a 
two-part tariff with a yearly access charge dependent on traffic and variable reservation 
and operation charges. High speed traffic is charged as well a traffic charge. The levels of 
the unitary charge applied to services are found to vary approximately in a proportion 
of 1 to 90 between the cheapest and the more expensive service. 
The charging systems applied in the exporter jurisdictions have been generally set on the 
basis of domestic policy objectives and financial considerations. They provide a good 
sample of different regulatory conditions, pricing principles (marginal cost pricing, social 
marginal cost pricing, marginal cost plus mark-ups or full cost minus subsidies), charging 
components and variables (Table 53), charging levels (within a range approximately 
going from 0,5 to 20 €/train-km depending on the specific conditions of the service) and 
calculation procedures. The French charging system is found to have many points in 
common with the Spanish one, as regards its focus on financial considerations. The 
German system seeks full cost recovery through a complex specification able to transmit 
a wide range of incentives to the market and related to both the supply and the demand 
side. The British charging system is coordinated with a large and experienced regulatory 
mechanism. It is based on marginal cost estimations and includes a specific mark-up 
levied on franchised train operators and intended to ensure full cost recovery. The 
Swedish system is based on short run social marginal costs and detailed cost calculation 
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methodologies, though it appears simple as regards charge differentiation. The 
Portuguese pricing system is oriented to recover marginal costs related to the use of the 
infrastructure through a straightforward but efficient differentiation of charges. Finally, 
the Italian system is based on a full cost recovery minus State subsidies principle 
applied to the market through an elaborate scheme able to provide complex incentives 
through the consideration of infrastructure, vehicle, operation and time related variables. 
Table 53: Synthesis of charging structures applied in the studied jurisdictions 
IM Charging structure 
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Note: C – Unitary charge (per train-km), T-Traffic volume, P – Time period, L – Line or section, S – Type 
of service, s – Speed, H – Type of path (priority), W – Train weight, V – Type of vehicle, O – Operator, M 
– Type of traction, l – Length of the route, s1 – Running speed, s2 – Commercial speed, g – Number of 
pantographs; α, β, γ, δ, ε and ϕ express functional dependency. 
Source: own elaboration with data from sections 6.3, 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.4, 6.4.5 and 6.4.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Development of case studies     
   287    
 
 
Chapter 
7  
DEVELOPMENT OF CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the case studies performed in this chapter is conceived as a way to test 
the validity and assumptions of the transferability assessment framework proposed in 
chapter 5. Building on the selection and the detailed characterization of importer and 
exporter jurisdictions produced in chapter 6, for every case study the analysis identifies 
the basic elements stated on the conceptual framework and explores the application of 
the transferability criteria there enounced. 
The aim of the case studies developed in this chapter is not to provide the result of the 
transferability assessment (i.e. say if the selected object is transferable or not), but to 
examine if the framework proposed seems robust enough to support the analysis of 
every case. In line with this goal, every case has explored first the main elements 
retained relevant for the analysis and then studied their consideration within the 
framework. 
Accordingly, the presentation of the case studies has adopted the following structure: 1) 
Preliminary analysis – this first section introduces the case, details the characteristics of 
the object being transferred and exposes the more basic considerations that should be 
taken into account when transferring it. It is an analysis performed outside of the 
framework proposed and will serve as a reference to conclude on its validity for that 
case; 2) Elements of the transfer network – this second section presents the basic 
elements of the problem according to the framework proposed (section 5.3.3); 3) Level 
of analysis – this section identifies the level of analysis adopted for the case study 
according to the framework proposed (section 5.3.4); and 4) Transferability criteria – 
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this final section explores the application of the four transferability criteria previously 
defined to the case study (section 5.3.5). 
Table 54: Summary of selected case studies  
Case study 
number 
Importer 
jurisdiction 
Exporter 
jurisdiction 
Object 
1 ADIF (Spain) RFF (France) Charging scheme for high speed services 
2 ADIF (Spain) DB Netz (Germany) Charging scheme for freight services 
3 ADIF (Spain) Network Rail (UK) Congestion cost calculation and allocation 
procedure 
4 ADIF (Spain) Banverket (Sweden) Marginal social cost pricing principle 
5 ADIF (Spain) REFER (Portugal) Infrastructure cost calculation and allocation 
procedure 
6 ADIF (Spain) RFI (Italy) Full cost minus subsidy pricing principle 
Source: own elaboration 
Each of the following sections is dedicated to one of the case studies indicated in Table 
54: section 7.2 analyzes the transfer of the high speed charging scheme applied by RFF 
in France; section 7.3 studies the transfer of the charge structure levied by DB Netz to 
freight services; section 7.4 examines the possible introduction of the cost calculation 
procedures used by ORR to determine the capacity charge applied in the UK; section 
7.5 focuses on the transfer of the Swedish marginal social cost pricing principle; section 
7.6 details the transfer of the cost calculation and allocation procedure used to determine 
the charge for essential services levied by REFER EP; section 7.7 analyzes the potential 
implementation of the full cost minus subsidies pricing principle applied in the Italian 
network; Finally section 7.8 resumes the conclusions derived from the case studies. 
 
 
7.2 Case 1: Charging scheme for high speed services 
7.2.1 Preliminary analysis 
This first case study seeks to frame the assessment of transferability of the charging 
scheme applied to high speed services in France to the Spanish network. The aim of the 
transfer, undertaken by the Spanish Public Works Ministry, is to increase the overall 
cost recovery ratio on high speed services by applying a structure and general level 
inspired in the French ones. 
Though it is not possible to provide an average figure of the level of track access charges 
for high speed services in France and Spain (given the aggregation of figures publicly 
available), the comparison between the charging levels can be established on the basis of 
7. Development of case studies     
   289    
an average service. Taking as a reference the charge for a conventional high speed train, in 
Spain it ranges between 6,51-6,88 €/train-km (Table 24) if it runs in the normal time 
period, while in France it amounts to 8,03 €/train-km (Table 37). Hence, it can be 
assumed as hypothesis for the case that the introduction of the new scheme is likely to 
rise about 20% the average level of the charges on high speed services. 
The differences between the charging schemes (both in level and structure) currently 
applied in the Spanish and the French networks to high speed services are indicated in 
Table 55. Both schemes present similar components, though they differ in the variables 
and the levels associated to each of them. 
Table 55: Differences between existing and transferred charging schemes for high speed services 
 Importer jurisdiction 
(Ministerio de Fomento) 
Exporter jurisdiction 
(Ministère de l’Equipement) 
 Structure Level Structure Level 
Access charge 
! 
" T( )
T
 
0,01 
! 
"(L)  1,051 
Reservation charge 
! 
" P,L,S( )  0,72-3,54 
! 
"(L,P)  0,908 – 15,137 
Modulation coefficient --- --- 
! 
"(S,s,l)  1 (factor) 
Operation / running charge 
! 
"(L,S)  0,72-2,08 
! 
"(S)  1,428 
Traffic charge 
! 
"(P,L,S)  2,345-4,585 --- --- 
Note: Level expressed in €/train-km; Levels calculated for high speed services only; Levels of access 
charge and traffic charge in the importer jurisdiction estimated for Renfe-Operadora and 350 seats/train; 
T – Traffic volume; P – Time period; L - Type of line; S – Type of service; s – Speed; l – Length of the 
route; α, β, γ and δ express functional dependency.  
Source: own elaboration with data from Ministerio de Fomento 2007h and RFF 2007d 
The consecution of the average increase in cost recovery will depend on the ability of 
the imported structure to exploit the willingness to pay of the demand in the new 
context and the effective ability to pay of the operators. The first issue mainly depends 
on the railway transport market segmentation and characteristics, while the second is 
mostly related to the economic equilibrium of the railway operators. This equilibrium is 
in turn conditioned by the characteristics of the final transport market (elasticity to 
price of final users), the cost and income structure of the operation business (ability to 
absorb the increase in infrastructure charges) and the regulatory framework for the 
transport operation business (e.g. allowance of cross subsidies, existence of State 
subsidies, etc.). 
At present, the high speed services rendered by RENFE-Operadora are the only market 
segment able to generate operational profits for the company without subsidies (2,7 €/ 
train-km in 2005 - Table 29) and, in a near future, they will probably increase their net 
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contribution. It is therefore important to take into consideration the effect that any rise 
in the infrastructure charge levied on this segment will have on the overall financial 
situation of the company, particularly on the financing of its investment commitments. 
Additionally, the introduction of a different charging scheme may alter the existing 
incentive structure, both through the variables considered for differentiation and the 
levels adopted for track access charges. With respect to this circumstance, it should be 
noted that for high speed services, the French scheme differentiates the charges 
according to the type of line and the time period, while the Spanish scheme also takes 
into account the type of service. Moreover, the variations according to the time period 
and the type of line observed in the French scheme are greater than those observed in the 
Spanish scheme (see Table 25 and Table 37). 
The success in the implementation of the new charging structure in the importer 
jurisdiction will also depend on other issues as the political context framing the decision-
making process, the acceptability of the changes proposed or the cost of introducing the 
new structure. 
 
7.2.2 Elements of the transfer framework 
The analysis of this case study through the framework proposed, requires first to define 
its fundamental elements. They have been characterized in Table 56. 
Table 56: Case 1 - Elements of the transfer framework 
Importer jurisdiction General Interest Railway Network (REFIG) managed by ADIF 
Importer entity Ministry of Public Works (Spain) 
Exporter jurisdiction Railway network managed by RFF 
Exporter entity Ministry of Transport (France) 
Aim of the transfer process Increase in cost recovery to fund the infrastructure management 
Sources of transfer Preselected 
Object being transferred Charging scheme for high speed services (both level and structure) 
External influences EU railway reform (liberalization of passenger market), EU 
legislation on railway infrastructure pricing (Dir. 2001/14/EC), EU 
accounting criteria (ESA-95), Spanish Railway Law. 
Context conditions Transport market volume, Transport market trends, Intermodal 
competition conditions, Type of separation, Railway market 
segmentation, Level of saturation, Differences in cost structure 
(operators), Level of State funding, Other commercial revenues. 
Source: own elaboration 
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7.2.3 Level of analysis 
As the transfer process studied involves the import of a global level of charges and 
differentiation criteria, it may be classified within the tactical level according to the 
transferability framework proposed. This classification implies that the transfer process 
will be framed by the general objectives set for the pricing policy and the pricing 
principles already selected. On the other side, this level of analysis still leaves freedom 
to decide on aspects related to the operationalization of the charge and its 
implementation. 
 
7.2.4 Transferability criteria 
The framework proposed relies on the examination of four different transferability 
criteria in order to provide a preliminary estimation of the feasibility of the transfer from 
the exporter to the importer jurisdiction. In this case study, the application of the 
criteria could be as follows: 
 
1) Indifference to context variations 
The introduction of the French charging scheme in the Spanish context should be tested 
against those relevant context variations between the importer and the exporter 
jurisdiction that could alter the final objective of the transfer: an increase in the cost 
recovery rate. This approach excludes the examination of the contextual variables that 
are similar in both contexts or those that lead to differences without influence on the 
transfer.  
Some of the main contextual differences that should be examined in this case are: 
• Transport market volume – The volume of high speed transport performed in 
France is largely superior to the one performed in Spain (in 2005 RENFE-
Operadora transported 2.325 million passenger-km on high speed services, the 
SNCF 42.700 millions). Therefore, the final amount of additional incomes due to 
an increase in the charge levied on high speed services will be lower in the 
Spanish case (i.e. the same increase of charges will probably produce greater 
incomes in the French case, rising faster the cost recovery). 
• Transport market trends – The high speed rail market in France is rather mature, 
while in Spain is still taking off. The ambitious plan for expanding the network in 
Spain will surely drive the evolution of railway demand for the next years. This 
contextual difference may determine the viability of the new charge in the 
medium and long term. 
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• Intermodal competition conditions – The conditions for intermodal competition 
differ in both countries as regards the existence of alternative transport modes, 
the infrastructure charges they bear, fuel tax, etc. They will have a strong 
influence on the behaviour of the final consumer, setting a cap to the final market 
price and limiting the ability to pay of operators. 
• Type of separation – Though formally separated, under the French arrangement, 
the incumbent operator SNCF performs network management tasks on behalf of 
RFF. This situation provides to the operator a sound source of incomes and a 
way to exert pressure on the infrastructure manager that may balance the net 
cash flow between both entities. Such situation does not exist in the Spanish 
case. 
• Railway market segmentation – High speed services in Spain also include high 
speed regional services, with different characteristics and market conditions than 
the “long distance high speed services”. They are not distinguished in the French 
scheme (as the variable type of service is not included). They could be negatively 
affected by the new scheme. 
• Level of saturation – The French network is intensively used and close to 
capacity in some high speed links (e.g. Paris – Lyon line with more than 250 
daily services – López Pita 2008b, p.3). This is not the case in Spain. The 
difference may alter the willingness to pay of operators in those parts of the 
network where congestion and scarcity costs are relevant. This contextual 
difference will show its full extent once the passenger transport segment will be 
open to competition in both countries.  
• Differences in cost structure (operators) – Relevant differences in the cost 
structures of the high speed business services in Spain and France may show 
different abilities to absorb a charge increase by the operators (see Fig. 69 and 
Fig. 73). 
• Level of State funding – Differences in the level of State funding for the operation 
business may alter the financial capability of the operator to absorb greater level 
of charges. Though high speed services did not receive any direct subsidy to 
operation in either country, there are strong levels of public subsidization to 
both operation companies (RENFE-Operadora and SNCF). 
• Other commercial revenues – As noted before, the SNCF disposes of greater 
sources of incomes other than transport operation. In year 2006, it received 
2.597 million € from RFF for network management activities. The same year, 
RENFE Operadora received 47,5 million € from ADIF (Table 34). The lower 
level of incomes outside transport operation for the Spanish operator may alter 
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its ability to absorb increases in the railway infrastructure charge at the company 
level. 
 
2) Indifference to external influences 
The introduction of the French scheme should as well be free from external influences 
acting on the importer jurisdiction.  
The main external pressure arises from the current European legal framework for the 
pricing of rail infrastructure, concerning the “market can bear” rule and the potential 
discrimination of new entrants through the application of access charges. The first of 
these conditions may limit both the overall level of the charge and its differentiation 
(they should guarantee that efficient operators are not priced off the network). The 
second may impede any rising on the level of the access charge component (the 
component α in Table 55). The relative importance of these provisions will increase as 
the liberalization trends continue and the opening of the railway transport market 
becomes a reality (2010). 
Other external pressure arises from the accounting criteria of the ESA-95, which sets the 
“50% rule”. This rule defines the accounting and profitability conditions driving the 
price setting procedure in Spain. Though these conditions have been voluntarily 
assumed for the domestic rail sector in Spain, it is out of the range of action of the Public 
Work Ministry to change them (as they are central to the arrangement of the Spanish 
railway sector decided by the whole Government). 
A similar reasoning applies to the Spanish Railway Law (that cannot be changed by the 
importer entity alone). The law specifies the structure of track access charges and the 
relation between the components and the costs of the infrastructure manager. Therefore, 
it does not seem possible to transfer the new structure without introducing changes in 
its current writing (thus re-opening the whole political debate). 
 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
The adoption of the French scheme to charge high speed services on the Spanish 
network should not be in open contradiction with the rest of the charging scheme. 
The main horizontal incompatibility may arise from the fact that the French scheme 
charges high speed services on the basis of the infrastructure they use (defined according 
to the level of saturation), while the Spanish scheme only introduces a slight distinction 
through the infrastructure variable (defined according to quality) and relies on the type 
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of service variable to target high speed services. Moreover, in France the high speed 
network is only opened to high speed services, while in Spain it may also be opened to 
other services (e.g. long distance passenger services or even freight traffic). 
The problem would be then to reconcile the incentives transmitted to the trains running 
on the network and the application of the increase in cost recovery only on high speed 
services. A priori, the consecution of this goal would require the introduction of changes 
on the imported scheme. 
In fact, on the one hand the incentives should be aligned for all trains running on the 
network as regards the use of the existing capacity and the reduction of the damage 
produced to the infrastructure. On the other hand, they should be differentiated to avoid 
hindering the development of new services (for instance, reservation charges set too high 
may difficult the development of on demand freight services). 
Additionally, the introduction of the French scheme would change the application of 
mark-ups to high speed services. The present mark-up based on the type of service and 
the number of seats available, conceived as a proxy to willingness to pay of different 
services, would be changed to a mark-up based on the link used. This circumstance could 
alter the type and mix of rail services offered in the network. 
 
4) Multilevel compatibility 
The introduction of the French scheme must be in agreement with the pricing principle, 
as well as with the objectives set by the Spanish Public Works Ministry for the railway 
sector. 
The pricing principles set for railway infrastructure charges in Spain seem to be 
compatible with the charging scheme transferred. In fact, the consideration of market 
conditions and financial equilibrium mentioned in the Railway Law suggest the 
application of mark-ups where the market can bear them (which has been already done 
in the current scheme through the traffic charge). As regards the objectives set by the 
Public Works Ministry for the transport policy in the PEIT, it should be verified that 
the new scheme does not affect the competitive position of rail in relation to air 
transport or the ability of freight traffic to run on those high speed links with low 
demand volumes. 
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7.3 Case 2: Charging scheme for freight services 
7.3.1 Preliminary analysis 
This case study is aimed at framing the assessment of transferability of the charging 
scheme applied to freight services running on the DB Netz network to the network 
managed by ADIF. The goal of the transfer, undertaken by the Spanish Public Works 
Ministry, is to increase the number and efficiency of the signals transmitted to freight 
operators running on the Spanish network. To reproduce the incentives, priority is given 
to the transfer of the structure and the variables present in the German scheme. Levels 
could also be changed in order to back the incentivization effect of the structure, but not 
necessarily with the scope of increasing the cost recovery on rail freight services. 
Without taking into consideration the access charge, the Spanish scheme allows to 
differentiate two operational situations: the freight train running on peak hour and the 
freight train running on non-peak hour (either normal or valley). On the contrary, the 
German scheme consists of four multiplicative factors and one additive term able to 
reflect 192 different operational situations for freight services (according to the variables 
type of infrastructure, priority, speed, level of congestion and weight of the train). Both 
schemes are reflected in Table 57. 
Table 57: Differences between existing and transferred charging schemes for freight services 
 Importer jurisdiction 
(Ministerio de Fomento) 
Exporter jurisdiction            
(DB Netz AG) 
 Structure Level Structure Level 
Access charge 
! 
" T( )
T
 
0,01-0,125 --- --- 
Reservation charge 
! 
" P,L,S( )  0,05-0,32 --- --- 
Operation charge 
! 
"(L,S)  0,06 --- --- 
Basic price --- --- 
! 
" L( )  1,86-4,12 
Product multiplier --- --- 
! 
" S,H( )  0,5-1,65 (factor) 
Utilization factor --- --- 
! 
"(L)  1-1,2 (factor) 
Minimum speed factor --- --- 
! 
"(s)  1-1,5 (factor) 
Payload component --- --- 
! 
"(W )  0-0,92 
Functional form Additive Multiplicative / Additive 
Note: Level expressed in €/train-km; Levels calculated for freight services only; Levels of access charge 
estimated for Renfe-Operadora and a new entrant carrying 500.000 train-km/year; T – Traffic volume; P 
– Time period; L - Type of line; S – Type of service; s – Speed; H – Type of train path (priority); W – 
Train weight; α, β, γ, δ and ϕ express functional dependency. 
Source: own elaboration with data from Ministerio de Fomento 2007h and DB Netz 2007b 
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The incentives provided by the German scheme are oriented towards a better use of the 
capacity available in the network (through the utilization factor γ), a reduction of the 
damage produced to the network (through the payload component ϕ) and a better 
operational performance (through the minimum speed factor δ). Moreover, the German 
structure is also shaped by the consideration of the cost structure of the infrastructure 
management business (the basic price α) and the exploration of the demand’s willingness 
to pay through a self-selection mechanism (the product multiplier β). 
The introduction of a new incentive scheme for freight services based on the German 
structure requires the inclusion of new variables (priority, speed, train weight), the 
adoption of a multiplicative functional form for the charging scheme, the adaptation of 
the values to the local conditions taking into account the relative importance of every 
incentive and the maintenance of the current cost recovery ratio. Moreover, it should be 
able to reflect the cost-related and demand-related specificities of the Spanish railway 
network. 
The effectiveness of the transferred scheme in the importer jurisdiction will depend on 
two key issues: the existence of the same incentivization needs (as the conditions and 
situation of freight traffic may be different in both networks) and the ability to provide 
them. 
7.3.2 Elements of the transfer framework 
The basic elements that are needed in order to apply the framework proposed are 
indicated in Table 58. 
Table 58: Case 2 - Elements of the transfer framework 
Importer jurisdiction General Interest Railway Network (REFIG) managed by ADIF 
Importer entity Ministry of Public Works (Spain) 
Exporter jurisdiction Railway network managed by DB Netz AG 
Exporter entity DB Netz AG (Germany) 
Aim of the transfer process Better incentivization of freight traffic 
Sources of transfer Preselected 
Object being transferred Charging scheme for freight services (both level and structure) 
External influences EU legislation on railway infrastructure pricing (Dir. 2001/14/EC), 
EU accounting criteria (ESA-95), Spanish Railway Law. 
Context conditions Railway market segmentation, Degree of competition, Network 
utilization, Network characteristics, Level of saturation, Access 
regulation, Type of rolling stock 
Source: own elaboration 
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7.3.3 Level of analysis 
According to the transferability framework proposed, the level of analysis adopted in 
this case study is the tactical level. As in the previous case (Case 1), the adoption of this 
level implies that the transfer process involves the import of the differentiation criteria, 
still leaving freedom to decide on the final form of the charges and their implementation. 
On the other side, this level has no possibility to challenge the strategical level (e.g. 
policy objectives and pricing principles). 
 
7.3.4 Transferability criteria 
The framework proposed requires the examination of four different transferability 
criteria in order to provide a preliminary estimation of the feasibility of the transfer from 
the exporter to the importer jurisdiction. As regards the import of the German freight 
charging scheme in Spain, the application of the criteria could be as follows: 
 
1) Indifference to context variations 
The introduction of the DB Netz freight charging scheme in the Spanish context should 
be tested against some relevant context variations that could alter the final objective: a 
better incentivization of freight services. The main contextual differences that should be 
examined are (not exhaustive): 
• Railway market segmentation – The share of rail freight transport is relatively 
more important in Germany than in Spain (24,2% and 20,6% respectively). The 
presence of international rail freight services and combined transport is more 
relevant on the German network than on the Spanish one. 
• Degree of competition – The number of new entrants in the German rail freight 
transport market is greater than in Spain (20% market share in Germany, very 
small in Spain). The diversity of operators and services may condition the 
differentiation required from the charging scheme. 
• Network utilization – The intensity of use of the network by freight trains is 
greater in the German network (estimated in 4.698 train-km/track-km year for 
Germany and 2.100 train-km/track-km year for Spain - Table 7). The constraints 
on the optimization of the use of the network may be more relevant in the 
German case. 
• Network characteristics – Both networks have a different distribution and 
proportion of links as regards the maximum speed allowed; the maximum length 
of freight trains is shorter in the Spanish network; the different network 
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structures (grid) may affect the formation of train paths. These differences may 
influence the application of some technical variables (e.g. maximum weight, type 
of infrastructure, priority). They may also provide a different cost structure for 
the infrastructure business. 
• Level of saturation – The German network presents strong levels of traffic in 
some relevant links of the network, which is not the case in Spain except for the 
Mediterranean corridor and some urban areas. The incentives related to the use 
of capacity may differ in both countries. 
• Access regulation – While the Spanish capacity allocation system starts from the 
existing train-paths, the German system is initially opened to any path 
requirement from the operators. The production of different quality paths may 
require changes in the capacity allocation process. 
• Type of rolling stock – The distribution of the characteristics of the rolling stock 
used for the operation of freight services may differ between both networks. 
This fact may condition the need for incentives oriented to minimize cost 
causation to the network. 
 
2) Indifference to external influences 
The introduction of the German scheme should not go against external influences acting 
on the importer jurisdiction. 
The main external pressure arises from the principles driving the pricing of rail 
infrastructure in the EU, particularly as regards the potential discrimination of new 
entrants in the freight transport market through a biased differentiation (i.e. the 
introduction of the new variables could be set in such way as to favor the incumbent 
against its competitors). Additionally, the “market can bear” rule also applies in this 
case study, as part of the differentiation is not based on costs but on the demand’s 
willingness to pay (through the selection of a given priority). Under the mentioned rule, 
it could be arguable whether a new entrant able to pay strictly the cost of its train 
running on the network should be relegated to a “low quality” train path if there is no 
scarcity of capacity in the network. 
The criteria linked to the application of the ESA-95 accounting rules, would only apply 
if in the consecution of the incentivization effect entails a relevant increase in the average 
level of charges. 
As in the previous case, the detail of the provisions included in the Spanish Railway 
Law sets a barrier to the introduction of changes on the structure of track access charges, 
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as it specifies the components and variables admitted (i.e. the writing of the Law should 
be changed in order to accommodate the new variables speed, priority and weight). 
 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
The adoption of the German scheme to better incentivate freight services running on the 
Spanish network should not be in open contradiction with the rest of the charging 
scheme. 
The main horizontal incompatibility may arise from the mixed use of the infrastructure. 
In fact, the existence of different incentivation schemes for trains running on the same 
infrastructure could lead to dysfunctions in the network. For instance, on the 
conventional network passenger trains would be subject to different charges depending 
on the time band (thus they are provided with an incentive to change the moment in time 
in which they run), while freight trains would be subject to different charges depending 
on the links of the network they use (thus they are provided with an incentive to change 
the route they use). The question then is to know whether the combination of temporal 
incentives on passenger trains and spatial incentives on freight trains will lead to a better 
use of the infrastructure. 
Another incompatibility may regard the existence of two different systems of producing 
and selling train paths. In fact, the introduction of the German scheme would require the 
definition of different train path qualities for freight services while train paths for 
passenger services would not be differentiated according to priority. 
 
4) Multilevel compatibility 
The introduction of the German scheme must be in agreement with the pricing principle, 
as well as with the objectives set by the Spanish Public Works Ministry for the railway 
sector. 
The pricing principles governing track access charges in Spain do not seem incompatible 
with the introduction of further differentiation in the charges applied to freight services, 
as far as they do not produce discrimination among operators. The exploration of the 
demand’s willingness to pay is allowed, as well as the pricing of congestion in the 
network. 
As regards the objectives of transport policy, the new structure is aligned with the 
improvement of the quality standards offered by rail, in line with freight market’s 
demand. At the time of adapting the German scheme to the Spanish conditions, it will 
also be necessary to introduce provisions favoring both intermodal and international 
freight services. 
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7.4 Case 3: Congestion cost calculation and allocation 
procedure 
7.4.1 Preliminary analysis 
This case study is aimed at framing the assessment of transferability of the congestion 
cost calculation and allocation procedure used in the UK to determine the variable 
capacity charge to the infrastructure managed by ADIF. The goal of the transfer, 
undertaken by the Spanish Public Works Ministry, is to improve operational efficiency 
through the pricing of congestion according to the British practice. The transfer of the 
practice implies the introduction of the cost calculation and allocation procedures 
adopted by ORR to determine the final form of the tariff.  
The current charging practice in Spain does not take into consideration congestion costs 
in the network and does not have a specific component related to it (i.e. there is not an 
equivalent of the capacity charge in the Spanish charging scheme). Two possibilities can 
be defined then: either the Public Works Ministry introduces a new component in the 
Spanish charging scheme in order to levy the congestion costs in the network, either it 
introduces the British calculation procedure with the aim of reflecting the congestion 
costs through one of the existing components. The second hypothesis is assumed here: 
the Spanish Public Works Ministry imports the cost calculation and allocation 
procedure implemented by ORR to set the capacity charge in the UK with the objective 
of calculating and allocating congestion costs in the Spanish network and levying them 
through the operation charge. 
The capacity charge levied by Network Rail is based on a complex calculation procedure 
that requires the establishment of a statistical relation between capacity utilization and 
delay in different route sections and time bands. The results are simplified through their 
allocation to different service groups, which reflect a combination of type of service, 
route and time band. The level of the charge varies between 0 and 1,33 €/train-km, and is 
intended to recover the extra costs caused to the infrastructure manager because of 
congestion. 
The implementation of such charging practice needs as a first step the determination of 
empirical relations between capacity utilization and delay. At this point there might be 
found the more relevant barriers to the transfer, as the British practice requires the 
availability of historical series of operational data in an adequate format to define a 
sound statistical relation between both variables. If they were not available, then it 
would be essential to modify the current information systems to produce them. 
Additionally, it will be necessary to segment the whole data obtained according to routes 
and time bands in such a way as to differentiate relevant variations in such relation. 
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Once again, the performance of the information systems implemented by ADIF will be a 
relevant factor for the correct implementation of the practice. 
As a second step, the British practice determines the unitary cost of the delay caused to 
other trains running on the network, applying the delay valuation considered in the 
performance regime (in turn based on a societal rate for the delay minutes, depending on 
the route and type of service). The implementation of the British practice would require 
the development of a similar valuation methodology in Spain, able to differentiate delay 
costs per route and service type. 
Once obtained the extra costs of congestion in the Spanish network according to route 
sections and time bands. It will be necessary then to allocate them to a limited number of 
service groups, in order to simplify the practical implementation of the practice through 
the operation charge. 
The main constraints to the feasibility of the transfer come from the probable limitations 
of the current information systems available to the Spanish infrastructure manager and 
the implementation costs of the British practice. Furthermore, it should be verified that 
congestion generates a level of costs as high as to justify the introduction of the ORR’s 
procedure. 
 
7.4.2 Elements of the transfer framework 
The analysis of this case study through the framework proposed, requires first to define 
its fundamental elements (Table 59). 
Table 59: Case 3 - Elements of the transfer framework 
Importer jurisdiction General Interest Railway Network (REFIG) managed by ADIF 
Importer entity Ministry of Public Works (Spain) 
Exporter jurisdiction Railway network managed by Network Rail 
Exporter entity Office of Rail Regulation (UK) 
Aim of the transfer process Improve operational efficiency in the network 
Sources of transfer Preselected 
Object being transferred Congestion cost calculation and allocation procedure 
External influences EU legislation on railway infrastructure pricing (Dir. 2001/14/EC), 
Spanish Railway Law. 
Context conditions Type of regulation, Type of regulator, Average delay, Network 
utilization, Technical characteristics of the network, Traffic mix, 
Information systems. 
Source: own elaboration 
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7.4.3 Level of analysis 
According to the transferability framework proposed, the analysis performed in this 
case study involves the operational level. In fact, the congestion cost calculation and 
allocation methodology imported will participate in the definition of the final form of 
the charge in the market. 
 
7.4.4 Transferability criteria 
The framework proposed relies on the examination of four different transferability 
criteria in order to provide a preliminary estimation of the feasibility of the transfer from 
the exporter to the importer jurisdiction. In this case study, the application of the 
criteria could be as follows: 
 
1) Indifference to context variations 
The introduction of the calculation procedure set by the ORR in the Spanish network 
should be tested against some relevant context variations that could alter the final 
objective: the improvement of the operational efficiency in the network. The main 
contextual differences that should be examined are (not exhaustive): 
• Type of regulation – The approaches to service quality and price regulation seem 
to be different in both jurisdictions. In the Spanish system the incentives to an 
efficient operation are currently being provided through the Service Level 
Agreement signed between ADIF and RENFE-Operadora. In the British system 
they are included within the charging scheme (either through the performance 
scheme or the capacity charge). 
• Type of regulator – The ORR has a higher degree of independence from the 
Government than the CRF, as well as greater means and a fully specialized staff. 
This contextual difference may favour the gathering, verification and processing 
of the detailed cost information required by the transferred practice, as well as 
the examination of the eventual complaints from the operators. 
• Average delay – Available data on delays is not directly comparable125. The 
punctuality achieved, together with the traffic volume in the network will define 
                                                
125In year 2006 the average delay on the Network Rail infrastructure was equal to 1,77 min/100 train-km 
(passengers) and 3,93 min/100 train-km (freight). In the same year, the services running on the Spanish 
network achieved punctuality indexes ranging between 95,7 and 99,7. The data gathered on the 
punctuality of services in the UK and Spain at the occasion of the BOB case study are neither fully 
comparable. They show however differences in the punctuality achieved in both networks. 
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the economic interest of recovering congestion costs applying a capacity charge; 
the average delay will affect as well the level of the charges related to capacity 
costs. 
• Network utilization – The intensity of use of the network is greater in the 
infrastructure managed by Network Rail (8.107 passenger train-km/track-km in 
Spain, 14.800 passenger train-km/track-km estimated for the UK). The greater 
intensity of use in the UK results in large parts of the timetable being fragile, 
with large knock-on effects when maintenance work or train delays impact other 
train operators’ performance. The lower intensity of use in the Spanish network 
may result in lower congestion costs imposed on the infrastructure manager, 
challenging the interest of considering congestion costs. 
• Technical characteristics of the network – Differences in the technical 
characteristics of the network (particularly presence of double tracks and sidings, 
the type of signalling systems) will produce different capacities. Moreover, the 
structure of the network will condition the number and length of possible 
operational sections. Different section lengths and capacities may condition the 
utility derived from the application of the British practice, particularly against 
alternative measures for the optimization of capacity use. 
• Traffic mix – As in the previous case, the relation between capacity utilization 
and delay may be altered by the mix of services running in the network. 
• Information systems – Differences in the information systems used by each of 
the infrastructure managers may limit the effective implementation of a detailed 
cost calculation methodology. This observation is also extensive to the series of 
historical data available. 
 
2) Indifference to external influences 
The introduction of the British cost calculation and allocation charge should as well be 
free from external influences acting on the importer jurisdiction. 
Given the alignment of the practice being introduced with the determinations of 
Directive 2001/14/EC and the transparency of the calculation procedure, it seems rather 
unlikely that it could go against the principles set in the EU legislation. Indeed, it is cost 
related and provides incentives for a better operational performance. However, the 
franchising system adopted in the UK favors the correlation between services and 
operators. This means that the costs derived from congestion can be allocated to the 
service (i.e. to the single operator running them) without any consideration on the 
responsibility for these costs. Within a liberalized scenario with on track competition, 
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the same services could be performed by various operators with different 
responsibilities for the congestion costs, making discriminatory the levying of a flat rate 
on the service (as an alternative, the calculation procedure should also include the 
variable “operator”).As regards the current determinations of the Spanish Railway Law, 
the consideration of congestion related costs is in line with the pricing principles 
enounced in Art. 73.5, but seems to fall outside the writing “variable maintenance, 
operation and management costs of rail infrastructure” set for the establishment of the 
operation charge (in fact, the congestion cost may be regarded as an external cost to the 
infrastructure manager). 
 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
The adoption of the British congestion cost calculation procedure to improve the 
operational efficiency of the services running on the Spanish network should not be in 
contradiction with the rest of the charging practice. 
The intervals adopted for the time period variable in other cost allocation procedures 
used in the Spanish charging system do not find an explicit correlation with the 
operational situation in the network (it has been in fact inherited from the previous 
arrangements existing within RENFE126). The definition of a new system of time bands 
related to the operational conditions in the network, may lead to two different sets of 
values for the same charging variable, depending on the component in which they 
appear. The same problem may arise with the definition of services (the current charging 
practice only distinguishes type of services). The double scale for the same variables 
may pose problems to the design and operation of information systems in the network. 
A second point of friction may arise as regards the relative level of detail and complexity 
achieved through the different calculation procedures. In fact, the calculation of 
congestion costs according to the British methodology is highly complex as regards the 
valuation of the costs and the disaggregation applied. The ability to improve operational 
performance embedded in a so detailed calculation may be outweighed by the outputs of 
less detailed procedures used to calculate the remaining costs reflected in the charge. 
 
 
 
                                                
126 Spanish track access charges consider different time periods, but they result from a historical 
convention and they are not currently related to congestion. Formerly they were used to allocate train 
paths among the different operating business units and to differenciate the final user charge. 
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4) Multilevel compatibility 
The introduction of the British congestion cost calculation procedure must be in 
agreement with the pricing principles and charging schemes already in place, as well as 
with the objectives and principles set by the Spanish Public Works Ministry for the 
railway sector. 
The inclusion of the congestion costs calculated according to the British practice within 
the operation charge, will produce an increase in the level of the charge, will need the 
inclusion of a temporal variable and will require a greater differentiation in the variables 
adopted. Otherwise, the refined cost calculation methodology will not transmit its full 
incentivization potential to the market. The adoption of an aggregated variable as the 
service group would be able to integrate the three dimensions (infrastructure, service and 
time period) in a single variable, but will also increase the difference between the 
operating charge and other components of the Spanish charging scheme. 
As regards the pricing principles, the imported practice does not seem incompatible 
with any of them as far as it does not rises the level as to alter the “financial equilibrium 
in the rendering of services”. The implementation of the practice should guarantee as 
well the non-discrimination of operators. As regards the objectives of transport policy, 
the new structure is aligned with the improvement of the quality standards offered by 
rail, as it promotes a better use of the available capacity. 
 
 
7.5 Case 4: Marginal social cost pricing principle 
7.5.1 Preliminary analysis 
The aim of this case study is to frame the introduction of the social marginal cost pricing 
principle applied by Banverket in the Swedish network in the network managed by 
ADIF. In line with the recommendations of the welfare economic theory, the aim of the 
transfer is to increase the socio-economic efficiency of railway transport and to favor a 
better competitive position for railways. 
The introduction of the Swedish pricing principle requires the shift to a cost-related 
approach for the whole charging system, thus avoiding the application of terms based on 
costs other than marginal or the willingness to pay of demand. This approach would 
need the change of the current Spanish charge definition procedures (the relation to fixed 
and variable costs indicated in the Railway Law and the prevailing price regulation 
mechanism) so that they become able to reflect marginal costs in the network.  
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At a more detailed level of definition, the adoption of the marginal cost principle will 
require the establishment of a sound calculation methodology for infrastructure costs. 
As well, the inclusion of external costs in the charge will need a specific consideration as 
regards their determination, allocation to the market and their impact on intermodal 
competition conditions. 
The implementation of the marginal cost principle may have strong implications for the 
financial equilibrium of the infrastructure business. As the level linked to the application 
of the marginal cost principle implies a reduction in the overall cost recovery (as fixed 
costs are not recovered), the infrastructure manager will need to reach financial 
equilibrium through other incomes or State funds. The average charge applied in the 
Swedish network in 2006 amounts 0,67 €/train-km, while the average charge applied in 
the Spanish network in the same year was equal to 1,15 €/train-km127. Supposing the 
same level of marginal costs (which is probably not the case), the financial requirements 
of the new principle can be estimated at least in 67 million €128. Moreover, in the years 
to come the application of the marginal cost principle will imply the renounce to the 
incomes generated by the mark-ups on high speed traffic, a basic input for the financing 
of the IM and the investments in new infrastructure. 
Additionally, the introduction of the Swedish marginal cost pricing principle will require 
that the differentiation of charges in the market is performed according to cost causation 
criteria. Thus, the variables and charging units included in the charging scheme should 
strictly be related to cost causation (limiting the application of time bands or the 
consideration of seat-km in the charge). 
 
7.5.2 Elements of the transfer framework 
The analysis of this case study through the framework proposed, requires first to define 
its fundamental elements (Table 60). 
 
 
 
                                                
127 Own calculation on the basis of Banverket (2007b, p.10 and p.37) and sections 6.3.11 and 6.3.13.4. 
Includes minimum access package and track access to essential facilities. 
128 According to Directive 2001/14/EC the incomes obtained through environmental charges cannot 
remain within the infrastructure manager and should therefore be transferred to the State. Moreover, a 
mark-up on passenger traffic is included in the figure. Hence, the average figure found for Banverket is 
greater than the unitary income for the infrastructure manager and then the estimation is a lower bound. 
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Table 60: Case 4 - Elements of the transfer framework 
Importer jurisdiction General Interest Railway Network (REFIG) managed by ADIF 
Importer entity Ministry of Public Works (Spain) 
Exporter jurisdiction Railway network managed by Banverket 
Exporter entity Banverket (Sweden) 
Aim of the transfer process Increase in socio-economic efficiency, Improve competitiveness of 
railways in the intermodal market 
Sources of transfer Preselected 
Object being transferred Social marginal cost principle 
External influences EU accounting criteria (ESA-95), Growth and Stability pact, 
Macroeconomic priorities, Spanish Railway Law. 
Context conditions Intermodal competition conditions, Type of competition, State 
funding availability, Other commercial revenues, Network 
characteristics, Type of services, Rolling stock, State of maintenance 
and renewal, Enhancement/enlargement projects, Acceptability.  
Source: own elaboration 
 
7.5.3 Level of analysis 
According to the transferability framework proposed, the level of analysis adopted in 
this case study is the strategical level. The adoption of this level implies that the 
transfer process involves the import of principles, leaving freedom to decide on their 
implementation through schemes and practices.  
 
7.5.4 Transferability criteria 
The framework proposed relies on the examination of four different transferability 
criteria in order to provide a preliminary estimation of the feasibility of the transfer from 
the exporter to the importer jurisdiction. In this case study, the application of the 
criteria could be as follows: 
 
1) Indifference to context variations 
The introduction of the social marginal cost principle adopted by Banverket in the 
Spanish network should be tested against some relevant context variations that could 
alter its feasibility (not exhaustive):  
• Intermodal competition conditions – The conditions for intermodal competition 
are different in both countries. The effects that the introduction of the new 
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pricing principle may have on the intermodal market share of railway will 
probably not be the same in Spain as those observed in Sweden. 
• Type of competition – The Swedish administration has promoted competition for 
the market in the case of unprofitable regional and long distance services. The 
effects on efficiency derived from the application of a marginal cost principle are 
not relevant under these conditions, as access is not opened and the level of track 
access charges is equilibrated through the conditions set in operation contracts. 
The mentioned services are still closed to competition in Spain. 
• State funding and other commercial revenues – In both countries the State 
currently assume the greatest part of the infrastructure management costs, either 
through payments for the services rendered or through additional grants. In the 
year 2006, track access charges only covered 5,0% of the total operational 
expenditures in Sweden, and 8,6% in Spain. 
• Network characteristics – The difference in some relevant technical 
characteristics between the Swedish and Spanish network may condition both 
the level of marginal cost-based charges and the level of total costs. This can be 
the case for the degree of electrification (59% in Spain, 78% in Sweden) or the 
layout parameters (e.g. curvature radii). 
• Type of services – The differences in the type of services running in the network 
may have an influence on the level of marginal costs. This can be the case for 
freight services (20,6% in Spain, 35,5% in Sweden). 
• Rolling stock – Relevant differences in the type of rolling stock running on both 
networks may as well change the level of marginal costs (e.g. through different 
axle loads). 
• State of maintenance and renewal – Though it is not possible to provide 
comparable figures on the state of the network in both countries, it would be 
necessary to consider it as a relevant context variable. The overall state of 
maintenance and renewal of the network conditions the costs that arise on it 
(both marginal and total costs), influencing the level of marginal costs and the 
required financial support for the implementation of the marginal cost principle. 
• Enhancement / enlargement projects – The level of investment in the network 
foreseen for the next years is different in both national railways. Spain is engaged 
in the ambitious investment program stated in the PEIT, while Sweden is 
defining its next investments on a more regular path. The conditions required in 
both networks to guarantee the financial equilibrium of the infrastructure 
manager will also be different. 
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• Acceptability – The degree of acceptability of environmental issues seems to be 
more developed in Sweden than in Spain. The reactions from the operators and 
the public with respect to the consideration of social costs in the charges may be 
different. The situation is similar as regards the acceptance of a lower price level 
for rail against other transport modes. 
2) Indifference to external influences 
The adoption of a social marginal cost principle for the pricing of railway infrastructure 
in Spain seems to be in perfect agreement with the most common interpretation of 
Directive 2001/14/EC. Thus it does not seem a relevant external influence for this case. 
On the other side, the framework set by the accounting system ESA-95 may lead to the 
infrastructure manager ADIF being classified as a non-market producer if it only 
recovers the marginal cost through charges. The risk of this situation to happen may be 
increased in the years to come, as the current arrangement is based on the future incomes 
in infrastructure charges due to the expansion of the high speed network. This external 
influence may lead to the incompatibility between the national debt objectives (in line 
with the Stability and Growth pact and other macroeconomic priorities) and the 
application of the marginal cost pricing principle. 
Moreover, the implementation of the marginal social cost pricing principle would require 
changes in the writing of the Spanish Railway Law, as it currently makes reference to 
the recovery of variable and fixed costs related to the maintenance, operation and 
infrastructure management of the railway network. It also makes reference to the 
application of mark-ups. The application of the marginal social cost pricing principle is 
not compatible with the recovery of fixed or capital costs. 
 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
The adoption of the Swedish pricing principle to infrastructure charges in Spain, should 
be aligned with the objectives and resource availability for other rail and transport 
policies. 
The more clear point of conflict arises with the planned development of the network, as 
ADIF is undertaking part of the investments on its own resources and, in the long term, 
should be able to return the capital contributions received from the State. A diminution 
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in the level of incomes derived from the change in the pricing principle may put at risk 
part of the investments129. 
The inclusion of social costs in the railway infrastructure charge may go against the 
revitalization of this mode whenever they are not assumed as well by the competing 
transport modes.  
 
4) Multilevel compatibility 
According to the assessment framework proposed, as the object transferred is a pricing 
principle, it would prevail over existing structures and levels and thus would not be 
subject to multilevel incompatibilities. 
 
 
7.6 Case 5: Infrastructure cost calculation and allocation 
procedure 
7.6.1 Preliminary analysis 
This fifth case study is aimed at framing the assessment of transferability of the cost 
calculation and allocation procedures applied by the INTF to determine the charge for 
essential services levied on the Portuguese network to the operation charge levied by 
ADIF on the Spanish network. The goal of the transfer, undertaken by the Spanish 
Public Works Ministry, is to improve the cost reflectivity of the Spanish charging 
practice (i.e. the allocation of costs according to cost causation). 
The charge for essential services applied by REFER EP is based on a detailed calculation 
procedure that requires the definition of homogeneous groups and the allocation of 
traffic dependent cost categories to them. Then unitary charges are calculated for every 
homogeneous group by dividing the costs by the useable capacities available for the 
specific homogeneous group. Furthermore, costs are calculated for the reference optimal 
network management conditions and for a full use of capacity. 
The implementation of the Portuguese practice in Spain would require as a first step the 
definition of homogeneous groups according to the technical and service characteristics 
of the infrastructure. The feasibility of this step will depend on the information systems 
implemented in the network and may lead, in the Spanish case to a different number of 
                                                
129 It must be remembered here that increases on demand due to the reduction in the price level on the 
network do not have any effect on the financial equilibrium of the infrastructure manager, as the charges 
paid equal the cost introduced in the network (i.e. the marginal cost). 
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homogeneous groups (given the greater extension and diversity of the network). A 
priori, this step does not seem to generate any specific barrier to the transfer. 
A greater difficulty may arise at the time of selecting and calculating the costs to be 
included in the charge. The practice of the INTF relies on the accounting system to 
produce the cost information associated to seven cost categories: track maintenance, 
bridges and tunnels maintenance, traffic control costs, telecommunications, signaling 
maintenance, level crossings and general costs directly related with traffic. 
A barrier may arise from the specific definition of cost categories adopted by the 
infrastructure manager ADIF. In fact, the more likely situation is the one in which the 
Spanish accounting system will use cost categories different from the Portuguese ones. 
Additionally, even in those cases where the cost categories may be apparently 
coincident, they will be diversely defined as regards the recognition of costs belonging to 
them (e.g. this is generally the case when it is necessary to distinguish maintenance 
activities from renewal or operation activities). Furthermore, the differences in the 
information and accounting systems may lead to a different level of disagregation of cost 
figures (according to track segments, lines, etc.) and to a dissimilar consideration of the 
variability of costs with respect to traffic. 
A second hindrance may be originated by the determination of the level of efficient 
costs. The Portuguese practice calculates the level of efficient costs, taking into account 
the minimum operation costs already observed in the network and setting a transitional 
mark-up decreasing with time. The import of the practice would require the definition of 
efficient operation costs in ADIF’s network and the likely evolution of efficiency in the 
infrastructure management segment over time. 
Once calculated the costs, the import of the Portuguese practice will require the 
allocation of costs to services. Two different models should be implemented to perform 
the allocation: 1) a model weighing the train-km run in the network according to the type 
of train (in the Portuguese case applies a factor equal to 2,56 to freight trains); 2) a 
model estimating the capacity available in every service group. The capacity model 
calculates the available capacity as the product of the maximum theoretical capacity 
(once considered the capacity consumed by maintenance tasks) and three factors 
respectively modeling the effect of the different service types, the guaranty that certain 
services are not crossed by other trains and the effect of non-existing demand in certain 
sections. These models should be put into place prior to the transfer of the INTF 
methodology to the Spanish charging practice. 
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7.6.2 Elements of the transfer framework 
The analysis of this case study through the framework proposed, requires first to define 
its fundamental elements (Table 61). 
Table 61: Case 5 - Elements of the transfer framework 
Importer jurisdiction General Interest Railway Network (REFIG) managed by ADIF 
Importer entity Ministry of Public Works (Spain) 
Exporter jurisdiction Railway network managed by REFER EP 
Exporter entity Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferroviario (Portugal) 
Aim of the transfer process Improve the cost reflectivity of the charging system 
Sources of transfer Preselected 
Object being transferred Cost calculation and allocation procedures used in the determination 
of the charge for essential services 
External influences EU legislation on railway infrastructure pricing (Dir. 2001/14/EC), 
Spanish Railway Law 
Context conditions Type of regulation, Type of regulator, Information systems, 
Accounting systems, Network length, Network utilization, Network 
complexity, Technical characteristics, Type of services 
Source: own elaboration 
 
7.6.3 Level of analysis 
According to the transferability framework proposed, the level of analysis adopted in 
this case study is the operational level. The adoption of this level implies that the 
transfer process involves the import of the cost calculation and allocation procedures as 
they have been implemented in the exporter jurisdiction. Obviously, there is still some 
flexibility to particularize them to the importer jurisdiction.  On the other side, this level 
has no possibility to challenge the tactical (i.e. the structure, variables or level of the 
operation charge) or the strategical level (i.e. the pricing principles driving the Spanish 
charging practice). 
7.6.4 Transferability criteria 
The framework proposed relies on the examination of four different transferability 
criteria in order to provide a preliminary estimation of the feasibility of the transfer from 
the exporter to the importer jurisdiction. In this case study, the application of the 
criteria could be as follows: 
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1) Indifference to context variations 
The introduction of the infrastructure cost calculation and allocation practice adopted by 
REFER EP in the Spanish network should be tested against some relevant context 
variations that could alter its feasibility (not exhaustive): 
• Type of regulation – The approaches to service quality and price regulation seem 
to be different in both jurisdictions. The Spanish Public Works Ministry 
provides efficiency incentives to the infrastructure manager basically through the 
framework agreement, while the INTF provides them as well through the 
charging scheme (as the practice transferred is based on efficient costs). 
• Type of regulator – The Portuguese regulator INTF has a higher degree of 
independence and autonomy from the Ministry than the Spanish regulatory 
body. It is also equipped with more means. This contextual difference may 
favour the consecution, verification and processing of the detailed cost 
information required by the transferred practice. 
• Information systems – Differences in the configuration of the information 
systems of ADIF and REFER EP may condition the number of homogeneous 
groups and the precision of their determination (this is particularly true as 
regards the definition of the basic infrastructure segments in the network). 
• Accounting systems – REFER EP and ADIF already publish their financial 
accounts according to different standards (Portuguese and Spanish GAAP). 
Their analytical accounting systems will surely differ in the cost categories, cost 
centres and level of aggregation of the cost information adopted. This contextual 
difference may suppose a critical barrier for the transferability of the Portuguese 
practice. 
• Network length – The notably difference in the extension of both rail networks 
(12.991 km for ADIF and 2.839 km for REFER) may condition the 
implementation of the Portuguese practice in Spain as regards the size of the 
homogeneous groups and the complexity of the capacity model. 
• Network complexity – The differences in network complexity (e.g. number of 
links and nodes, number of stations, number of links with different technical 
characteristics, etc.) may have a similar effect as the differences in network 
length. 
• Technical characteristics – The diversity in the technical characteristics of both 
networks (e.g. ADIF’s network has three different track gauges, while REFER 
has two) will condition the formation and number of homogeneous groups as 
well. 
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• Network utilization – The inclusion of service considerations in the formation of 
homogeneous groups drives the attention on the differences between the network 
utilization in both railways, particularly as regards the number of “suburban” 
areas (while in Portugal only Porto and Lisbon are distinguished, in Spain it is 
possible to differentiate up to 11 urban areas with suburban services). 
 
2) Indifference to external influences  
The implementation of the Portuguese cost calculation and allocation procedure in the 
Spanish operation charge should be indifferent to the action of external influences. 
The practice being transferred seems to be aligned with the main determinations of the 
EU legal framework, as it seeks to proxy marginal infrastructure costs through a detailed 
cost allocation methodology, applies a cost causation allocation to the market and 
includes incentives for efficiency in the infrastructure management activity. The only 
concern could arise from the distribution of the variable costs among all the available 
capacity. If it is true that it provides an incentive for the infrastructure manager for 
increasing the activity in the network, it is also true that it may lead to charge the 
remaining services well below the cost they introduce in the network. 
The current writing of the Railway Law as regards the costs that should be recovered 
through the operation charge (“variable maintenance, operation and management costs 
of rail infrastructure”) seems perfectly compatible with the Portuguese practice. 
 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
The adoption of the Portuguese practice should not be in contradiction with the rest of 
the charging practice. 
Though there is no precise information available on the cost calculation and allocation 
procedures currently applied by the Public Works Ministry in order to define the final 
form of the other charging components included in the Spanish charging practice, it is 
possible to hypothesize possible points of friction at this level. A first concern may 
result from the definition of variable and fixed infrastructure costs: the criterion adopted 
to define variable costs in the calculation of the operating charge should be 
complementary with the criterion adopted to define fixed costs in the calculation of the 
reservation charge. A second conflict may arise at the moment of allocating costs: the 
costs of maintenance, operation and management of rail infrastructure not allocated to 
the operation charge, should be allocated to the reservation charge. This condition 
suggests the convenience of adopting the same cost categorization for the calculation of 
both components. 
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4) Multilevel compatibility 
The introduction of the Portuguese cost calculation and allocation procedure must be in 
agreement with the pricing principles and charging schemes already in place, as well as 
with the objectives and principles set by the Spanish Public Works Ministry for the 
railway sector. 
The Portuguese practice does not seem incompatible with the Spanish operation charge. 
In fact, the level of this component should be linked to variable costs (which is done by 
the imported procedure) and should be differentiated according to type of infrastructure 
and type of service (both variables are taken into account in the imported procedure). 
As regards the level of the charge, the imported procedure should lead to a similar 
volume of incomes as the one currently used. As regards the differentiation applied, the 
imported practice could distinguish two types of passenger services in order to achieve a 
greater consistency with the other components of the Spanish charging scheme. 
As far as the imported practice does not introduce any relevant change in the charging 
scheme, it is deemed to be compatible with the Spanish pricing principles and objectives 
set for the transport policy. Only in the case that it would lead to relevant changes in 
the level of the charge, it should be tested against the financial stability of the 
infrastructure manager and the feasibility of the investment plan foreseen in the network 
or the development objectives for the operation segment. 
 
 
7.7 Case 6: Full cost minus subsidies pricing principle 
7.7.1 Preliminary analysis 
This case study analyzes the introduction in the Spanish network of the pricing 
principle applied by the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport in the network 
managed by RFI. The scope of the transfer is to increase the control on the State funding 
of infrastructure services, avoiding possible deviations in the medium and long term. 
The Italian principle is based on the recovery of operation costs arising from the use of a 
technologically efficient infrastructure. The principle is based on two benchmarks, the 
real operation costs and the estimated efficient operation costs, and a public subsidy 
covering the difference and the remaining costs arising in the network (maintenance, 
renewal, investment). The part of the subsidy related to the recovering of operation 
costs takes the form of a discount and is expected to decrease in time as the railway 
infrastructure improves its condition (providing a strong incentive to the infrastructure 
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manager if adequately modulated over time). This principle may be described as a “full 
cost minus subsidies”. 
The adoption of the Italian pricing principle in Spain will introduce a conceptual change 
in the system currently applied. Both systems are based on financial considerations 
related to the State and the public agencies performing the railway services, but while 
the Spanish price setting procedure takes into account the ability to pay of the demand 
(in order to define the mark-ups applied on high speed services), the Italian system first 
selects the level of costs and then allocates it to the demand. 
Moreover, the implementation of the Italian pricing principle in Spain could have strong 
implications for the transport operators, that would have to bear a “non-customized” 
level of costs (that can be well below, close or even above their willingness to pay). 
Additionally, the implementation of the principle together with the selection of the 
operation costs as its basis, may lead to relevant increases in the level of access charges 
borne by the operators. As a reference, the average charge in the Italian network in 2006 
was 2,56 €/train-km130, while in the Spanish network reached 1,15 €/train-km. If 
operational costs were similar in both jurisdictions, the average increase in access charges 
would be greater than 120%. However, the final level implemented in Spain would 
depend on the level of subsidization foreseen by the Spanish Public Works Ministry. If 
the subsidy is to be maintained at its present level, then the introduction of the Italian 
pricing principle will have a low effect on the current charge level, though it may have 
financial consequences in the future. If priority is given to pass the full efficient 
operation costs to the operators, the introduction of the principle will generate a strong 
impact. According to the finality of the transfer, the second option is assumed here. 
The consecution of the control objective on public funding will be dependent on the 
setting of clear rules for the awarding of subsidies, able to be maintained over time and 
able to provide adequate incentives to the infrastructure manager and the railway 
operators. These rules fall in the field of price regulation and the framework contracts 
signed between the State and the infrastructure manager. If additionally the 
implementation of the pricing principle results in changes in the costs allocated to the 
different operators and the level of the charges, then the successful implementation of 
the Italian principle will need to consider the final transport market (elasticity to price 
of final users), the cost and income structure of the operator or the level of competence 
in the market. 
 
                                                
130 Calculation based on RFI (2006b, p.44) and FS (2007, p.38 and p.80). 
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7.7.2 Elements of the transfer framework 
The analysis of this case study through the framework proposed, requires first to define 
its fundamental elements (Table 62). 
Table 62: Case 6 - Elements of the transfer framework 
Importer jurisdiction General Interest Railway Network (REFIG) managed by ADIF 
Importer entity Ministry of Public Works (Spain) 
Exporter jurisdiction Railway network managed by RFI 
Exporter entity Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (Italy) 
Aim of the transfer process Increase the control on the State funding of infrastructure services 
Sources of transfer Preselected 
Object being transferred Full cost minus subsidy pricing principle for all the network 
External influences EU accounting criteria (ESA-95), EU Directives on railway 
infrastructure pricing (Dir. 2001/14/EC) 
Context conditions Type of regulation, Type of regulator, Type of separation, Transport 
market trends, Intermodal competition conditions, Network 
characteristics, Differences in cost structure (operators) 
Source: own elaboration 
 
7.7.3 Level of analysis 
According to the transferability framework proposed, the level of analysis adopted in 
this case study is the strategical level. The adoption of this level implies that the 
transfer process involves the import of principles, leaving freedom to decide on their 
implementation through schemes and practices.  
 
7.7.4 Transferability criteria 
The framework proposed relies on the examination of four different transferability 
criteria in order to provide a preliminary estimation of the feasibility of the transfer from 
the exporter to the importer jurisdiction. In this case study, the application of the 
criteria could be as follows: 
1) Indifference to context variations 
The introduction of the full cost minus State subsidy adopted by RFI in the Spanish 
network should be tested against some relevant context variations that could alter its 
feasibility (not exhaustive): 
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• Type of regulation – The approaches to service quality and price regulation seem 
to be different in both jurisdictions. The Spanish Public Works Ministry 
provides efficiency incentives to the infrastructure manager basically through the 
framework agreement, while the CIPE provides them as well through the pricing 
principle. The coordination between the current regulation mechanisms and the 
pricing principle may be different in both jurisdictions, challenging its 
effectiveness. 
• Type of regulator – The Italian regulator has a high degree of independence and 
autonomy, while the effective functioning of the Spanish CRF has not been 
established yet. This contextual difference may favour the gathering, verification 
and processing of the detailed demand and cost information required to 
implement the transferred pricing principle without too high impacts on the 
infrastructure manager and the operators. 
• Type of separation – The Italian Administration has promoted partially 
integrated separation in the railway sector. Though accounting separation 
guarantees a fair reflection of the operation and infrastructure management 
activities, the consolidation of accounts within the same holding may lead to 
different incentivization effects than in a fully separated structure (like in the 
Spanish case). 
• Transport market trends –The ambitious plan for expanding the network in 
Spain will surely drive the evolution of railway demand for the next years. This 
contextual difference may determine the financial viability in the medium and 
long term of a charging system only levying operational costs. 
• Intermodal competition conditions – The conditions for intermodal competition 
differ in both countries as regards the existence of alternative transport modes, 
the infrastructure charges they bear, fuel tax, etc. The effects of changes in the 
infrastructure pricing principles on intermodal competition may be different in 
both countries and may set a relevant barrier if the operators are not able to 
absorb the eventual increases in the level of the charge. 
• Network characteristics – The difference in some relevant technical 
characteristics between the Italian and Spanish network may condition the level 
of subsidization of the operation costs, as the “efficiency scenario” will be 
different in both cases. 
• Differences in cost structure (operators) – Relevant differences in the cost 
structures of the railway operators in Spain and Italy may show different 
abilities to absorb an eventual redistribution or increase in the level of the charge. 
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2) Indifference to external influences 
The introduction of the full cost minus State subsidies scheme should as well be free 
from external influences acting on the importer jurisdiction.  
The main external pressure arises from the current European legal framework for the 
pricing of rail infrastructure, concerning the explicit mention to the marginal cost pricing 
principle, the “market can bear” rule and the potential discrimination of new entrants 
through the application of access charges.  
Though it is true that the current interpretation of the Directive 2001/14/EC does also 
allow charging above the marginal cost level, it is as well true that it requires doing it 
through the application of mark-ups related to the willingness to pay of every service 
and not through the direct allocation of costs to the network. Additionally, the full cost 
minus subsidies principle must be implemented in such a way as to guarantee that no 
service able to pay its marginal cost is excluded from the network. This point is 
particularly important as regards the future liberalization of the passenger transport 
segment, as new entrants should not be discriminated in their access to the network. 
Other external pressure arises from the profitability condition established on the railway 
operators as a result of the ESA-95 accounting criteria. In fact, the expected increase in 
the average level linked to this principle may put at risk their profitability. 
From the perspective of the Government, this pricing principle guarantees the stability 
of the State funding over time, as it passes the cost risk to the infrastructure manager 
and, indirectly, to the rest of the system. However, if the final market is not strong 
enough as to absorb the increase in the charges, then the accounting criteria may result 
unfulfilled and the capital grants to the sector consolidated as debt. It is probable that 
under this scheme, the Public Works Ministry will calculate the level of subsidies in 
such a way as to guarantee that the ESA-95 criteria are met. This is basically the current 
approach. 
As regards the Spanish Railway Law, its current writing seems to suggest that total 
maintenance, operation and railway infrastructure management costs are recovered in 
addition to the levying of part of the capital costs. However, the levels set for the charge 
are clearly below this limit. Probably it should be changed in order to include a mention 
to the availability of subsidies. 
 
3) Horizontal compatibility 
The adoption of the Italian pricing principle to infrastructure charges in Spain, should 
not be in open contradiction with the objectives and resource availability for other rail 
and transport policies. 
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Obviously, its implementation would need a change in the current principles driving the 
setting of track access charges. In fact, the social marginal cost principle prevails on the 
“market conditions” indicated in Art. 73. Moreover, it may enter into conflict with the 
“economic feasibility” and the “financial equilibrium in the rendering of services” if there 
are not alternative funding sources to fill the gap in revenues for the infrastructure 
manager. 
The implementation of the principle may conflict as well with the objectives stated in 
the PEIT for the development of railway services, particularly where additional 
investments will be required on the part of the operators. 
 
4) Multilevel compatibility 
According to the assessment framework proposed, as the object transferred is a pricing 
principle, it would prevail over existing structures and levels and thus would not be 
subject to multilevel incompatibilities. 
 
 
7.8 Synthesis 
The case studies developed in this chapter have applied the conceptual framework 
proposed for the assessment of transferability to six transfer problems involving 
different exporter jurisdictions, aims and objects. Additionally, every case has been 
examined through a set of basic considerations formulated outside of the framework 
proposed, in order to be able to conclude on its ability to reflect them and on its 
robustness with respect to the objective pursued (i.e. the assessment a priori of how 
likely is the transferred object of being successfully implemented in the importer 
jurisdiction). 
The formal approach proposed by the framework has revealed its utility to structure 
the analysis in every case, as well as to normalize the comparison between different 
transfer objects and to ensure the completeness of the information used in the 
preliminary stages of the transfer process. The identification of the elements of the 
transfer obliges the importer jurisdiction to explicitly state the object of the transfer (e.g. 
a charging scheme, a charging scheme together with a calculation procedure, a principle, 
etc.) and the objective sought with it. The definition of the level of analysis requires to 
clarify the dimension of the change wanted with the transfer (strategical, tactical or 
operational). The application of the transferability criteria forces the consideration of 
the relation between the transfer, the context and the charging system already in place. 
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The elements included in the framework have shown their utility for the assessment of 
transferability, with the only exception of the item source of transfer. This element, 
intended to provide information on the preselection criteria applied prior to the 
transferability assessment, is probably more adapted to the problem of selecting an 
object to transfer among those resulting from a preselection and less to the consideration 
of individual cases as those developed in this thesis. As well, the application of the 
framework has evidenced some ambiguity as regards the identification of external 
influences and context conditions. In fact, in some occasions it is not possible to identify 
the effective ability of the importer jurisdiction to modify external influences (e.g. 
national legislation) or the relations between both types of factors (e.g. up to what point 
the regulatory framework is a context condition or the result of external influences?). A 
more precise definition of these elements seems advisable in future developments of the 
framework. 
The levels of analysis proposed by the framework seem appropriate to take into 
account the specificities related to the possible objects of transfer within the field of 
railway infrastructure charging (pricing principles, charging schemes and charging 
practices). The underlying multilevel structure clarifies the boundaries of the transfer 
process and articulates the relation between the object transferred and the current 
charging systems already in place, helping for the identification of impacts derived from 
the transfer and inconsistencies in the final outcome. 
The transferability criteria enounced in the framework have shown their utility at the 
time of detecting possible barriers to the implementation of the transferred object in the 
importer jurisdiction. Although in some cases they have not been able to provide a final 
statement on the transferability of the object (partly because of the preliminary nature 
of the information available at this stage of the transfer process), they act as a screening 
tool able to detect points where further attention should be paid. 
During the development of the case studies, some concerns have arisen as well as regards 
the ability of the framework to incorporate some comprehensive economic concepts, the 
added value of the comparative approach to the contextual variables or the consideration 
of transfer costs. 
The first question has been supported by the evidence that some economic principles 
with great explanatory power with respect to the feasibility of a transfer cannot be 
easily expressed in terms of context factors or external influences. This is the case, for 
instance, of the notion of willingness to pay, essential for establishing the feasibility of a 
transfer aimed at increasing the cost recovery of the charging system. This 
straightforward and unitary economic concept finds a difficult coordination with the 
framework proposed, as it is dependent on a wide number of context factors (intermodal 
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competition in the final market, total volume of demand, expected market trends, cost 
structure of the operating companies, etc.). It is also truth that the evaluation of the 
willingness to pay will require the analysis of the whole number of factors through a 
detailed study, out of the scope of the initial position occupied by the transferability 
assessment in the transfer process flow. In this case, the disaggregated approach offered 
by the framework may be used to rise warnings at an early stage related to particular 
aspects that could be treated with greater detail in more advanced steps of the transfer 
process. 
The second consideration arises from the fact that in order to assess the transferability 
of a given object from the exporter to the importer jurisdiction, it would suffice with the 
characterization of the object and the context of the importer jurisdiction. According to 
this rationale, the criterion indifference to context variations should be converted in 
compatibility with the domestic context. Though this second approach would result in 
lower information requirements, the analysis of the cases has shown the usefulness of 
the comparative approach in relation to a number of aspects. In fact, the comparative 
approach favours a better understanding of the object being transferred (as it allows to 
establish a link between the object and the context conditions in the exporter 
jurisdiction), may simplify the identification of barriers to transferability without 
requiring a detailed analysis (as the contextual differences can be easily detected) and 
maintains the focus on the results achieved in the exporter jurisdiction as benchmark to 
evaluate the success of the transfer process. 
The third consideration arises from the evidence that some transfers may require large 
modifications in the importer jurisdiction in order to ensure the correct implementation 
of the object transferred (e.g. changes in information systems, changes in the national 
legal framework, etc.). The costs resulting from these changes, as well as other costs 
linked to the transfer do not find a specific treatment among the criteria enounced. 
Indeed, it is believed that they should remain outside of the methodology proposed, as 
the information available at this stage would produce inaccurate cost estimations and the 
more costly modifications will be already detected in the form of differential context 
conditions. 
As a concluding remark, it must be noted that the experience obtained through the case 
studies has pointed out some aspects of the framework that could be further refined (e.g. 
the abovementioned considerations), but has not been able to contest in any case its 
ability to establish necessary conditions on the objects transferred. Accordingly, the 
framework proposed for the assessment of transferability remains useful as a screening 
procedure to be applied in the early stages of the transfer process, though it seems 
unable to produce sufficient conditions granting the transferability of a given object (as it 
was expected). 
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Chapter 
8  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Main findings 
The characterization of the charges for the use of railway infrastructure produced in this 
research has shown their sensitiveness to a full array of economic and political factors, 
that intervene in their definition through a complex chain including the objectives set for 
the railway sector, the structure of the infrastructure market (i.e. type of competition, 
separation or ownership adopted), the regulatory regime enforced (i.e. direct, indirect or 
mixed regulation), the price regulation mechanisms (e.g. direct setting, revenue cap, price 
cap, etc.), the pricing objectives and principles (e.g. marginal costs, average costs, etc.), 
the charging structure, the charging levels or their final implementation in the market. 
When observed for the European scenario, the whole of these factors reflects the 
opposed effects of integration and differentiation dynamics, the first ones introduced by 
the legislative efforts of the EU railway reform and the second ones derived from the 
inertia of the national railway systems and the predominance of domestic interests. On 
the one hand, the European law has established the fundamental structure of railway 
infrastructure markets and determined the essential approach to their regulation, through 
the setting of access charges and priority rules at the interface with operators and the 
constitution of regulatory bodies able to supervise their application. It has set as well 
the pricing principles and the basic elements allowed in the charge. On the other hand, 
the inherited technical and operational characteristics of the national rail networks, the 
inertia of the existing institutional arrangements or the ambiguity embedded in the 
common regulations have favoured the customization of the structural and regulatory 
characteristics of railway markets and the implementation of tailored infrastructure 
charges. The result so far is a great dispersion among the price regulation provisions, 
pricing principles, charging structures, and charging levels applied throughout the EU. 
It is in the conflicting relation between harmonization and national specificities that this 
research has detected the lack of comprehensive approaches and found the opportunity 
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to introduce the concept of transferability in the field of rail infrastructure charges. This 
notion is seen as a tool able to guide the search of higher levels of convergence and 
consistency among the pricing policies of several Member States, particularly in 
combination with the best practice approach promoted by the EU. 
As a first step, this research has reviewed the notion of transfer as developed in other 
disciplines, notably in comparative politics and management science. The efforts of 
comparative politics have been focused on the development of the policy transfer 
concept, still open as regards its relation to similar notions (e.g. policy learning, policy 
diffusion, convergence, etc.). The basic conceptual contributions of this literature are 
found in the relation between transfer and policy-making, the consideration of 
rationality and coercion in the transfer process or the analysis of transfer failure. As 
regards the operationalization of the transfer concept, it has developed a multilevel 
approach to transferability, has assumed the absence of comprehensive rationality in the 
process and has defined three basic steps for policy transfer (information, 
evaluation/adaptation and decision /implementation). Management science has produced 
the notion of benchmarking, also subject to debate because of its dynamic nature and 
increasingly extended application. The most valuable inputs provided by this literature 
result from its large operational experience, that has consolidated aspects as the cyclical 
steps of learning and transfer, the specific attention devoted to the monitoring and 
understanding of internal practices, the ordered and formal approach to the comparison 
process or the strong orientation towards a clear objective. 
The presence of the learning and transfer steps in the benchmarking literature and the 
apparent overlapping of concepts such as policy learning, policy transfer and policy 
benchmarking has suggested a link between the two literatures explored. This research 
understands both literatures as different approaches to the same “transfer problem”, 
with the view arising from comparative politics being a top-down approach and the 
view arising from management science being a bottom-up approach. Furthermore it 
proposes to define the relation between the notion of transferability and both literatures 
according to three dimensions: the sphere where the transfer question lies (management 
or policy-making spheres, with the management sphere clearly related to benchmarking); 
the policy definition dimension (referred to the point of the policy-making process where 
the transfer problem has arisen); and the complexity dimension (related to the specific 
complication of the transfer problem). According to these dimensions, the notion of 
transferability should be related to the benchmarking literature in the management sphere 
or when the transfer is located in well defined and lowly complex steps of policy-
making, and to the policy transfer literature otherwise. This view is in harmony with the 
development of the benchmarking concept, eminently practical, which reached the 
policy sphere only after succeeding as a management tool. 
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As a second step, this research has proposed the operationalization of the transfer 
notion through the concepts of transfer problem and transferability. The first has been 
defined as the situation where an entity wants to transfer a policy or practice already 
successfully applied by another entity in another jurisdiction to its own jurisdiction. 
The second has been defined as the condition of being transferable from the exporter 
jurisdiction to the importer jurisdiction, meaning that the transferred policy or practice 
can be successfully implemented in the importer jurisdiction (i.e. it is able to achieve 
there the outcomes that it has already attained in the exporter jurisdiction). Accordingly, 
the assessment of transferability has been conceived as a prospective exercise that tries 
to determine a priori how likely is an imported policy or practice of being successfully 
implemented in the importer jurisdiction. 
In this operationalization, several assumptions have been formulated as regards the 
position of the transferability assessment with respect to the literatures reviewed, the 
transfer process and the policy-making process. As regards its relation to the literature, 
a high degree of complexity has been postulated for the transfer exercise, which entails 
the limitation of the quantitative and defined approach of the benchmarking literature to 
the practice level, with the contribution of the policy transfer literature prevailing at the 
policy and measure levels. As regards its relation to the transfer process, this research 
proposes a five-step sequence (definition, selection, learning, adaptation and action) and 
assumes that the transferability assessment happens at the selection phase. 
Transferability is thus conceived as a necessary condition that must be fulfilled by the 
policies or practices studied in order to continue through the next stages of the transfer 
process. Finally, it is assumed that the relation between transferability assessment and 
the policy-making process takes place through the transfer process, likely to start at any 
point of the policy-making cycle, and particularly at the steps of definition of options 
and implementation. 
As a third step, this research has defined a general framework for the assessment of the 
transferability of policies, measures and practices between different jurisdictions. The 
framework is conceived as a set of elements, levels and criteria. The elements are defined 
as the basic inputs that should be available in order to assess transferability. They are 
six: the jurisdictions and entities involved; the aim of the transfer process; the object 
being transferred; the sources of policy transfer; the external influences acting on the 
importer jurisdiction; and the context conditions prevailing in the importer jurisdiction. 
The levels of analysis are defined with the aim of particularizing the assessment of 
transferability for the different stages of the policy-making process. They are three: the 
strategical level (focused on the transferability assessment of policies and the decision-
making process involved in their definition), the tactical level (focused on the 
transferability assessment of measures) and the operational level (focused on the 
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transferability assessment of practices). The transferability criteria represent necessary 
conditions to be fulfilled by the object being transferred in order to be suitable for 
transfer to the importer jurisdiction. An object should be qualified as transferable to the 
importer jurisdiction if it is able to fulfill the criteria of indifference to context variations 
(i.e. the contextual differences between the importer and the exporter jurisdiction do not 
affect its outcomes), indifference to external influences (i.e. the external influences do not 
prevent its implementation), horizontal compatibility (i.e. it does not enter in conflict 
with other objects located in its same level in the policy-making process) and multilevel 
compatibility (i.e. it does not enter in conflict with other objects located in superior 
levels). 
The particularization of this framework for the specific field of railway infrastructure 
charging has relied on a thorough characterization of this phenomenon according to its 
theoretical and practical dimensions. The comprehensive analysis of the political and 
economic rationales underlying the setting of track access charges has revealed the strong 
interrelation between this activity and other important fields of action (e.g. transport 
regulation, financial and budgetary issues, environmental objectives, etc.) as well as its 
widespread effects on a number of institutions, actors and society at large. Based on this 
evidence, this research proposes the conceptualization of railway infrastructure pricing 
as a political decision. The detailed study of a wide number of national charging 
practices in the EU-27 through the review of a very fragmented number of sources (legal 
frameworks, regulatory decisions, network statements, financial reports, accounting 
standards, etc.) has supported the identification and description of pricing principles, 
charging structures, charging levels and charging practices as they happen in reality. This 
practical experience has been incorporated to the formulation of a decision-making 
process for railway infrastructure pricing policies, able to bring together the basic 
“blocks” found in the theory. 
The interaction between the general transferability framework and the detailed 
characterization of railway infrastructure pricing, has allowed the particularization of its 
elements, levels and criteria. The transfer problem is now referred to entities with 
decision-power about the pricing policies implemented on a given railway infrastructure. 
The type of objects likely to be transferred and the corresponding levels of analysis 
have been identified with the pricing principles (strategical level), the charging schemes 
(tactical level) and the charging practices (operational level). The context conditions 
have been established with respect to categories like geography, transport market, 
railway market, regulation, railway network, operation conditions, financial conditions, 
etc. The external influences have been identified with larger structural processes 
affecting the railway sector (e.g. the Europeanization dynamics embedded in the EU 
railway reform). The transferability criteria have been adapted to the particularities of 
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the context conditions and the external influences, as well as to other pricing principles, 
charging schemes or charging practices already acting on the importer jurisdiction. 
Finally, this particular framework has been tested through the development of six 
different case studies built on the real practice followed by an importer jurisdiction and 
different exporter jurisdictions. To characterize the charging practices in the various 
jurisdictions, the research has gone against two relevant difficulties, the first one related 
to the high dispersion and low availability of the information related to real practice 
followed by the national railway administrations (particularly as regards the incentives 
sought, the rationale behind the segmentation of the demand, the cost calculation and 
allocation procedures, etc.) and the second one derived from the lack of comparability of 
the different national practices. To overcome as much as possible these difficulties, this 
research has dedicated a particular attention to the collection of reliable sources on the 
national practices and has established a valuable basis for the comparison through the 
development of a common and structured approach to the description and analysis 
(both qualitative and quantitative) of the different national charging practices 
The application of the transferability assessment framework proposed to the case 
studies has revealed the utility of its formal approach to organize the analysis of 
transferability, as well as to normalize the comparison between different “transfer 
problems” and to ensure the completeness of the information used in the preliminary 
stages of the transfer process. In fact, the identification of the elements of the transfer 
obliges the importer jurisdiction to explicitly state the object of the transfer and the 
objective sought with it, while the definition of the level of analysis requires clarifying 
the dimension of the change wanted with the transfer (strategical, tactical or 
operational). Furthermore, the application of the transferability criteria forces the 
consideration of the relation between the transfer, the context and the charging system 
already in place. 
The elements included in the framework have shown their utility for the assessment of 
transferability, with the only exception of the item source of transfer, intended to 
provide information on the preselection criteria and probably more adapted to the 
problem of selecting an object to transfer among various than to the consideration of 
individual cases as those developed in this thesis. As well, the application of the 
framework has evidenced some ambiguity as regards the identification of external 
influences and context conditions. Indeed, in some occasions it has not been possible to 
identify the effective ability of the importer jurisdiction to modify external influences or 
the relations between both types of factors. A more precise definition of these elements 
seems advisable in future developments of the framework.  
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The levels of analysis proposed by the framework seem appropriate to take into 
account the specificities related to the possible objects of transfer within the field of 
railway infrastructure charging (pricing principles, charging schemes and charging 
practices). The underlying multilevel structure clarifies the boundaries of the transfer 
process and articulates the relation between the object transferred and the current 
charging systems already in place, making easier the identification of impacts derived 
from the transfer and inconsistencies in the final outcome. The transferability criteria 
enounced in the framework have shown their utility at the time of detecting possible 
barriers to the implementation of the transferred object in the importer jurisdiction. 
Although in some cases they have not been able to provide a final statement on the 
transferability of the object (partly because of the preliminary nature of the information 
available at this stage of the transfer process), they act as a screening tool able to detect 
points where further attention should be paid. 
During the development of the case studies, some concerns have arisen as well as regards 
the ability of the framework to incorporate some comprehensive economic concepts, the 
added value of the comparative approach to the contextual variables or the consideration 
of transfer costs. 
The first question has been supported by the evidence that some economic principles 
with great explanatory power as regards the feasibility of a transfer cannot be easily 
expressed in terms of context factors or external influences. This is the case, for instance, 
of the notion of willingness to pay, essential for establishing the feasibility of a transfer 
aimed at increasing the cost recovery of the charging system. This straightforward and 
unitary economic concept finds a difficult coordination with the framework proposed, 
as it is dependent on a wide number of context factors (intermodal competition in the 
final market, total volume of demand, expected market trends, cost structure of the 
operating companies, etc.). It is also truth that the evaluation of the willingness to pay 
would require the analysis of the whole number of factors through a detailed study, out 
of the scope of the initial position occupied by the transferability assessment in the 
transfer process flow. In this case, the disaggregated approach offered by the framework 
may be used to rise warnings at an early stage related to particular aspects that could be 
treated with greater detail in more advanced steps of the transfer process. 
The second consideration arises from the fact that in order to assess the transferability 
of a given object from the exporter to the importer jurisdiction, it would suffice with the 
characterization of the object and the context of the importer jurisdiction. According to 
this rationale, the criterion indifference to context variations should be converted in 
compatibility with the domestic context. Though this second approach would result in 
lower information requirements, the analysis of the cases has shown the usefulness of 
the comparative approach in relation to a number of aspects. In fact, the comparative 
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approach favours a better understanding of the object being transferred (as it allows to 
establish a link between the object and the context conditions in the exporter 
jurisdiction), may simplify the identification of barriers to transferability without 
requiring a detailed analysis (as the contextual differences can be easily detected) and 
maintains the focus on the results achieved in the exporter jurisdiction as benchmark to 
evaluate the success of the transfer process. 
The third consideration arises from the evidence that some transfers may require large 
modifications in the importer jurisdiction in order to ensure the correct implementation 
of the object transferred (e.g. changes in information systems, changes in the national 
legal framework, etc.). The costs resulting from these changes, as well as other costs 
linked to the transfer do not find a specific treatment among the criteria enounced. 
Indeed, it is believed that they should remain outside of the methodology proposed, as 
the information available at this stage would produce inaccurate cost estimations and the 
more costly modifications will be already detected in the form of differential context 
conditions. 
As a concluding remark, it must be noted that the experience obtained through the case 
studies has pointed out some aspects of the framework that could be further refined (e.g. 
the abovementioned considerations), but has not been able to contest in any case its 
ability to establish necessary conditions on the objects transferred. Accordingly, the 
framework proposed for the assessment of transferability remains useful as a screening 
procedure to be applied in the early stages of the transfer process, though it seems 
unable to produce sufficient conditions granting the transferability of a given object (as it 
was expected). 
 
 
8.2 Future research 
From the theoretical and empirical work done, it has been possible to conclude that the 
proposed framework is sufficiently robust for its implementation in diversified contexts. 
However, some of the assumptions formulated at the time of designing the framework 
and the experience obtained through the case studies have pointed out some aspects that 
could be subject to further research. 
The areas where it has been detected insufficient knowledge, with a particular relevancy 
for the further expansion and improvement of the proposed framework are: 
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• The development of a more precise definition of external influences and context 
conditions, possibly particularized for the different levels of analysis foreseen in 
the framework. 
• The development of a better understanding of the interdependencies arising 
among the transferability criteria and particularly the relations existing between 
context conditions, external influences and the charging systems currently 
implemented in some railway administrations. 
• The improvement of the ability of the proposed framework to incorporate some 
comprehensive economic concepts like the willingness to pay within its formal 
structure. 
• The formal inclusion of dynamic considerations in the framework. Based on 
them, the evaluation of transferability should also try to reflect on the evolution 
of the local policies and contexts or external influences to foresee if the 
limitations to transferability will still be valid at the effective moment of 
implementation. 
• The exploration of possible sufficient conditions related to the aim of the transfer 
and specific to each level of analysis able to guarantee the successful 
implementation of the transferred object in the importer jurisdiction. 
• The development of a more detailed assessment procedure, coordinated with the 
present framework, able to provide relevant inputs to decision-makers during the 
adaptation phase. It should be able to determine whether and how the 
transferability conditions associated to a specific transfer could be improved. 
• The enlargement of the case studies basis used for the conceptual validation of 
the framework proposed. If possible, the validation already done should be 
completed with documented cases of transfer of charging policies or practices 
between railway administrations. 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
§ Paragraph 
ADIF Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias  
 (Spanish Infrastructure Manager) 
AEFP Asociación de Empresas Ferroviarias Privadas 
 (Private Railway Companies Association - Spain) 
AEG Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz  
 (General Railway Law - Germany) 
AGCM Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 
 (Competition Agency - Italy) 
App. Appendix 
APQC American Productivity and Quality Center 
Art. Article 
AT Austria 
ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies 
AZP Agencija za Zeleznice Promet Republike Slovenije 
 (Slovenian Infrastructure Manager) 
B.U. Business unit 
BE Belgium 
BEST Benchmarking European Sustainable Transport (EU thematic network) 
BG Bulgaria 
BGBI Bundesgesetzblatt  
 (German Official Journal) 
BOE Boletín Oficial del Estado  
 (Spanish Oficial Journal) 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CES Consejo Económico y Social 
 (Economic and Social Council - Spain) 
CfIT Commission for Integrated Transport (UK) 
CFL Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Luxemburgeois 
 (Luxembourg Railways) 
CFR Compania Nationala de Cai Ferate 
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 (Romanian Railways) 
CIPE  Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica 
 (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning - Italy) 
CMPS Centre for Management and Policy Studies (UK) 
CP Caminhos de ferro Portugueses 
 (Portuguese Railways) 
CRF Comité de Regulación Ferroviaria 
 (Railway Reguation Committee - Spain) 
CRRD Congested Related Reactionary Delay 
CZ Czech Republic 
D.R. Diário da República 
 (Portuguese Official Journal) 
DB Deutsche Bahn 
 (German Railways) 
DE Germany 
DfT Department for Transport (UK) 
DG Directorate General 
DGF Dirección General de Ferrocarriles 
 (Directorate General for Railways - Spain) 
DGTREN Directorate General for Transport and Energy (EU) 
EC European Commission 
ECMT European Conference of Ministers of Transport 
EGTM Equivalent Grosse Tonne Mile 
EE Estonia 
EES European Employment Strategy 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EIBV Eisenbahninfrastruktur-Benutzungsverordnung 
 (Railway Infrastructure Use Regulation - Germany) 
EICIS European Infrastructure Charging Information System 
EIM European Rail Infrastructure Managers 
EL Greece 
EPIC  Établissement Public Industriel et Commercial 
 (Public Business Entity - France) 
ERA European Railway Agency 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
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ES Spain 
ESA European System of Accounts 
EU European Union 
EU-12 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom 
EU-15 EU-12 + Austria, Finland and Sweden 
EU-25 EU-15 + Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia 
EU-27 EU-25 + Bulgaria and Romania 
EWS English, Welsh and Scottish Railway 
FEVE Ferrocarriles Españoles de Vía Estrecha 
 (Narrow Gauge Spanish Railways) 
FC Full Cost 
FC- Full Cost less State Contribution 
FI Finland 
FR France 
FS Ferrovie dello Stato 
 (Italian Railways) 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIF Gestor de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias 
 (High speed Infrastructure Manager - Spain) 
HLGB High Level Group on Benchmarking (EU) 
HLOS High Level Output Specifications (UK) 
HOV High Occupancy Vehicle 
HSL High speed Line 
HSR High speed Rail 
HU Hungary 
IE Ireland 
IM Infrastructure Manager 
INTF Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferroviário 
 (Portuguese Rail Regulatory Body) 
IT Italy 
IVW Inspectiedie Verkeehr en Waterstraat 
 (Dutch Safety Inspectorate) 
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J.O.R.F. Journal Officiel de la République Française 
 (French Official Journal) 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
LDZ Latvijas Dzelzcelsh State 
 (Latvian Infrastructure Manager) 
LG Lietuvos Gelezinkeliai 
 (Lithuanian Railways) 
LGV Ligne à grande vitesse 
 (High speed Line) 
LRMC Long Run Marginal Cost 
LU Luxembourg 
LV Latvia 
MC Marginal Cost 
MC+ Marginal Cost Plus Mark-ups 
MTO Medium Term Budgetary Objective 
n.d. No date 
n/a Non applicable / Non available 
NL The Netherlands 
NS Nederlandse Spoorwegen 
 (Dutch Railways) 
OBB Austrian Railways 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OMC Open Method of Coordination (EU) 
ORR Office of the Rail Regulator / Office of Rail Regulation (UK) 
OSS One Stop Shop 
p./pp. Page / pages 
Pax-km Passenger-km 
PEIT Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte  
 (Infratructure and Transport Strategic Plan – Spain) 
PL Poland 
PLK Polskie Linie Kolejowe 
 (Polish Infrastructure Manager) 
PSO Public Service Obligation 
PT Portugal 
RAB Regulatory Asset Base 
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RDC Railroad Development Corporation 
Rec. Recital 
REFER Rede Ferroviária Nacional 
 (Portuguese Infrastructure Manager) 
REFIG Red Ferroviaria de Interés General 
 General Interest Railway Network (Spain) 
RENFE Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles  
 (Spanish Infrastructure Manager) 
RFF Réseau Ferré de France  
 (French Infrastructure Manager) 
RFI Rete Ferroviaria Italiana 
 (Italian Infrastructure Manager) 
RHK Rahatallintokeskus 
 (Finnish Infrastructure Manager) 
RNE RailNetEurope 
RPI Retail Price Index 
ROR Rate of Return Regulation 
ROSCO Rolling stock leasing company 
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board 
RU Railway Undertaking 
SE Sweden 
SEITT Sociedad Estatal de Infraestructuras del Transporte Terrestre 
 (National Agency for Land Transport Infrastructure - Spain) 
SI Slovenia 
SJ Statens Järnvägar 
 (Swedish Railways) 
SK Slovakia 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer 
 (French Railways) 
SPI Strategic Planning Institute 
SRA Strategic Rail Authority 
SRMC Short Run Marginal Cost 
SZDC Správa železniční dopravní cesty 
 (Czech Infrastructure Manager) 
TEN-T Trans European Transport Network 
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TEU Transport Equivalent Unit 
TQM Total Quality Management 
TOC Train Operating Company 
Ton-km Tonne-Kilometre 
TSI Technical Specifications for Interoperability 
UIC International Union of Railways 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
US United States of America 
WTP Willingness to pay 
ZSR Zeleznice Sloveskej Republiky 
 (Slovak Infrastructure Manager) 
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